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A SERIES OF THEOLOGICAL PAPERS CHIEFLY SELECTED FROM THE PERIODICAL AND OTHER LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND HOLLAND.

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RECENT GERMAN DISCUSSIONS ON THE ATONEMENT.*

In these days, when so many students of theology are, year by year, in increasing numbers, flocking to the universities of Germany, and studying the productions of its fertile thinkers, the University of Erlangen is one that has become, of late, a very favorite resort for this purpose. Many reasons might be assigned for this. For one thing, the place possesses no small attractions of an external kind. A quiet country town of Northern Bavaria, it lies amid pleasant and picturesque scenery, just where the last spurs and outlines of the Bohemian mountains sink in gentle fir-clad undulations to the plain; where the sluggish Regnitz flows northward to swell the upper waters of the Main; and is not far from the romantic tract of country which is somewhat extravagantly dignified by the name of Franconian Switzerland, nor from the grander scenery of the Fichtelgebirge. Nor is the surrounding country destitute of historic associations of great interest. The grand old imperial free city of Nuremberg, with its two cathedrals, its quaint old houses, and its moated walls and towers—seeming like a fragment of the middle ages preserved intact to our day, to remind one vividly of the days when Gustavus Adolphus held the city against the hosts of Wallenstein, or when Luther preached and Albert Dürer painted within its walls—is within easy reach of Erlangen; while the episcopal city of Bamberg and the princely residence of Baireuth are not much further off. Altogether, in outward respects, Erlangen is a place where a summer may be very pleasantly spent, and where the aspects of German life, in town and country, may be observed free from the disturbing influence of tourists and travelers. And then, too, in its university, it possesses attractions of a high order for the theologian. It may be said to be the head-quarters of the modern Lutheran orthodoxy. The theological faculty, though not very large numerically, can boast of several men both able and eminent in their respective branches. Among these are Delitzsch, one of the greatest Hebraists of the present day, and well known as the author of excellent comment-

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*From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1865.

aries on various parts of the Old and New Testaments; Thomasius, one of the best modern systematic divines in the Lutheran Church; Herzog, the accomplished editor of the valuable theological encyclopedia known by his name, and Hofmann, who is, perhaps, the most original, acute, and profound thinker of them all. His most important contribution to theology, as yet, is the *Schriftbeweis*, or "Scriptural Proof," as he calls it, which, though modestly designated on the title-page only "a theological essay," extends to the formidable size of three thick, closely-printed octavo volumes, and is virtually a complete system of theology. This is, we say, his most important work as yet, for he is at present engaged in another on the Scriptures of the New Testament, which bids fair, if completed on the scale on which it is begun, to attain at least an equal extent and importance. The former work, however, possesses an interest for the student, not only as containing the views taken of the entire body of Divine truth by an earnest and highly-gifted mind, but, also, because it has given rise to a large amount of discussion in Germany on the fundamental article of the Christian faith—the doctrine of the Atonement. We intend here to attempt a sketch of the controversy on this great doctrine that has been carried on in Germany in connection with Hofmann's views, as set forth in the *Schriftbeweis*, in the hope that it may prove both interesting and instructive to call attention to some of the recent aspects that have been assumed on the Continent by this great question, so much canvassed in some quarters in our own country.

Now, in the outset of such a sketch, it is of no small importance, for the right understanding of the controversy in question, to see with some clearness its position in the general movement or current of thought—to have a general view of the lay of the country, as it were, before we descend to a more particular survey. The whole history of religious discussion may be regarded as one long warfare, or campaign, in which truth and falsehood are the great opposing powers. The scene is, at the first glance, confused enough. There seems to be an endless variety of combatants, arrayed under different standards, or under none at all—some moving in one direction and some in another; some wavering and halting between the two sides; some falling away suddenly from one or another, others gradually and unconsciously moving off from those with whom they formerly stood, one band

meeting another, with varying success, at point or positions of more or less importance and value for either side. Here we see an obstinate struggle for a position of very small importance, and there the key of the whole country may be lightly given up with little thought of its value. To understand aright the meaning and bearing of any one of these conflicts, it were well, if possible, to discover their place in the general plan of the campaign. What, then, let us ask, is the position of Hofmann and his system in the general map or chart of theological opinion, and in what direction are he and his opponents respectively moving?

It is well known to all, who are at all acquainted with the present state of theology in Germany, that whereas at one time Rationalism, with few exceptions, almost universally prevailed, now this enemy of the truth has been, to a very large extent, overcome; and the general teaching—leaving out of view Strauss and the Tübingen school, with a few other yet remaining adherents of the old Rationalism—is evangelical and orthodox. This is undoubtedly true; but while the modern teachers of theology are certainly orthodox, as compared with the preceding Rationalism, we must further recognize the fact that they are not all equally so, as compared with one another, or with the standard that would be applied by the great body of Evangelical Christians in this country. We may distinguish among them two, or perhaps three, general types of character. One of these may be regarded as the successor of Schleiermacher—not, indeed, as occupying his position or maintaining his views, but as having advanced from the start made by him, and in the line in which he showed the way to a much more evangelical position than he ever attained; for the great merit and historical importance of Schleiermacher seems to us to have lain in this, that he was instrumental in first turning the tide of battle and giving it an impulse in an evangelical direction. His own system contained many rationalistic and mystic elements, and, judged of by an abstract standard, would be reckoned heterodox enough; and so, too, that school of theology which we may call generally, and in the mass, that of his followers is characterized by some laxity and boldness of speculation; but it is now of a much more sound and evangelical character than Schleiermacher's own, and, whatever may be its defects, the barometer is, so to speak, rising, not falling; and it seems to be advancing to a better and healthier

faith than ever, having learned, in the conflict with Rationalism, to hate and avoid that cold, hard dogmatism which in Germany was the immediate precursor of the reign of Rationalism. This school comprises such names as Neander, Ullmann, Tholuck, Nitzsch, Dorner, etc., but it is, of course, from its nature, more of a general tendency than of any special set of opinions that holds such men together.

With another party, again, the reaction against Rationalism has been much more complete and rapid, and has led to a revival of the original Lutheran system, as elaborated by the divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The theologians of this class take their stand on the symbolical books of the Reformation, and give to them an authority which almost verges on the supremacy of Scripture; and in doctrine, judged by our standard, they err as much by excess as the other school err by defect, holding baptismal regeneration, consubstantiation, and all the extreme views of Luther on the authority of the Church and its ministers. This school may be represented by such men as Hengstenberg, Keil, Kurtz, Thomasius, and others—men whom we can not but hold in high esteem for their eminent services on behalf of the truth, but in whom there is much of a confessional, a ritual, in a word, a High Church spirit, with which we can not sympathize. The true ideal of a revived orthodoxy would lie between the two extremes, relying less on speculation than the former, and less on Church authority than the latter, and more simply and exclusively on Scripture, thoroughly and exactly understood, than either. Such we may see exemplified in such men as Schmid and Beck, of Tübingen, and may, perhaps, be regarded as a third form of theological thought besides the other two.

Now, the first of these schools, if we may so call them, stands, it will be evident, in the most close and vital connection with the general current of thought of the present age. It is quite in harmony with it, and can easily adopt its garb and form so as to be at once intelligible and acceptable to it. But it is otherwise with the Lutheranism of the other school. It has been attained by a violent reaction, and must, almost of necessity, take the form of opposition, and protest against all the current modes of thought and speculation. Not only Rationalism, but every other form of doctrine that falls short of the Augsburg Confession, are

regarded simply as enemies; and there seems to be something forced or artificial in such a position, and little room for sympathy with the prevailing tendencies of the age. But the attractive power of current modes of thought is continually acting on a party resisting or standing aloof. The influence of the impulse imparted to theology by Schleiermacher is felt even by the extreme party, and is, now and then, drawing some from it toward itself. The new Lutheran school have felt this even where they are strongest. Baumgarten has been influenced by it; and in Erlangen, which is one of the great strongholds of Lutheranism, Hofmann, whose speculations seem to be due to the same kind of influence, has become involved in a controversy with the most eminent men of his own school.

This, which is but a very rough and general outline of the various theological schools on the Continent, may convey a substantially correct idea of the position and movement of Hofmann's theology, and of the nature of the discussions to which it has given rise. It would seem to be due very much to the influence of that mode of thought and theological atmosphere, if we may so say, that has prevailed in Germany since the time of Schleiermacher, and to be a movement, at least, in that direction. Hence, the more severe among his critics have not scrupled to regard his system as essentially rationalistic. He has been called, as he says, to answer charges that his doctrine on the Atonement and Justification is "Romish, Osiandrian, Socinian, mystical, rationalistic, and Schleiermacherian;" and Philippi, referring to the downfall of Schleiermacher's system, and presaging a like fate for Hofmann's nearly related one, has quoted the words in Acts v, 9: "Behold the feet of them that have buried thy husband are at thy door, and shall carry thee out." Such statements are, doubtless, exaggerated, or, at least, rest on the controversial practice, too commonly employed, of holding a man responsible for all the consequences that may be drawn from his statements. Still, they indicate, as it were, the line on which the opinions in question move, while more exact inquiry must determine the precise point on the line, whether nearer or further from the center of truth at which the respective parties stand.

It was quite natural that a work containing such a system, and coming from one of the orthodox school of revived Lutheranism, should excite much attention, and raise much opposition

among the adherents of that party. The works named at the head of this article are but a few out of a very large number that have been written on this controversy, some bearing more generally on Hofmann's method and system as a whole, and others more especially on his doctrine of the Atonement, which is both in itself the most important and the chief point in which he has deviated from the current orthodoxy. Hofmann himself does not admit that he has departed essentially from the standards of the Lutheran Church. He is still a true son of that Church, and while admitting that the form in which he has put his theology is a new one, and different from that of the common orthodoxy, he maintains that he retains all that is essential in the old doctrine, and that he has but given a better and more Scriptural form to the substance of what is put in language which he rejects in the symbolical books. He entitles his reply to his accusers, "Defense of a new way of teaching the old truth," and employs, as a motto, these words of Bengel: "*Adhuc non ea Scripturæ viguit experientia et intelligentia in ecclesia, quæ in ipsa Scriptura offertur.*" As Hofmann has been both assailed and defended by men of the Lutheran school, the controversy has turned, more than is common in Germany, on the consistency of his doctrines with the standards of the Church, and has brought out, incidentally, much interesting materials in the testimony of the German Reformers on the subject of the Atonement. In defending his orthodoxy, Hofmann takes his stand on the principle that no symbolical books can be regarded as authoritative on questions which were not before their authors, and intended to be decided by them; and contends that, as the question of the mode of the Atonement had never been discussed in the Church before the Reformation, the Lutheran Confessions can only be held binding in their statements of the fact, and not in their explanations of the manner of the Atonement. The principle itself is a true and most important one; for it is the only one on which symbolical books can be at once honestly and intelligently subscribed; and, in general, we think Hofmann's views of the position and authority of Church standards much more satisfactory than those of his opponents who seem often to lay too much stress on an appeal to human standards, as compared with an appeal to the Word of God. Such standards can but at best ground an *argumentum ad hominem;* Scripture alone can furnish a proof absolutely con-

clusive and decisive. Whether or not Hofmann does not press a true principle too far, in defending his own variations by it, is, of course, another question; and here, we think, he is decidedly in the wrong. Besides others outside, all Hofmann's colleagues at Erlangen, with the exception of Herzog, who belongs to the Reformed, not to the Lutheran Church, have expressed their opinion in this controversy. Professor Schmid has appeared in his defense; Thomasius has published a pamphlet against him, to which Harnack, another of the professors, has appended a postscript; and the discussions on this subject have furnished the occasion of Delitzsch's valuable "Commentary on the Hebrews," in an appendix to which he has entered into the question at issue.

But, without entering into further details of the controversy, let us come now to an account of what Hofmann's views on the Atonement really are, premising, first, a few words on the general character and method of the system developed in the *Schriftbeweis;* for his method is somewhat peculiar, and has been made the object of attack no less than the special contents of his system. In it, too, we may observe that the influence of the Schleiermacher school has been, whether consciously or not, at work. The grand characteristic of Schleiermacher's method is, that he develops his system from the religious consciousness, instead of taking it directly from Scripture. The feeling of absolute dependence is, with him, the foundation of all religion, and on this foundation he constructs his entire system of theology. Hofmann's method is so far similar, that he regards the proper business of the theologian to be the analysis and development of the Christianity that exists in himself as a Christian; and theology consists in the scientific expression of that which makes a man a Christian: "I, the Christian, am to me, the theologian, the most proper object of my science." His method differs from Schleiermacher's in postulating as the foundation of his system, not a mere feeling, but a fact; namely, the believer's fellowship with God in Jesus Christ. And, besides, his theology is not merely subjective; for, when he has completed the analysis and development of this primary fact, and expanded it into a system, he admits the necessity of testing the result by an appeal to Scripture, and if, in any particular, his system should be found to be contradicted or unsupported by Scripture, he allows that there must have been some error in the process, and that it must

be corrected and remodeled to be brought into accordance with Scripture. He uses Scripture as a test, and he brings the theory he has constructed to that test in the most conscientious and painstaking way. We do not intend to enter into the merits or defects of this method of Hofmann's, as that would lead us too far away from our present purpose. The reader will find a criticism upon it in an article by Professor Dieckhoff, which was translated in a former number of this *Review*, No. xxxvii, July, 1861. We do not regard this article as altogether fair to Hofmann's system; but, still, as the criticism of an adversary, it will give a pretty correct notion of its general character.

We refer to this matter, just now, chiefly to explain the somewhat peculiar plan and title of the book in which Hofmann's system is contained. The title, "*Der Schriftbeweis*"—the Scriptural Proof—describes very exactly its contents, for nearly the whole of it is occupied in bringing the theological system of the author to the test of Scripture, and establishing its consistency with its teaching. After some preliminary observations, he proceeds at once to give a complete statement of his system, which, being a mere statement, without explanation or defense, occupies comparatively few pages; and then he addresses himself to his main task of comparing each of its parts in detail with the teaching of Scripture. The nature of his plan does, we think, lead him to occupy a somewhat false position in relation to Scripture, as if his task were merely to show that Scripture contains nothing inconsistent with his system, instead of positively educing it from Scripture, and thus he is more liable than a different method would have made him, to the temptation of employing a forced exegesis to make Scripture speak in accordance with what he has previously arrived at as the result of his thinking. But, with this drawback, it must be admitted that his work is an admirable specimen of the mode of employing the Bible as the test and proof of a doctrinal system. It is favorably distinguished from some modern English productions of similar views to his on the Atonement, by the fullness and thoroughness with which he enters into the Scriptural evidence on the subject. He does not deal, as is too often the case, in mere vague and misty generalities, or merely content himself with adducing a few isolated texts as passages. He takes into view the whole teaching of the Bible in all its parts, as one grand consistent whole, and he examines, with

the utmost critical and exegetical minuteness, every passage that at all bears on the point that may be considered. Thus, for instance, in discussing the question of the Atonement, which occupies the greater part of the second volume, he enters into a complete discussion of the sacrificial system of the Old Testament, then takes up the Messianic Psalms and the prophecies in Isaiah liii, and then, passing to the New Testament, he subjects to a thorough criticism every passage, first in the Gospels, and then in the Epistles, that refers in any way to the death of Christ. His expositions are invariably very instructive and suggestive, though not always quite trustworthy, as he is apt to be led away by his own extreme acuteness and ingenuity; and sometimes his explanation of a passage that seems to tell against his theory, looks very much like explaining it away.

But we must attempt now to give a statement, as exact and distinct as possible, of what Hofmann's theory on the subject of the Atonement actually is, after which we shall have some remarks to make on its excellencies and defects. Now, in order to understand aright any theory on this subject, especially when it forms a part of so consistent a system of theology as that of Hofmann, we are thrown back on the consideration of a previous subject, the views entertained on the natural state of man as fallen, from which he is redeemed by the death of Christ. For the whole scheme of salvation, of which the Atonement forms the center and heart, is a remedial scheme, and as such it has a proportion and correspondence to the disease for which the remedy is provided. According to the nature of the disease, is the nature of the remedy, and according to what men's ideas are of the nature of the disease, will be, for the most part, their opinions of the nature of the remedy. This is a well-known principle, and the truth of it is illustrated not only in the evangelical scheme of doctrine, but in all the more complete and consistent systems, more or less erroneous, that have been opposed to it. And it is the more important to act on this principle in judging of such a system as Hofmann's, for otherwise we are very apt to be perplexed and misled by his peculiar terminology, which is quite different from the ordinary theological language, so much so that it is sometimes hard to recognize the old familiar doctrines in the garb in which we meet them in his writings. Let us, then, first advert to Hofmann's views on the Fall and its con-

sequences. As to the constitution of man in general, in every state, whether unfallen, fallen, or redeemed, he considers him as a being to be viewed in two distinct aspects, which he distinguishes by the names "nature" and "person" respectively. In the former aspect, man is viewed simply as an organized creature, forming part of the chain or system of created existence in the world, being the head and culmination of it, indeed, but still, after all, himself an integral part of it—an animal among animals, though the highest and noblest of all. Viewed in this aspect, man is called a *nature*, and this side of his existence is called his nature-life (*Naturleben*). But this is not the only aspect of humanity. Man is also a person—is a free, self-conscious *Ego*, and, as such, may stand in a personal relation to God, and have personal intercourse with him. In this aspect he is called a person, and when we speak of this person-life (*Personleben*), this distinction is, as Hofmann employs it, not so much a division of human nature into two parts, as a distinction of two relations in which man stands—to the lower creation, on the one hand, and to God on the other—and he uses it to bring out what is meant by man's original state, as created in the image of God. It is in the latter aspect, according to him, that man is the image of God, and this Divine image consists not in a moral quality, but in a moral relation in which he stands to God. Man's relation as a person to God is the image (Abbild) of the relation in the Godhead between the Father and the Son, and this is what is meant when it is said that man is the image of God. And in virtue of this relation to God, in which he was originally created, man stood in a relation to the world different from all other creatures, having lordship over it. This dominion over the creatures is not itself the image of God, but it is the consequence of it. The probation of man was made to have reference to this relation to the creatures, inasmuch as a limit was set to his dominion, by the removal of which it might seem to him that it would be enlarged. His duty would have consisted in such an attitude and conduct as would correspond to his relation to God, and to the relation in which God had willed him to stand to the world. In imposing a condition upon him, God dealt with man, not merely as a nature, but as a person, speaking to him as one person to another. And his continued enjoyment of the relation in which he stood to God depended on his own personal conduct. He could and ought to have made the

relation (*Verhältniss*) to God in which he had been created in his own personal attitude (*Verhalten*); and, had he done so, he would have continued in his original state.

This, however, he did not do; for he was tempted by Satan, who acted on his nature-life, and through that influenced his personal conduct in a way that ran counter to the relation in which and for which God had created him. The Fall thus consisted in man allowing himself to be determined to a will and an act contradicting the Divine appointment of his relation to the world. From this there followed two consequences, extending to all the descendants of Adam. On the one hand, man exchanged, as far as in him lay, the relation to God in which he had been placed by creation, for one of dependence on the Evil Spirit by whom he had been led into sin. And as, in the first temptation, it was by the nature-side of his being that Satan acted on man, so still the power he has over fallen man is exerted primarily on this nature-life, but extends through it also to his person. And, on the other hand, by the Fall man became, instead of an object of God's love, an object of his wrath. The wrath of God is very distinctly and emphatically recognized in Hofmann's system; it is defined to be "the hostile aspect of the Creator asserting himself against the creature denying him," and it is held to be the cause of all the suffering that exists in the world. Such, then, is the natural state of mankind in consequence of the Fall. It has in it these two elements—bondage to Satan on the one hand, and exposure to the wrath of God on the other. Of these two consequences of the Fall, the former is viewed by Hofmann as the consequence of the latter; or rather, as he expresses it more exactly, the two are but descriptions of one and the same fact, viewed on its two different sides. For, he says, as Satan's acting, though designed to be against God, yet always serves to fulfill the will of God, so it was also the will of God that Satan should exercise that destructive power over man's corporeal nature. Death is the comprehensive name for all the consequences of sin, all that excludes from fellowship with God; and while, on the one hand, Satan is described as *ὁ τὸ κράτος ἔχων τοῦ θανάτου*; yet on the other hand, Moses says, "We are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled." The twofold consequence of the Fall is then just the twofold aspect of man as a nature and as a person.

But, notwithstanding these consequences of the Fall, there is still a possibility of restoration for man. For while God's attitude toward man as fallen is indeed one of wrath, as above explained; yet it is also one of love. The love that God bears to man, even sinful and fallen, is manifested especially in two things, corresponding again to the two sides of humanity, nature, and person. One is that though he let men fall into bondage to Satan, yet he allowed his spirit to remain in them as the ground of their life; and the other is that although they were now objects of his wrath, yet he allowed them still to bear the image of God. This twofold attitude of God to fallen and sinful men—on the one hand, one of wrath; and, on the other hand, one of love—makes a restoration possible. Still it does not of itself effect that restoration; for itself remaining ever the same, it leaves men in the state they are in, in consequence of sin. For their actual restoration something more is needed; and that is an acting (*Selbstbethätigung*) of God, which shall overcome the working of the Evil One, and shall determine man (acting on his personality through his nature) to assume an attitude toward God corresponding to the now existing relation of God to mankind. This attitude of man toward God consists in a penitent acknowledgment of guilt and desert of punishment, but, at the same time, a reliance on the gracious will of God, which allows mankind to remain for restoration and perfection. And the act of God that determines man to such an attitude is no other than a testimony of God of himself, which man only requires to allow to produce its proper effect on him, in order to be determined to such an attitude toward God.

Here it might seem that Hofmann's system coincides with that of the Broad Church divines in this country, in making redemption entirely subjective, the work of Christ a mere declaration and exhibition of the love of God, by which men are to be attracted, melted, moved from a state of enmity to one of reconciliation and friendship to God. But this is not really so. There is far more in Hofmann's system than in such views of the atonement as these. As he holds very clearly and emphatically that man is the object of the wrath of God because of sin, so he maintains that something more was needed for his restoration than simply a manifestation of God's love. There is a contradiction that must be solved between the love of God

and the sin of man that draws down his anger; and the solution of this contradiction is the work of Christ. When he speaks of the restoration of man being effected by an act of God testifying of himself, and thereby working in man such an attitude toward God as becomes him, he regards the restoration thus effected as, so to speak, but a provisional and typical one. And as long as these two acts—the act of God, which accomplishes the restoration, and the act of man, by which he does so—remain distinct, the restoration effected can only be typical and provisional; it is only when they converge, as it were, and meet in one, so as to be no longer distinct, but one and the same act, that the real and final restoration is effected. And this convergence of the two is only found in Christ the Mediator, not of a typical, but of a real and perfect, reconciliation between man and God.

This brings us at length to the person and work of Christ. In all mere men, as they are from their birth under the consequences of sin, their bondage to the Evil One is antecedent to God's testimony to them, and therefore *a fortiori* antecedent to their being determined by that testimony of God. Hence their bondage to the Evil One can not be entirely removed, but only interrupted, by their being thus determined by the testimony of God. And therefore the self-determination of Jesus, by which the bondage of men to Satan is destroyed, in order to be effectual for that end, must have preceded the beginning of his human life. He must have willed to accomplish the work of redemption before he was born in the world; and he must have willed to become flesh in order to the accomplishment of that work. And, as he was a Divine person before he became man, he did so no otherwise than as he willed. And he willed to assume human nature as a suitable means for the exercise of his personal fellowship with God, but an exercise of it under the conditions to which human nature is subjected by the Creation and the Fall. Thus he entered into fellowship with man; and in that fellowship he still maintained and exercised his fellowship with God, even under all the consequences that the Fall has brought on man. Hofmann, speaking of the relation of Christ to other men, says: "He was like them, and he was not. Because he was, he was circumcised, and allowed himself to be baptized. Because he was not, he received at his circumcision

the name with which before his conception the angel had designated him as the Savior of his people; and at his baptism the voice from heaven gave him the testimony that he is the Son of God, for whom the Baptist prepared his people. Flesh and blood is unsuitable to the kingdom of God; and human nature, as by sin, so too by the consequences of sin, is estranged from God. Therefore must the Savior and Son of God, who assumed this human nature, though he partook not of its sin, but only of the consequences of its sin, live a life in which he was subjected to all the conditions which exist for mankind in general, and for Israel in especial, in consequence of sin. Moreover, he assumed this human nature, this flesh and blood, because he would make the sin and the sinfulness of those into fellowship with whom he entered his own, not indeed so that it was in any way his attitude (*Verhalten*), but yet so that his relation to God, and therefore also God's attitude to him, was determined by it." (*Schriftbeweis*, Vol. II., p. 35.)

Having thus spoken of the person of Christ, and of the state into which he had entered by becoming man, the doctrine of Hofmann on the work which he performed in that state is comprehended in these three points: 1st—How he maintained his relationship as a Son to the Father in the righteousness of his life; 2d—What was done that the world might recognize in this relationship the restoring and perfecting of the relation between God and mankind; and 3d—What issue his life had, since the world would not be moved by the testimony of the Father and of Jesus himself to faith in him, but rather by the ungodly working of the Evil One to unbelieving enmity against Him. The first of these points comprises Hofmann's doctrine on the obedience or righteousness of Christ. That consisted, according to him, in the maintaining and exercising of his fellowship with God, and that under the conditions that sin has imposed on mankind. And this he views as extending over the whole course of his life on earth, from first to last, including his sufferings as well as his actions. He says (Vol. II, p. 126–7): "He belonged entirely to his people; in holy love manifesting and witnessing of himself to those who desired him, in holy zeal resisting those who blasphemed him and his calling. But his zeal must eat him up. His end must be the result of hatred against the truth of God: this belonged as much to the righteousness of

his death, as the calling to bear witness of the truth to the righteousness of his life. Then the exercise of his holy fellowship with God became a free conscious resigning of himself under that catastrophe. In prayer he withstood the temptation of his approaching suffering; in prayer he endured the suffering itself till he said, 'Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit;' and, dying, passed from a holy state of life to a holy state of death." A second part of the work of Christ consisted in a proclamation to the world of this relation into which he had entered to mankind on the one hand, and to the Father on the other—a proclamation of this as the restoration and perfection of man's relation to God, and a demand of faith in this, on their part, as the condition of their sharing in it. This proclamation consists in the Father's testimony to the Son, as well as the Son's testimony to himself; and this includes more than is usually comprehended in the article on the prophetic office of Christ. But a mere testimony, though it be the highest and completest possible, will not suffice to deliver man from sin and the power of Satan. Under the influence of these, the people refused to believe in Jesus, resisted and rejected him, and hence the only issue his history could take was that which it did take in his death. And thus we come to the third and most important point in regard to the work of Christ—the nature and result of his death. And here, for the sake of accuracy, we shall translate the very words of Hofmann's system (Vol. I., p. 47–8): "After now the opposition between the Father and the Son, which had come in with the incarnation of Jesus, and the fellowship of the Son with sinful humanity, in virtue of which he underwent all the consequences of sin, had been developed so far that the Father allowed to come upon the Son, and he upon himself, through the hatred to God of the Evil One working in the unrighteous, the utmost that can come upon sinful man on the side of his nature by the wrath of God; then, in the personal fellowship of love between the Father and Jesus, preserved under all the consequences of sin, the contradiction between God's eternal will of love and the sin of man that called down his wrath was solved; because there was now established a relation between God and mankind, for which the guilt of sin and the wrath of God no more existed, and which was delivered from all the power of the Evil One, since it had its origin no more in the sin of the human race, but in the right-

eousness of the Son of God, maintained to the end within sinful humanity, and under the consequences of its sin."

In a word, the Atonement, according to Hofmann, consisted in the endurance by the Son of God, in our nature and for our benefit, of the utmost that sin and Satan could do against him, and the preservation of a perfect holy fellowship with God under all the consequences of sin. And when we bear in mind that, in Hofmann's system, the power of Satan over man is a consequence of sin and an expression of God's wrath against it, this doctrine, when expressed in plain and ordinary language, does not seem to deviate so very far from the doctrine of the Confessions; and perhaps the chief points of difference might appear to be that he denies that Christ suffered the punishment of sin, and that he suffered in our stead, admitting only that he suffered for our benefit. No doubt these are most important points, and we shall return in the sequel to consider how far Hofmann denies them; but meanwhile, that we may deal quite fairly with this system, let us endeavor to point out its chief excellencies. For we do not care to deny that there are in this system, wrong as we believe it to be in one essential point, several excellencies, and these of a very high order.

And here we would note, first, the thoroughly historical character of Hofmann's theology. It will appear, even from the rapid sketch we have given of the main points in his system, that it is entirely cast in the mold of history. It does not take the form of a system of abstract speculative truths, connected logically with one another; but is rather a statement and elucidation, in historical order and connection, of the great events in the history of mankind, such as the Fall, the first promise, the separation of a peculiar people, the great events in the history of that people, the incarnation, the work and death of Christ. Thus he deviates from the customary mode of treating the doctrine of redemption in speaking, not so much of the person of Christ, a doctrine, as of his incarnation, a historical fact; by treating, first, of what he has done and now does, on the one hand, and then, of what he has been and now is, on the other. This historical spirit we can not help thinking to be more in accordance with Scripture than any other; for what is the whole of the Bible but just a history of God's dealings with man? And it has also a great advantage in giving theology less of the air of a dry abstract

system, and more that of an actual living reality. And we observe, too, in his exposition of Scripture, the same historical spirit distinguishes him, and he always takes a wide and comprehensive view of Scripture as a whole, and views every individual passage in the light of the place it occupies in the entire course of Scripture, and the special end it was intended to serve.

Again, closely connected with this is another admirable characteristic of Hofmann's theology—the prominence given in it to the person of Christ. This also is very conspicuous in it. The person of the Savior is the center and heart of the entire system. It presents to our view the Son of God entering into our human nature, under all the disadvantages and evils that the fall and sin had brought upon it; and, notwithstanding them all, living a perfectly holy life of communion with the Father, bearing witness to the truth in an evil world, enduring the contradiction of sinners against himself, and finally on the cross suffering all that sin and Satan could do against him; maintaining through it all his holy communion with God, and thus in his person founding a new relation of man to God, in which sin and Satan are overcome and destroyed. Thus his system falls in, in this respect, with the prevailing tendency of theology at the present day, to make the living person of the Savior, and not the abstract work or plan of salvation, the center round which every thing else in theology is grouped. This inclination, to give a more prominent and commanding position in religious thought and theological systems to the person of Christ than has been done in some past ages of the Church's history, has often been noted as one of the best and most hopeful characteristics of the tone and mode of thought of the present day; and, though we often find it in alliance with forms of doctrine that are defective and dangerous, we doubt not that, if fully and fairly carried out, it will lead the mind of the age in the right direction. This personal element is, indeed, so often most strongly insisted on by those whose views of doctrine are unsound, that we are apt to regard it as somehow peculiarly congenial to such views, and to have a lurking feeling or fear, that in order to give to the person of the Savior that prominent place in theology it ought of right to have, we must make concessions to those laxer views, and give up something of the fullness and completeness of the

orthodox evangelical creed. But, in reality, so far is this from being so, that the very opposite is the case. It is not necessary to give up one iota of the great doctrine of the Reformed Confessions, in order to give the very fullest and most prominent exhibition of the person of Christ; and so far from that element being peculiarly congenial to a Socinianizing or even Arminianizing theology, there is no form of doctriue that so thoroughly and entirely adapts itself to the recognition of the personal element as the Calvanistic doctrine of a real, particular, efficacious Atonement. For our apprehension of the person of Christ as a living reality depends, to a large extent, on our apprehension of the work he does. If redemption be nothing more than the exhibition of the person of Christ as an example of holiness and patience, or a manifestation of the love of God, Christ becomes to us very little more than a mere phantom; if we are to recognize him as a real person, we must recognize him as having a real work to do. To take the person of Christ apart from his work, is the very way to run into the most cold, hard, and unscriptural theology possible; as witness the endless subtilties of the Nestorian, Eutychian, and Monotheletic controversies in the Eastern Church; the only way to preserve a real living faith in Christ as a person, is to regard him as having done and still doing a real work. If it be only as an example, or as an evidence of God's love, that his life and death are presented to us, an air of unreality to our mind comes over them. An example, if that were all, might be conveyed almost as well by a fictitious or imaginary as by a real life; and a manifestation of God's character and will toward us might rather suggest the idea of an impressive spectacle or pageant; it is only when we keep hold of the belief of a real earnest work to be done, that we can apprehend Christ as a real, living, personal Savior. And, moreover, it is not enough that we conceive of Christ as a person; what is needed to save our religion and our theology from being a mere set of dry doctrines is, that we have some interest in the Savior and he in us. And nowhere can we find that personal relation of the sinner to a personal Savior so fully acknowledged as in the theology which regards his work, not as a mere general making salvation possible, but actually saving those who are perishing in sin; so that each believer may say, with Paul, for himself, "He loved me, and

gave himself for me." This is the only kind of theology that really recognizes to the full the personal element.

Hence there is no system of theology that so fully brings out and adapts itself to the personal element as the theology of the Covenants. And we think that this mode of viewing theology, though unhappily it has become somewhat obsolete, owing perhaps to its having been carried to an excessive minuteness of detail by some of its expounders, is admirably fitted to meet the modern state of the question, and the modes of viewing the Atonement now prevalent. It is a prevailing habit to regard Christ as the root or head of humanity, and constituting in his person, rather than by his work, the reconciliation and reuniting of man to God. And the common doctrine of substitution and imputation men are apt to stumble at, as presenting a hard, legal, technical, and therefore a repulsive aspect. Now, the federal theology affords a practical proof that the ideas on which such men lay so much stress are by no means peculiar to them, or inconsistent with the orthodox doctrine of the Atonement. We are disposed to give the Broad Church divines all credit for the prominence they have given to the person of Christ, and the view they have given of Christ as the head of redeemed humanity, which perhaps had been too much lost sight of by the orthodox of the past age. And we recognize this as a signal excellence in the system of Hofmann. But we are not disposed to concede to the Broad Church an exclusive right to such ideas and views; or to admit that we must give up the whole or any part of the orthodox doctrine in order to have a right to them. On the contrary, we hold that such views of the presence of Christ and of his position as the second Adam, the head of his people, are not only perfectly consistent with what has been the immemorial doctrine of the Church as to the vicarious nature of his obedience and suffering, but are more harmonious with that doctrine than with any perversion or evasion of it. Nay, we would be quite content to dismiss the terms "substitution" and "imputation" altogether, if so be they prove stumbling-blocks to any honest inquirer; for we are persuaded that if the great doctrine of a personal Savior, the Son of God and Second Head of redeemed mankind, be fairly and fully recognized, all the reality that is implied in a vicarious atonement will be maintained, whether we adopt the terms substitution and imputation or not—

maintained, perhaps, in a better form than it could be by the use of these terms. Let it be admitted that the Son of God, by becoming man, so identified himself with our fallen race as to become our Head, the last Adam; that he lived, obeyed, suffered, died, in this character, so that, in virtue of this headship and identification, what he did and suffered was virtually done and suffered by us, and regarded by God as such; and that we became interested in the work and death of Christ when made one with him as our personal head and Savior by the Spirit revealing and offering Christ to us, and moving us to embrace him by faith—let this be admitted, and all that is really implied in the Atonement is maintained. This we conceive to be the most Scriptural form of theology, as it is the one which gives a more prominent place to the person of Christ, and a more affecting power to his personal love, work, and suffering for us, than any other. But this is no new discovery of the liberal theology of these latter days; it is the theology of the best of the Fathers, of the Reformers, and of the Puritans. We find it very fully and admirably brought out in the Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly, and in such works as Witsius on "The Covenants," Bunyan and Edwards "On Justification." * We do not think, then, that this mode of viewing theology, and making the person of Christ the center and care of it all, is to be regretted or censured as a defect, but rather to be hailed as a signal excellence, and as such we regard it in the work of Hofmann.

We might point also to several other good features in Hofmann's

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* When we say that Christ became our Head, we use the phrase in an indefinite sense, as we do not wish at this stage to raise the question as to the extent of the Atonement. We merely assert at present the representative character of Christ as the last Adam. (See Witsius on "The Covenants," Book II, cap. 4, secs. 1, 6.) Edwards says: "Christ has assumed our nature, and has so assumed all in that nature that belongs to Him into such a union with Him, that He is become their Head, and has taken them to become His members." ("Discourse on Justification.") Bunyan says: "He took hold of our nature. I say He took hold of *us* by taking on Him flesh and blood. The Son of God, therefore, took not upon Him a particular person, though He took to Him a human body and soul; but that which He took was, as I may call it, a lump of the common nature of man, and by that took hold of the whole seed of Abraham. Heb. ii., 16. Hence He, in a mystery, became us, and was counted as all the men that were or should be saved." ("Justification by an Imputed Righteousness.")

theology; as, for instance, the prominence he gives to the active work of Christ, and to the conquest of Satan as an element in redemption. But we hasten rather to a consideration of what is the fatal defect and flaw in his system. Even here we think that in some respects he comes nearer to the commonly believed doctrine than his adversaries would admit, or even he himself seems to be aware of. The statement of the question at issue in the controversy, as he puts it, is not a little perplexing. He says, the question is not whether the death of Christ was expiatory; but in how far it was so—in how far the sin of the world is expiated by the death of Christ. This state of the question he repeats over and over again in his defense of his system. Now, perhaps, to German divines, this mode of speaking may throw some light on the subject, but to us we must confess it appears not only not to do so, but to be even altogether unintelligible. The only possible meaning we could imagine it to have would suggest, as the question at issue, either some form of the Romish question of the sufficiency of the work of Christ, or some form of the controversy as to the extent of the Atonement. But here, where it is confessedly neither of these, but the nature of the Atonement that is in question, we can not see any propriety or advantage in such a phrase. To us it seems that expiation is not an idea that admits of degrees at all; and, if the death of Christ was really expiatory at all, we can not conceive what is meant by its being more or less so, or by the question being raised how far it was so. Despairing, then, of getting any light on the subject from this *dictum*, we turn to Hofmann's more specific statements of his divergence from the received doctrine. And here we find that he denies that Christ suffered in the room and stead of sinners, or explicitly that he endured the punishment that sin deserved, or that he endured what they must have endured had he not suffered. This, no doubt, indicates a very marked and radical deviation from the orthodox doctrine. Still, we do not think that the *vicariousness* of the Atonement is precisely the point at issue, or the point where Hofmann's error lies. No doubt, he denies the common doctrine of a vicarious atonement; but we do not think his error lies in denying the vicariousness of it; he differs from us, no doubt, in not holding that Christ endured the punishment of sin in our stead—but it appears to us his error lies not in denying (what we hold) that

Christ suffered in our stead, but in denying what we hold as to *what* it was he so suffered.

This will appear more clearly as we go on. It is true that, over and over again, Hofmann repeats that he denies any substitution of Christ for sinners. We think, however, that this is not so. He really admits the only kind of substitution that any theologian asserts; and the substitution that he denies is a mere figment of his own imagination. The Atonement of his own system is as truly a vicarious one, however different in other respects, as that which we believe. As we have seen, a grand leading thought in this theology is, that Christ, as the Second Head of humanity, entered into our world and our life, making as it were common cause with us sinners, though himself sinless, and by persevering in holiness under all the consequences of sin, founded in his person a new relation of mankind to God, free from sin and death. This view of Christ entering into humanity, and becoming one with sinners, he seems to regard as inconsistent with that of his obeying and suffering in their stead; he quotes in his defense many passages from Luther embodying the former view; and adds, by way of comment, "Christ has done a work for all mankind, not vicariously beside it, but having entered into it, so that its relation to God has, in his person and history become a new one." But is there any inconsistency between these two views? Is not the very doctrine of vicarious atonement expressed, when we say that Christ, as the last Adam, so became one with his people, as their head and representative, that he took upon him their sins and death, in order that they might partake of his righteousness and life? Is not the very idea of a person doing any thing vicariously, as by substitution instead of another, this, that he represents the other, and that the other is regarded as being one with him, and as doing whatever he does? Thus an advocate appears for his client, speaks and acts instead of him, just because he is regarded by the court as representing him, sustaining his character, and being, in the eye of the law, the very client himself; or a plenipotentiary negotiates a treaty instead of a sovereign, just because he represents him, or acts in his name; or a member of Parliament represents his constituents, goes to Parliament instead of them, and they are regarded as having given their consent to the taxes they pay, because he has done so. In all

these cases the maxim holds good, "*qui facit per alium facit per se;*" and substitution is perfectly consistent, nay, is the very same thing, with representation or identification. And this and no other sort of substitution is what is involved in the catholic doctrine of the Atonement. True, there is another sort of substitution, and it is probably this latter that Hofmann means to deny—that of exchange or barter, as where one thing is given in exchange for another. But this kind of substitution applies more properly to things than to persons. And it is an important principle that, in the Atonement, there is a substitution of persons, not an exchange of things. It is not that Christ's work and sufferings, considered as a thing apart from his person, are substituted or taken in lieu of the obedience and suffering of the sinner; but Christ himself, as a person, undertakes the obligations, and acts in the stead of the sinner as a person, and then, on the ground of this, the work and sufferings of Christ are accepted for the sinner. Scripture does no doubt speak in very many places of the work of Christ as a redemption, a purchase, the payment of a ransom or price, etc.; and we are not at liberty to explain away such phrases as mere figures, indicating no reality. They do point to a real transaction, and are images chosen by God as being the most suitable to convey to our minds true notions of the Atonement in certain of its aspects. Still, they are figures, and can not be pressed as complete analogies in every respect, without doing violence to the nature and laws of interpretation of figurative language, and, in consequence, running into the most erroneous and unscriptural notions.

The Atonement is not a pecuniary but a judicial transaction. It is one great advantage of the federal system of theology, that it brings out so prominently the substitution of persons, and excludes so entirely an idea of comparing the great mystery of our redemption to a commercial or pecuniary transaction. And Hofmann's theology is in many respects very much allied to that of the Covenants. He does admit a vicarious atonement in the only sense in which we would care to contend for it. For, even according to his system, Christ suffered every thing that he admits to have come upon man in consequence of the Fall. Its consequences, as we have seen, were, according to him, mainly two—the wrath of God on the one hand, and subjection to the power of Satan on the other; and he distinctly teaches

that Christ endured both of these. The latter of them, indeed, is the more prominent of the two in his system; for he makes a great deal of Christ's endurance of all that Satan could do against him, using the sin and passions of men as his instruments; and this he even makes the proximate cause of the death of Christ. The other point, that Christ endured the wrath of God, is not quite so conspicuous in his system. Still it is explicitly and repeatedly avowed by him. He says, (*Schriftbeweis*, Vol. I., p. 479–80): "This wrath of God is nothing else but what the name implies: the hostile attitude of the Creator asserting himself against the creature denying him; and the infliction of all evil that comes upon men is an exercise of it, if not always on the individual on whom it falls, yet always on mankind. Only Jesus is the absolutely beloved; and what he endured was purely the exercise of the wrath of God against humanity, into which he had entered in order to endure it." It is but fair, however, to hear his own explanation of the sense in which he holds this, as he gives it in the second part of his *Defense*, p. 94–5: "When I say that the Eternal Son exchanged his Divine blessedness for subjection to the wrath of God against mankind, Thomasius thinks I must, therefore, also say that the punitive judgment of God against mankind was executed on the Son, and that he suffered this punitive judgment vicariously. For he thinks immediately of the death of Christ, to which he limits his endurance of the wrath of God against mankind; while to me, that Christ assumed our nature, and that he came to stand under this wrath of God, is one and the same thing; for since mankind lies under God's wrath, it is to me self-evident that Christ's coming into it is a subjection of himself to the wrath of God. As now the whole history of the Lord is an accomplishment of that relation to the Father in which he placed himself by his incarnation, so he experiences the wrath of the Father against mankind from his very conception onward to his death, ever according to the measure of the progress of his history; in one way before and during his growth to manhood, in another way after that; in one way simply as man, in another as an Israelite in particular; in one way before the beginning of his public ministry, in another way in the course of it; in one way in the time of his active work, in another in the hours of his suffering and death."

As to this extending of Christ's endurance of the wrath of

God over the whole of his life, we can not quite see our way to agree with Hofmann. It has a good deal to commend it to us; but in dealing with this mysterious and solemn subject, it is better perhaps, to leave such questions in abeyance, as the subject is so far beyond the reach of our faculties, and the materials furnished by Scripture are so scanty. From the prominence always given in Scripture to the death of Christ, and from the indications in the Gospel narratives of such a special and mysterious gloom and sorrow over the last hours of our Savior's work on earth, it seems evident that if not exclusively then, at least then in a very special way, the Lord was laying on him the iniquity of us all; but beyond this we can hardly go. Still, whatever we may think of Hofmann's view on this point, that does not affect the fact that he does really represent Christ as bearing all the consequences of sin, and enduring these to the very utmost.

But it will be asked, If he admits all this, how can he possibly deny that Christ suffered just what sinners deserved, and must else have suffered? The only grounds of distinguishing between them that he has stated are just these, that the doom of sinners is eternal death, the abiding wrath of God, and that it necessarily involves the pangs of remorse and an evil conscience, which Jesus, the sinless one, could not feel. We are astonished that such a man as Hofmann should give countenance to such dishonest quibbles, which it is somewhat difficult to deal with calmly and seriously. Does he really imagine that the great body of Christians, who cherish as their dearest faith the vicarious Atonement of Christ, hold a doctrine so monstrous, so impious, as he assumes is implied in it? Or does he mean to say that such is the necessary consequence of the doctrine, or that any person could possibly suppose that to be what is meant by it? But if those men who do not scruple to use this as an argument, are really in earnest with it, why insult our understandings with elaborate arguments against a vicarious atonement, when if they could but prove that these consequences are involved in it, we could not for a moment believe it—no, not if it were stated in so many words on every page of Scripture? To compare great things with small, such men are like those grammatical critics who, though no man in his senses would or could misunderstand a sentence, will yet maintain that they have a right to say that it means some absurd thing, which they say grammar requires.

No one maintains, or can possibly maintain, that the sufferings of Christ are exactly, and in every respect, identical with those that the lost will be doomed to suffer, or that this is essential to his being the substitute of sinners. If so, there could be no substitution at all. There is, indeed, some difference among the orthodox, whether it is proper to say that the sufferings of Christ are the same, or only an equivalent to the punishment of sinners themselves. But it is a point of small moment which of these expressions, *idem* or *tantundem*, we prefer. It is generally contended, and with truth, that the infinite dignity of the person who suffered in the stead of sinners, gave an infinite value to his sufferings; so that, though limited in time, they could atone for the infinite guilt of sin; and, on the other hand, it is obvious, that remorse and an evil conscience, being themselves of the nature of sin, can not be strictly part of the punishment that God inflicts, since God is not the author of sin. But more generally it may be held that the essence of the Atonement, as a vicarious endurance of the punishment of sin, does not lie in the amount or precise kind of suffering endured, but in the character in which it is endured. If it be admitted that Jesus suffered as the sinner's representative and substitute, and that what he suffered was of the nature of a penal infliction, we have secured all that is essential to the orthodox doctrine; for, as we said before, it is not the exchange of one thing for another, but the substitution of one person for others, for which we contend.

And this brings us to what appears to us to be the real, fundamental, and fatal defect in Hofmann's theology. It is not that he denies a vicarious Atonement, for the Atonement he admits is just as truly vicarious as that which the great body of divines maintain. He admits that Christ suffered all that he allows that men suffer in consequence of sin; but he denies, in both cases alike, the properly penal character of the suffering. He denies that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins; but this by itself does not give a complete idea of his opinion; for he denies also that what men are exposed to, and must have suffered but for Christ, is properly punishment for sin. There is, as we have seen in his system, a very explicit and emphatic recognition of the wrath of God, as part of the sinner's doom, and as borne by Christ; but there is no recognition whatever of the curse or condemnation of God, either as lying on man or as

borne by Christ. It is true that now and again, in his exposition and defense of his system, he speaks of punishment or of the punitive judgment of God (*Strafgericht*) against sinners; and it is a common formula with him that Christ did not suffer the punishment that sinners must else have suffered. But this seems to be merely a form of speaking, which he can not altogether avoid, and it is remarkable that it only occurs in his explanations of his system; for in the formal and precise statement of it, prefaced to his work, neither the phrase nor the idea of punishment occurs in any connection from beginning to end. There is an entire omission in his doctrine of the Atonement of the judicial element in any form. Redemption is, indeed, a great and momentous work of God; but it is not, according to him, in any sense a judicial transaction. God does not sit as the moral governor and judge of the world.

And this is not a mere defect in one part of his theology, as in the doctrine of the Atonement; for his system is eminently a consistent and logical one; and he is never, so far as we can see, betrayed into an admission of a judicial dealing with men on the part of God. The flaw runs through the entire system, and makes its appearance at very various points, and in forms that we should little expect. Thus, for example, he admits the reality of the wrath of God, and it might perhaps be held by some that this is the nature of punishment; but with him it is the expression, not of God's righteousness, but of his holiness. In like manner the contradiction that needs to be solved by the Atonement is not between the sin of man and the righteousness of God, but simply between it and his holiness. God acts toward men, according to Hofmann, simply as a holy being, not as a righteous moral ruler and judge. And in consistency with this is his idea of what is meant by righteousness as an attribute of God. This, in his system, has an entirely different meaning from its ordinary one. It would lead us too far away from our subject to explain fully the meaning attached to, and the place occupied by, the righteousness of God, in Hofmann's system. Suffice it to say, that it is defined (Vol. I., p. 571) as "the self-consistency of God's eternal will, which accomplishes itself historically, and which has for its object, not good in general, but *the man of God.*" And when we add that this eternal will of God is what, in this system, takes the place of the decrees of

God in common theological language, it will at once appear that the righteousness of God in this view has nothing whatever in common with what is usually understood by that term. His justice as the moral ruler and judge of the world, and the same omission of the judicial aspect of God's dealings with man, appears in other points too. Thus, where he explains the original position of man, he admits, indeed, that God dealt with him as an intelligent, moral agent, and in a sense dealt with him in the way of probation; but there is nothing like any judicial dealing on God's part with man. Again, in his Eschatology, we find, indeed, a final separation of the evil and the good, and the consignment of the finally impenitent to the power of Satan, without remedy; but there is nothing like a judicial dealing and reckoning with men; and even the final doom of the wicked, though he sometimes calls it by the name of punishment, can, in strict consistency, be only, after all, the expression of God's holiness and wrath against sin, and not the penal execution of a judicial sentence of condemnation.

It is thus apparent that Hofmann's deviation from the evangelical doctrine of the Atonement is not a mere incidental error, but an essential flaw that runs through his whole system. The difference is not an accidental and trifling one, but an all-pervading and irreconcilable divergence in first principles. The grand leading principle of the evangelical doctrine of the Atonement, and indeed of the whole evangelical theology, is, that God deals with men in a judicial manner, and governs them by a moral law, sanctioned by rewards and punishments; and the leading principle of Hofmann's system is just a denial of this. This is the grand question at issue; compared with this principle we care little for precise definitions of substitution, or identity, or equivalence. If the principle of a moral government by law is admitted, the whole is admitted; if that be denied, the whole is lost. This is the real issue to which the question must come in the controversy, in this country as well as elsewhere; all else is of minor and subordinate importance. Hofmann's theology is, we think, eminently characteristic of the present mode of theological thought. Both its excellencies and its defects are just exactly those of the modern mode of viewing such questions. We think that all that is excellent in it can be adopted and brought out at least as fully in the orthodox

theology as in any other, and that we do not need to give up any thing essential in our time-honored creed, in order to appropriate these excellencies ourselves. They should certainly not be left or allowed to be the exclusive property of a looser or less sound doctrine. And in its defects this theology just exhibits the tendency, that is too common in the present day, to deny or overlook the legal in a one-sided devotion to the personal element. And such a system as Hofmann's is, we think, not unworthy of the study of those who are interested in this great controversy in our land. It exhibits substantially the views of Maurice and his school, but stated and defended with much more fullness, thoroughness, and consistency, and we may add, in some respects, with a nearer approximation to the truth than is commonly done among ourselves. We see the opinions of this school, as it were, magnified and brought out more thoroughly in all their bearings. It is always satisfactory, too, to hear the utmost that can be said in favor of any system of error, in order to come to a thoroughly fair and firm conclusion, and we do not know where we could point to a more able, acute, and plausible defense of that form of theology to which we refer, than is contained in the *Schriftbeweis* of Dr. Von Hofmann, of Erlangen.

CHRISTIANITY dies when it ceases to be aggressive. The pressure of heresy or persecution, like the weight on the arch, only makes it stronger; the indifference and inactivity of the professors, like the influence of the weather on the arch, destroy its cohesion and insure its ruin; and therefore it is that, though more daring and resolute attacks were never made on Christianity than in our own day, they yet afford no ground for serious alarm, because the Christianity which is assailed was never so active as now.—*London Quarterly Review.*

UNEXHAUSTED RESOURCES OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE.*

What Professor Rogers happily designated, some years ago, "the Eclipse of Faith," is still very visibly advancing. We have no fears, of course, that the eclipse will ever become complete, and it is not of the nature of such phenomena to be permanent. Such obscurations in the moral world, like those of the heavenly bodies, are often only partial, and are always only transient. But the fears which an eclipse of faith excites are better grounded than those imaginary terrors which used to be created by eclipses of the sun and moon. They are only too real—they are any thing but superstitious. Unbelief is the poison of souls. It is the negation of the first and the most indispensable condition of all religious life. "He that cometh to God must believe;" as indispensably as to have the sensation of light, one must have eyes, or to have the sensation of sound, one must have ears. In every form, even the mildest, unbelief is a canker-worm at the very root of piety. Like a plague, it slays innumerable souls while it lasts; and, though it passes away again, its victim-souls continue dead and lost. It has a special malignity, indeed, which belongs to no other form of human evil. It is the only sin of man which in its own nature involves a rejection and denial of the divine Savior and his salvation. Hence, the deep concern which the spread of such a virulent mischief can not fail to excite in every Christian heart, and the gathering alarm which keeps pace with the growing symptoms of its diffusion and activity.

And such symptoms are only too abundant at the present time. Witness the recent publication of such works as the new edition of Strauss's "Leben Jesu," in which he addresses himself with an air of confidence, as if assured of a wide-spread sympathy, to the whole German people; and the two forms of Renan's "Vie de Jesus," which have been spread in thousands, and ten thousands of copies among all classes, educated and uneducated, in

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* This paper formed part of an inaugural lecture, delivered by Professor Larimer, Oct. 4, 1864, at the opening of the New College Hall, in Queen Square House, Guildford Street, London, and is taken from the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, Jan. 1865

France. Witness among ourselves the now open infidelity of the *Westminster Review*, and the less extreme, but still decided, Rationalism of other periodical journals, which all circulate freely in our lending libraries and reading-rooms. Witness the existence among us of an infidel association, recently alluded to in terms of deep regret by Lord Brougham at York, "for the purpose of directing an organized assault upon the Christian faith," and which, he tells us, is busy "distributing infidel tracts, conducting a periodical work, and holding meetings for debate, both in the southern counties and even as far north as Edinburgh." But these open and declared assailants of Christianity are not the most dangerous propagators of unbelief. Lord Brougham also referred to others among us, "whose attacks are not plain and open, but covert and insidious, casting doubts and raising suspicions without such a direct assault as religion itself might meet and repel—nay, sometimes proceeding from persons who avow their belief, but would reduce the subject of it to such dimensions as leave it unstable and incapable of defense." We all know whom these allusions point to. They plainly refer to a state of things in the Church of England, which is without all previous example in its history, and which is now filling with astonishment and alarm not only an immense proportion of its own ministry and members, but all of every denomination throughout the land who are concerned for the honor of God's Word, and the interests of fundamental Christian truth. Why, the very foundations of the faith have been tampered with and challenged by eminent ministers of that Church, and not only so, but it has hitherto been found impossible to apply the discipline of the Church to any of these offenders. The authors of *Essays and Reviews* have been able to make good, in the court of last appeal, their legal right to remain in the National Church; and the faithfulness of the two Houses of Convocation in condemning the inculpated volume, has only served to draw upon them a bitter and contemptuous censure and warning from the Lord Chancellor, speaking from the woolsack. Meanwhile, a colonial bishop, who has offended in a similar sense, is waiting to be rescued from the hands of his own metropolitan by the same court of appeal which has thrown its shield of protection over Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson; and men begin to fear that even a bishop will be allowed to teach that the Pentateuch is a book of fables, and that Jesus

Christ himself was too little of a scholar and critic to know it, and yet have a right to remain a bishop of the Church of England notwithstanding.

These are only a few of the sad symptoms of the spread of unbelief in various degrees and forms, both without and within the Church. But these few must suffice for the present; and for the present, too, we must waive all reference to the various causes which have been at work to produce this remarkable outbreak of an evil which is never, indeed, wholly absent from society, and never can be expected to be so, but which has only of late begun to show itself to any formidable extent within the inclosure of the orthodox Churches of Britain. For the question which we mainly propose to consider at present is the very interesting and important one—whether the advance of Christian apologetics is keeping pace with the advance of unbelief—whether the Christian evidences are being developed in new forms and degrees of power to meet the new forms and developments of Infidelity and Rationalism—whether, in a word, Christianity is proving herself to have *resources of evidence* still fresh and unexhausted to meet and overcome all the assaults of her enemies, and to enable her to maintain her position as firmly as ever at the very head of the world's civilization? We hear many predictions from her adversaries that the day of her downfall and ruin is at hand. Is it then come to this, that we have now grave reason to tremble for the ark of God; or have we not, on the contrary, good grounds to feel assured, in view of the fresh resources which the Christian argument is developing and bringing forward into the field of conflict, that the ark is safe even in the midst of enemies, ever increasing in number and in boastfulness? There exist, we are persuaded, good grounds for this assurance; and to indicate some of these, in the way of hints and suggestions, rather than of full and adequate exposition, is the object of the present paper.

Our readers are all aware that in the evidential school of Paley, including such recent writers as Chalmers, Taylor, Miall, and others, it has been usual to lay the main stress of the Christian argument upon the external rather than the internal evidences; *i.e.*, rather upon the attestations borne to Christianity from without, than upon the self-attesting, self-evidencing power of Christianity and the Christian documents from within. The internal evidences

were regarded rather as *auxiliaries* to the main proof, than as the main proof itself. Even the character of Christ was ranked by Paley as a mere auxiliary evidence, as though the radiant presence of the sun himself in the heavens were not the best and the all-sufficing proof of his existence and glory. Under such an estimate and arrangement, it was natural that the external evidences should be more studied and elaborated than the internal—the former being regarded as the supreme Christian bulwark and defense. But within the last twenty years a great change has taken place in this respect, corresponding to a remarkable change which has occurred in the tactics and method of unbelief. It was Hume's famous "Essay on Miracles" that gave form and arrangement to the Evidences of Paley; it is the "Leben Jesu" of Strauss that has given a new direction and development to the apologetics of our own age. Between Hume and Paley the question of the Christian miracles was one of external testimony: Hume denying the sufficiency of the testimony; Paley maintaining its sufficiency and redundancy. Strauss holds a miracle to be impossible in its very nature and idea, and therefore incapable of proof by any amount of testimony whatever. Disregarding, therefore, all testimonies external to the New Testament, he carries the war into the Christian documents themselves. His method is *critical*. His aim is to show that the four Gospels contain the evidences of their own untruth and unreality; he magnifies their differences into contradictions; he makes no account of the innumerable points of main importance on which they agree, by reason of the numerous small points on which he alleges them irreconcilably to differ; and he resolves the whole evangelical history into a mythology, upon the alleged showing and evidence of the Gospels themselves. Such a *critique* of the Christian documents, it is plain, could only be met by another *critique* more true and just. The controversy was thus fairly removed from the external to the internal field, and the special work of the Christian apologist now came to be to show that the New Testament is its own best evidence, instead of being its own sufficient confutation. The internal evidences have thus come to be developed more largely during the last quarter of a century than at any previous period.

The external evidences remain, of course, as logically strong and impregnable as before. We have no sympathy with those

writers of the Coleridge and Maurice school, who speak disparagingly of Paley and his successors. A historical religion can not dispense with historical evidences additional to its own documents—*i. e.*, with ancient collateral testimonies to its foundation facts and primary documents. The absence of such evidences would be almost an insuperable objection to its historic truth; the presence and validity of such historical vouchers are nearly indispensable conditions of rational conviction; and the service done by writers like Paley and Chalmers, in marshaling and handling such proofs to the greatest advantage, is a service which can never lose any thing of its value and importance. Still, we think, it is a great improvement in apologetic tactics that the internal evidences should now be regarded and used as the chief weapon of defense, and the main strength of the Christian position. It is the method which corresponds best with our Lord's sublime claim to be the light of the world, which if he is, as we assuredly believe him to be, he can not but shine, and be perfectly visible in his own light. It is the method, too, which our age specially needs; for nothing now, it would seem, will be able to convince unbelief that Christ was a miraculous person intervening in history, unless Christ is able to compel that conviction by his own superhuman and superearthly greatness and glory. But whether this tactical change can be deemed an improvement or not, it is certain that a great development of the resources of the Christian argument in this direction has been lately going on, and is likely to go on with increasing speed.

The fundamental principle of modern unbelief, in its most recent form—the philosophical dogma which lies at the root of all its hostile criticism, both of the Christian system and its canonical documents—is the principle, the dogma, that all miracle or supernatural intervention is impossible and inconceivable, and therefore wholly incapable of proof. A miracle can never be *real;* a narrative, interwoven with miracle, can never be regarded as true history, rationally or scientifically. Such is the fundamental axiom of Strauss and Baur, of Renan and Baden Powell. How, then, have the Christian advocates of our time been meeting and confronting this master principle of modern unbelief? They have sometimes confronted it as a philosophical dogma with philosophical reasonings, claiming to be as purely scientific as those by which its upholders have tried to maintain it; and they have been

able to do this with great force of argument. Witness the essay on miracles by Professor Mansel of Oxford, in the "Aids to Faith," where he replies to the essay of Powell, and the "Treatise on the Supernatural in relation to the Natural," by Professor McCosh of Belfast, in both of which works corroborations of their reasonings are produced from the writings of such philosophers as Dr. Thomas Brown and John Stuart Mill, who wrote purely in the interest of mental science. But we do not refer further to philosophical reasonings of that kind, valuable as they are as auxiliaries in this high debate. What we wish to bring prominently into view is this, that the Christian advocates of our time are more and more confronting this false philosophical dogma with the actual and admitted phenomena, or constituents of Christianity itself, as carrying *in themselves*, in their own inherent character and qualities, the evidence at once of the falsity of the dogma, and the reality and truth of the Christian revelation. There are four distinct constituents or actual elements of Christianity of which this argumentative use has recently been made, and in such a way as to bring out, with ever-increasing force, the self-evidencing light and resources of the Christian system. These are, the *character of Christ* as it stands before us, vividly though not artistically delineated in the four Gospels; the *canonical Christian documents* as they lie before us collected in the New Testament; the *Christology*, or doctrine concerning Christ, which is confessedly taught and preserved in these existing documents; and the *history of the Apostolic Church* in as far as these same documents contain it. All these constituents of Christianity, be it observed, are present and actual things before men's eyes. However opinions may differ as to the amount of self-evidence they contain in behalf of their own supernatural origin, there can be no difference, as to the matter of fact, that the things themselves are actually before us. We do not need to ask what evidence exists to prove the reality or actuality of these Christian things, but we can proceed at once to ask, What does the admitted existence of these Christian things prove? We go at once into the intrinsic character and quality of the things themselves, and interrogate them as to the origin from which, on the showing of their own nature, they must have been derived.

1. The element or constituent of Christianity to which this method has lately been applied most frequently, and with the most

powerful effect, is the character of Christ as depicted in the four Gospels. The conviction has been rapidly growing and ripening, among thoughtful Christians of all lands, that Jesus Christ himself is his own best evidence; that he who said, "I am the light of the world," can not need any other light than his own to show that he is indeed shining; that he who said, "I am the truth," must have meant to say that the truth was exhibited in himself—not only in its contents, but also in its evidences. We read of "the truth as it is in Jesus," *i. e.*, as it was set forth—not only in what he taught, but in what he was in his person, character, spirit, and actions; and the Christian world is now everywhere inferring that this immanent or indwelling truth must be inclusive of *evidential* truth, as well as of truth dogmatic. It can not be an accidental coincidence that so large a number of works on the sinless perfection of our Lord should have recently appeared in all parts of Protestant Christendom. Such a fact can only have proceeded from a profound and powerful movement of the Christian mind of the world. It was the publication of Strauss's "Life of Jesus" that gave the first impulse to it, and the first fruits of the movement appeared in the anti-Straussian literature of Germany, in writings of Neander, Lange, Olshausen, Ebrard, Tholuck, and many others, in which, according to Professor Schaff, of America, "the ethical element and the human perfection of Christ were more fully brought out than had ever been done before." In such polemical works the subject was necessarily mixed up with many others; but within the last ten years it has been taken up by itself, and placed in an endless variety of lights, in numerous productions both of the Old and the New World. Drs. Ullmann and Dorner, in Germany; Dr. Oösterzee, in Holland; M. de Pressensé, in France; Dr. Bushnell and Professor Schaff, in America; and in our own country, Dr. Young, in his "Christ of History," and Mr. Bayne, in his "Testimony of Christ to Christianity," not to mention shorter treatments of the subject by Dean Stanley, Professor Goldwin Smith, and other writers—all these have recently been working, in this vein of golden ore, to the great enrichment of the Christian argument, and the powerful defense of the Christian cause. "I venture," says Dean Stanley, "without disparagement of previous ages, to express a humble yet firm conviction that never before our own age has there been so keen, so discriminating a perception of the peculiarities (if I may so

speak), the essential, innermost, distinguishing marks of the unapproached and unapproachable character described to us in the four Gospels. We have not arrived at the end of it. Far from it. In the very fact of the large traits of his life and character which still remain unexplored lies a boundless hope for the future. But in the advances that have been made, even within our own generation, in apprehending new yet eternal characteristics of that Divine Mind, we may already feel a confident hope for the present. . . There are, no doubt, many voices of God in the world, many voices of God in the Bible; and 'none of them,' as the apostle says, 'is without signification.' But if there be any which can hope to make itself heard above the questionings and distractions of this tumultuous time, it is the voice of God in his Son—in the character and spirit of Jesus Christ—for, amidst all the shocks and changes of belief, this is the one part of our religion which not only has undergone least attack, but has actually grown in its hold on the understanding and affections of men."

Now, there is evidently a specific adaptation in this grandest of all departments of the Christian evidence to the specific form of this age's unbelief—its refusal to credit miracle upon any accumulation of external testimony. For here is a supernatural character which bears testimony to itself. Here is a character of miraculous excellence which may be clearly seen to be such in its own unassisted light. Here is a superhuman person who has supervened upon the common world, who has found his way into the society of ordinary men, and who verifies the reality of his superearthly presence by a character of absolute and therefore superearthly perfection. And what wonder, after that, that a miraculous person should do the miraculous deeds which are recorded of him in the Gospel history? What is there incredible in the other supernatural constituents of a religious system which had its origin and doctrinal substance in the personal history of a being who is himself a miracle—a moral and mental miracle—*i. e.*, the most glorious of all miracles! "Jesus of Nazareth," to use the powerful words of Professor Schaff, "is the one absolute and unaccountable exception to the universal experience of mankind. He is the great central miracle of the whole Gospel history; and all his miracles are but the natural and necessary manifestations of his miraculous person, performed with the same ease with which we perform our ordinary daily works."

Or, in the glowing words of Dr. Bushnell: "As no proof besides the light is necessary to show that the sun shines, so Jesus proves himself by his own self-evidence. The simple inspection of his life and character suffices to show that he can not be classified with mankind (man though he be) any more than what we call his miracles can be classified with mere natural events. The simple demonstrations of his life and spirit are the sufficient attestation of his own profession, when he says, 'I am from above,' 'I came down from heaven.' On the single question, therefore, of the more than human character of Jesus, we rest in perfect confidence a principal argument for Christianity as a supernatural institution; for if there be in Jesus a character which is not human, then has something broken into the world that is not of it, and the spell of unbelief is broken."

2. A second constituent of Christianity which admits of being examined with the same view of bringing out its self-evidencing light and power, is the Christian Canon, especially the documents of the New Testament. Without the least disparagement to the *external* evidence which can be produced in support of the literary genuineness and the historical credibility of these documents, and fully admitting the indispensableness of that evidence to a full scientific proof of these points, it is evident that there is a growing disposition in Christian advocates to lay more stress than formerly on the evidence supplied by the documents themselves, and that this inherent and perfectly independent evidence is now undergoing a more searching and productive scrutiny than at any former period. And there is much reason for this preference. It is a kind of evidence which is accessible to all, instead of being only intelligible and appreciable to scholars and critics; which is almost as well gathered from the English Testament as from the Greek original; and which is not in the least mixed up with doubtful disputations with regard to the genuineness and credit of other ancient writings (such as the Epistles of Ignatius), which sometimes require, and hardly admit of being satisfactorily attested themselves, before they can be brought forward to do the work of attestation to the New Testament books. The grand question here is this: Is the history contained in these New Testament books real history? If so, then there can be no doubt that the history is also supernatural or miraculous. The aim, therefore, of the Christian advocate here must be to bring out the internal

evidence of *reality*, or to evolve from the documents themselves the hidden and deep-lying signatures and marks of honesty and truthfulness in the sacred historians, and of lifelike reality and actuality in the accounts which they have drawn up. Now, the vein of evidence which has been most worked of late in this department has been that which Paley designated the "evidence of undesigned coincidences," and of which he gave so admirable a first sample in his "Horace Paulinæ." That commencement has been followed up in our own time with ever-increasing results by Professor Blunt and Mr. Burks; and to these has been added, this very year, by another Cambridge divine, Dr. Howson, a valuable enrichment, in his Hulsean lectures on the character of St. Paul. In depicting successive features of that grand character, second only in grandeur and perfection to the character of Christ himself, Dr. Howson draws his materials indifferently from all the epistles bearing the name of St. Paul, the latest as well as the earliest, with the single exception of the epistle to the Hebrews, and from the records of his speeches and actions contained in the Acts of the Apostles. He finds a perfect harmony, in all the indications of Paul's character, lying scattered over the face of all these documents, or lying deep down under their surface, and often rather implied than expressed, rather whispered than outspoken, half-concealed rather than flaunted before the eyes; and the natural and unavoidable inference which he draws is as follows: "So far as the *same* features of character come easily and naturally into view from a survey of all the documents which supply our information, from all those parts of the Book of the Acts which affect this Apostle, and from all the letters written by the Apostle himself, we obtain an argument for the *authenticity* of all; for if we can follow one thread through the whole, even though that thread be a fine one, it is surely some indication that the texture of the whole is coherent; and, secondly, so far as *a definite and self-consistent* character emerges into view, on an examination of all that is written by St. Paul or concerning him, so far, it seems to me, we have rather a stubborn argument to present against the theory, that Christianity, in the form in which the New Testament exhibits it, came together by a kind of accidental or mythical process." In other words, all this cumulative evidence, derived from numerous and plainly undesigned coincidences, on such a subject as the many-sided individuality of the chief of the apostles.

goes to convey a deep impression or *feeling*, both of the genuineness of the documents and of the reality of the history; but this history, if real, brings us at once face to face with the supernatural; for it is a capital part of this very history that St. Paul was converted, by a miraculous manifestation of Christ to him, on his way to Damascus, and that, on several subsequent occasions, he was admitted to visions and revelations of his risen Lord.

The whole New Testament teems with this sort of evidence of historical reality, and all the more, that it is made up partly of narratives and partly of letters; that so considerable an interval of time elapsed between the composition of its earliest and its latest books; and that so many different authors contributed to the collection. Where coincidences are found in large numbers under such conditions of the collection, they can not be accidental, and yet are plainly undesigned, and they can only be accounted for by the reality of the events and the persons concerned. As Dr. Howson remarks: "This mine of evidence, so well worked in some of its parts, is by no means yet exhausted, nor am I aware that the narrow vein—narrow but yet golden—which relates simply to St. Paul's personal character, has ever been closely and minutely pursued." Dr. Howson's own contribution to the cumulative argument thus accruing is both original and weighty, and it is only an earnest, we are persuaded, of many more contributions to it which are yet to follow. The other eminent characters of the New Testament, especially St. Peter and St. John, will no doubt be immediately handled in the same manner. And, in still another direction, we begin to discern a rich vein of internal evidence, underlying almost the whole surface of the New Testament, which has never yet been entered by a single explorer. We can only indicate it briefly.

It is now generally admitted that the epistles of St. Peter, St. John, and St. Paul have all a character of clear and sharply-marked individuality, which they derive from the personal idiosyncrasies of their respective authors, who, though entirely one in Divine inspiration, were still extremely different in natural temperament and gifts, and in habits of thought and feeling. We can see the temperament and the intellectual type of each of the men in the very shapes into which they threw Christian truth, in the proportion of prominence in which they place one or another of its parts and aspects; in the forms of language, argument, or illus-

tration which they employ to exhibit and enforce it in their respective epistles; but, in the historical books of the New Testament, we have also unmistakable indications of the natural temperament, character, and qualities of these same eminent apostles. Here, then, is an additional subject of comparison between the histories and the epistles—between what is to be gathered about the men from the scattered notices of the histories, and what is to be gathered about them from a minute and searching analysis of the epistles. The German divines have long been engaged, and with great success, in making these separate analyses of the doctrinal and moral teaching of St. Peter, St. John, and St. Paul, and the effect has been to bring out to view their points of individuality and difference quite as clearly as their points of unity and resemblance. They have worked in this vein of inquiry without any anticipation of the evidential use to which the results obtained by them might be afterward applied; but such an application of them is now imminent, and will form a valuable addition to the internal proof of historical truth obtained from the undesigned coincidences, or, in other words, the deep-lying harmonies of the New Testament; and this addition, be it observed, will not be quantitative only, but qualitative at the same time. The coincidences thus laid open will be of a different kind from any obtained before; they will be evolved, not by comparing fact with fact, as Paley does, but by comparing statements of fact about these apostles made by others, with statements of doctrine made by the apostles themselves. From certain facts recorded about them—not by themselves, but by others—we draw our own conclusions, regarding their temperaments and mental and spiritual habits as men and as Christians; and then, when we turn to their own epistles, we find, upon a searching analysis, the same idiosyncrasies of constitution and habit manifesting themselves in their several ways of looking at, and handling, and setting forth the same great Christian theme which is common to all. St. Peter, for example, is unmistakably the sanguine apostle of Hope in his two epistles, which are fuller than any of the other epistles of the Christian future, as he is ever the ardent and sanguine apostle in the four Gospels. That he was so is only an inference, indeed, in both cases—from his doings in the Gospel, and from his teachings in the epistles; but in both cases the inference, as to his character and temperament, is clear and confident, while

the coincidence or harmony that is evolved is all the more impressive, because it is only arrived at in this inferential and indirect way, and because the premises from which it is inferred in the two cases are so different in kind, as statements of fact and statements of doctrine; the one set of statements, in addition, being made by the evangelists in regard to the apostle's early life, and the other set made by St. Peter himself at a much later period of his Christian development. But when we recognize, in this way, the same personal idiosyncrasies which we find in the one set of documents, reappearing again, though in the most delicate and circuitous and undesigned manner, in the other set of documents, will not this be evidence of the most unexpected and convincing kind, both of the truth of the histories and the genuineness of the letters? Will not this widely-reaching and almost all-pervading harmony—so late in being perceived, but so real and striking when at last laid open—leave upon the mind a vivid impression, an irresistible feeling of reality and truth? Must it not deepen the conviction that the life, whose outgrowths and outflowings are preserved in the New Testament, was a real life; and its history, in other words, is true and genuine history, and, if such, then truly supernatural, genuinely and authentically Divine?

3. There are still two additional lines of internal evidence remaining to be noticed, but to these we can only allude in the briefest manner. They have been treated respectively by the late Professor Auberlen, of Basle, and Professor Doedes, of Utrecht. The one is the line of evidence by which we carry up the rise of the New Testament *doctrine*, in its written form, to a date as early as twenty or twenty-five years after the crucifixion. The epistles to the Thessalonians, Corinthians, Romans, and Galatians can all be traced up by intrinsic marks to that period, and in these we find the whole Christology of Christianity already developed. There is no room for dispute about these facts. Even the Tübingen school admit the genuineness and very early date of the four last-named epistles, and these four are far the most important of the six. Here, then, we have intrinsic and quite independent evidence of the fact—independent, we mean, of all testimonies exterior to the New Testament itself—that that whole doctrine of the person and personal work of Christ, which forms the most distinctive substance of the New Testament the very kernel of the Gospel, was already put into a written form within a quarter

of a century after the crucifixion. Here is an indisputable fact, of which some account must be given. Here is an indubitable and acknowledged effect, produced in the views and convictions of men who were most of them cotemporaries of Christ, which must have had a cause. What was that cause? Our Christian belief is that this early Christology was founded on historical *fact*. The resurrection and ascension of Christ were believed and taught by the early Church, simply because Jesus Christ had actually risen and ascended; and nothing can seem to us more plain and certain than that the apostles never could have gone forth to publish such facts about their Master if they had not been absolutely convinced of their reality; and that they never could have been convinced of their reality if the facts had never occurred, or if there had been no adequate evidence of their occurrence. The characters of the chief apostle are before us in their own writings, both their intellectual and moral characters, and we can clearly see that they were neither fools nor knaves, neither senseless enthusiasts nor designing impostors; but Strauss and Baur allege that the Christology of these six epistles and the rest is a mythology. What! a mythology so immense, so systematic, so harmonious, so complete, all developed in the short space of five and twenty years—less than a single generation! All developed, too, in the minds of the very same men who were cotemporaries, and all but one of them companions of Jesus of Nazareth, and who knew all the real facts of his earthly career as well as they knew any thing! All developed, beside, in the minds of men to whom, as Jews, nothing could have appeared more impious and blasphemous than the deification of a mere man, or the adoration of Jesus as the Son of God, unless he had been declared to be such by the voice of God himself with power! Would not the production of *such* a mythology, in *such* minds, in *such* a short space of time, have been a phenomenon as impossible and inconceivable as a miracle is alleged to be? But, if the mythology is impossible, the Christology must be true, and no more than the dogmatic formulation of divine and sublime reality.

4. It is in a similar way that we are brought close up to supernatural reality upon the fourth line of internal evidence, still remaining to be noticed, and no more than noticed. Here we start from the portion of Church history contained in the Acts of the Apostles as illustrated by the epistles, and, traveling upward, we

arrive first at the foundation of the Gentile Churches by St. Paul—an event arising out of his previous miraculous conversion; and next, at the foundation of the Church of the Circumcision by the Twelve—an event proceeding upon the previous resurrection of our Lord. Admit the miraculous conversion and the real resurrection, and both these events of primitive Church history, about which there can be no dispute, are fully and adequately explained. They are undeniable and acknowledged events in history, and must have had adequate antecedents to produce them and to account for their production. The New Testament assigns two miracles for their antecedents, and those who refuse that account of the events, that causation of the effects, are bound to substitute another account and another causation that shall be more satisfactory. Have they done so? No. Has Strauss, has Baur, has Renan been able to do it? No. Baur, with all his acuteness and power of historical pragmatism, is helpless, and as much as confesses it by maintaining that it is enough to explain the rise of the Apostolic Church that the apostles *believed* in the resurrection of Christ, though nothing of the kind had actually occurred; as though it was not in that case the duty of the historian to account for the rise of the belief, and to show how on natural principles it could possibly have arisen and become fixed and immutable. And he is equally helpless in the matter of St. Paul's conversion. It was not miraculous, he asserts, and yet he can not show how it could be other than miraculous. It was only the result of natural causes and a natural process; but what the natural cause and process were, he is unable to assign. Given Saul's sudden change of opinion as to the death of Christ, that, instead of being the just execution of an impious blasphemer and deceiver, as he had always hitherto thought, it was really the sacrificial death of the Son of God and the Lamb of God, taking away the sin of the world; and all that follows in his career follows naturally and admits of easy explanation. But this sudden change of conviction, so immense in its amount and in its effects, is the very thing which Baur is utterly unable to account for; that is to say, he is brought face to face with a miracle in history, and yet, to save his philosophical dogma, he will not confess it to be one, though he as much as owns his inability to show how it was or could be any thing else.

This obstinate and immutable determination of Baur and Strauss,

and, we may add, Renan and Baden Powell, to admit of no agency or causality in any part of history which is superior to the powers and order of what men call nature, and to refuse the very name of history to all narratives which assume the possibility and record the reality of supernatural intervention in human affairs, leads us to remark, in conclusion, that if Christianity is continually unfolding new resources of argument and evidence as its controversy with unbelief goes on, unbelief, on the other side, is continually laying more and more bare its own terrible tendencies and issues. It is not the old Deism now which stands forth as the rival of Christianity, but a new Pantheism, or rather a new and revised edition and re-issue of the old Pagan Pantheism of the later philosophers of Greece and Rome; but, so far as religious life and duty and consolation are concerned, Pantheism and Atheism come much to the same thing. That Strauss, at least, has arrived at this terrible issue is manifest from the new edition of his book published last year; it has been a dedication to his deceased brother, in which he gravely commends him for having been "able to bear under all the trials of life without any help from religious faith, and to die calmly and peacefully without any delusive hope of heaven." Unbelief, then, is rapidly nearing the abyss. In the person of its most advanced professor and champion, it has actually plunged into it. It would seem that in the "Leben Jesu" infidelity has spoken its very last word. The only alternative in religion set before the world in these last days is Christianity or nothing. In the last century, the choice was between Christianity and Deism. Deism is nowhere now. The distinction which it made between God and nature has grown obsolete, and has given place to the dogma that God and nature are identical terms. So then the final choice is simply between Christianity and the Pantheistic abyss. Are we to hold fast the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ—the light and the life of man—or are we to fall back again into the old Paganism from which Christ has in vain redeemed us, and the whole of Christendom to become again a world "without God and without hope?" In such circumstances, when the appeal is made to us, "Will *ye* also go away?" with what a profound sense of being wholly shut up unto Christ as our only possible strength, our only imaginable hope, must we all reply, "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life!"

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RECENT RESEARCHES IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA.*

NOTWITHSTANDING all that has been done of late years for the geography and archæology of Syria and Palestine, by such exhaustive explorers as Drs. Robinson, Eli Smith, and Thompson—by Van der Velde, Porter, Miss Beaufort, Dean Stanley, and others—it is quite clear, from the advertisements of recent publications, and still more from those which are announced as in the press or preparing for publication, that the subject is far indeed from having lost its interest, and that this field of research has ever new treasures with which to reward the toils and perils of the increasing band of investigators.

It is a special subject of congratulation to Biblical students, that the geology and natural history of Palestine, in which scarcely any thing has been attempted for very many years, have been at length taken up and prosecuted by persons competent, before all others, to do justice to them. Mr. Tristam, the well known naturalist, has already given us a foretaste of the pleasure which we may anticipate from the publication of his work, in the lively extracts from his journal already published in the last volume of "Long Vacation Tourists." It is a great satisfaction to know that his researches have resulted in many and important additions to the Fauna and Flora of Palestine; that his piscatory recreations in the Sea of Tiberias have brought up from the depths of that sacred lake new specimens of fish, of the existence of which in those waters no naturalist before had any conception; and that his double-barrel has brought down from the hights of Hermon ornithological rarities, whose *habitu* was supposed to be confined to the Arctic regions. We await with eager interest Mr. Tristam's promised contribution to this most important department of Biblical study.

Still more rich in promise are the results of the important expedition, from which the Duke of Luynes has quite lately returned, after a most successful prosecution of well-considered researches in a field which has hitherto baffled the enterprise of English,

* From the *Christian Remembrancer*, Jan. 1865.

French, and Americans alike. This nobleman, already well-known to Oriental scholars for his diligent and successful prosecution of Phœnician studies, and particularly by the publication of the great inscription on the sarcophagus of the Sidonian king Esmunazar, now in the Louvre at Paris, after a long and careful preparation commensurate with the importance of his undertaking, has during the current year conducted a party of explorers to the East, where no pains or expense were spared to realize results worthy of the enterprise. An iron boat, constructed at Toulon expressly for the navigation of the Dead Sea, and successfully launched on its heavy waters, has compelled that reluctant lake to reveal its long-hidden secrets, which English, Irish, and American sailors had before investigated at no less a penalty than their lives. It is indeed a subject of gratification that this deadly sea, after exacting three victims—Lieutenants Costegan and Molyneux, of our Royal Navy, and Lieutenant Dale, attached to the American Exploring Expedition of Captain Lynch—has, however grudgingly, surrendered at discretion to the indomitable perseverance of European science. Twenty-seven days' sailing, without the slightest difficulty, on these hitherto mysterious waters, not much larger in extent than some of our English lakes, while it will serve to check and, if necessary, to rectify the surveys of Molyneux and Lynch, will probably leave nothing to be added to our knowledge; while it may be hoped that the considerate liberality of the Duke in presenting his boat, when it had served his purpose, to the Arab inhabitants of the shores of the lake, will enable enterprising travelers, at least for some few years to come, to verify for themselves the accuracy of his observations.

But the Duke of Luynes has not confined his attention to the Sea of Lot, as it is styled by the natives. The great crevasse of the Ghor, as the Jordan Valley is called, and of Wady Araba, between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Akaba, have been thoroughly surveyed; Kerak, Machærûs, Arak-el-Emir, and Jerash have been explored; as has also the country of Edom, including Petra, for so many past years closed to travelers by the feuds of the Arab tribes in the vicinity. In all these regions, not only have geological surveys and hydrographical observations been made with the utmost care, but all have been laid down with the nicest accuracy (and the appliances of photography have not been neglected), so as to furnish the elements for an accurate atlas of a

country which has heretofore been only skimmed by travelers, whose hasty passage through the dangerous and inhospitable region afforded neither time nor opportunity for a scientific examination. Finally, on the Duke's return to France, the officer of the Imperial Navy who accompanied his expedition remained behind to make a careful survey of Palmyra, where he has taken photographs of all the most important objects, and determined the exact position of the city by a series of astronomical observations. We sincerely congratulate the Duke on his safe return, and tender him our hearty thanks for his eminent services to the great cause which we all have at heart; and we trust that in no long time we shall be able to announce that sacred literature has been enriched by the publication of his work.

With little less impatience do we await the new volume of travels by the author of "Le Voyage autour de la Mer Morte," which is to contain the account of his recent excavations at Jerusalem and beyond Jordan, at Arak-el-Emir, and other newly explored sites on the borders of the country of Moab. All that proceeds from the pen of M. de Saulcy is worth reading; and even when his arguments fail to carry conviction, they serve at least to confirm our confidence in his industry and honesty; and our admiration for the zeal and ability with which he advocates his somewhat startling theories, disposes us to deal leniently with his too lively imagination, the deductions from which will not, perhaps, always bear the test of rigid criticism. He has set himself a hard task if, as we hear, he is undertaking to prove that the cotemporaneous inscription on the coffin-lid which he discovered in the Tombs of the Kings assigns it to the wife of Zedekiah, king of Judah, and so proves the square Hebrew character to be anterior to the Babylonish captivity; or that the monuments about Jerusalem, which bear unmistakable traces of an acquaintance with the classical forms of an architecture, date back to the era of Solomon. We can safely leave these interesting subjects in his hands, with the conviction that he will do all that can be done for the vindication of his interesting and ingenious theories.

THE QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE,
AS AFFECTED BY DIFFERENCES OF COLOR, SIZE, AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.*

BY M. QUADREFAGES.

Of all the characteristics presented by human groups, those which vary the most and within the widest limits are, without contradiction, the characters which depend upon color. For example, the skin changes from a rosy white to black; and really, for one who does not form an accurate conception of the nature of such changes, there is here somewhat to strike the mind. It is difficult, at first sight, not to believe that the skin in the negro and the white presents some radical differences, and this belief, which one states more or less distinctly to himself, has certainly much to do with the general tendency to admit the multiplicity of species. There is, however, nothing less justified than this conclusion drawn from outward appearances. Researches already ancient would permit us to presume this fact, which modern studies, aided by more delicate and rigorous processes, have placed utterly beyond all doubt. Whether we employ a methodical maceration, as M. Flourens has so successfully done, or, with MM. Krause, Simon, and Koelliker, call to our aid the microscope and chemical agents, we always come to the same conclusions, and these conclusions may be thus stated: the skin of the white man and that of the negro are composed of the same parts, of the same layers, arranged in the same order; in both, these layers present the same elements, associated or grouped in the same manner; upon an individual of the white race, we can find in various parts of the body the skin of the black man and the skin of the yellow man, (that is to say, the skin of the three extremes, which human groups present), with all their most intimate and profound characters. Let us endeavor to give an idea of the facts, on which these conclusions, at the same time so important and so little in harmony in appearance with the evidence of our senses, rest.

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* Translated from the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, by Hon. Simeon Nash, Gallipolis, Ohio.

In order the better to make ourselves understood, we will regard the skin, considered as a whole, as essentially composed of three layers, the *dermis*, the *epidermis*, and the *mucous body of Malpighi.* The first forms the hide, or the skin properly so called; it is more deeply situated and largely supplied with blood by a multitude of vessels infinitely ramified. It is to these that it owes the red tint, which it presents to the naked eye, when it is exhibited uncovered; but if we examine it by a sufficient magnifier, we perceive between the meshes of the vascular net-work the proper tissues of which it is composed, and these tissues are as white in the Guinea negro as in the European. The epidermis is found wholly external, a layer of horny appearance, composed of translucid laminæ more or less intimately adhering to each other, and the demi-transparency of which permits us to perceive the general tint of the tissue placed below. This layer is entirely alike in all races.

It is between the dermis and epidermis that is found placed the mucous body, the seat of color. This is composed of cells pressed one against the other, and placed one over the other in a way to form a certain number of stratifications. Thus far again, all is alike in the negro and in the white; but in this last, the contents of the cells the lowest placed are, in most parts of the body, almost colorless, and present but a slightly yellowish tint: this color deepens in the yellow and white races themselves, when they assume the brown tint; finally in the negro, it becomes of a more or less brownish black. We here see to what is reduced this phenomenon of the different colors of the human races. In neither is there the appearance of any new organs or organic elements; there is but a color, which, starting from a mean term, deepens or lessens, and passes from one shade to the other in a way to become more or less prominent in each of these elements.

Such as it is, however, this fact might have been considered as having a real value in the present question, if it was constant; that is to say, if each special tint always accompanied more important characters peculiar to certain human groups; but this is not the case, and it is especially of man that we may repeat what Linneus said in reference to flowers—*nimium ne crede colori.** All black men are not negroes; there are some of them, which

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* Do not trust too much in color.

are attached by an indisputable and not remote relationship to the white populations. Finally, as we have said above, the Europeans, male and female, carry upon them, on various parts of the body, *specimens*, as we may say, of the characteristic skin of the principal human groups. M. Flourens has fully demonstrated that the mammary areola owes its special color only to the presence of a skin identical in every respect with that of the negro; M. Koelliker has again found in a European, and in a part of the body difficult to name, a coloration of the cutaneous layers entirely resembling that which the head of a Malay had exhibited to him: M. Simon de Berlin has proved that the spots of redness and the beauty spots are nothing else than points where, without any alteration, the cells of the mucous body are colored as they are in the negro. Let me add to what I have already indicated certain other well-known facts, such as the multiplication of red spots under the influence of heat and the sun, and the change of the facial surface in pregnant women, etc. When with this collection of facts we compare certain observations relative to the changes of color cited in a former part of this work, we shall certainly be bound to conclude that the diverse tints which human groups offer are very far from having in anthropology the value which has for a long time been accorded to them, but is at this day generally denied.

If we examine in detail the phenomena of color which the eyes, the hair, or even the internal parts present, we should come to the same results. The blue, gray, and chestnut eyes are far from being rare among negroes; the best characterized population with a perfectly white skin have very often black hair. As to the deep color of the brain and certain membranes, which some have sought to make a distinctive sign of the negro, it has been very much exaggerated; and, if it exists in certain cases, there is nothing constant about it. The dissections, today very frequent, which are made in our amphitheaters on individuals belonging to this race, justify us in this assertion. Moreover, this internal coloration is not alone met with in the negro. In a recent work, M. Gubler, in summing up his numerous observations on this subject, has clearly shown that it is found, in various degrees, in Europeans, with a more or less deep tint; that it presents at times and in places an intensity as great as

in the negro, and that it is sometimes hereditary and sometimes personal.

This instability of the phenomena of coloring, and the facility with which they are produced, identically the same in human populations otherwise very different, and manifested at times in a way altogether isolated in individuals, agree as little as possible with the nature of characters calculated to distinguish a *species*, and remind us in every respect, on the contrary, of the facts which the *characters* of *race* present. Moreover, we find it again, and in a yet more decided degree, in our domestic animals. In them, the skin where exposed presents variations of tint not durable. The feet of our ordinary hens are sometimes whitish, more usually slate-colored; they have become black, olive, yellow, etc., in other races, some of which are of a very recent origin. The skin of the body even is yellowish in the Cochin China hen; white in the Gallic; black in those dark species which are found in America, on the plain of Bogota; in Asia, at the Philippines, at Java; in Africa, at the Cape Verde Islands; and which would be developed very rapidly in certain countries of Europe, if we did not seek to arrest them on account of the disagreeable appearance which they present to consumers. In them, indeed, the black color does not stop on the surface of the body; it penetrates inward, as in Europeans and the negro of whom we have just spoken; only here it is much deeper, and invades all the mucous membranes, the periosteum, and the cellular sheaths which encircle the muscles, so that the entire flesh seems to be impregnated with it.

The feathers in birds, and the hair in mammals, represent the hair and villosity which with us cover the various parts of the body. It would be wholly useless to enter into details in order to demonstrate to the reader that this plumage and this skin-covering vary in the same domestic species in regard to color, within limits much more extended than the corresponding parts do in man. All know that the tints are here much more numerous, and that, moreover, they are mixed up, or placed along side of each other by plates, spots, bands, and in a hundred ways, which we never see on the human body. These differences are not the only ones which the teguments of different races present; they vary also in quantity. We have dogs with a thick fur, such as the island dog and the sheep dog, and others, whose skin

is entirely naked, like the race improperly called the Turkish race. Oxen present similar phenomena, and M. Roulin informs us that in descending the Cordilleras we may observe upon the animals all degrees of skin-covering, from the thickest to a perfect nudity of the skin. In the region of the grasses the oxen have remarkably long and thick hair; in the plains of Neiba and Mariquita there is formed a race which has only fine and scattered hairs. These oxen, designated under the name of *pelones*, are not in request, but are suffered to live. It is not so with the *colongos*, which are entirely destitute of hair. These are pitilessly slain, in order to prevent them from propagating; and, if they have hitherto remained as a variety, and have not constituted a race, it is clear that we owe it to this radical precaution. Finally, among birds and among mammals the plumage and the skin-covering change their quality according to the race. We know that the last have two sorts of hair, the wool and the jar, with which the down and the feathers in the first correspond. In our European fine-wooled sheep the jar has completely disappeared, except on the nose, ears, and feet; it exists, on the contrary, upon the sheep of Senegal and Guinea, and may be long or short according to the race. Similar facts have been observed in birds. In South America the hens have no down; on the other hand, the silk hen of Japan, recently found again perhaps by Madam Passy, is only covered with a fine, silky down, and is entirely destitute of feathers. Thus in two classes of animals, which supply nearly all our domestic species, the elements of the plumage or the skin-covering may be almost substituted for one another; both may be remarkably modified, both may be exaggerated in an evident manner, both may completely disappear, and all these facts characterize not *species*, but rather single *races*.

We do not observe such extremes in man. To whatever group he may belong, his head always remains covered with hair, and also, with a few exceptions, which are found in all the groups, we find more or less of villosity in those places where we possess it in a permanent manner. Some entire populations have the beard less thick than the Europeans; there exist none who are completely destitute of it. The opposite assertion, repeated upon various occasions by a number of authors, both ancient and modern, has always been refuted by more exact observations.

Herodotus and Ammianus Marcellinus have said that certain Asiatic populations were completely beardless; but Pollas informs us that the depilation, practiced with great care in infancy, alone gave them this appearance. Humboldt has shown that the same explanation is applicable to the pretended want of beard in the Americans, and D'Orbigny has fully confirmed what his illustrious predecessor had asserted on this point. As to the hair of so remarkable an aspect, which characterizes the various negro groups, it is truly wrong that one should distinguish them by an epithet which assimilates it to the wool of our flocks. It rather resembles the crisped hair of the horse's mane, but is in reality ordinary hair, only coarser and rougher than ours, and corresponding to the jar in mammals. Thus, in whatever point of view we may compare the feathers or the hairs of our domestic races with the hair and villosity of man, we ever meet, in the first, examples of variations much greater than in the most widely separated human groups. We shall see the same fact repeated in a permanent way in the comparative study of the other characters more important than those which have hitherto claimed our attention.

Let us speak first of the size. Here we shall find some very precise and significant figures. Daubenton and M. Isidore Geoffroy have given some tables indicating the length and hight of the principle races of dogs, measured, one from the end of the nose to the origin of the tail, the other from the fore-quarters. In comparing the mountain dog and the little spaniel, we find that the length varies from 1 meter and 328 millimeters to 305 millimeters; the hight, from 770 millimeters to 162.* Thus, in the first of the races in question, the body is more than four times longer than in the second, and the hight is almost fivefold. In accordance with the reasons which we have already indicated, the greater part of the domestic species vary less than the dog; they do not the less, however, as to hight, present some differences almost as remarkable. The niçard rabbit is hardly 20 meters in length; the ram rabbit attains even to 60 meters, that is to say, to three times the length. According to Daubenton, the hight of the sheep rises, according to races, to 1 meter 19 centi-

* Meter, 3.28 feet; millimeter, 0.03937 inches. The figures are whole numbers and decimals. Centimeter, 0.3937 inches.

meters, or descends even to 325 millimeters; here again the relation is very nearly 1 to 3. Our ancient draft-horses from the banks of the Rhone, the horse of the English brewer, and a race of horses in Friesland, are often 1 millimeter 80 centimeters at the neck; the Shetland horse, according to David Low, is sometimes only 76 centimeters in hight at the same place. It is then less in size than some dogs measured by M. Isidore Geoffroy, and the relation of the largest to the smallest race is yet more han double. This figure is so much the more remarkable as in general the attention given by man to this species has always had in view the elevation of the size, and the increase of the proportions, in order to render it better fitted to perform a greater part of the service which is demanded of it. An examination of goats, oxen, and hogs, would supply us with some analogous facts.

We will now ascertain the limits within which the stature of the human groups varies, and, passing by the intermediates, let us compare at once the two extreme races—the Patagonian and the Bushman. It is known that the hight of the first has been singularly exaggerated. Pigafetta, the historian of the voyage of Magellan, and Oviedo, who rendered the same service for Loaysa, agree on thirteen feet in hight (4 meters 20 centimeters); but this hight is singularly reduced as the observations become more numerous and precise. Drake had already remarked that among his countrymen there were found individuals of a taller stature than the largest of the Patagonians. This opinion of the celebrated English admiral, after having been too much overlooked, has received an emphatic confirmation. Commerson and Bougainville, after having passed several hours in the midst of a Patagonian group, estimated the hight of these savages at five feet eight inches or six feet; but no traveller has studied this question with so much attention as Alcide d'Orbigny. He has sojourned in the country, observed individuals from numerous localities, and employed all necessary precautions in order to make sure of the identity of the populations which he examined with those of whom his predecessors had spoken, and especially taken precise measurements. Now, the hight of the largest Patagonian which he measured was five feet eleven inches, (1 meter 915,) and the mean obtained by him is five feet four inches (1 meter 73.) D'Orbigny indicates, moreover, the circumstances

which may have misled any one, who should see cnly at a distance, or in passing, the men in question. To their tall stature they join athletic forms and shoulders remarkably broad, and they drape themselves in their mantles of skin in a way to produce an illusion, which this skillful traveler says he often fell into, all prepared as he was against it. Here, then, is in reality the hight of the tallest race of men. Let us now see what is that of the smallest.

The Laplanders have for a long time passed for being the smallest race; but Capell Brooke, who lived a winter among them, and was able to measure a great number of them, has ascertained that their mean hight was from five feet to five feet two inches, English, (from 1 meter 52 to 1 meter 67.) They are then larger than the Bushmen. Indeed, Barrow, who has taken the measures in a *kraal* of one hundred and fifty inhabitants, has found that the tallest man was but four feet nine inches English, (1 meter 44,) and the mean hight, which he gives, is four feet six inches, (1 meter 31.) In comparing this figure with that which we just now cited for the Patagonians, we find that the relation of the greatest mean hight to the smallest is represented by *one and three-tenths*—that is to say, that the first is very far from being double of the second. It is clear that the limit of the variations of hight is three or four times less in man than in animals.

The study of the general proportions of the body leads to a similar conclusion. Let us compare, for example, the length of the trunk with that of the members. Here again the researches of Daubenton and M. Isidore Geoffroy upon dogs furnish some precise numbers. In the tables, which they have drawn up, we see that the small greyhound has a hight at the fore-shoulders of 36 centimeters, and that 53 is the length of the body. In the basset, the hight is 30 centimeters and the length 81. In the first case, the relation of the hight to the length of the body is expressed by 0.68, and in the second by 0.37. These two comparisons vary then almost from single to double, and the difference depends especially, we know, upon the proportional length of the members. Other domestic species would present numbers not less significant, if we had corresponding measurements. Such especially is the sheep. We find also among them races with long legs, for example, the kirghise races; but there exists also

a race of very recent formation, to which we will recur again somewhat in detail—the *otter race* or the *ancon race*, which is developed in North America. This race is among sheep what the basset is among dogs, and to judge of it by the designs which we have seen, the relation of hight to length must be nearly the same.

In human groups, the relative proportion of the trunk and the limbs never varies to an extent at all comparable with what we find in the animal races. The polygenists have insisted, on various occasions, upon the length of the superior limb, and especially of the fore-arm in the negro. In general, this length is a little greater than in the white man; but do we here see a difference comparable to that which the greyhound and the basset, our sheep and the otter sheep, present? Our readers are able to judge of it for themselves. We will say as much of the legs of the Hindoo compared with those of the European. Were the difference as great as some travelers affirm, there would be nothing in the fact which would compare with what we have stated, and with what every one knows to exist among animals.

Besides, the exaggerations in relation to the variations of hight and proportion in human groups are easily explained by a fact too often forgotten. When the question turns upon our species and certain details of external organization, the eye, in consequence of the education which it has undergone, possesses a rigor of appreciation which renders the least modification quickly perceptible. All know with what promptitude we seize the differences of hight of a few millimeters, and how even we exaggerate them to ourselves. It is almost always the same where the question relates to the proportion of the various parts of the body among themselves. There is nothing easier than to be convinced of this in some of the public baths, where the population of our great cities exhibit so many sad examples of almost all possible deformities. At the sight of some of these badly constructed specimens of the human form, we say to ourselves at once, making use of a vulgar expression, "They are all legs." Let us look more closely, let us compare them with other individuals of the same total hight, and we shall see that there is scarcely a difference of a few centimeters, between the length of the legs. In the ordinary man, reckoning the hight at 1 meter and 75 centimeters, the length of the arms, from the articulation in

the shoulder to the end of the fingers, is about 75 centimeters; that of the legs, from the point below the hip to the heel is about 80 centimeters. Let one subtract or add in thought 10 or 12 centimeters only (3.9 inch or 4.71 inch) either to the superior limb or to the inferior one, and who will not see that there would result a real deformity, calculated to strike us at the first glance? And yet we should have lengthened or shortened these limbs, the first but a seventh, and the second but an eighth. Between the negro and the white, and between the Hindoo and the European, the difference is very far from being so considerable, while we have seen these same parts to vary from one to two between one animal race and another, all the proportions being preserved. Here again the limit of variation is clearly much greater in animals than in man.

Every variation in hight and proportion necessarily bears upon the osseous system, which forms the frame of the body; but the skeleton may yet be affected, and even in its most central parts, in various other ways. All things, however, being equal, the trunk, for example, may be, in the same species, either longer or shorter, according to the races. Ordinarily these differences depend upon the lengthening or shortening of the vertebræ, the number of which, however, remains fixed. Sometimes also this member itself varies. Hogs are remarkable in this respect. According to Eyton, whom M. Godron cites, there may exist from thirteen to fifteen dorsal vertebræ, from four to six lumbar and sacral vertebræ. These variations are much wider still in the tail, the skeleton of which is nothing but a prolongation of the vertebral column; we find, says Eyton again, from thirteen to twenty-three osselets, and all these differences become hereditary in certain porcine races in England. M. Frederic Cuvier had already remarked that the tail of the dog contains from sixteen to twenty-one vertebræ. Besides, this appendage is one of those which, in many domestic species, present the most considerable modifications. In the sheep in particular, as Pollas and D. Low inform us, the tail sometimes almost entirely disappears in certain Persian, Abyssinian, and Tartar races; sometimes, on the contrary, it is lengthened to such a degree as to be drawn on the ground, as in certain sheep of the Ukraine, Podolia, Wales, etc. It is habitually very lean, but it is also known that it is sometimes loaded with enormous fatty bunches, weighing according to Chardin, more than thirty pounds,

and requiring the use of artificial means to support this inconvenient burden and facilitate the movements of the animals.

Does man present the least fact, which can be compared with the preceding one? Evidently not. In human groups, the number of pieces, which enter into the composition of the vertebral column, properly so called, remains always and every-where the same. If at times individuals have been met with presenting more or fewer vertebræ, these facts are gathered up and pointed out on account of their rarity; and, far from forming the character of a race, they remain entirely isolated. As to the prolongation of the vertebral column, which in us corresponds to the tail in animals, and which is called the coccyx, there is ground, within the last few years, for discussion. The question of men with tails, which was long since supposed to be resolved, has again been brought upon the tapis, and it is difficult entirely to pass over it in silence. What, then, is there of truth in what ancient and modern testimony furnishes upon this subject—testimony coming, in some cases, from persons evidently worthy of credit? There is here nothing but what is very simple. Man, in an embryonic state, has a tail proportionally as long as the dog. In the process of the development and metamorphosis, this tail is found changed into the coccyx. A stoppage in the metamorphosis of this part would then be sufficient, in order to present in man a caudal prolongation, sensibly longer than that which he possesses in a normal state. Now, we know that such stoppages have been frequently observed in almost all the organs. There would then be nothing strange if the fact, so much controverted, should be realized in some individuals. However, while admitting that it might be so, which is not proved—while admitting, moreover, that this singular conformation might become hereditary, and that the history of the famous Niam-Niams might not be a fable—this modification would yet be a very small matter, compared with those which the tails of the various races of sheep daily exhibit to us. Thus, neither in its essential part nor in its exterior prolongation, does the vertebral column of man present any variations to be compared with those which we meet with in our domestic races, and which characterize them.

We have insisted somewhat in detail upon the preceding characters, because the results of the comparison which we seek to establish between the animal races and human groups can be trans-

lated into figures, and expressed with sufficient facility in words. We will pass more lightly over the facts, which, in order to be appreciated, would at least require some very exact and numerous figures. Such are those which are drawn from the study of the bones of the head. Daubenton and Blumenbach had already remarked that, from the head of the wild boar to that of the domestic hog, the characters varied more than from the head of the white to that of the negro. Prichard, in reproducing this opinion, the accuracy of which it is so easy to verify, has justly extended it to the heads of the various races of dogs. If we place on one side the heads of the white and negro the best characterized, and on the other the first found heads of the house-dog, the water-spaniel, the greyhound, etc., it is impossible not to see, at the first glance, that the differences are much greater in the second group than in the first. In man nothing will strike the inexperienced eye, with the exception perhaps of the *prognathism*, that is to say, a slight projection forward of the jaw-bones and the teeth. In the dogs, on the contrary, one will see at once that the form and the proportions in almost all parts vary in a most marked manner. Unfortunately, without running into details altogether technical and difficult for even professed naturalists to follow, we can not here give an idea of these modifications, and we shall refer the reader disposed to verify the accuracy of our assertions to the details given by Frederic Cuvier in a special work, to the plates which Prichard had added to his abridgment of his *Natural History of Man*, and especially to the skeletons which constitute a part of the collections of the museum. However prejudiced one may be, he will certainly be compelled to acknowledge that the skeleton of the head varies from one race of our domestic animals to another, much more than among human groups.

The study of functions would give results altogether similar to those which we obtain by an examination of organs. Confining ourselves to a single example, we observe that woman is everywhere fruitful, and at all seasons, and that the extreme limits of her fecundity are never as widely separated as they are between races in the species which we have cited. The same is equally true of the instinctive and psychological faculties. In animals these faculties vary under the influence of man or new conditions of existence. The wild boar, it is known, retires daily into his den, and comes forth hardly ever except by night. The hog, on

the contrary, sleeps during the night and wakes during the day. Under the empire of domesticity, the wild boar has become a diurnal animal from a nocturnal one, which he naturally was. The beaver, in America as well as in Europe, disturbed in his repose and tracked by the hunter, has completely modified the kind of life which constituted him one of the most curious examples to study when one wished to form an opinion of what instinct and intelligence were in animals. In lieu of uniting into large families, of building dams and cabins, he has set himself to live alone, and to dig for himself a hole. Social and builder as he was, he has become solitary and a digger. In the two cases which I have cited, there is, so to say, an inversion of native faculties, and I do not believe that any thing similar in man can be cited.

In support of this conclusion, in support of all which precedes, I should love to examine here, somewhat in detail, some of the least favored groups among human populations. There are especially three whose history would be singularly instructive. At all times, the polygenists have tended to exaggerate beyond measure the distance which exists between these groups. Not being able to raise the whites above the level which we all know, they have been forced to exceed very much the real inferior limit, and to place lower and lower the populations the worst supplied with physical beauty or intellectual aptitudes. They have, then, been drawn to attach them as closely as possible to animals themselves. Hence, all the efforts which have been at first tried to find resemblances and identities between certain anthropomorphic apes and the negro. The black men were declared to be incapable of civilization; one spoke of their *snout*, and in spite of what Desmoulins, a naturalist, very little to be suspected in this respect, might have said, it was maintained that the brain of the negro and that of the orang-outang presented striking resemblances. However, when Africa became open to our intrepid travelers, when we knew the Dahomans, the Fantis, and the Aschanti, when we had ascertained to a certainty that there existed cities and arts and a negro civilization, it was necessary, elsewhere, to search for that species of man which ought, according to certain theories, to serve as the intermediary between the white man and the brute. They then threw themselves upon the Hottentots, and repeated on that subject, by aggravating it in a very notable manner, all that had been said of the negroes. The refutation was furnished by information

supplied by Levaillant, and confirmed, from year to year, by other travelers and missionaries. Because one was a shepherd and a nomad, and rubbed the body with grease or rancid butter, it did not follow that he could be compared to an ape. Finally, they addressed themselves to the Australians, and this time they traced the picture of the most complete degradation. To be declared absolutely destitute of religion, laws, arts, and industries, to be proclaimed totally incapable of rising in any way in civilization, were certainly the mildest reproaches addressed to this unhappy population. Physically, it was not to the orang-outang that one compared the Australian, but to the mandril.* As to morality, let us see how an English author sums up all he has said of them: "In a word, they have all the bad things which humanity ought never to present, and many more at which the apes, their congeners, would blush." It would seem that the progression has been rapid, if we must compare the African negro with the ape; it was at any rate a superior ape. One makes of the Australian an inferior and vitiated ape. What is there of truth in these darkened pictures? Nothing, except that the Australian is one of the lowest representatives of humanity. Has he, on this account, lost the imprint of the human type? Have the characters of the kingdom and the species disappeared? No! with him, as with the negro and the Hottentot, more accurate information has done justice to these inaccurate assertions, based altogether upon incomplete observations and rash generalizations, sometimes upon worse motives. In order to justify our assertions, let us indicate some of the features of the history of this group according to information furnished by some eminent men who have lived in Australia, fathomed the mysteries of this almost unknown part of the world, and really studied and compared the various populations which inhabit it.

And first, do the Australians stand as low physically as have asserted not only Bory Saint Vincent and those who repeat his assertion, but also some travelers, who did but touch the land, and then judged an entire continent by some points where they happened to stop? Mitchell and Pickering shall answer for us. The first describes his guide Yulliyalli, as *a perfect specimen of humanity*, the equal of whom it would be impossible to find in

* An inferior race of apes.

those communities which wear clothing and shoes. And this not an exception. The English traveler refers repeatedly to the physical *perfection of these human machines*, developed in full liberty. Pickering, the companion of Captain Wilkes, in the great scientific expedition of the United States, confirms in every particular this judgment; he declares never to have any where met with that excessive leanness of the extremities, so often given as one of the *characters* of the Australians, and treats as simple caricatures most of the engravings of the race, which have been published. Out of thirty individuals from the interior, he declares that he saw few of them who were of remarkable ugliness, while others, contrary to all previous ideas, had the face decidedly fine. He concludes his observations by saying: "Strange thing! I regard the Australian as the most beautiful model of human proportions in respect to muscular development. He combines the most perfect symmetry with force and activity; while his head may be compared to the ancient bust of some philosopher." This, we see, is very far from the opinions expressed which appear in some very recent works. It is evidently necessary to give up the attempt to find, in the general form of the body and exterior characters, differences sufficiently great to separate the Australian from the human species represented by the whites.

Are the polygenists better supported when resting their opinions upon the differences of an intellectual order, and the manifestations which spring from these? Industry, for example; is there none of it among the Australians? Bory affirms it; he has pretended that these people know neither how to construct a temporary cabin, nor to arm themselves with any thing else than stakes, rudely dressed, and sharpened at each end. All these assertions have been repeated. Bory forgot the facts already observed by Perron, during his stay at Entracht Land; and from which it results that the natives knew how to hollow for themselves in a friable rock lodgings, the sides of which presented cavities for the purpose of there placing their *utensils*. He forgot that the same Perron had brought back from Australia a stone hatchet, fixed to its handle by a mastic of such hardness that it excited the astonishment of all our chemists, and of which one of them, Laugier, wished to make an analysis. He forgot that there had been found in these same countries very varied arms

for hunting and war. Since that epoch, our information is yet more complete; but, without speaking of the most recent, how does it happen that what Captain Stuart collected on the voyage, which led him to the banks of the Murray, as far back as 1831, is certainly passed over in silence? Is it a people like that which Bory and his successors have painted, who build permanent huts capable of lodging from twelve to fifteen persons; who have invented the bark canoe; who have woven nets well fitted, some with large meshes for hunting the kangaroo, others with small meshes for catching fish, and some of them even eighty feet in length? From these facts, we might justly conclude that the Australians possess in reality the most at least of the elementary industries which are found among savage tribes; but, what is still more significant, Dr. Cunningham, who has made to New South Wales four voyages in the capacity of chief surgeon of the vessels destined for the transportation of *convicts*, and staid in that colony for two years, who has studied with care the native population, and who is any thing but an admirer of these people, found the Australians lively, playful, inquisitive, and intelligent. He ascertained that they learn to read and write almost as rapidly as the Europeans, and all speak and understand English very well. They very easily seize hold of the ridiculous, and appreciate at the first glance social differences. The New Hollanders of whom Cunningham speaks, are those of Sydney and its environs; but he declares repeatedly that there exist populations very superior to these which surround that colony. Let us, however, take these for a term of comparison. Is there, in the intellectual portrait which we have sketched, a single feature which authorizes us to make of them a separate species?

It has been said and repeated that the Australians are incapable of rising above the level where they were found by the first navigators. This is again an assertion which is found to be contradicted by facts. When we seriously set ourselves to the education of the inhabitants of New Holland, they have promptly responded to our attentions, as appears from the information furnished by Dawson, Cunningham, etc. Individuals who have, like Daniel and Benilong, been brought into England, and introduced into polished society, have become true *gentlemen*, according to the admission even of those whose opinions we are combating. If, when restored to Australia, they have in the end returned to sav-

age life, who can be astonished at it, when he reflects upon the position which the prejudice of color assigns to the negro in the colonies, especially in the English colonies; to the irresistible attraction which the desert and its independence exert even over the whites who have once tasted of them; and also to those *hereditary instincts* which characterize so distinctly certain races? Perhaps it may be said that those are only individual examples, which prove nothing as to the masses; but here is a wholly different fact, borrowed from a review which may be called local, and which shows that some populations may be very easily regenerated in the mass. Mr. Bateman and some Englishmen went to Port Philip, on the south side of Australia, with the design of there forming an agricultural establishment. They were very soon struck with the civilization of the inhabitants of this region, whom they found much better clothed and lodged, and better supplied with furniture and provided with all necessary articles than their fellow-countrymen. A few days after, this phenomenon of relative improvement was explained by the appearance of a white man, clothed in a frock-coat, made from the skin of a kangaroo. He was an old grenadier of the English army, named William Buckley, who, sent to that region at the time of the first attempt at colonization made in 1803, had escaped, and lived thirty-three years with the natives. It was not long before he became their chief, and under his direction they had attained the point which so much astonished the new colonists. This was the effect which the isolated influence of a single soldier had produced in savages declared wholly incapable of any progress.

Besides, let us see in what terms M. de Blosseville states, in his remarkable work upon Australia, the latest information, collected especially in the South. "The dearness of handwork has imparted a value to the labor hitherto unemployed of these wandering tribes. It appears that, when interest demands, they do not remain unintelligent witnesses of the useful arts, and that their huts and housekeeping are neatly kept. In 1853, two hundred thousand sheep were under the care of native shepherds. One of the principal commissioners employed no other workmen. They readily became brick-makers, wood-choppers, cattle-drivers, and even constables for their own race." Along side of these Australian populations, evidently entered upon the road of civilization, the same author points out the posterity of the convicts which

have escaped from the penal colonies scattered among the little islands, and much nearer a savage state than a degraded civilization. Thus, in Australia, the *white man* sinks as the *black man* rises. This testimony is certainly a complete refutation of all the polygenist assertions, and is so much the more decisive since the author who has furnished it never even thought, while tracing the lines which have just been quoted, of the question now under discussion.

Even when left to their own nature, the Australians are very far from having fallen as low as is pretended. It has been said that the family no longer exists among them. The shameful facility of the wives, and the indifference of the husbands, have been constantly insisted upon; but these examples are selected only from the tribes bordering upon Sidney—tribes whom civilization has corrupted, as it too often has done elsewhere. In some other regions it is not the same. Dawson, on the contrary, traces a very patriarchal picture of the Australian family. It has again been said and repeated that they possess no vestige of the social state; that they always wander about in groups composed, at most, of one or two families. Long since, however, Gray and De Long showed that there exists among them a division into clans, which are themselves subdivided into tribes and families, the name of which is found in that of the individuals. They gave a list of these clans, and exhibited the usages, which remind us, at the same time, of the institution of the *tabu* of the Polynesians and the *totem* of the Americans. Moreover, Stuart has discovered the existence of very numerous villages, composed, sometimes, of sixty or seventy cabins, and containing from eight hundred to one thousand inhabitants. It has been said, and it is even yet asserted, that the Australians have no idea of property, yet the authors whom we have already cited have discovered that each tribe possesses its own lands, the limits of which, habitually respected, are never crossed but in case of war, or upon a formal invitation, and that this right of property also extends to the family. We might multiply these contradictions between the assertions of the polygenists and the testimony of men who, while residing upon the spot, have taken the pains seriously to study these calumniated populations; but we think we have said enough to demonstrate that, in whatever point of view we look at them, the intellectual faculties of the New Hollanders do not differ from

those of white men, except in a lower degree of development, and that the *variation* here remains much on this side of the limits which we have seen to occur between the different races of animals of the same species.

Not less disfigured has been the picture of the good or bad moral qualities of the Australians. There have been attributed to them the vices, which they have, in common, not only with savages in general, but also with nations the furthest civilized, such as the desire of revenge, drunkenness, and the looseness of morals which is observed to prevail in great cities, while all those facts, brought to light sometimes by the same author, and which prove how accessible are their hearts to the gentlest and noblest sentiments, to family affections, to conjugal love, and to the loveliest gratitude for the slightest services, are overlooked and forgotten. Once deceived by a white man, the Australian never trusts him again; he resorts to reprisals, but Dawson remarks that he acts with perfect good faith toward the man who has known how to merit his confidence. Cunningham has discovered in this people the sense of *honor* exhibited in veritable duels, where all takes place according to rules from which one can not escape without disgrace. Finally, here is a fact which we borrow from Captain Stuart, proving that the spirit of chivalry, as it was understood by the noblest paladins, is not a stranger to these pretended demi-brutes. Two Irish escaped convicts got into a quarrel with the natives among whom they had fled. They came to blows, but the Europeans were without arms. Before attacking them, the Australians furnished them with some, in order that they might defend themselves, after which they fought and slew them.

It is manifest that every trace of religion would be denied to the Australians. Here, as usual, the facts do not support the assertion. A belief in spirits and a dread of ghosts has been found to exist among all the tribes. Among them all, also, the dead are buried with peculiar ceremonies. Lieutenant Britton had an opportunity of seeing the funeral rites of the nomads of the banks of the Wollomby. Without describing them in detail, we may remark that the tombs, which are very regular, are encircled with rings of bark, designed to protect them against the attacks of the bad genii, and that arms are there deposited, in order that the dead man, when he shall come forth, may find them within his reach, and be able to use them against his enemies.

Surely this is enough to show that the notion of another life exists among the Australians. As to the idea of beings superior to man and capable of acting upon him for weal or woe; this also has been found wherever it has been sought. In all the tribes, we discover a belief, common to so many people, in a spirit of good, and a spirit of evil. In the environs of Sidney, the spirit of good is called Coyan. He is invoked whenever lost children are to be sought for. In order to render him favorable in such cases, an offering of darts is made to him; if the search is vain, it is concluded that Coyan has been irritated in some way. The bad genius is called Potoyan; he roams during the night around the cabins, seeking to devour their inhabitants. Along side of their superior divinities, the Australian places some secondary genii, among others the *wanguls*, aquatic monsters, which remind one of the *kelpies* of Scotland, and the *balunbols*, a species of angels, or rather fairies of the woods, which live on honey. All that Cunningham has told us respecting their beliefs is confirmed by the information collected by Wilkes from the missionaries of Wellington. The names only are different, for the reason that the dialects spoken in Australia are different, and this fact suggests to us a last remark, the importance of which will be readily understood.

The polygenists, seeing different species in the human groups, are inevitably led to circumscribe them in a trenchant manner, to refer to each of them as being peculiar to it, some physical, intellectual, or moral traits, of which they make so many *special characters*. They do not fail to act in this way with the Australian, and it is to this tendency that it is especially necessary to attribute what has been said of the features of their face, and the proportions of their limbs, represented as wholly exceptional. The same assertions are made in reference to their language. It has been almost denied that they have a language, properly so called, and are able to emit sounds truly articulated. In a linguistic as well as in a physical point of view, many have represented them as beings wholly unique. Now, of these two alleged facts one is no more true than the other. We have seen above what we are obliged to accept respecting size. Let us add that the Australian population is by no means homogeneous, but that between the different tribes there are some decided physical differences to such an extent, that Cunningham speaks

of tribes with a copper tint. Finally, let us cite a very remarkable fact: Pickering has discovered among the Drawidian nomads of India, individuals who exhibit all the characteristic features of the Australians, so that, to judge of them solely from physical resemblance, these populations, separated from each other by such great distances, would still be very nearly related.

Indeed, it is precisely to this result that the comparison of languages has led us. In his excellent work, entitled *The Earth and Man*, M. Alfred Maury has restored and sanctioned by his authority the conclusions to which M. Logan had arrived. Another philologist, whom the use of oriental languages renders so much the more fitted to approach this question, and who has made them a special study, M. Runer-Bey, has desired to state for us the fruit of his researches on this subject. All their labors fully agree and come to the same conclusions. The Australian idioms, although numerous and varied, are all branches of one fundamental language: this presents such resemblances with the Drawidian languages of India that we can not separate them, and we are led to unite them in the same family. Thus philology, as well as physical characters, far from isolating the Australians, attaches them to continental populations. Finally, these two orders of ideas and facts, harmonious in this as in every other respect, evince a mixture of blood and languages, so that, far from being a *species apart*, the Australians do not form a *pure race*, and are manifestly the product of the crossing of the true oriental negroes with a yellow or Malay element.

And now let us draw from all these individual facts, which we have here presented, the general consequence which naturally flows from them. Struck with the differences which exist among human groups, the polygenists have thought that they could not account for them without admitting the existence of many *species* of men. Now, an attentive study demonstrates that, in a natural point of view, these differences fully belong to the order of those which the vegetable and animal races present. Moreover, it follows from a rigorous comparison that, in relation to *extent*, the animal races exhibit between themselves variations more considerable in every respect than human populations the most widely separated. In order to draw from these facts all their legitimate consequences, we should be right in concludiug that in themselves they render the doctrine of unity more probable

than the opposite doctrine. We do not, however, yet wish to go to that extent, and we restrict ourselves to saying: in order to explain the diversity of human groups, it is useless to have recourse to the hypotheses of the *multiplicity of species;* the *multiplicity of races and the unity of species* are sufficient. The argument, drawn by the polygenists from the differences existing between these groups possess, then, no value.

FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

LET the fairest star, therefore, be selected, like a beauteous island in the vast and shoreless sea of the azure heavens, as the future home of the criminals from the earth, and let these possess whatever they most love, and all that it is *possible* for God to bestow; let them be endowed with undying bodies, and with minds which shall forever retain their intellectual powers; let no Savior ever press his claims upon them, no Holy Spirit visit them, no God reveal himself to them, no Sabbath ever dawn upon them, no saint ever live among them, no prayer ever be heard within their borders; but let society exist there forever, smitten only by the leprosy of hatred to God, and with utter selfishness as its all-prevailing and eternal purpose, then, as sure as the law of righteousness exists, on which rests the throne of God and the government of the universe, a society so constituted must work out for itself a hell of solitary and bitter suffering, to which there is no limit except the capacity of a finite nature! Alas! the spirit that is without love to its God or to its neighbor is already possessed by a power which must at last create for its own self-torment a worm that will never die, and a flame that can never more be quenched! —*Dr. Norman Macleod.*

UNITY OF APOSTOLIC DOCTRINE.*

The four great typical systems of apostolic doctrine are those of James, Peter, Paul, and John, as contained in their respective epistles, illustrated from other sources; such as the discourses of James, Peter, and Paul, in the Acts of the Apostles, and the Apocalypse and Gospel, written by John. The doctrinal representations, in so far as they are disclosed in these records, bear indisputable marks of variety, individuality, and diversity. Each mind receives and gives its own measure of the truth. It has been said that their differences from one another are determined by the mode in which they regard the relation of the Gospel to the Jewish economy. We think this is not their source, but only one manifestation of the modes in which they severally regard the truth of Christianity—modes which were determined by the fundamental difference of their moral nature, and which were all necessary to the adequate setting forth in the world of this infinite subject.

James may be styled the Apostle of *Law* and *Obedience*. With him the moral law of the Old Testament has been transformed, with a glory that excelleth, into the spiritual law of liberty. Peter may be styled the Apostle of *Prophecy* and of *Hope*. The achievements of Christ have fulfilled all that the Prophets have foretold, "unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things which are now reported unto you." And his ardent spirit gazes ever in prophetic hope "upon the glory that shall be revealed." Hope flashes her radiance over the brief pages of his letters; for the victory and glory of his Lord are yet to be consummated. Paul may be styled the Apostle of *Righteousness*, and reconciliation with God in Christ. The mighty synthesis of his doctrine we can not even sketch, nor is it needed. And John is the Apostle of *Love*—God's love, and man's love.

In this arrangement of these great systems of doctrine, we recognize unity, and, more, progress; a harmony which swells with

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* From an article on *Apostolic Doctrine*, in the *London Quarterly Review*, for April, 1865.

ever-rising tones, till it is lost in heavenly hallelujahs of love. But it is the agreement and unity of these systems that we now maintain. Paul's doctrine, as the most fully expounded, is taken as the standard; and with it we have reserved space only to indicate, in a few words, the argument of the Apostle James. We note then, in the Epistle of James, these points: The foundation of his argument is Faith. He is a servant of God and of Jesus Christ, to whom his faith is given; and he addresses his brethren of like faith, (James ii, 1.) This faith is to be perfected by trial, (i, 3,) and by works, (ii, 22.) This faith, when real, and perfecting itself by works, is imputed for righteousness, (ii, 23;) this faith works by love, (i, 27; ii, 13.) Salvation is by the word of God, (i, 18–21.) The forgiveness of sins is of the Lord, (v, 15.) The soul is born anew of God, (i, 18.) Every good gift is of God, (i, 5;) so that our salvation is wholly of grace, (iv, 12.) Faith gives the energy to obey the law, and perfects in this obedience the entire soul, (i, 4; ii, 17–26.) The law becomes thus the "law of liberty," (ii, 12,) the "royal law," (ii, 8.) The Lord Jesus Christ is his own Lord, and the Lord of every believer. He hears prayer: He is the Lord of Glory, before whom all believers humble themselves. He regards now the iniquity of the wrong-doer, (v, 4.) He shall reward those who love Him "with a crown of life," (i, 12;) "for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh," (iv, 12.)

We believe that this analysis suffices to prove the identity of this doctrine with that of Paul. We need not adduce the passages from Paul which discover this identity. Faith, indeed, is here regarded in relation to the Lord's righteous law, which must be obeyed; there is no explicit reference, therefore, to the atonement of Jesus, but the whole scheme of salvation, based on that great fact, is distinctly set forth, so that it is continually implied. In Peter's Epistles, the doctrine, which is recognized as Pauline, is so clearly enunciated that they are set down by the Tübingen school as writings by one of the Pauline sect in the second century. We need not expound this agreement in detail. Our space forbids our exposition of the grand doctrinal system of the Apostle John. Yet, assuredly, there is here the same Gospel, having one Lord, one faith, one hope. This concord of faith insures the triumph of the Church, which this apostle reveals; for by him we are told of those who "overcome by the blood of the Lamb."

REASONS FOR SKEPTICISM AS TO CERTAIN SPECULATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE.*

BY HENRY ROGERS,

Author of "The Eclipse of Faith," etc.

To M. D.—You ascribe my skepticism, (as you call it, and of course we are all skeptics as to what we do *not* believe,) in relation to your new-fangled speculations, to a "blind adherence" to the traditional beliefs of a "stereotyped theology;" and you tell me that it is in oblivion or contempt of what Bacon says in the First Book of his "Novum Organum."

You were never more mistaken in your life. I demur to your scientific crotchets, not because I believe the Bible, (though I do believe it,) but because I believe in Bacon. If I know myself, I fancy that, even though I had not read a syllable of the Bible, and had no "traditional beliefs" to renounce, I should have objected to the new scientific dogmas which you urge on my acceptance, just as much as I do now; and that precisely because (as I think) you, and not I, have forgotten Bacon, and been misled by those "idola" of the human intellect, before which not theologians alone, but scientific speculators too, (as indeed his First Book is more expressly designed to show,) may too readily fall.

The hint, however, to look into Bacon has not been lost upon me, though I fancy I did not particularly need it; for if I ever made a book my *vade-mecum*, it is the First Book of the Novum Organum.

And surely if ever a book deserved a periodic or constant perusal it is this. Gibbon, it is said, read every year the Provincial Letters; Voltaire always had the Carême of Massillon on his table; Robert Hall, the Essays of Addison; one friend of mine used annually to peruse the principal writings of Burke; and another Don Quixote. I should be afraid to do precisely the same by Bacon, lest he himself should rebuke me for exhibiting somewhat of that same slavish spirit which he condemns in the admirers of Aristotle. But I confess that I read him with a perpetual renewal both of wonder and delight; not only for the profundity

* From *Good Words*, April, 1865.

and comprehensiveness with which he explores the darkest recesses of human error, but for the perpetual coruscations with which the most exquisite imagination that ever ministered to philosophy lights up all his dark way, and gleams on the fossil remains and glittering petrifactions of ancient prejudice, like a thousand wax-lights on the sides of a spar cavern.

It is precisely *because* I take him as my guide, that I reject the dogmas for which you challenge my belief; nor am I unwilling to give you my reasons for so saying.

While he condemns, and justly condemns, (Aphorism lxv,) those who, not content with affirming that there must be a harmony between the "Word" and the "Works" of God, (though it may be long before we can fully show it,) persist in deducing whole "systems of natural philosophy, from the first chapter of Genesis or the book of Job," he is gloriously impartial in his censures, and shows not only that the theologian, but the scientific man also, as in ages past, so in the ages to come, may, in spite even of his own clear exposition of error, fall into similar delusions.

He did not suppose, that, having once so luminously sketched those "idola," some of them congenital to the human mind, others necessarily superinduced in the course of its development, which obstruct our admission of truth, or betray us into the reception of error, he could thereby secure the mind (scientific or otherwise) against the danger of relapsing into them. On the contrary, while he shows that the past history of science, throughout its whole course, has illustrated their potency, and ascribes its long failure, or slow and uncertain progress, to their dominion, he distinctly declares that even the inauguration of his own better method would itself bring with it a new temptation to fall into the old errors; that those "idola" he had guarded against would be apt to reappear in more subtle forms—that the tendency to hasty generalization, the impatience of arriving at results, the inability of the mind to "stay its judgment," or exercise a wise abstinence; the temptation to yield to the seductions of a forward and obtrusive fancy, to round and imperfect theory, or give symmetry to a halting hypothesis, would still be apt as ever to haunt the human intellect, however men might acknowledge the principles of the Inductive Philosophy. And therefore he expressly declares (Aphorism lxiv): "There is a certain caution not to be omitted; for I foresee and augur, that if ever men, roused by my counsels, betake themselves

seriously to experiment, and bid farewell to sophistical doctrines, then, indeed, through the premature and precipitate hurry of the understanding, the leaping or flying to universals or principles of things, great danger may be apprehended from philosophies of this" (the empirical) "kind; against which evil we ought, even now, to be on our guard." Nor is it superfluous to insist, as he did, that men still need to be warned against a class of delusions, which, he says, had been so common in previous ages of philosophy; "those foolish little models of imagined worlds (as it were, little *apes* of the true *simiolas*) which the fancies of men have created in their philosophical systems," and which "must be given to the winds." Let men know how vast a difference there is (as I have already said) between the idols of the *human* mind and the Ideas of the *Divine*. (Aphorism cxxiv).

If we may judge from the extent and audacity of modern hypothesis-making in relation to this very class of speculations, or the confidence with which such hypotheses are too often spoken of, as if they were demonstrated truths, this aphorism may be profitably studied in the present day; for the "hypotheses non fingo," which Newton considered his glory, seem little to the taste of many recent philosophers.

Certainly, my friend, I believe that never since Bacon's time has there been greater license of hypothesis than in our own day; and that especially, in relation to subjects demanding (if they are ever destined to be effectually and definitely settled by man at all, and are not rather among those things which it is the "glory of God to conceal," or which he leaves to our modest conjecture only) the utmost exercise of philosophic caution and self-restraint. Of many of them indeed one may well doubt, with M. Compte, whether they are, or *can* be, the legitimate province of science at all. To investigate the *present* laws of nature, to trace the succession of antecedents and consequents of all *present* phenomena, to analyze and classify the *facts* of the world as it is actually constituted, and lies open to our *experience*, would seem to be the proper province of *experimental science.* But, not content with this, many of you have set up as "world-makers," and are as busy as the old Greek philosophers about cosmogonies; the origin and evolution of all things; about the possible period of the gestation of the universe from its first embryo condition; the primary elements out of which all things have been evolved; whether there need have been any

such thing as "creation" proper, or any "beginning" at all; whether the "primordial forms" of all animated nature need have been more than three or four, or even more than one; and whether all species of creatures may not have been developed out of, or transmuted into, one another.

Now, as the absolute decision of such questions (some of them seem, in fact, rather the proper *pabulum* of those metaphysical speculations, which modern science generally despises, than of legitimate scientific investigations) necessarily carries us beyond the sphere of experience into regions transcendental to it, I can not help feeling some sympathy with M. Compte's too trenchant and summary proscription of all such subjects, as not even belonging to genuine science at all; subjects in which man, merely as *man*, with his merely natural *organa* of science, can not hope to know, and, at best, can but conjecture.

It is, accordingly, not a little droll to see how M. Compte, indisposed though he was to admit any *other* supreme being than "Collective Humanity," yet censures the *dogmatical* Atheist who seeks to give a plausible account of "the causes and origin of things" themselves. "The true spirit of the Positive Philosophy consists in always substituting the study of laws for the study of causes. It is, consequently, irreconcilable with the ambitious dreams of a misty Atheism, relative to the *formation of the universe, the origin of animals, and so forth.* Positivism does not hesitate to declare such doctrinal chimeras to be inferior, even in rationality, to the spontaneous beliefs of mankind." He, on like grounds, excludes geology (as ordinarily understood) from the circle of the sciences altogether.

I should certainly be sorry to go so far, or say that men must remain perpetually or absolutely ignorant on all the problems in question, (indeed there are not a few of us who are old-fashioned enough to believe that we may get glimpses of the truth about some of them, even though the oracles of science were dumb), or deny that science may lawfully, if it will but modestly, form at least its hypotheses respecting them, though it may acknowledge that to obtain absolute certitude is beyond its power. But most assuredly the subjects are such as are inveterately haunted by some of the worst "idola," and perhaps have their chief charm for men whose ardent imagination particularly exposes them to their seductive power.

But while none ask science to refrain from such speculations, if it will but refrain from dogmatism; if it will not take conjecture for certainty; if it will but acknowledge that a theory is still but a guess; if it be really so, one can not but wish, in the interests of science itself, that it should deal not only very modestly but very sparingly with them. If not, they will absorb more and more of the time and toil which should be given to more hopeful and legitimate fields of scientific enterprise; the tendency will constantly be, as in the case of the alchemists, to substitute visionary projects for practical objects; to devote too much attention to things which pique curiosity indeed, but also least repay merely human labor upon them.

The simple fact is, that this class of questions, being bound up with the most intense longings of the human heart for knowledge, are, in the absence of either the supposed *higher* light of revelation, or the all but impossible apathy which Compte enjoins on his dogmatic Atheists, so piquant, so enticing and fascinating, that man, left to himself, will run out into endless speculations as to the origin and the evolution of things—as to whence he came and whither he is going. If he can not rest content with the Genesis and Apocalypse of the Bible, he will make a Genesis and Apocalypse for himself. Hence the extent to which all such speculations grafted themselves upon the physics of the ancient world; nor was it perhaps (as I have ventured elsewhere to suggest) the least of the *temporal* benefits of Christianity, "that so many myriads found repose in it from the ceaseless questions which must have agitated the greatest sages of antiquity; that so large a portion of the highest intellect of our race, in fact, accepted its decisions on those questions, and thus was set free to pursue the path of science within the limits and in the direction in which alone human science can be successfully prosecuted.

Nor have I any hesitation in predicting that if the present era of science should be unhappily signalized by (what some think its boast) a general tendency to religious skepticism, that there will be just as voluminous speculations on these subjects as ever; there will be a "plentiful crop of sects and schisms," from which the world has for ages been happily free; that they will draw more and more, for the support of their own fungous growth, on the thought, time, and toil which should serve for the nourishment of genuine science; that men will be disputing whether their fore-

fathers were once apes, instead of considering questions vitally interesting to them as *men*, or how the world came into being rather than how it may be "subdued" and improved. The human mind can not endure to be without a theory on these subjects, whether it be inclined to skepticism or the contrary; and hence the difficulty of the lesson which M. Compte would so calmly enjoin on his dogmatic Atheist. Hence, too, in numberless writings of the present day, we see a skepticism asserting itself with all the passion and vehemence which it is fond of representing as the peculiar infirmity of theologians!

However, only let science abstain from dogmatically asserting that *that* is demonstrated truth which is but crude conjecture, and there will be nothing to complain of.

But I can not say that this is the case with you, or with some of those whose disciple you avow yourself. The theories you urge upon my attention, and which (as I think) illustrate Bacon's "idola" far better than his "inductive method," are affirmed by you and by others with a dogmatism which seems to me diametrically opposed to all true science. I read, for example, in one of the critiques you have commended, (I quote the very words:) "The best chapter in the book, as might have been expected, is that which treats of 'Design in Nature.' The poor old final causes will always afford to an assailant as easy a victory as that of Falstaff over Hotspur. . . . Yet, since there certainly *was* a time when the argument was considered of value, a forcible *exposition of its emptiness* does not seem to us altogether superfluous."

In another place I read: "Language was not innate, but adventitious—a mere acquirement, having its origin in the superiority of the human understanding. . . . Each *separate* tribe formed its own language, and there could *be no doubt* that in each case the framers were *arrant savages*, which was proved by the fact, that the rudest tribes ever discovered had already completed the task of forming a perfect language."

Listen again to the oracles of modern wisdom: "There arise no new *species*, by any creative interference; none disappear by divine mandate of destruction, since the natural course of things, the process of development of all organisms and of the earth, is amply sufficient for the production of all these phenomena. Even man is neither a distinct creature, formed in a special manner, and differently from all other animals, nor provided with a special soul,

and endowed with a divine breath of life; he is only the highest product of a progressive natural selection, and descends from the simious group standing next to man." . . . Again: "By science and *by reason*, we neither have, nor can possibly have, any evidence of a Deity working miracles."

But are these things worthy of the caution of inductive philosophy? Amidst all this confident and dogmatical assertion, you know as well as I do that the points here so curtly assumed are not only, every one of them, denied or disputed by the great mass of intelligent men, but every-where doubted, and most keenly controverted in the scientific world itself.

I now proceed to show why, on Bacon's grounds, not on those of "traditional beliefs," I can not accept as proven any of the six "articles" of your scientific creed, which you so confidently urge upon my faith—"faith," I may well say, for assuredly they are not commended to my reason.

I shall only premise one thing, and that is that the gibes and sarcasms which, after the fashion of the day, you launch against the advocates of "traditional beliefs" and "stereotyped dogmas," will equally apply to you and science; there is not a foible of the intellect, not an "idolum tribûs" or "theatri," with which the one are charged, that may not be retorted on some of the more advanced of the modern champions of science; and precisely because there is, in all of us, so much more of *man* than of either science or theology. Thus, you tell the theologian that he believes what he *wishes* to be true—in spite of evidence. What else can be said of many of the advocates of those wild theories which scientific fancy has given us in our day—having all the illusion and none of the beauty of poetry? You tell me that the theologian believes a dogma because it is old: and do not our modern speculators often believe their shining novelties, for a similar though an opposite reason; that is, just because they are new? You tell me that many cling to certain opinions, because they wish the Bible to be true; and is it not too evident, from the tone of many, that they think an opinion chiefly charming because they wish the Bible to be false? You tell us that of course this or that work, in defense of an "effete orthodoxy," is received with praise by all the orthodox journals, and that we can tell beforehand the organs that will applaud. And can not we do the same in reference to any novel bit of heterodoxy? Can we not lay our finger before-

hand on the very journals that will pet and patronize that, even though it be directly in the teeth of some other heterodoxy which it has already petted and patronized? You tell me that you are shocked at the "odium theologicum" which so universally prevails among theologians, and is indeed the constant theme of reproach in journals and newspapers; just as if, by the way, the "odium politicum" was quite unknown to the world! But is there not also such a thing as even the "odium scientificum?" Can not our *savans*, on the occasion, snarl and growl over an old jaw-bone or an old tooth out of a gravel drift, as fiercely as theologians over any of their doctrines? Have not the amenities of science been sometimes so forgotten as to call for the rebukes of our great, and in general most just, censor of manners—our *Custos morum*—"Mr. Punch?" May not a *savant* be so provoking and so provoked as even to "spit" on the gaberdine of a heterodox doubter of some tale of the sacred "*gorilla?*" I do not mention these things as against science, any more than the "odium theologicum" should be so uncandidly and perpetually urged against theology. The "odium theologicum," and the "odium politicum," and the "odium scientificum" are all alike odious; but they are the fruit, not of theology, or politics, or science, but just of human nature—of passion and prejudice—an *idolum* of the heart, if not of the intellect, and just as misleading as any *idolum* of the intellect can be. When darling opinions, and systems, and hypotheses, and claims to discovery are to be defended, the coolest and most tranquil fields of speculation—even those of mathematics—are apt to be troubled with these hurricanes of passion, as the quarrels between the followers of Leibnitz and Newton full well show.

Nay, as if to show that there is no infirmity of the intellect, no form of self-deception, to which you men of science pronounce theologians subject, which is not at all peculiar to them, or which is not equally exemplified by other classes of men, even that formidable charge of being the easy dupes and victims of "spiritual pretensions" and "pious frauds" may be retorted upon a good many of you. To the various pretensions and juggleries of modern "spiritualism," science has yielded its full quota of credulity; and if irreligious, *not* religious, men have sometimes made religion the dupe of "pious frauds," quick-eyed science has often been victimized of late in the very same manner; and simply for this reason, that theologians and philosophers happen to be alike—

men. I refer, for example, to the plentiful manufacture and eager reception of the *modern-antique* relics of a pre-Adamite world.

Perhaps it may be asked here, "But do you intend to charge eminent scientific men with having been voluntarily either accomplices or victims of these 'pious frauds' in behalf of scientific truth?" Assuredly not; no more than I suppose Clemens Romanus himself to have forgotten the "Apostolical Constitutions," or that some great and good man, for his sins unluckily canonized as a saint, really bequeathed to the Church all the rubbish, in the shape of relics, which passes under his name. But in science, philosophy, and theology alike, men will exhibit the same strong hankering for evidence, where they *wish* an opinion to be true, and the same credulity in receiving it; and in all cases, there will be opportunely found those who will take advantage of this disposition, and provide any evidence that may be wanted. Let there be credulity enough, and money enough, and a man can get any thing he wants, whether it be the toe or tooth of a pre-Adamite man, or the toe or the tooth of a St. Francis or a St. Dominic. Let him bid high enough, and bring faith enough, and if he pleases, he can get a genuine spoon of Tubal-Cain's own manufacture, inscribed with some hieroglyphics vouching to be the old metal-worker's own trade-mark, and purporting to mean "Tubal-Cain, maker—Mesopotamia!"

I shall now proceed to notice the six doctrines to which you challenge my assent, on the grounds of science, but, as I affirm, in contravention of all true science. It will be observed that I need neither to impugn nor defend the conclusions themselves. I am concerned only to show that the faith often reposed in them is mockery of genuine science—at war alike with the method of Bacon and the practice of Newton.

1. And the first I will mention is what you call "Uniformitarianism" in geology, for the idolatry of which (in the language of a very able Edinburgh review,) it is really not very easy to account by any thing but a certain "turn of thought" in the speculator; or, in the language of Bacon, by an "*idolum specûs*," a misleading image in the philosopher's own mind.

According to this, we are, it seems, to assume (for in the very nature of the case it can be nothing more) that not only have precisely the same forces been always in operation in the production

of terrestrial phenomena, but that in no past time have they operated with greater intensity than at present; that is, that the *rate* or law of change has never been other than it is now, or imperceptibly slow; that as we now see the sea gaining upon the shore and receding upon that, at the rate of a few score yards in a century, similarly slow have such changes ever been; that the vast mountain chains have been elevated to their present hight by a movement absolutely insensible; and in one word, to use the favorite term of the advocates of this view—that there have been "no catastrophes," in the history of our world. The ground of such an hypothesis is of course that in the *present* condition of the world there is an *approximation* (for that is all) to such a supposed freedom from "catastrophes;" that is, during the comparatively brief experience of man; that is, again, we are to measure the depths of pre-historic time by our present experience; or, in the phraseology of Protagoras, "make man the measure of all things" in this matter.

Now, the first thing that is to be said is, What is meant by a "catastrophe?" If it be meant that any thing inconsistent with a precise law of absolute "continuity" in all geological phenomena, (indeed some expressly argue for such a law,) operating with the same imperceptibly slow *rate* of change, is to be considered a catastrophe—then we have no such condition, even *now*, as the hypothesis in question requires. We have "catastrophes" even *now* quite sufficient in magnitude to suggest the analogy that in some periods of the world's "pre-historic" history there may have been greater "catastrophes," rather than that there were none. Certainly the tremendous earthquakes which have often shaken down whole cities, or the volcanic eruptions which have swallowed them up, the inundations which have occasionally swept over whole provinces—all these seem "catastrophes" sufficiently "catastrophic" to those who suffer from them, however little they may disturb the equanimity of the philosopher who quietly speculates about them five thousand miles off, or two thousand years after date. The earthquake of Lisbon, which destroyed at once sixty thousand human beings; the late cyclone at Calcutta, which killed as many, flooded eight hundred square miles of country, and resistlessly broke the barriers along eighty miles of coast, may surely claim to be called a "catastrophe," if there be any meaning in the word at all. And even if, *singly*, none were greater in pre-his-

toric times, yet if they only happened more frequently, (though happily without such "catastrophic" effects to human beings), the law of geological "continuity" would seem to be sufficiently violated.

What is meant then by no "catastrophes?" Is it meant that none were *greater* than the *greatest* that have occurred during the historic period? What an arbitrary limitation is here! Not to repeat what has just been insisted upon, that even if there were no greater catastrophes (but only more frequent,) all idea of a law of "continuity" would be torn to tatters, who shall assure us that if there were any as great as the greatest that have occurred in historic time, there may not have been still greater before it? Certainly, those we have seen suggest the idea that the tremendous forces which we thus know to exist in the bosom of nature may, for aught we can tell, have acted in remote ages with much more intensity and over much larger surfaces than at present. If it be said that the convulsions of this nature which we *now* witness are infinitesimal *compared* with what would be required to elevate or submerge whole continents, the answer is, that these convulsions, though less extensive, are equally in the teeth of the *principle* assumed; equally a violation of an absolutely continuous and equable variation; not to say that if we thus make the idea of a "catastrophe" purely relative to the sum of the unchanged, then the entire annihilation of our world would be but an infinitesimal event in relation to the entire system, or that of half a score of worlds still but infinitesimal in relation to the visible universe. They would be relatively no more "catastrophal" than the rolling of a pebble from Mount Blanc would be so to the mountain from which it was detached.

Moreover, it may well be suggested that if the changes of this nature that now take place are less frequent and destructive than those which *may* have visited our earth at earlier periods, it is precisely what we should expect, if God be indeed a beneficent Creator, and the system in which *man* was to play a part was to be preserved at all; that is, if there be really any propriety in the language used by the most illustrious geologists, as well as by the rest of the world, and which supposes that the earth was *prepared* for the habitation of man. When man came to inhabit his house, if he was not to receive a "writ of ejectment" as soon as he got into it, it was essential that there should not be the tumultuous

movements and astounding shocks which might occasionally shake it during the building. But not to insist on this; the changes which occur now are assuredly quite sufficiently startling, and wrought by a sufficiently terrible power, to show us what may have been.

To pass by these conjectures, it may be added that it certainly seems more natural, judging from all the *appearances* of the earth, to suspect that those same forces which now occasionally act with a tremendous energy and intensity over a limited space, sometimes acted in like manner over far larger portions of our globe. The gigantic ravines, the cloven mountains, the earth in rents and fissures, the plicatures, contortions, and fractures of strata, displaced at every angle, all seem to point to occasional changes of prodigious magnitude, rapidly effected, and by the operation of the most energetic forces. And even if it be admitted that all such changes *might* be wrought by given forces, operating with inconceivable slowness throughout an unlimited time, still, as they might be also produced by a force of given magnitude operating through a shorter time, either formula, apart from other proofs, will be of equal mechanical value; not to say that there are phenomena which, even in the estimation of the most eminent geologists, can not be accounted for by the theory. Even a principal advocate for the uniformitarian view admits "that many great rivers could never, even in millions of years, have excavated the valleys through which they flow."

But, above all, were it possible thus to account for the phenomena, still the question recurs, "What can we *know* about the matter?" How can we pretend to go back to those primeval ages, and penetrate those mysteries of the twilight of time? The rebuke of God to the patriarch might well be addressed to many a geologist who dogmatizes on the subject: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the Earth?"

Speaking of *apparent* violations of his law of geologic continuity, one of the most strenuous of its champions says that its advocate may with "just as much probability and confidence assert" that the revolutions in question have been produced by infinitesimally slow changes, brought about during a long period "enormous and incalculable, as the catastrophist can maintain it to have been brief and spasmodic." Precisely so, a severe judge of evidence would reply. Apart from other and more decisive evidence, neither the

one nor the other of you has any business to dogmatize on the matter, since both have got into regions which transcend the sphere of experience.

And if any scope at all is to be allowed to such *a priori* reasoning, one would feel inclined to argue with the above very able writer in the "Edinburgh," that, considering the infinite variety of nature, the theory of varying intensity of the great physical forces seems intrinsically far more probable than a monotony of physical operation, the evidence of which seems to exist principally in the *turn of thought* of those who advocate it.

Of course, I do not pretend that it is possible to establish any thing certain, by merely human light, on either side; though I think, to most candid minds, the appearances of the world rather favor another hypothesis than yours. Our very limited experience must be regarded as an altogether fallacious measure; yet it certainly seems not unreasonable, from the aspects of nature, to surmise that both sudden revolutions and slow variations—intervals of intense action alternating with intervals of repose—have been employed, and probably cotemporaneously, in the construction and development of the world. But, whether it be so or not, the question is, what just logical right can we have to lay down this "uniformitarianism" as a postulate, and to judge of all things in the immense series of pre-historic ages by such an arbitrarily imagined law, deduced from the computed *rate* of present terrestrial change; though, by the way, geologists differ by hundreds of thousands, and even millions of years, as to the time in which certain given changes have been wrought?

The notion is, of course, welcome to any one who is predetermined that the world shall be of unlimited antiquity; for it makes even the commencement of the present human epoch recede into the dimmest distance. But to judge of past time by such a chronometer is, as a witty critic says, "much the same as if a man, finding that an individual nearly six feet in hight had grown only half an inch last year, were to conclude that he must be one hundred and forty years old." In short, the principle is nothing but the fanciful extension of our limited experience to immense periods of which we know nothing. This principle is opposed by many eminent geologists with the vigor worthy of those who aspire to act upon Newton's great maxim: "Hypotheses non fingo." "Do not geologists," as one, himself a celebrated geologist, says, "some-

times speak with needless freedom"—most people would say, most presumptuous freedom—"of the ages that have gone? Such expressions as that 'Time costs Nature nothing,' appear to me no better than the phrase which ascribes to nature the horror of a *vacuum*." (I would just add, that if Time costs Nature nothing, it seems to cost these speculators just as little). "Are we to regard as information of value the assertion that *millions on millions* of ages have passed since the Epoch of Life in some of the earlier strata! Is not this abuse of arithmetic likely to lead to a low estimate of the evidence in support of such random conclusions, and of the uncritical judgment which so readily accepts them?

2. Another favorite speculation of yours, as well as some other votaries of science, I must think most strangely *un*scientific. I mean that by which, in your antipathy to the idea of "creation," you insist that all the forms of existence, organic and inorganic, have proceeded from one another in the course of an "orderly cosmical evolution," which leaves us without any necessity of speculating upon the fact of *origination;* that, in fact, "we have no reason to think that the universe ever had a beginning, any more than it will ever have an end."

Now, if you accepted the old atheistic hypothesis of the eternal existence of the world as it is—of an eternal succession of men and mice, for example, and left the problem undetermined whether the first of the series of owls was an egg or an owl—though I should not think your theory very scientific, I should at least cease to argue with you about it; but as you do not, and choose to chase all the fleeting forms of animated being through all the diversities and modifications of genera and species, to a few (perhaps to one) "primordial forms," I confess I think your repugnance to the idea of "creation" has not relieved you from the necessity of admitting it; and, as I will proceed to show, that you have left the great difficulty, from which the "turn of thought" of certain philosophers recoils, just where it was!

In one point we are both agreed. The absolute origination of any thing is a notion incomprehensible by us, transcendental to all the faculties of our nature. I who admit, and you who deny, the Bible, are at one there. I admit that the conception of Creation, the absolute *origination* of all things, or of *any thing*, is a conception derived thence, and thence alone; I believe it is a *fact*, however incomprehensible; but the appeal is to my faith. "By

faith we know that the worlds were made by the word of God, and that things which are seen were not made of things that do appear." Everybody, then, being agreed that this is the condition of all merely human speculation on the subject, one would think that the next thing to be said by *science* would be, "As this is a subject transcendental to us, let us scientific folks let it alone." But no; you are not satisfied with such a simple, and *truly* scientific course, but proceed to lay down hypotheses by which the evolution of the whole visible creation is to be explained, not only without any *successive* acts of creation, but in such way as to leave it in dubiety whether there has been any such act at all!

These theories still relegate me at last to phenomena which leave me precisely in the original difficulty—a difficulty which you merely strive to hide from me and from your own eyes by removing the epoch of the origination of all things sufficiently far back, and tracing the succession of changes through a sufficiently long pedigree. "All living things," say some philosophers, "the infinite diversities of animal forms, the exhaustless variety of species that people this world, were originated, not by creation, but out of one another, by a process of very slow development: men (say) from apes, apes from birds, birds from fishes, fishes from earlier and more rudimentary forms of life; and these, in all probability, from three or four minute germs of vitality."

It is hard, of course, to say how *next* to nothing these were; but, unhappily for the theorist, there were still existent "some things," and had life; and so we have the problem concerning "*origination*" brought back on our hands; for if "*Ex nihilo nihil fit*" be absolutely true, it is a difficulty that does not admit of degrees; the creation of an atom is as great a puzzle as the creation of a world. In vain, scandalized at the idea of creation, in vain you tell me that your three or four "primordial forms" perhaps date from millions of millions of years ago, more or less; and I confess that a million of years, when you have the command of all time, are of little consequence. Indeed, some of our geologic Pantheists, who think that man is to become a God, seem to have already anticipated one of the divine attributes; for "a thousand years with them are as one day, and one day as a thousand years." But use your freedom; go as far back as you please; and what then?

I do not ask who gave you, on such a subject, this prodigious

license of speculation; or how you came to have the right to talk thus freely of the transactions of millions of years ago; or how you can *know* any thing of those successive changes by which you suppose the whole universe to have been thus evolved from a few primordial forms? I might ask all this, and possibly much more, before exercising a transcendental faith in transcendental speculations on questions which both of us admit to be transcendental. But a far more weighty objection is this: Do you flatter yourself that you have got rid of that ungrateful idea of "absolute creation?" and that it is no longer necessary to incumber yourself with it? What do you make of those three or four primordial forms, or even that *one* "primordial form," to which some think these may possibly be reduced? Were these eternal? Had they eternal vitality within them, though it was eternally latent—latent, though at last destined to make up for lost time, or rather a lost eternity, by evolving out of an invisible egg or two all the visible universe—or were they created out of nothing? In leaving us in doubt upon this point, you leave the whole difficulty just where you found it. It is in vain for the theorist to tell us that he has, at all events, limited the successive acts of creation, and given the Deity a *minimum* to do: that the appearance of different species at different periods is all admirably provided for by that theory by which he has so satisfactorily evolved men out of the ape, and the ape and all his ancestors out of other and still inferior beings. The answer, of course, will be: "But the difficulty is to evade the idea of 'creation' itself. It is as easy for us to believe that that power, whatever it was, has repeated the act of creation, as that he has performed it once; that he has repeated it at different, widely different, stages of the history of the universe, as that he performed it *at all*. Nay, it is much easier than it would be to suppose the whole animated universe developed out of a seed, perhaps not half the size of a grain of millet."

Now to this question, as to the logical exigency of admitting "origination" at some time or other, I do not see that you give any other answer than an evasive one, which, in fact, amounts to this: "But if the act of creation took place at all, it took place so long ago, and such a great way off, that we had better say nothing about it." Say nothing, then, and give up those "primordial forms" which betray you while you think they conceal you.

"But it would be distressing to me," you may say, "to imagine

that if there *be* a God, he has not proceeded in the way of gradual evolution according to a law which I can trace, and in analogy, at all events, with all those laws which I can see in operation about me, and in conformity with my infinitesimal experience." Yes; that is it: it is the "turn of thought" again; it is an *idolum tribûs*, that is troubling you; you must make yourself and your experience the measure of all things; and in obedience to this, you will speak of ten thousand things of which you know nothing, and talk glibly of the events of millions of years ago, as of those of yesterday.

3. Subservient to the preceding speculation, and like it transcending the sphere of experience, is that doctrine of the transmutation of species, in which the old and, as it was at one time thought, exploded theory of Lamarck is substantially revived. I will be perfectly frank. I freely acknowledge to you that it is not the more than Ovidian *strangeness* of these metamorphoses that would at all stagger me, if you but gave me evidence for them as plainly as you give me conjecture and fancy. They are to me as *miracles*, (which I shall presently endeavor to show in spite of your protest they precisely resemble,) and all I want is the proper *evidence* for them. When I see the transformations which take place in this system of wonders in which we live; when I see what becomes of a grain of "mustard-seed" thrown into the earth; when I see the grub transfigured into a winged butterfly; when I see the varieties of the same species which actually exist, (though the variation is still within moderate limits,) I hardly see why, in the abstract, any thing may not become any thing. But when I ask for the *facts* which are to sustain the prodigious theory that all the genera and species of living things have proceeded from two or three "primordial" germs, perhaps even from one, then I feel I may indeed accept your theory as poetry, but I must renounce it as science. For surely you have the strangest way of reasoning. When I ask for specimens in the rocky cemeteries which contain the fossil relics of other extinct animals, of the tentative and transitional forms that must have existed, in numbers numberless, on such an hypothesis, you tell me that the geological eras are so vast that they have perished, and that it is unreasonable to ask for them When I ask for proofs in historic time that such changes are going on now, you tell me that the whole of historic time is too short to give even an appreciable portion of so slow a transformation! So that as the geologic eras are so vast that all the

required proofs have perished, the historic period is too short to allow any of them to appear! How is it possible to refute—but then, moreover, how is it possible to establish—an hypothesis which is so conveniently provided with fanciful alternatives? If I complain of the absence of *experimental* proof—proof which seems to my weakness a necessary condition of *experimental* science—you refer me to Baden Powell, who says that, "Supposing it true that we have *no* experience of a particular event occurring, and supposing at the same time it could be shown that *if* that event *did actually occur*, we could never (from the particular nature of the case) have any *evidence* of its occurrence, then it is clear that the argument, from *want* of experience, must fall to the ground." Certainly; but so must the argument for the actual occurrence of the event. Surely it is much as if a man, being asked for the proof of something that depended on documentary evidence, were to reply that it was unreasonable to expect or ask it; for that the document was burned, and therefore, in the particular case, the proof *could* not be given! In short, I object to the speculation, not, as you say, because I believe it to be inconsistent with my "traditional beliefs," but because it seems to me an outrage on the principles of inductive science itself; telling me to speculate in regions acknowledged to be transcendental to experience; telling me that the condition of doing so is to leave all experience behind me, and that I am not to wonder that I do not find its evidence there!

In truth, it seems to me, when I compare your reasoning on this subject with that on other subjects—that of "Uniformitarianism," for example—that you palpably play fast and loose with experience. In order to prove *that*, you will have experience paramount; the present forces of nature, and none other, operating within precisely the present limits: when you want to prove "transmutation" of species, then the *want* of experience is of no consequence! Similarly, when you want to prove that no testimony can prove miracles, because these, you say, are opposed to experience, then experience is every thing; when you want to prove "transmutation" of species, of the same nature, and equally wonderful with miracles, (nay, more so, if many miracles be more wonderful than a few), then experience so limited as ours is not worth mentioning! This clearly will not do. You appeal, as an inductive philosopher, to experience; and to experience you must go. As matters stand, you are tied to it, and untied, as pleases

you. It is a sleight-of-hand, something like that of the "Davenport Brothers." By science, you are bound fast in the cords of *experience;* but no sooner are you in your cabinet, than, *presto!* the lights are put out; fiddles and trumpets played by supernatural agency come tumbling about us; mystic sounds of a dialect unknown to science murmur in our ears; and you are found liberated from your bonds. And thus we are to believe the whole story of transmutations, and that "any thing may become any thing," all experience notwithstanding.

But assuredly Christians ought not to be twitted with excess of faith, when the votaries of Science can indulge in such *abandon* of fancy.

In another paper I shall briefly consider those remaining articles of your philosophic creed particularly urged on my consideration; namely, the alleged unlimited antiquity of *man*—I mean the *genus homo*, such as you and I belong to; the incredibility of miracles; and man's predicted absolute mastery of all the secrets of nature.

HENGSTENBERG ON JOHN.*

THE latest and ripest work of so accomplished an expositor as Dr. Hengstenberg needs no recommendation to the English public. Multitudes have derived instruction from his Commentaries on Old Testament Scriptures and on the Apocalypse, and they will find themselves amply rewarded by hearing him in this, his only exposition of the Gospels. . . . The characteristics of Dr. H.'s work are a very careful, reverent, and evangelical exposition of the Lord's deepest discourses as reproduced by John; a straightforward, independent, and sometimes remarkably original interpretation of some controverted passages; and, above all, a thorough, pervasive, and striking appeal, not only to Old Testament prophecy, but also to Old Testament phraseology, in the elucidation of the text. . . . It is not merely that the allusions to the older scriptures are brought out in their full force, but the reader's ear is taught to catch the most subtile echoes of the Old Testament speech which are found in St. John's report of our Lord's words.

* From a notice of a translation of the work in the *Homilist* for June, 1865. London.

THE MORALITY OF PANTHEISM.*

We shall to-day speak of Pantheism: not that we intend to compare it with the idea of moral perfection, which we laid down in commencing this series, and which serves us as a standard by which to estimate successively all doctrines. No; for Pantheism has no morals, or rather, it is a necessary source of immorality. Why, then, do I speak of it here? First, because it is a noted doctrine, and has in it something seductive to the higher order of intellects, and for the lovers of subtile philosophical speculation, and thus readily carries away distinguished and leading minds. But, as its consequences lead men to immorality, it is well to caution you, in order that a distinct view of these consequences may put you on your guard against the principles from which they are derived. In the second place, because Pantheism is fashionable, even among those who understand nothing of it—and among these it is just this very thing that gives it vogue—and it can be truly said that this system is the deepest, and I will dare to add, at the same time, the most sublime of errors—that in which human reason shows at once its greatest strength and greatest weakness.

Pantheism is, as it were, the common end of all erroneous doctrines in philosophy, if they are consistent—a kind of ocean into which all these rivers of error flow and are lost. If I were delivering a course of lectures on the history of philosophy, I believe that it would not be difficult to show that almost all—I do not say *all*, lest I should appear too exclusive or positive—that almost all the purely rationalistic systems of philosophy, which have a metaphysics in which they seek, by the mere power of reason, to explain God, man, nature, the origin of things and their end, do fall into Pantheism if they remain faithful to their principles. I well know that some have escaped it by inconsistency; and, in general, it is inconsistency that saves, and very luckily; for you understand that false principles, being once adopted, by being pressed to their extreme results, would necessarily lead to

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* Translation of the Twelfth Lecture of a course on La Morale de L'Evangile *comparée aux divers Systèms de Morale.* Par M. L. Bautain. Paris, 1855.

what is monstrous and absurd. We are going, then, to speak of Pantheism, but only so far as concerns morality. I regret that I have not time thoroughly to discuss this whole subject, which at the present moment is singularly prevalent in the world, and which, indeed, has prevailed in all ages.

And, first, What is Pantheism? I will try to tell you as simply as possible; for, in my opinion, philosophical instruction only gains by simplicity, without all those set formulas, more or less abstract and mysterious, which, leaving common language, are intelligible only to a few initiated ones, and generally bring a cloud between the truth and ourselves.

Pantheism is a doctrine which recognizes but one single substance, of which all other existences are only forms, modes, and consequently emanations. Pantheism may be spiritualistic or materialistic, according as the single substance which it allows is spiritual or material. In the first case, this single substance will be the universal spirit, the great Spirit—God; and consequently there will exist nothing but God; the whole universe will be only God manifested, not, indeed, as we Christian philosophers understand it, by a real positive creation, but by his evolutions, developments, and emanations, so that existences are God manifesting himself under such form, such manner of being, such a property or particular quality. Then, God is all, and all is God—whence the word Pantheism.

But it may be that this single substance is material. Thus, among the ancient Greeks, the first philosophers, Thales and his disciples, the Eleatæ, Epicurus, the Stoics themselves, recognized matter as the one substance. It is, therefore, improperly that they are called Pantheists, although they have admitted only one substance. All philosophers of this class should rather be classed in the materialistic school.

Pantheism, at first view, appears to be a very strange error, because it is contrary to good sense. Each one of us readily admits that himself is not God, especially at certain times. It is scarcely possible to deceive ourselves, when we consider human life in its daily details, in its most natural wants, in its most common acts. When we see our poor humanity so miserable, so needy, in infancy crying, next stammering, afterward reasoning, then reasoning perversely, and especially crying out against others, having so much trouble in gaining a little science and

morality, a little wealth, greatness or virtue, when we see all these things, is it not very difficult to believe that we are gods? For myself, I confess I have never been tempted by this imagination.

Pantheism is, then, every thing which is most contrary to common sense. Besides, in this hypothesis, all men, my neighbor, my servant, would doubtless be gods also. There would then be some gods in the service of other gods. This lecture-room would then be an Olympus, an assemblage of gods. Here would be one god—a very little one certainly—instructing other gods! And how, in this capacity, could we sustain our relative situations in a suitable manner—I who come here to teach you truth, and you to learn it, granting me for this end an attention which sustains and encourages me? But if we are all gods, we have no need, I to teach, you to be taught; the situation would be truly ridiculous.

Nevertheless, what is astonishing, this is the very error which, under either a religious or a philosophic form, is most widely extended in the world. Now, even in this nineteenth century of the Christian era, after the word of God has been proclaimed to all the earth, after a supernatural light has illumined all the nations of the world, there are yet millions of men who profess this monstrous error in their religion, who believe it seriously, who imagine that they are emanations or parts of the great whole, and that, after a certain number of evolutions, they will return to be absorbed in its bosom. These are the Hindoos, the followers of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the two religions so widely extended in Asia. There must be something very singular and profound in the system, since we see multitudes of men, who on every other subject have as much good sense as we ourselves, permitting themselves to be led away in such aberrations, and adhering to them with confidence.

It was in India that Pantheism arose; thence it passed into Egypt, and afterward into Greece—for Greece received all its doctrines from the East; every thing most profound in Greek philosophy came from the traditions and sanctuaries of Egypt. In the temples of India and Egypt this doctrine was always dominant, being cultivated and transmitted by the priests. At this day it is still maintained in India, which must be called preeminently the country of tradition and changelessness. It is still believed there in our day. There are millions of men who

profess the belief that all men are parts, emanations of Brahma; that some came forth from his head, viz., the men of letters, the *literati;* others from his arms, the warriors and governors, executive men; others from his stomach, viz., people of the third estate, of the middle class, merchants, tradesmen, agriculturists, all who work in material things; finally, the last from his feet, the miserable soudras, who compose the fourth caste, and who are condemned by their very origin and low extraction to a sort of servitude. All these castes still exist just as they were fixed in the beginning, and they can never change their destiny. They remain inclosed in the limits established by divinity itself, and for four thousand years, perhaps, all the social organization of the country has rested on these foundations.

Why need I recount to you the doctrines of Buddhism, which numbers, it is said, nearly three hundred thousand adherents—a system which contains enormities revolting to good sense and feeling? Nevertheless, by philosophical speculation on the one side, and by religious tradition, falsified and perverted, on the other, these pantheistic doctrines have taken possession of and still rule over the universal mind. But we shall confine ourselves to philosophical Pantheism.

Remark only in the beginning, and in order to explain so noticeable a fact, that man, having always felt the want of an explanation of the origin of things, of God, the world, himself, and the relation of beings, whenever his reason, being left to itself, has endeavored, by thorough examination and rigorous and inflexible logic, to account for these mysteries, it has always lost itself in this abyss. The cause of this is that the fact of the creation, the passing from non-existence into existence, is inconceivable to mere reason, and it is difficult for it not to be led away by the imagination, which represents the creative action in a human way, as an extension, an emanation, or a simple evolution of the infinite Being. Therefore, it is not wonderful that in the midst of this darkness, and without the aid of a higher light, the most eminent minds of antiquity fell into Pantheism, and that, in modern times, thinkers just as profound, since they repudiate the instructions of Christianity, have been led as far into the same error.

If religious tradition had remained pure, it would have been a preservative to the ancients against this error, because the primitive religion explained the true relations of the Creator and the

creature. But these traditions were gradually changed among all nations except the Jews; so this is the only nation of all antiquity which has escaped Pantheism. But you also know how many words and revelations, how many blessings and miracles, and, finally, how many chastisements and calamities, were necessary to keep in the narrow way of divine revelation this race, so hard-hearted, untractable, and stubborn, and so constantly going off into sensualism. And yet, just in proportion as speculation developed itself among the Jews, you see Pantheism cropping out in the most famous of the books of the Rabbins.

This accounts for the diffusion, I will even say the universality, of this error among the pagan and Oriental nations. And indeed, even *now*, after the triumph of Christianity, which is the declared enemy of Pantheism, and which alone can preserve us from it—*to-day*, when the light of the Gospel is spread over the whole world, and when Christian science is within reach of all, alas! you see how men seek still to establish this error, even by the authority of the Divine Word. They have abused certain expressions of St. Paul—"God, in whom we live, and move, and have our being;" "God, in whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things"—to make them teach Pantheism. They would make St. Paul a Pantheist! This shows us how much more easily, in times less enlightened than our own, religious tradition could be distorted, first by learned men and philosophers, and then by the imagination of the people.

Pantheism passed from India and Egypt into Greece. You know Pythagoras, Solon, and later, Plato, visited the temples of Egypt. Pythagoras carried back thence all that was profound in his doctrines, and, among other things, Pantheism; for the Pythagorean system, so far as we can judge of it by what remains to us, was entirely Pantheistic. It will not be necessary to press very much the Platonian dualism, in order to find in it this error; for, according to Plato, there is no existence, no perfection, no beauty, except in the spiritual, intelligible world. The world of matter, the *hylè*, has neither existence nor beauty; it expresses only privation, limitation, non-existence. The doctrine of the Eleatæ, of Leucippus and Democritus, of the Stoics and Neoplatonists, is a developed Pantheism. It was particularly in this last school, at Alexandria, that Pantheism was expressed most scientifically in formulæ. The Alexandrians professed the doc-

trine of emanation, or of the emanation of the divine beings. There the subtilty of the Greek mind united with Oriental tradition, magianism, gnosticism, and by an eclecticism, often little coherent, or rather by a confused syncretism, established the Pantheistic doctrine.

In the middle ages Pantheism reappeared from time to time, especially in the speculations of Amaury de Chartres and Jordan Bruno.

In modern times, Spinoza brought it again into vogue. I will not inquire whether Descartes was really the cause of its revival. You know that Descartes defined substance as that which is dependent upon nothing else for its existence, and besides, he defined matter as extension, and mind as thought—seeing in extension the essence of matter, and in thought the essence of mind. Starting from these definitions, Spinoza would have said, There is but one thing which needs only itself in order to exist; that is God, the universal Being. Therefore there is only one single substance which unites in itself the two fundamental properties of mind and matter, viz., extension and thought.

Whether Spinoza did or did not take the suggestion from the Cartesian doctrine, it contains the whole foundation of his system, which he drew up in mathematical form, in order to give it a more rigorous character.

He was opposed, you know, with great force and skill, by the skeptic Bayle, who made the absurd consequences of the system an objection to the system itself, saying, "These are the consequences to which you come; and as absurd consequences come only from false principles, the absurdity of your consequences proves the absurdity of your principles." I can not dwell on these details; I only indicate to you the main points.

After Spinoza, came the German Pantheism, which is unlike that of the Holland philosopher, and was established in a different way. For the German philosophers did not mean to be Pantheists, any more than Kant intended to be a skeptic. Kant reached skepticism honestly. In opposing the doctrine of Hume, the author of skepticism, and wishing to establish belief and the rights of reason, Kant called in question the power of reason. In the same way rose the Pantheism of the German philosophy, of which Kant was, unintentionally, the exciting cause. Not purposely did Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel come at last to Pantheism;

they only wished to disprove the skeptical demonstrations of Kant, as he had undertaken to destroy those of Hume.

Kant having declared that every thing is subjective for man, and that reason is unable to apprehend the objective, it follows that the reason, being able to understand nothing out of itself, only perceives its own phenomena; therefore, the world and all that it contains is only an appearance. We conceive images, notions, but all this is in us; the real *per se* is inaccessible to us, and so the objective, if it is not zero in fact, is always to man an x.

Well, Fichte, who comes next, says Kant is wrong in bringing into question the power of reason. It is not true that reason can not reach the objective: these two imply and presuppose each other; the *me* is only developed on condition of a *not-me;* the *not-me* or the objective is just as little inaccessible to us as we are who assume it. What says consciousness? That in assuming myself as *me*, and considering myself in contrast with myself, it is impossible not to assume a *not-me*.

What follows thence? That the *not-me*, the objective, that which is called the world, is only a reflection or a production of the *me*, of my thought; and that thus it is impossible to perform an act of consciousness without having the intuition of a *not-me*. Consequently, skepticism, said Fichte, is nonsensical.

You see it was the desire to give to *belief* an immovable basis that brought into existence this strange system. You have here also an example of the hardihood of German speculation, which, having once admitted a principle, goes straight on, even into absurdity, without being at all disturbed about consequences; for, as a result of the system of Fichte, the world is only an effect, an expansion of the *me*. I—I am every thing, at least as its beginning, its cause. All other existences are emanations, forms of my personal power. However, a stop was not made here.

Schelling came in turn, and said to Fichte: Your solution is false, and your system too narrow; for your *not-me* has no more reality than that of Kant. Like him, you continue in skepticism and idealism; you do not get at the world of reality; for the *me* and the *not-me*, the subjective and the objective, are two correlative and consequently conditional terms, in which, therefore, the absolute can not exist. It is *reflection* which makes us believe that these are separated by an abyss.

But beyond reflection—which is only a secondary power—there is *intuition*, which discerns the common and identical root of these two. For the real and the ideal are like two parallel streams, which flow from the same source. This pure source is *being;* but being, as yet indeterminate—being before its distinction into real and ideal. Truth is not in the real only, nor in the ideal only; for each of these isolated series is only one phase, one part of truth; and hence they are relative, and consequently conditional. Truth, then, is with the *absolute*, that is to say, in being *per se*, and primitive; whence emanate correlatively the subjective and the objective, the *me* and the *not-me;* in this transcendental identity accessible to intuition alone, where the ideal and real worlds meet undistinguished. Therefore we *can* attain to the reality, and we reach it by this only, that we have its idea; for the idea and its corresponding object interpenetrate each other, and are identified in the bosom of absolute being.

But here comes Hegel, who says to Schelling: You have not advanced the question at all; for in pretending to reach the idea of the *me* and the *not-me* by an intellectual intuition, you still make use of a subjective instrument, and so your realism is only apparent; you do not get out of yourself. The absolute oneness of subject and object, or the transcendental identity of the *me* and the *not-me*, takes place in the *idea*, which gradually acquires consciousness of itself in developing itself, and the gradual development of which constitutes the universe, its various forms and phases, or, in a word, history. *The idea*, which was necessarily one, at first held every thing in itself, but, as it were, virtually, obscurely, without even knowing itself. As soon as it was manifested by its *word*, creation began, light was separated from darkness, and the various beings, which are only forms of the universal Being, or *Idea*, appeared. But it is only when it became conscious of itself that spirit was born, and this is the human spirit, by means of which the idea, completing its own development, and especially acquiring consciousness of all that is in itself, attains to its highest perfection, and takes its place as universal being, knowing the universal, that is to say, as God. God, therefore, produces or makes himself in and by creation, and especially by the reflection and science of man: *Gott ist im werden.* Not merely does God have knowledge of himself in and by the spirit of man, but in and by it he makes or begets himself. The thought

of man is the consciousness, the science, the soul of the universe, as exterior nature is its body or form; and these together are the two manifestations of the one Idea, or of the one God.

All this is written and set forth in obscure language, very difficult to comprehend, but with much of method, and rigorous logic; for Hegel is especially remarkable for inflexibility of logic, and the strong spirit of system.

You imagine, perhaps, gentlemen, that we have reached the end. Not at all. The Germans always push onward, without knowing whither they are going, or at least without being troubled, until they fall into an abyss, or into the mire. This is just what has happened here. The disciples of Hegel, Bruno Bauer, Ruge, Feuerbach, and especially Stirner, who is the latest, by means, I believe, of subtile speculations, have fallen into the grossest sensualism, viz., into materialism, which, like the false mysticism, begins with the spirit and ends with the flesh.

Hear Stirner: "The all is not God; for there is no God; but the all is *I.* You are always speaking to us of something transcendental, of a God, of humanity, of humanism, of Germany. What is all this? I know no God, no humanity, no country. I know only myself; I love only myself. Away with all doctrines, whether humanitarian or patriotic or religious; away with liberty and the German constitution. I alone—I entirely alone; and when all the rest is overthrown, when there shall no more be any people or humanity or country—O, then I shall breathe freely, I shall be happy, because I shall be my own, entirely my own, without sharing with another."

See, then, to what the German philosophy has come, starting from the criticism of Kant. Born of skepticism, it soared into the clouds, seeking for truth; and after having pursued phantoms, which it caressed as realities, it fell empty and exhausted upon the earth and into the mud.

And all this is philosophically written, with a certain elegance, with calmness and *sangfroid!* A philosopher comes to you and says: "There is nothing; your country, yourselves, man, God are nothing. There is nothing but myself, my enjoyment, and my will. I am not free and happy unless I be delivered from all these vain phantoms, from all these shadows of human imagination." See, gentlemen, what result is reached by the aid of reason alone. And this is attained not all at once, but insens-

ibly, by a chain of doctrines, one movement of which causes another, and the victim is at last crushed in the machine of destruction.

But Pantheism has appeared in modern times not only in Germany; it has reached us also. We, French, have also our Pantheism; a small affair, fortunately; for as this is the most pernicious of errors, the smaller it is, the less injurious will it be. There is the Pantheism of the humanitarian school, to which a distinguished writer has recently given his adherence—one who had given the Church such fair hopes, but who has now so cruelly deceived and sadly renounced it. This school is reviving almost the metempsychosis of Pythagoras, a thing certainly not very new. In its system, the universe proceeds from a single source, of which all existences are emanations or modifications. Men, by the development of their mind and will, are ever advancing from progress to progress, from transformation to transformation; at death they take a new form, and thus they will go on, from age to age, from eternity to eternity, I know not whither. *Apropos* to this, I recollect an incident related to me by a gifted woman, who meddled a little with philosophy—some such women there are. She said one day to the author of this revived metempsychosis of the Greeks: "But what shall we finally reach, in this indefinite progress of yours? for we can not change our forms without end, like our garments. We can not be ever going on from existence to existence; and we feel the necessity, after transformations more or less numerous, of reaching a state of happiness, of repose, and of knowledge, where we may be fixed." The philosopher looked at her and coolly replied: "You ask me where you are going, and what you will finally become. Am I the good God, that I can tell you?" This answer is *verbatim*, and it shows the ingenuousness and simplicity of the philosopher, that in his embarrassment at being questioned directly, "Whither shall we come at last?" he betook himself to the good God, to whom in the end it is always necessary to come back. He would have done better had he begun with him.

Finally, there is the eclectic Pantheism, which is always denying itself, and that with reason, on its own eclectic principles. Why should an eclectic hold on to a difficulty? But Pantheism belongs to the very nature of modern eclecticism, and a thing can not get rid of its own nature. As I have shown you recently,

the most contrary doctrines are here found associated, or at least placed, side by side, in juxtaposition, and the effort to effect their fusion has generally resulted only in utter confusion. So in the eclectic metaphysics found in the *Fragments Philosophiques*—a work otherwise well written—you meet with those famous paragraphs, which have been rightly criticised by several, especially by M. Maret. This author, in his *Theodicée Chrétienne*, has written on this subject some excellent pages with great skill and clearness. You will find there a metaphysics, which, if one does not wish to call it Pantheism, strikingly resembles it. But one substance is admitted—at least we are given to understand that there is only one, and that it is impossible there should be more—of which creatures appear to be only various modifications and manifestations. There occur, also, those unhappy phrases, reprinted in the new editions, although they were very strongly objected to, in which it is formally said, in order to explain the Trinity, that it is composed of the infinite, of the finite, and of the relation of the two; moreover, that God, being eminently the active being, or pure action, can not but create; that one can no more conceive of God without the world than of the world without God. Hence it follows that creation is a continual act of the Divinity, necessary in order to complete the divine life in him, and that it is, therefore, an eternal emanation of the universal Being.

Such is the result of the eclectic metaphysics. But in its morals and psychology it is different. It recognizes the substance and the causality of the human soul. It affirms the soul's individuality, spirituality, identity, liberty, and immortality. It has very good things to say on all these points; and it boasts, not without cause, of having contributed to reëstablish spiritualism in the French philosophy. We readily admit this, and congratulate it thereupon. But it is not so easy to reconcile its psychological opinions with its metaphysical dogmas; and we very much fear that the sad consequences of the one destroy the good effects of the other; for there is Pantheism in its metaphysics—disavowed, indeed, and so pardonable—only it ought not to be denied and affirmed at once. Those passages which have been so justly censured should have disappeared in the new editions; because, after all, so long as a man affirms that God is a trinity of the infinite, the finite, and their mutual relation, he must necessarily maintain that the finite is a portion of the trinity,

and that man is God. So long as he says that the creation is a necessity, it will follow that it is an emanation from God, and constitutes a part of God. Pantheism will remain in the face of all disavowals, in spite of all protestations.

We pass now to the morality, or rather the immorality, of Pantheism. Pantheism destroys morality, and this you will easily understand. If there is but one substance existing, it follows that all beings, and consequently men, are only qualities or modifications of this substance; and if this one substance is material, all the developments of this world, all movements, all actions, are only the product of fate. This is the necessary result of the materialistic Pantheism; for if we are nothing but matter, a form, a property, an organization of matter, it is very evident that the fate which rules universal matter rules ourselves, and that thus our pretended liberty is an illusion. Every thing is necessary, every thing is inevitably and fatally enchained and geared into the great machine called the universe. There is no morality, since there is no liberty.

If the only substance is God, and if he is recognized as a being sovereignly intelligent and sovereignly free, and as soon as we admit the idea of God, we can not do otherwise, and if we are only emanations and manifestations of God, it is evident that when we act it is God who acts in us, and consequently our will is only an instrument, a means of which God makes use; we do nothing of ourselves, we have no responsibility. Hence we fall into fatalism.

If, therefore, there is but one substance, morals are an impossibility. All beings being modifications of the single substance, it is this which acts, by a mechanical fatality, if it is material; by a spiritual necessity, if it is spiritual; for it is the will of God which acts in us, and we are only blind and impotent instruments, and so responsible for nothing. We are not even servants; for servants are responsible in the sphere of their activity, and conformably to the laws imposed on them. We are simply blind agents, passive instruments, like a staff or lever in the hand of its mover.

Then there is no more distinction between good and evil, between just and unjust; there is no *right* as opposed to *fact*. All is right, because all is God; and consequently all is good, because it is and can not be otherwise.

Hence, as far as morality is concerned, all actions have the same worth, and differ only in reference to their utility. Some actions are injurious, others useful; some are agreeable, others the contrary; but no moral character attaches to any. We are a part of a necessary series of things; and, as all that happens in the world has its reason for being in the great *whole*, whose movements we obey without comprehending, and without concurring by any causality of ours, it follows that every thing that is done is well done; that all that is has its reason for existing, and has its legitimation in the very fact of its existence; for that which makes a thing lawful is the reason for its existence.

Hence has arisen that system of historical fatalism, which in modern times some have sought to establish, and which still prevails in our modern histories. By this, men have endeavored to justify even the greatest crimes, including the horrors which disgraced our Revolution. As if in order to sustain what was great, and beautiful, and right in that revolution, we must assume the responsibility of all the abominations with which it was stained! This is the result of that pantheistic system which sees God every-where, and good in every thing, simply because it exists. Every one is now justified, even Robespierre, whose crimes have found apologists. Men have said, "This poor M. de Robespierre was obliged to act as he did; circumstances compelled him; further, his course advanced the cause of liberty; and, in short, as it did take place, it had reason for taking place; therefore, it was well—was legitimate!"

See, gentlemen, the consequences of a bad, a pantheistic philosophy; for certainly, if Pantheism is true, every thing is right, crime as well as virtue. The most wicked actions, like their opposites, are only forms, and differ only by their consequences. As to moral character in actions, there is no such thing. It is the divine action which moves men. As in nature, plants are developed under the influence of the sun and the seasons, so in human things every thing takes place spontaneously, necessarily, blindly. Morality has nothing to do therein, or, rather, there is no such thing as morals.

Recall what has been said, viz.: "What import the consequences of a doctrine, provided it is true; the point is to know whether it is true or false, and not whether it is useful. Consequences will come as they can." Such, indeed, must be the

language of the partisans of historical necessity. Surely, if God is the only substance, and the universe but manifestations of him, one need not be troubled about the consequences of human action, whatever they may be. Every thing comes back again to divine action, which does every thing necessarily, and which is all things, τὸ πᾶν.

This *all*, what is it? Who shall describe it? It is a word which has no more meaning than its opposite, nothing. It is *being* equal to *non-being*, or the absolute identity of the two. It is the Idea of Hegel, evolving itself necessarily and eternally. It is the indefinite *processus* of life, the first and universal matter of the Eleatæ. It is the *maïa* of the Hindoos, the atoms of Leucippus. It is—whatever you please. But in all these vain conceptions and empty words, there is nothing reasonable, nothing which indicates a moving toward a fixed and final end. Life is an indefinite series of transformations, an unceasing metempsychosis, a phantasmagoria without result, a something of which, like the philosopher just quoted, I can not assign the end, only lucky if, in despair, I may fall, like him, into the hands of the good God.

Thirdly, in such a system there is no motive to do right. There is no need to be troubled, since it is God who acts in us. This notion is more prevalent than we imagine, only in another form. You often hear it said, by those who wish to gratify their passions, while their conscience nevertheless troubles them, "Why resist? It is nature speaking, and why oppose nature? God has made us thus; why not obey the instincts he has given us? Why not satisfy the desires he has implanted, the passions he has kindled in our bosoms?"

If Pantheism be true, those who talk thus are perfectly right. The excuses which such seek for themselves, show that they adopt, to some degree, pantheistic doctrines; for they are valid only on this hypothesis. If there is a law of fate which constrains the movements of every being, then there is no motive to do or not to do one thing more than another; we must follow the natural impulse, spontaneity, instinct; abandon ourselves to the passions which arise in the heart, to the desires which draw us, to all the impulses which act upon us. There is no reason to abstain from what is called evil, or to perform what is called good; because these are simply equivalent forms, with no essen-

tial difference between them. There remains no longer fear to restrain me or hope to excite me, for I am capable neither of merit nor demerit. From the beginning, my place was marked, my pathway was traced in the life of the great whole. I can not deviate from it, whatever I may do; and, finally, after the series of evolutions through which I must pass, I shall return to the point from which I first started, this that I call my soul, my person, will vanish into the universal life, like a mist in the atmosphere, and all will be over.

Finally, public morals are annihilated with private; that is to say, under this system, a virtuous public policy is not possible. You have lately seen renewed all the ancient political errors which originated in Pantheism. This metaphysics, leading the way, and private morality being destroyed, public morals perish with it; for public morals, or policy, like private morals, are derived from some doctrine or metaphysics. I have shown you the wildness of the politics of Plato, resulting from his philosophy. It is the same in this case. If the world is God, if there is only one being, of whom all existences are only modifications, and if they all are multiplied forms of the whole, of which they variously manifest the unity, then human society ought to be constructed after the image of the universe.

In a social organization of this kind, what will become of individual liberty? There will be no more of this than of personal morality; it is not possible that there should be any; for you are no longer persons, individuals, citizens; you are branches of a tree, rays from a center, movements of a force, modifications of a substance. There is no more liberty for you in society than in the universe; for society, in order to be real, must be formed after the image and resemblance of the great whole. Just as in the universe, there is one who does every thing, and all existences are only modes and instruments of that one, so in politics you must be the modes and instruments of the whole, which is called the State. The State—a great word, about which now a great noise is made, and which always signifies some *one* particularly—the State is all, and must do all in its own interest and glory. Every thing else is nothing.

Hence have come those political Utopias, *quashed* in the midst of universal ridicule, and which nevertheless have produced much evil, by seducing and exciting the multitudes by the allurement

of riches and power obtained without labor. I mean Communism and Socialism. All has been preached to the people in the name of liberty! In the name of liberty the demand was made of the most absolute sacrifice of individual liberty to the will *of the whole*, that is, of the State, which in its unity embraces and possesses all. The State alone has rights. It is like the substance and single cause in the world, so all power belongs to it. It is the master of all things, and individuals are only its modes, its appurtenances, its instruments. They are devoted to it—soul, body, and possessions; it disposes of them, and makes them do as it pleases.

Hence also comes that which has been called the organization of labor. The plan was to muster us all as an army, and make us labor on account of the State, without profit to the State or any body else. Society would have been a great camp, or something worse; for indeed in camps, even under a rigorous discipline, the individual subsists and has certain rights. But in the communist or social system individuals disappear; they have nothing to claim as their own; they are forfeited to the State, which does with them whatever seems good to it, as in the universe the great *whole* does as it pleases with every thing.

To such things pantheistic doctrines lead—to fatalism, to slavery, to the annihilation of personal and public liberty. And still there were liberal men, or those who call themselves such, who preached these doctrines in the name of liberty!

In closing, and that I may leave you something which will be of service to you against Pantheism, I will indicate the only two methods of resisting it effectively.

The first is within reach of every body: it is common-sense as opposed to pantheistic speculation; it is a feeling, a consciousness of the practical. I say good sense, and not reason; because the reason, given up to itself, as St. Paul says, becomes vain in its speculations and is lost in its own imaginings. When it has nothing higher than itself to enlighten and guide it, it ends by falling into this fundamental error, which, as we see, includes all others.

Pantheism may be refuted, like skepticism, by using against it plain good sense, or that mode of looking at things which is common to us all, because it is the result of our nature and organization, and is the best guide and surest safeguard of our

existence. Thus, as I just now said, suppose there were here among us a skeptic, who did not believe in the existence of bodies, and that in going out of this room he should encounter an obstacle stopping him, or a danger threatening him, he will surely wish to avoid them. If, however, he is a skeptic, he will have no regard to them; but his good sense gets the better of his system. Just so it is with Pantheism; common-sense prevents our believing in it seriously. In spite of ourselves we instinctively believe that there is a God, author of the world; that the world is not God any more than the work is the workman; that this world is filled with different beings, among whom we live; that these beings are real, because our life is constantly mingled with theirs, and we are continually occupied in seeking or avoiding them. We are convinced that we exist as individuals, and that all others do so too. Gentlemen, if I were a skeptic, could I at this moment persist in that delusion? For am I, after all, talking here to myself, or to phantoms which exist only in my ideas? But I can not take you for phantoms; and it would be just so if I were a Pantheist. We are unalterably convinced that there is a multitude of substances, of material and spiritual beings, distinct from each other; that there is a God, men, and a world. And unless we give up common-sense, and become fools, or profound philosophers after the manner of some, we can not confound things so evidently distinct, and conceive of all things as constituting one great whole.

And yet this monstrous error is, as I have shown you, the fatal consequence of certain systems, which some men of great talent have adopted without knowing their last result, or being willing to follow them to their end.

There are, in fact, and I can not say it too often, two men in the philosopher; there is the man of good sense and the man of system. And it is for this reason that a man is sometimes pantheistic in speculation, while he follows good sense in every thing else. It is very certain that the most outspoken Pantheist recognizes something which is not God, if it be only himself.

On another side is conscience, which preserves from moral errors, even when one believes in fatalism. There are moments when conscience protests; one feels strongly that he has done wrong, that there is a duty for him to perform, obligations to fulfill, injustice to avoid. He feels the necessity of guarding his

conscience and saving his responsibility. But in Pantheism all these things are illusions or chimeras.

The other method of combatting Pantheism I shall only indicate, as I have not time to develop it.

Pantheism springs from the pretension to explain God and creation by reason alone. If the reason is inconsistent with itself, it stops at dualism, like Plato, who admits a God, with matter uncreated, eternal like himself, which he must reduce and fashion in spite of its resistance. If, however, reason be consistent to the last, it goes beyond dualism, and by its inability to explain creation simply by its own light, is drawn on to the doctrine of a single substance. On these two important points there are only two valid solutions, and both these belong to Christianity.

The strongest argument of our day, in favor of Pantheism, has been this: God is essentially active; he can not but act; therefore, he necessarily creates; therefore, the finite is a necessary product of the infinite, and so creation is necessary!

To this the Christian philosopher replies: Yes, God is essentially active; he is pure action, hence he must act; he is the infinite mind, hence he must know; he is the infinite will, therefore he must will; he is infinite love, and so he must love. Now, for the action, knowledge, will, love, of the Infinite, there must be an end and object worthy of itself, infinite like itself, and with which it shall be in necessary relation, since it is unable not to know, to act, to will, to love. The essential object, therefore, of the action or knowledge of God should be universal, like himself; the essential object of the love of God can not be other than a universal object; the essential object of the universal will must be a universal object. But creation, being finite, is only a finite object of the infinite action, and consequently can not be its essential act; it can not, therefore, be an adequate end for the infinite activity.

But hear what Christianity says: God is pure action; therefore he produces, necessarily; therefore he begets from all eternity by the knowledge which he has of himself. He is the universal being, and so by the knowledge which he has of himself, and which he can not but have, he begets the image of the universal being, which is perfectly equal to himself, although distinct, and the image is his word, his intelligence, his wisdom, his λόγος.

God loves; he can not but love; but he can love essentially only what is sovereignly perfect; therefore the object of his love is the image of his own perfection. Therefore, from the activity of God results necessarily the triplicity of terms or persons in God, viz., the head or source, who, by the knowledge which he has of himself, produces continually his own image, which is the express image of his person, and the brightness of his glory, his Word, the universal *λὸγος*. And since he produces, begets, he is the Father, and the begotten Word is the Son. And from the necessary relation of the two proceeds *love*, or the spirit of life; because it is not possible that God should beget his Word without loving Him and being loved by Him. Thus God, in knowing himself from all eternity, acts and produces eternally, and consequently finds in this very product the essential object of his activity and love.

This is the idea of the fundamental doctrine of Christianity; and there is no other way, metaphysically, of escaping from Pantheism. You see from this that God had no need to create in order to act. Consequently, if he has created the finite, it was by an act which he indeed willed to do, but which was not essential to him, and of which he had no need. *Creavit quia voluit.* The only act which is essential to him is a universal act, which produces the universal, and which is therefore infinite both in subject and in object. But this act is only within the Deity, by the knowledge which he has of himself. It is the fullness or plenitude of the Divine life; and the formulated expression of this act is the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. O, gentlemen, here are magnificent things, to be said and to be heard, if one could find language to express them. There is a sublime and truly transcendental philosophy in the application of this high science of the nature of God to the study of man and of the world; for this fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion is, at the same time, the first law, the universal law of creation.

In conclusion: The doctrine of the creation, as Christianity teaches it, is the pure and sublime truth as God has revealed it to us; for reason can not attain to it by its own unaided light. The creation, according to Christianity, is a creation *ex nihilo.* Unaided reason, on the contrary, and with it all the ancient philosophy, said, *Ex nihilo, nihil.* We say, God has made all things out of that which was not. *Dixit, et facta sunt; fiat lux, et facta est.*

There is the mystery of the divine power; and this is the only solution which preserves from Pantheism. Otherwise, you come either to an eternity of matter with Plato, or to a single substance, matter or spirit, with most other philosophers, who have been either unacquainted with or opposed to the Christian ideas.

These are the two great truths which combat and destroy Pantheism; and these are both supernatural. Revelation has made them known to us; but you see how admirably they illustrate philosophical speculation, and how, when reason unites its light with that which is accorded it from on high, a new horizon opens before it, where it perceives the connection of natural and supernatural truths, and the relations of heaven and earth.

You see, finally, that the deep speculations of Christianity are in accordance with good sense, and that of all the systems which we have examined, touching these grave questions, this is the only one which furnishes them a rational solution. But we must confess this solution did not come from men, and could not have come from men; for it is only God who can tell us the nature of God, and he alone who made the world by his word, can explain by his word the origin of the world.

THE LAND OF THE GOSPEL:

NOTES OF A JOURNEY IN THE EAST.

BY EDMOND DE PRESSENSE.*

It has been announced, for some time, that M. Pressensé was busy in the Holy Land, following the footsteps of M. Renan, for the purpose of gathering materials for a work which should be a true *Vie de Jesus*. This little book is the herald of that greater work. It consists, as the author indeed says, of notes only; but, we may add, of very well-written and interesting notes. They indicate, in a few words, the peculiarity of a scene, the characteristics of a town, and the chief incidents of a journey, with a remarkable felicity and success.

* A notice of the work in the *Christian Spectator* for July, 1865.

ON TYPES.*

M. Renan, in his "Life of Jesus," intimates that the Founder of Christianity "would not have appealed to the evidence of miracles, if he had had the least idea of a natural order regulated by laws." And it is worthy of notice, that the infidelity of the present day founds its strongest arguments against Revelation, and against all preternatural interposition of God in human affairs, on the acknowledged general prevalence of law in the ordinary course of the world.

There are two ways in which a Christian may reply to this argument. He may, on the one hand, be satisfied with the answer first suggested by Butler, and frequently employed in the present day, that miracles and prophecy, and all other alleged instances of divine interference, may, for aught we know, be parts of a system, results of a law not cognizable by us, and superior to any that we can observe or ascertain. Or, on the other hand, he may appeal to obvious facts and the experience of men, that the moral world is evidently, for a time, in a state of disorder, and, therefore, that we must not expect to be able to refer its phenomena, still less the remedies rendered necessary by its present condition, to the operation of established laws; and that we really have no ground, under these circumstances, or indeed under any circumstances, for questioning the right and power of God to operate exceptionably, independently of ordinary laws, or in opposition to them.

But the preternatural exercise of divine power is by no means incompatible with the ideas of order and system; nor do we make the smallest sacrifice of faith when we find ourselves able to trace the operation of regular laws in any portion of revealed religion.

Modern science would, of course, reject the Christian notion of a Type. It would probably admit that, in the history of a nation, there might be a casual correspondence in the events and characters of one age with those of another. Any thing more than this—the attempt, for instance, to establish an arbitrary and

* From the *Christian Advocate and Review* of January, 1865.

intentional analogy between the Brazen Serpent or the Rock and the Person of our Lord—would be set aside as unphilosophical; an accidental resemblance, sufficient to be used as an illustration, would be admitted, but no more. And it is asked further, To what end were types employed? Were they used for the instruction of men of old, or of us who live under the completed dispensation? If for the Jews, they are inconvenient and imperfect methods of instruction: if for us, they are superfluous, because their lesson has been long since superseded by the direct teaching of the Gospel.

We shall find a satisfactory answer to these and similar questions, if we can point to a law, that is, to an acknowledged method of procedure under the government of God, according to which it is to be expected that the events and characters of the earlier dispensation should be properly typical of events and characters under the later.

I believe that such a law may be traced and indicated in the order of God's dealings with his Church. And we are guided to it by the analogy of the natural world; by the order of creation, the processes of nature, and the general laws which regulate human design and action.

In the language of philosophy, as in that of natural history, the word "Type" is used to denote the ideal. An individual is called the type of his species, when it possesses all the essential characteristics of that species. The less perfect examples are said to be formed after this type, or ideal, as copies are made from an original. The same, too, strictly speaking, is the force of the word in Scripture language. Christ, for example, is the type or ideal conception of restored humanity; all Christlike men, in all ages, are copies of him. Theology has changed the use of the term, and calls the ideal the archetype, while it limits the application of the word type to those prefigurations which are found in the Old Testament.

Bearing in mind the proper application of the term, I proceed to notice what may be called the typical process in human design and action.

In every invention which has passed through a period of development, we can, for the most part, observe that the efforts of successive inventors or improvers are guided by a common plan and purpose; implying a type, a perfect idea or conception, at which

all are aiming, and toward which every advance appears to tend. The stages of progress are simply steps toward the attainment of the ideal, the common pattern and guide of all. And in every several stage of invention, from the earliest and rudest contrivances, we shall find a correspondence of the various parts with the complete organization of the perfect machine.

So, if we stand and look at the sculptor making his first bold cuts into the marble, apparently at random, all is shapeless and unsightly. We can see no approach to that which is to be; until presently a projection here and a depression there, a curve traced or a mass brought out, begin to present to our minds an intelligible form, and enable us to follow on in imagination, till we partially grasp the idea which has long been dwelling, clear and well defined, in the mind of the artist.

But it is far more important to find this principle prevailing in the operations of the natural world, and controlling the growth and progress of all organized life: and this as well in the order of creation, the succession of classes and families registered by geology, as in the evolution of successive generations in the same kind.

This truth is clearly stated by Dr. McCosh, in a work devoted to this particular subject, ("Typical Forms and Special Ends:")

"Every organic object is constructed after a type."

"All natural objects, and especially all organic objects, are fashioned according to a type, and operate according to unchanging laws."

And the same author, in a later work, ("The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural:")

"In the typical system of nature, the earlier is a sort of prefiguration of the later. The seed contains what is to become the full-grown plant. The embryo has already what is to expand into the full-grown animal. The earlier geological ages show rude types, with capacities which can become developed only in the more finished forms of later vegetable and animal life."

This may serve to indicate the law of development which prevails in the ordinary action of nature and of mankind.

Can the same law be traced in the progress of Revealed Religion? I believe it can; and that, "in the spiritual economy of God, things are fashioned after a pattern, just as the natural

sciences have shown that there are types or model forms throughout the works of God.

We all believe that the scheme of man's salvation, ultimately revealed in the Gospel, was formed, perfect and entire, in the eternal counsels of God. We believe in the completeness and finality of that scheme; that it admits of no addition, no modification, though it is capable of being adapted to every conceivable phase of thought and state of society.

It appears, further, to have been a part of the Divine plan, that the development of this scheme should be gradual, and that there should be a certain period of preparation before its final accomplishment.

If, then, it is assumed that there was in the mind of God a plan of salvation, complete and final, and that his treatment of the Jews was simply a development of this plan, and their history a progress toward it, it follows, by that law of development which prevails generally in the operations of God, that the events, the persons, and the institutions of the Old Testament must be typical; in other words, that the elementary arrangements should be a systematic and regular progress toward the perfect idea—should be more or less formed upon that idea, and resemble it.

The original, so to speak, was in the mind of God from all eternity. Copies ἀντίτυπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν, were, from time to time, presented to his Church, bearing, in greater or less degree, the stamp of the ideal. "See," said he to Moses, "that thou make all things according to the *pattern* showed to thee in the Mount."

Dr. Newman, in his most celebrated work, states truly, that among the decisive tests by which a true development is distinguished from a corruption are: 1. Preservation of the idea; 2. Continuity of principle; 3. Early anticipation; 4. Logical sequence; 5. Chronic continuance. It would be a mere waste of time to show that all these tests may safely be applied to the process by which the world was prepared for the Gospel. Nor would it need many words to prove that, from the earliest days of sacred history, we can make out, here and there, a feature of the form that is to be—some broad, rough-hewn outline of a shape, to be hereafter minutely and elaborately finished.

Thus we find *events* so directed as to declare and enforce the eternal principles of God's moral government. Sin, the universal fault, is followed by death, the invariable penalty. The possi-

bility of a mediator is suggested; the principle of substitution is established; the government of God is declared to be supreme; His absolute freedom of choice is vindicated and exhibited in the selection of Israel, their separation, and their peculiar discipline. From very early events, we learn that the way of salvation is arbitrary on the part of God, while faith is a required condition on man's side; that God is merciful and long-suffering, but that the effect of impenitence and unbelief is ruin.

So we find, in the *history of the Jews*, a previous intimation of the principles of the Gospel, and accordingly the history of the Jews is properly typical.

Still more marked is this typical character in the positive *institutions* of God for instruction, discipline, and expiation. Nor could these institutions be otherwise than typical, unless God had been minded to thwart his own counsels, and to lead the minds of his people away from the true idea which he had in view. All the essential elements of the Gospel are represented in the religious system of the Ancient Jewish Church. Original guilt, uncleanness, and estrangement; access to God by the way of his appointment alone, a Person chosen by God, set apart, consecrated as priest, the invariable sacrifice of a life for atonement, (not to enter upon more particular and more striking anticipations;) all these surely make up a complete outline of that system of redemption and purification afterward revealed in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

Once more, in the supposed case we naturally look for typical *persons*. Some modern writers speak of the possibility of this; others go further, and maintain that it is reasonable. I believe that it is necessary. If men were to be raised up in the providence of God for the direct purpose of carrying on, in their generation, a progressive work, which was to culminate in the person of a perfect agent, it seems impossible to conceive of them otherwise than as resembling and representing Him in their work and characters; imperfectly, no doubt, but yet in their several ages and positions they were employed as the assistants of the great Artist to carry on the work in its earlier and ruder stages, not wholly, nor in considerable part, comprehending the design, but working toward it, and having a sight of it, though dimly and indistinctly. And so their characters took the form of the ideal; their feelings, acts, and words in some degree represent Him

whose ministers they were. All in common possessed a knowledge, though imperfect, of the true God; an apprehension, though indistinct, of his great plan and purpose, and a loyal attachment to his kingdom. And it is the possession of these broad characteristics which marks the true personal type.

If the foregoing remarks are founded on the truth, the typical character of the Old Testament will be nothing else than the gradual appearance of the general traits of the Gospel, in the *Events* which were arranged to prepare for it, the *Institutions* which were designed to point to it, and the *Persons* who were employed to bring it about.

And this at once disposes of the objection above noticed. If it is asked, For whom was the system of types employed—for us or for the Jews? I reply, neither for us nor for the Jews. It is idle, in the presence of a great universal law, to ask for whose particular benefit it was enacted; as well might we ask for whose especial benefit the law of gravitation or of electro-magnetism was ordained. The rules and conditions of development—the great typical principle—constant like other laws, would have held their course if we had never existed, and if the Jews had never been a nation, for the advantage of the whole universe. We may profit by them in our place and generation, as the sailor uses the magnet, without presuming to ask whether it was created for his guidance.

One result of the admission of this theory is, a far greater latitude of what may be called typical interpretation than is generally granted. Much difference of opinion has at all times existed as to what may fairly be called types. Some, I know, have concluded that the only safe way of interpretation is to limit the term to those events, persons, and institutions which are plainly declared in the New Testament to be types. Other interpreters have, no doubt, been led so much by their own imagination, as to bring suspicion on the whole system, by certain extravagancies of application. But if that is typical which is formed on the Gospel type, then wherever we can see a resemblance to the Gospel in any general principle, or a likeness of Christ in any essential feature, there we are justified in recognizing a type, as we commonly speak. The resemblance may be more or less strong; it may appear to one man, while another may be unable to see it; but I shall not be justified in denying that there is a likeness,

because I can not make it out, if another asserts that he does perceive it.

It is, no doubt, on some such ground as this, that Alford concludes that "Christ is every-where involved in the Old Testament, as he is every-where evolved in the New." And again, "He that sees not Christ every-where in the Old Testament, sees him nowhere."

And, to quote once more the eloquent language of McCosh, "The Incarnation of the Eternal Word, followed by the setting of a perfect example, by the working of a perfect righteousness, and by a peculiar suffering, is the great supernatural event, carrying all the others along with it, as the streams which feed it, or the rivers which flow from it."

The adoption of this theory, or some such theory, may tend also to produce a more systematic and discriminate interpretation of admitted and undoubted types. It is the unity of design, the correspondence in essential principles, that makes the true type. Lesser points of resemblance, which may be almost regarded as accidental, (in the logical sense of the word,) such as the selling of Joseph for money, or the preservation of Moses in his infancy, would seem to serve chiefly to draw attention to truer and deeper coincidences—the faith and obedience, the loyalty to God and devotion to his people, which bear the stamp of the true type, and prefigure the character of the great Deliverer himself.

So, the lifting up of the serpent is typical; we have the highest authority for saying so, (and the scarlet thread of Rahab is, to some minds, typical;) but in either case, it is the deeper meaning of the ordinance, the arbitrary character of the method, and the appeal to faith in the recipients, which contain the true conception of the way of salvation.

I will only suggest, in passing, that a clear view of a typical system in the Old Testament helps us considerably in the classification of characters. Because, as Jesus is the type of restored humanity—and in his likeness the servants of God were fashioned from the first—so we find another type, the natural man, exhibited all along in contrast with this, and a series of characters represented, all in various degrees bearing the figure of the mold in which they were formed.

It may possibly be objected, that a theory of types which thus refers them to a general law of development, a law which

prevails universally in the natural world, removes them altogether from the region of the preternatural, and robs them of that exceptional sovereign character which we like to attribute to them as instances of special providence.

To this it is replied, that there are two ways of reducing the facts of Revealed Religion to a system. One way is that of M. Renan, which consists in repudiating the preternatural element altogether. The other is that which is here pursued. It makes all preternatural; it attributes an inspired character to the facts of Jewish history, as well as to the record of those facts; it makes the history of Israel bear to the history of other nations the same relation as the Bible bears to other books.

It only assumes that the preternatural operations of God are likely to be regulated by similar laws, where we can trace laws at all, to those which direct the order of nature.

And I venture to think, that the adoption of a definite theory of types may help us to an increased certainty and uniformity of interpretation, and at the same time give us a truer and a deeper insight into the unity of design, the harmony of parts, and the regularity of progress, which characterize the revelation of God, from first to last.

S. A. P.

OUR TIMES AND OUR CHURCHES.*

BY REV. SAMUEL HUBDITCH.

But we must not hope for less perilous times. There is not the least sign in commerce, legislation, literature, or public taste of the advent of a spirit more favorable to religion. If the Church is to recover, it will not be by the decline of her enemy's strength, but by the increase of her own. On herself the whole burden lies. He who declined to pray for his people's removal from the world, declines to make it less perilous to remain in it. He will not alter, but they must overcome, the world. Nature, with the same vastness in her mountains, and hardness in her rocks, and breadth in her oceans, and violence in her storms, and force in all her laws, is more than ever subject to man, because

* An extract in the *Scottish Congregational Magazine* for June, 1865.

he has become more skillful. He has discovered and asserted his superiority, and she has made loyal answer. Let the "children of light" in this also learn wisdom from "the children of this generation." Are Christians to be scared from their propriety by the spirit of fashion and wealth, and the *egoism* of this world—the heavenly by the earthly? Shall a royal priesthood, a holy nation, blush, and cringe, and skulk, and compromise in a world of shams like this? The cycles through which the education of the Church is extended, are purposely varied, that the spiritual life may show its independence of all accidents and circumstances. It has borne the world's frown, and is now called to show no fascination under the world's smile.

A spiritual life—which is in the will, irresistible righteousness; in the conscience, delicacy and decision; in the understanding, light; in the affections, reverence and love—is the one thing our Churches want, and ours to-day is the high honor of consulting how to bring it to them or them to it.

After much thought, I have found the simplest and safest answer to the question, "How to revive the Churches?" to be the answer to another, "How to revive myself?" . . . Our tendency to decline is shared by all our people, and the conditions of their recovery and ours are the same. If the effect of the times has been to diminish the Church's appreciation of her Savior, and increase her distance from him, her attention should be especially directed to the duty of getting nearer to him. Our relation to Christ brings with it all our privileges and powers. "He that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit." Near to Him, we see things as they are, and feel and act as we ought. There sin appears the abominable thing it is. There the tinsel of this life loses all its color, and the voices that call to worldly greatness have a dull and unexciting sound. There the thousand questions of the Scripture are answered. There all doubts of personal acceptance die, and the fountains of gratitude and joy are opened. Cowardice then changes to courage, indolence to industry, law is lost in love, and duty in delight. There eternity and heaven and the great spirit-world stand open, throwing all things terrestrial into the shade. We die with Christ, and rise and sit with him in heavenly places.

PUSEY'S COMMENTARY ON JONAH.*

Chapter I.

1. *Now the word of the Lord*, lit. *And etc.* This is the way in which the several inspired writers of the Old Testament mark that what it was given them to write, was united on to those sacred books which God had given to others to write, and formed with them one continuous whole. The word *And* implies this. It would do so in any language, and it does so in Hebrew as much as in any other. As neither we, nor any other people, would, without any meaning, use the word *And*, so neither did the Hebrews. It joins the four first books of Moses together; it carries on the history through Joshua, Judges, the Books of Samuel and of the Kings. After the captivity, Ezra and Nehemiah begin again where the histories before left off; the break of the captivity is bridged over, and Ezra, going back in mind to the history of God's people before the captivity, resumes the history as if it had been of yesterday—*And in the first year of Cyrus.* It joins in the story of the Book of Ruth before the captivity, and that of Esther afterward. At times, even prophets employ it, in using the narrative form of themselves, as Ezekiel: *And it was in the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, in the fifth day of the month, and I was in the captivity by the river of Chebar, the heavens opened and I saw*, etc. If a prophet or historian wishes to detach his prophesy or his history, he does so—as Ezra probably began the book of Chronicles anew from Adam, or as Daniel makes his prophesy a whole by itself. But then it is the more obvious that a Hebrew prophet or historian, when he does begin with the word *And*, has an object in so beginning; he uses a universal word of all languages in its uniform meaning in all language, to join things together.

And yet more precisely; *And the word of the Lord came to— saying*, occurs over and over again, stringing together the pearls of great price of God's revelations, and uniting this new revela-

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* From the *Minor Prophets, with a Commentary, explanatory and practical, and Introduction to the several Books, by the* Rev. E. B. Pusey, D. D., *Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church.* Oxford, 1861. 4to.

tion to all those which had preceded it. The word *And*, then, joins on histories with histories, revelations with revelations, uniting in one the histories of God's works and words, and blending the books of Holy Scripture into one Divine Book.

But the form of words must have suggested to the Jews another thought, which is part of our thankfulness and of our being: *Then to the Gentiles, also, hath God given repentance unto life.* The words are the self-same familiar words with which some fresh revelation of God's will to His people had so often been announced. Now they are prefixed to God's message to the heathen, and so as to join on that message to all the other messages to Israel. Would, then, God deal thenceforth with the heathen as with the Jews? Would they have their prophets? Would they be included in the one family of God? The mission of Jonah, in itself, was an earnest that they would; for God, who does nothing fitfully or capriciously in that He had begun, gave an earnest that He would carry on what He had begun. And so, thereafter, the great prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, were prophets to the nations also; Daniel was a prophet among them, to them as well as to their captives. But the mission of Jonah might, so far, have been something exceptional. The enrolling his book, as an integral part of the Scriptures, joining on that prophesy to the other prophesies of Israel, was an earnest that they were to be parts of one system. But then it would be significant, also, that the records of God's prophesies to the Jews all embodied the accounts of their impenitence. Here is inserted among them an account of God's revelation to the heathen, and their repentance. So many prophets had been sent, so many miracles wrought, so often had captivity been foreannounced to them for the multitude of their sins, and they never repented. Not for the reign of one king did they cease from the worship of the calves; not one of the kings of the ten tribes departed from the sins of Jeroboam; Elijah, sent in the Word and Spirit of the Lord, had done many miracles, yet obtained no abandonment of the calves. His miracles effected this only, that the people knew Baal was no god, and cried out, "*The Lord, He is the God.*" Elisha, his disciple, followed him, who asked for a double portion of the Spirit of Elijah, that he might work more miracles to bring back the people. He died, and, after his death as before it, the worship of the calves continued in Israel. The Lord marveled, and

was weary of Israel, knowing that if He sent to the heathen they would hear, as he saith to Ezekiel. To make trial of this, Jonah was chosen, of whom it is recorded in the book of Kings that he prophesied the restoration of the border of Israel. When, then, he begins by saying, *And the Word of the Lord came to Jonah*, prefixing the word *And*, he refers us back to those former things, in this meaning. The children have not hearkened to what the Lord commanded, sending to them by His servants the prophets, but have hardened their necks and given themselves up to do evil before the Lord and provoke him to anger; *and*, therefore, *the word of the Lord came to Jonah, saying*, "*Arise, and go to Nineveh, that great city, and preach unto her*," that so Israel may be shown, in comparison with the heathen, to be the more guilty, when the Ninevites should repent while the children of Israel persevered in unrepentance.

Jonah, the son of Amittai. Both names occur here only in the Old Testament. Jonah signifies "dove;" Amittai, "the truth of God." Some of the names of the Hebrew prophets so suit in with their times, that they must either have been given them prophetically, or assumed by themselves, as a sort of watchword, analogous to the prophetic names given to the sons of Hosea and Isaiah. Such were the names of Elijah and Elisha. "The Lord is my God," my "God is salvation."

Such, too, seems to be that of Jonah. The "dove" is everywhere the symbol of "mourning love." The side of his character which Jonah records is that of his defect, his want of trust in God; and so his unloving zeal against those who were to be the instruments of God against his people. His name, perhaps, preserves that character by which he willed to be known among his people, one who moaned or mourned over them.

2. *Arise, go to Nineveh, that great city.* The Assyrian history, as far as it has yet been discovered, is very bare of events in regard to this period. We have as yet the names of three kings only for one hundred and fifty years. But Assyria, as far as we know its history, was in its meridian. Just before the time of Jonah, perhaps ending in it, were the victorious reigns of Shalmanubar and Shamasiva; after him was that of Ivalush, or Pul, the first aggressor upon Israel. It is clear that this was a time of Assyrian greatness; since God calls it *that great city*, not in relation to its extent only, but its power. A large weak city

would not have been called *a great city unto God.* (Chapter iii, 3).

And cry against it. The substance of that *cry* is recorded afterwards, but God told to Jonah now what message he was to cry aloud to it. For Jonah relates afterwards how he expostulated now with God, and that his expostulation was founded on this, that God was so merciful that He would not fulfill the judgment which He threatened. Faith was strong in Jonah, while, like Apostles, "the sons of thunder" before the day of Pentecost, he knew not "what spirit *he* was of." Zeal for the people, and, as he doubtless thought, for the glory of God, narrowed love in him. He did not, like Moses, pray, *Or else blot me also out of Thy book;* or, like St. Paul, desire even to be *an anathema from Christ* for his people's sake; so that there might be more to love his Lord. His zeal was directed, like that of the rebuked Apostles, against others, and so it too was rebuked. But his faith was strong. He shrank back from the office as believing, not as doubting, the might of God. He thought nothing of preaching, amid that multitude of wild warriors, the stern message of God. He was willing, alone, to confront the violence of a city of six hundred thousand, whose characteristic was violence. He was ready, at God's bidding, to enter what Nahum speaks of as a den of lions: *the dwelling of the lions and the feeding-place of the young lions, where the lion did tear in pieces enough for his whelps, and strangle for his lionesses.* He feared not the fierceness of their lion-nature, but God's tenderness, and lest that tenderness should be the destruction of his own people.

Their wickedness is come up before me. So God said to Cain, *The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground.* and of Sodom, *The cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, because their sin is very grievous; the cry of it is come up unto me.* The *wickedness* is not the mere mass of human sin, of which it is said, *the whole world lieth in wickedness*, but evil-doing toward others. This was the cause of the final sentence on Nineveh, with which Nahum closes his prophesy, *Upon whom hath not thy wickedness passed continually?* It had been assigned as the ground of the judgment on Israel through Nineveh. *So shall Bethel do unto you, on account of the wickedness of your wickedness.* It was the ground of the destruction by the flood. *God saw that the wickedness of man* was *great upon the earth.* God

represents himself the Great Judge, as sitting on His throne in heaven, Unseen, but All-seeing, to whom the wickedness and oppressiveness of man against man *goes up*, appealing for His sentence against the oppressor. The cause seems ofttimes long in pleading. God is long-suffering with the oppressor, too, if so be he will repent. So would a greater good come to the oppressed, also, if the wolf became a lamb. But, meanwhile, "every iniquity has its own voice at the hidden judgment-seat of God."* Mercy itself calls for vengeance on the unmerciful.

3. *But (And) Jonah rose up to flee from the presence of the Lord;* lit. *from being before the Lord.* Jonah knew well that man could not escape from the presence of God, whom he knew as the Self-existing, He who alone IS the maker of heaven, earth, and sea. He did not *flee*, then, *from his presence*, knowing well what David said, "*Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me.*" Jonah fled, not from God's presence, but from standing before Him, as His servant and minister. He refused God's service, because, as he himself tells God afterwards, he knew what it would end in, and he misliked it. So he acted, as men often do, who mislike God's commands. He set about removing himself as far as possible from being under the influence of God, and from the place where he *could* fulfill them. God bid him go to Nineveh, which lay north-east from his home; and he instantly set himself to flee to the then furthermost West. Holy Scripture sets the rebellion before us in its full nakedness. *The word of the Lord came unto Jonah, go to Nineveh; and Jonah rose up*; he did something instantly, as the consequence of God's command. He *rose up*, not as other prophets, to obey, but to disobey; and that, not slowly nor irresolutely, but *to flee from* standing *before the Lord*. He renounced his office. So when our Lord came in the flesh, those who found what He said to be *hard sayings*, went away from Him, *and walked no more with Him*. So the rich *young man went away sorrowful, for he had great possessions.* They were, perhaps, afraid of trusting themselves in His Presence; or they were ashamed of staying there, and not doing

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* S. Greg. Mor. v, 20.

what He said. So men, when God secretly calls them to prayer, go and immerse themselves in business; when, in solitude, He says to their souls something which they like not, they escape His voice in a throng. If He calls them to make sacrifices for His poor, they order themselves a new dress or some fresh sumptuousness or self-indulgence; if to celibacy, they engage themselves to marry forthwith; or, contrariwise, if He calls them not to do a thing, they do it at once, to make an end of their struggle and their obedience; to put obedience out of their power; to enter themselves on a course of disobedience. Jonah, then, in this part of his history, is the image of those who, when God calls them, disobey his call, and how He deals with them when He does not abandon them. He lets them have their way for a time, encompasses them with difficulties, so that they shall "flee back from God displeased to God appeased."*

"The whole wisdom, the whole bliss, the whole of man lies in this, to learn what God wills him to do; in what state of life, calling, duties, profession, employment, He wills him to serve Him."† God sent each one of us into the world to fulfill his own definite duties, and, through His grace, to attain to our perfection in and through fulfilling them. He did not create us at random, to pass through the world doing whatever self-will or our own pleasure leads us to, but to fulfill His will. This will of His, if we obey His earlier calls, and seek Him by prayer, in obedience, self-subdual, humility, thoughtfulness, He makes known to each by His own secret drawings, and, in absence of these, at times, by His Providence or human means. And, then, "to follow him is a token of predestination."‡ It is to place ourselves in that order of things, the pathway to our eternal mansion, for which God created us, and which God created for us. So Jesus says, "*my sheep hear my voice and I know them, and they follow* ME, *and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand.*" In these ways God has foreordained for us all the graces which we need; in these we shall be free from all temptations which might be too hard for us, in which our own special weakness would be most exposed. Those ways, which men choose out of mere natural taste or fancy, are mostly those which expose them

* S. Aug. in Ps. lxx. † From Lap. ‡ From Bourdaloue

to the greatest peril of sin and damnation. For they choose them just because such pursuits flatter most their inclinations, and give scope to their natural strength and their moral weakness. So Jonah, misliking a duty which God gave him to fulfill, separated himself from his service, forfeited his past calling, lost, as far as in him lay, his place among "the goodly fellowship of the prophets," and, but for God's overtaking grace, would have ended his days among the disobedient. As in Holy Scripture, David stands alone of saints, who had been, after their calling, blood-stained; as the penitent robber stands alone converted in death; as St. Peter stands singly, recalled after denying his Lord; so Jonah stands, the one prophet, who, having obeyed and then rebelled, was constrained, by the overpowering Providence and love of God, to return and serve Him.

"Being a prophet, Jonah could not be ignorant of the mind of God, that, according to His great wisdom and His unsearchable judgments, and His untraceable and incomprehensible ways, He, through the threat, was providing for the Ninevites that they should not suffer the things threatened. To think that Jonah hoped to hide himself in the sea, and elude, by flight, the great eye of God, were altogether absurd and ignorant, which should not be believed, I say not of a prophet, but of no other sensible person who had any moderate knowledge of God and his supreme power. Jonah knew all this better than any one, that, planning his flight, he changed his place, but did not flee God. For neither could man, hiding himself in the bosom of the earth or depths of the sea, or ascending (if possible) with wings into the air, or entering the lowest hell, or encircled with thick clouds, or taking any other counsel to secure his flight. This, above all things and alone, can neither be escaped nor resisted, God. When He willeth to hold and grasp in His hand, He overtaketh the swift, baffleth the intelligent, overthroweth the strong, boweth the lofty, tameth rashness, subdueth might. He who threatened to others the mighty hand of God, was not himself ignorant of nor thought to flee God. Let us not believe this. But since he saw the fall of Israel and perceived that the prophetic grace would pass over to the Gentiles, he withdrew himself from the office of preaching and put off the command."* "The prophet knoweth, the Holy

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* S. Greg. Naz. Apol. pro fuga, prope fin.

Spirit teaching him, that the repentance of the Gentiles is the ruin of the Jews. A lover, then, of his country, he does not so much envy the deliverance of Nineveh, as will that his own country should not perish; seeing, too, that his fellow-prophets are sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, to excite the people to repentance, and that Balaam, the soothsayer, too, prophesied of the salvation of Israel, he grieveth that he alone is chosen to be sent to the Assyrians, the enemies of Israel, and to that greatest city of the enemies where was idolatry and ignorance of God. Yet more he feared lest they, on occasion of his preaching, being converted to repentance, Israel should be wholly forsaken. For he knew by the same Spirit whereby the preaching to the Gentiles was intrusted to him, that the house of Israel would then perish; and he feared that what was at one time to be, should take place in his own time."* "The flight of the Prophet may also be referred to that of man in general who, despising the commands of God, departed from Him and gave himself to the world, where subsequently, through the storms of ill and the wreck of the whole world raging against him, he was compelled to feel the presence of God, and to return to Him whom he had fled. Whence we understand, that those things also which men think for their good, when against the will of God, are turned to destruction; and help not only does not benefit those to whom it is given, but those, too, who give it, are alike crushed; as we read that Egypt was conquered by the Assyrians, because it helped Israel against the will of God. The ship is imperiled which had received the imperiled; a tempest arises in a calm; nothing is secure when God is against us."†

Tarshish, named after one of the sons of Javan,‡ was an ancient merchant city of Spain, once proverbial for its wealth, which supplied Judea with silver, Tyre with *all manner of riches*, with iron also, tin, lead. It was known to the Greeks and Romans as (with a harder pronunciation) Tartessus, but, in our first century, it had either ceased to be or was known under some other name.|| Ships destined for a voyage, at that time so long, and built for carrying merchandise, were naturally among the largest then con-

* S. Jer. on Jonah i. 3. † S. Jer. on i. 4. ‡ Gen. x. 4.

|| Pliny (iii: 3) speaks of Carteia as so called by the Greeks; in iv. 36, he identifies Gades, the Carthaginian Gadir, with the Roman Tartessus. Strabo says, "Some call the present Karteia, Tartessus."

structed. *Ships of Tarshish* corresponded to the "East Indiamen," which some of us remember. The breaking of *ships of Tarshish by the East wind* is on account of their size and general safety instanced as a special token of the interposition of God.

And went down to Joppa. Joppa, now Jaffa, was the one well-known port of Israel on the Mediterranean. Thither the cedars were brought from Lebanon for both the first and second temple. Simon the Maccabee "took it again for a haven, and made an entrance to the isles of the sea." It was subsequently destroyed by the Romans, as a pirate-haven. At a later time, all describe it as an unsafe haven. Perhaps the shore changed, since the rings to which Andromeda was fabled to have been fastened, and which probably were once used to moore vessels, were high above the sea. Perhaps, like the Channel Islands, the navigation was safe to those who knew the coast, unsafe to others. To this port Jonah *went down* from his native country, the mountain district of Zabulon. Perhaps it was not at this time in the hands of Israel. At least the sailors were heathen. He *went down*, as the man who fell among the thieves is said to have *gone down*, *from Jerusalem to Jericho.* He *went down* from the place which God honored by His presence and protection.

And he paid the fare thereof. Jonah describes circumstantially how he took every step to his end. He went down, found a strong-built ship going whither he wished, paid his fare, embarked. He seemed now to have done all. He had severed himself from the country where his office lay. He had no further step to take. Winds and waves would do the rest. He had but to be still. He went, only to be brought back again.

"Sin brings our souls into much senselessness. For as those overtaken by heaviness of head and drunkenness are borne on simply and at random, and, be there pit or precipice, or whatever else below them, they fall into it unawares; so, too, they who fall into sin; intoxicated by their desire of the object, know not what they do; see nothing before them, present or future. Tell me, fleest thou the Lord? Wait then a little, and thou shalt learn from the event, that thou canst not escape the hands of His servant, the sea. For as soon as he embarked, it too roused its waves and raised them up on high; and as a faithful servant, finding her fellow-slave stealing some of his master's property, ceases not from giving endless trouble to those who take him in,

until she recover him, so too the sea, finding and recognizing her fellow-servant, harasses the sailors unceasingly, raging, roaring, not dragging them to a tribunal, but threatening to sink the vessel, with all its men, unless they restore to her her fellow-servants."*

"The sinner *arises*, because, will he, nill he, toil he must. If he shrinks from the way of God, because it is hard, he may not yet be idle. There is the way of ambition, of covetousness, of pleasure, to be trodden, which certainly are far harder. 'We wearied ourselves,' say the wicked, 'in the way of wickedness and destruction, yea, we have gone through deserts where there lay no way; but the way of the Lord we have not known.' Jonah would not arise, to go to Nineveh at God's command; yet he must needs arise to flee to Tarshish from before the presence of God. What good can he have who fleeth the Good? What light, who willingly forsaketh the Light? *He goes down to Joppa.* Wherever thou turnest, if thou depart from the will of God, thou goest down. Whatever glory, riches, power, honors, thou gainest, thou raisest not a whit; the more thou advancest, while turned from God, the deeper and deeper thou goest down. Yet all these things are not had without paying the price. At a price and with toil, he obtains what he desires; he receives nothing gratis, but at a great price purchases to himself storms, griefs, peril. There arises a great tempest in the sea, when various contradictory passions arise in the heart of the sinner, which take from him all tranquillity and joy. There is a tempest in the sea, when God sends strong and dangerous disease, whereby the frame is in peril of being broken. There is a tempest in the sea, when, through rivals or competitors for the same pleasures, or the injured, or the civil magistrate, his guilt is discovered, he is laden with infamy and odium, punished, withheld from his wonted pleasures. *They who go down to the sea* of this world, *and do business in mighty waters—their soul melteth away because of trouble; they reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and all their wisdom is swallowed up.*"

4. *But* [*and*] *the Lord sent out* [lit. *cast along*]. Jonah had done his all. Now God's part began. This he expresses by the word *And.* Jonah took *his* measures, *and* now God takes His. He

* S. Chrys. Hom. 5 de Pœnit. n. 3. T. II, p. 312.

had let him have his way, as He often deals with those who rebel against Him. He lets them have their way up to a certain point. He waits, in the tranquillity of His almightiness, until they have completed their preparations; and then, when man has ended, He begins, that man may see the more that it is His doing. "He takes those who flee from him in their flight, the wise in their counsels, sinners in their conceits and sins, and draws them back to Himself and compels them to return. Jonah thought to find rest in the sea, and, lo! a tempest." Probably, God summoned back Jonah, as soon as he had completed all on his part, and sent the tempest, soon after he left the shore. At least, such tempests often swept along that shore, and were known by their own special name, like the Euroclydon off Crete. Jonah, too, alone had gone down below deck to sleep, and, when the storm came, the mariners thought it possible to put back. Josephus says of that shore: "Joppa having by nature no haven, for it ends in a rough shore, mostly abrupt, but for a short space having projections, *i. e.*, deep rocks and cliffs advancing into the sea, inclining on either side toward each other, (where the traces of the chains of Andromeda, yet shown, accredit the antiquity of the fable,) and the north wind beating right on the shore, and dashing the high waves against the rocks which receive them, makes the station there a harborless sea. As those from Joppa were tossing here, a strong wind, (called by those who sail here, the black north wind,) falls upon them at daybreak, dashing straightway some of the ships against each other, some against the rocks, and some, forcing their way against the waves to the open sea, (for they fear the rocky shore,) the breakers towering above them, sank."

The ship was like [lit. *thought*] *to be broken.* Perhaps, Jonah means by this very vivid image to exhibit the more his own dullness. He ascribes, as it were, to the ship a sense of its own danger, as it heaved, and rolled, and creaked, and quivered under the weight of the storm which lay on her, and her masts groaned, and her yard-arms shivered. To the awakened conscience every thing seems to have been alive to God's displeasure, except itself.

5. *And cried, every man unto his God.* They did what they could. "Not knowing the truth, they yet know of a Providence, and, amid religious error, know that there is an object of rever-

ence."* In ignorance they had received one who offended God. And now God, *whom they ignorantly worshiped*, while they cried to the gods, who they thought disposed of them, heard them. They escaped with the loss of their wares, but God saved their lives and revealed himself to them. God hears ignorant prayer, when ignorance is not willful and sin.

To lighten it of them, lit. *to lighten from against them*, *to lighten* what was so much *against them*, what so oppressed them. "They thought that the ship was weighed down by its wonted lading, and they knew not that the whole weight was that of the fugitive Prophet."† *The sailors cast forth their wares*, but the ship was not lightened. For the whole weight still remained, the body of the Prophet, that heavy burden, not from the nature of the body, but from the burden of sin. For nothing is so onerous and heavy as sin and disobedience. Whence also Zechariah represented it under the image of lead. And David, describing its nature, said, *My wickednesses are gone over my head; as a heavy burden they are too heavy for me.* And Christ cried aloud to those who lived in many sins, *Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will refresh you.*

Jonah was gone down, probably before the beginning of the storm, not simply before the lightening of the vessel. He could hardly have fallen asleep then. A heathen ship was a strange place for a prophet of God, not *as* a prophet, but as a fugitive; and so, probably, ashamed of what he had completed, he had withdrawn from sight and notice. He did not embolden himself in his sin, but shrank into himself. The conscience most commonly awakes, when the sin is done. It stands aghast at itself; but Satan, if he can, cuts off its retreat. Jonah had no retreat now, unless God had made one.

And was fast asleep. The journey to Joppa had been long and hurried; he had *fled*. Sorrow and remorse completed what fatigue began. Perhaps he had given himself up to sleep, to dull his conscience. For it is said *he lay down and was fast asleep.* Grief produces sleep; whence it is said of the Apostles in the night before the Lord's Passion, when Jesus *rose up from prayer and was come to his disciples, he found them sleeping for sorrow.* Jonah slept heavily. Deep was the sleep; but it was not of

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* S. Jer. † Ib.

pleasure, but of grief; not of heartlessness, but of heavy-heartedness. For well-disposed servants soon feel their sins, as did he. For when the sin has been done, then he knows its frightfulness. For such is sin. When born, it awakens pangs in the soul which bare it, contrary to the law of our nature. For so soon as *we* are born, we end the travail-pangs; but sin, so soon as born, rends with pangs the thoughts which conceived it." Jonah was in a deep sleep—a sleep by which he was fast held and bound; a sleep as deep as that from which Sisera never woke. Had God allowed the ship to sink, the memory of Jonah would have been that of the fugitive prophet. As it is, his deep sleep stands as an image of the lethargy of sin. "This most deep sleep of Jonah signifies a man torpid and slumbering in error, to whom it sufficed not to flee from the face of God, but his mind, drowned in a stupor and not knowing the displeasure of God, lies asleep, steeped in security."

What meanest thou? or rather, *what aileth thee?* (lit. *what is to thee?*) The ship-master speaks of it, (as it was) as a sort of disease, that he should be thus asleep in the common peril. The *ship-master*, charged, as he by office was, with the common weal of those on board, would, in the common peril, have one common prayer. It was the Prophet's office to call the heathen to prayer and to calling upon God. God reproved the Scribes and Pharisees by the mouth of the children who *cried Hosanna;* Jonah, by the ship-master; David, by Abigail; Naaman, by his servants. Now, too, he reproves worldly priests by the devotion of laymen; skeptic intellect, by the simplicity of faith.

If so be that God will think upon us, (lit. *for us*,) *i. e.*, for good, as David says, *I* am *poor and needy*, *the Lord thinketh upon* (lit. *for*) *me.* Their calling upon their own gods had failed them. Perhaps the ship-master had seen something special about Jonah, his manner, or his prophet's garb. He does not only call Jonah's God, *thy God*, as Darius says to Daniel, *thy God*, but also *the God*, acknowledging the God whom Jonah worshiped, to be *the God.* It is not any heathen prayer which he asks Jonah to offer. It is the prayer of the creature in its need to God, who can help, but knowing its own ill-desert and the separation between itself and God, it knows not whether He will help it. So David says, *Remember not the sins of my youth nor my transgressions; according to Thy mercy remember Thou me for Thy goodness' sake, O Lord.*

"The ship-master knew from experience, that it was no common storm; that the surges were an infliction borne down from God, and above human skill, and that there was no good in the master's skill. For the state of things needed another Master, who ordereth the heavens, and craved the guidance from on high. So then, they too left oars, sails, cables, gave their hands rest from rowing, and stretched them to heaven and called on God."

7. *Come, and let us cast lots.* Jonah, too, had probably prayed, and his prayers, too, were not heard. Probably, too, the storm had some unusual character about it, the suddenness with which it burst upon them, its violence, the quarter whence it came, its whirlwind force. "They knew the nature of the sea, and, as experienced sailors, were acquainted with the character of wind and storm, and had these waves been such as they had known before, they would never have sought by lot for the author of the threatened wreck, or, by a thing uncertain, sought to escape certain peril."* God, who sent the storm to arrest Jonah, and to cause him to be cast into the sea, provided that its character should set the mariners on divining why it came. Even when working great miracles, God brings about through man, all the forerunning events, all but the last act, in which he puts forth his might. As, in his people, he directed the lot to fall on Achan or on Jonathan, so here he overruled the lots of the heathen sailors to accomplish his end. "We must not, on this precedent, forthwith trust in lots, or unite with this testimony that from the Acts of the Apostles, when Matthias was by lot elected to the Apostolate, since the privileges of individuals can not form a common law."* "Lots," according to the ends for which they were cast, "were† for: *first*, dividing; *secondly*, consulting; *thirdly*, divining. *First*, the lot for dividing is not wrong if not used, (1) without any necessity; this would be to tempt God: (2) if in case of necessity, not without reverence of God, as if Holy Scripture were used for an earthly end," as in determining any secular matter by opening the Bible: (3) for objects which ought to be decided otherwise (as an office ought to be given to the fittest): (4) in dependence upon any other than God. *The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing of it is the Lord's.* So then they are lawful "in secular things which can not otherwise be con-

* S. Jer. † Aquin. 2. 2., q. 95, Art. 8.

veniently distributed," or "when there is no apparent reason why, in any advantage or disadvantage, one should be preferred to another." S. Augustine even allows that, in a time of plague or persecution, the lot might be cast to decide who should remain to administer the sacraments to the people, lest, on the one side, all should be taken away, or, on the other, the Church be deserted. *Secondly*, the lot for consulting, *i. e.*, to decide what one should do, is wrong, unless in a matter of mere indifference, or under inspiration of God, or in some extreme necessity where all human means fail. *Thirdly*, the lot for divining, *i. e.*, to learn truth whether of things present or future, of which we can have no human knowledge, is wrong, except by direct inspiration of God. For it is either to tempt God, who has not promised so to reveal things, or, against God, to seek superhuman knowledge by ways unsanctioned by Him. Satan may readily mix himself unknown in such inquiries, as in mesmerism. Forbidden ground is his own province.

God overruled the lot in the case of Jonah, as He did the sign which the Philistines sought. "He made the heifers take the way to Bethshemeth, that the Philistines might know that the plague came to them, not by chance, but from Himself."* "The fugitive (Jonah) was taken by lot, not by any virtue of the lots, especially the lots of the heathen, but by the Will of Him who guided the uncertain lots."† "The lot betrayed the culprit. Yet not even thus did they cast him over; but, even while such a tumult and storm lay on them, they held, as it were, a court in the vessel, as though in entire peace, and allowed him a hearing and defense, and sifted every thing accurately, as men who were to give account of their judgment. Hear them sifting all, as in a court. The roaring sea accused him, the lot convicted and witnessed against him, yet not even thus did they pronounce against him, until the accused should be the accuser of his own sin. The sailors, uneducated, untaught, imitated the good order of courts. When the sea scarce allowed them to breathe, whence such forethought about the Prophet? By the disposal of God. For God, by all this, instructed the Prophet to be humane and mild, all but saying aloud to him, 'Imitate these uninstructed sailors. They think not lightly of one soul, nor are unsparing as to one body,

* Lap. † S. Jer.

thine own. But thou, for thy part, gavest up a whole city, with so many myriads. They, discovering thee to be the cause of the evils which befel them, did not even thus hurry to condemn thee. Thou, having nothing whereof to accuse the Ninevites, didst sink and destroy them. Thou, when I bade thee go and, by thy preaching, call them to repentance, obeydst not; these, untaught, do all, compass all, in order to recover thee, already condemned, from punishment.'"*

8. *Tell us, for whose cause* (lit. *for what, to whom*). It may be that they thought that Jonah had been guilty toward some other. The lot had pointed him out. The mariners, still fearing to do wrong, ask him thronged questions, to know why the anger of God followed him. *What* hast thou done *to whom? What thine occupation?—i. e.*, either his ordinary occupation, whether it was displeasing to God, or this particular *business* in which he was engaged, and for which he was come on board. Questions so thronged have been admired in human poetry, S. Jerome says, for it is true to nature. They think that some one of them will draw forth the answer which they wish. It may be that they thought that his country, or people, or parents, were under the displeasure of God. But perhaps, more naturally, they wished to "know all about him," as men say. These questions must have gone home to Jonah's conscience. *What is thy business?* The office of Prophet, which he had left. *Whence comest thou?* From standing before God, as His minister. *What thy country? of what people art thou?* The people of God, whom he had quitted for heathen; not to win them to God, as He commanded, but, not knowing what they did, to abet him in his flight.

What is thine occupation? They should ask themselves, who have Jonah's office to speak in the name of God, and preach repentance. "What should be thy business, who hast consecrated thyself wholly to God, whom God has loaded with daily benefits, who approachest to him as to a friend? *What is thy business?* To live for God; to despise the things of earth; to behold the things of Heaven;" to lead others heavenward.

Jonah answers simply the central point to which all these questions tended.

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* S. Chrys.

9. *I am an Hebrew.* This was the name by which Israel was known to foreigners. It is used in the Old Testament only when they are spoken of by foreigners, or speak of themselves to foreigners, or when the sacred writers mention them in contrast with foreigners. So Joseph spoke of his land, and the Hebrew midwives, and Moses' sister, and God in His commission to Moses as to Pharaoh, and Moses in fulfilling it. They had the name, as having passed the river Euphrates—"emigrants." The title might serve to remind themselves that they were *strangers and pilgrims*, whose fathers had left their homes at God's command and for God, "*passers by* through this world to death, and through death to immortality."

And I fear the Lord; i. e., I am a worshiper of him; most commonly one who habitually stands in awe of him, and so one who stands in awe of sin, too. For none really fear God—none fear him as sons, who do not fear him in act. To be afraid of God is not to fear Him. To be afraid of God keeps men away from God; to fear God draws them to him. Here, however, Jonah probably meant to tell them that the Object of his fear and worship was the One Self-existing God, He who alone IS, who made all things, in whose hands are all things. He had told them before that he had fled *from being before the* Lord. They had not thought any thing of this, for they thought of the Lord only as the God of the Jews. Now he adds that He whose services he had thus forsaken was *the God of heaven, who made the sea and dry land*—that sea whose raging terrified them and threatened their lives. The title, *the God of heaven*, asserts the doctrine of the creation of the heavens by God, and His supremacy. Hence Abraham uses it to his servant, and Jonah to the heathen mariners, and Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, and Cyrus in acknowledging God in his proclamation. After his example, it is used in the decrees of Darius and Artaxerxes, and the returned exiles use it in giving account of their building the temple to the Governor. Perhaps, from the habit of intercourse with the heathen, it is used once by Daniel and by Nehemiah. Melchisedek, not perhaps being acquainted with the special name (the Lord,) blessed Abraham in the name of *God, the Possessor*, or *Creator of heaven and earth; i. e.*, of all that is. Jonah, by using it, at once taught the sailors that there is One Lord of all, and why this evil had fallen on them, because they had with them himself,

the renegade servant of God. "When Jonah said this, he indeed feared God, and repented of his sin. If he lost filial fear by fleeing and disobeying, he recovered it by repentance."

10. *Then were the men exceedingly afraid.* Before, they had feared the tempest, and the loss of their lives. Now, they feared God. They feared not the creature, but the Creator. They knew that what they had feared was the doing of His Almightiness. They felt how awful a thing it was to be in His hands. Such fear is the beginning of conversion, when men turn from dwelling on the distresses which surround them, to God, who sent them.

Why hast thou done this? They are words of amazement and wonder. Why hast thou not obeyed so great a God, and how thoughtest thou to escape the hand of the Creator? "What is the mystery of thy flight? Why did one who feared God, and had revelations from God, flee, sooner than go to fulfill them? Why did the worshiper of the One true God, depart from his God?" "A servant flee from his Lord, a son from his Father, a man from his God!" The inconsistency of believers is the marvel of the young Christian, the repulsion of those without, the hardening of the unbeliever. If men really believed in eternity, how could they be thus immersed in things of time? If they believed in hell, how could they so hurry thither? If they believed that God died for them, how could they so requite Him? Faith without love, knowledge without obedience, conscious dependence and rebellion, to be favored by God, yet to despise His favor, are the strangest marvels of this mysterious world. All nature seems to cry out to and against the unfaithful Christian, *Why hast thou done this?* And what a *why* it is! A scoffer has lately said, truly,* "Avowed scepticism can not do a tenth part of the injury to practical faith, that the constant spectacle of the huge mass of worldly unreal belief does." It is nothing strange that the world, or unsanctified intellect, should reject the Gospel. It is a thing of course, unless it be converted. But, to know, to believe, and to disobey! To disobey God, in the name of God! To propose to halve the living Gospel, as the woman who had killed her child, and to think that the poor quivering remnants would be the living Gospel any more! As though the will of

* In the Times.

God might, like those lower forms of His animal creation, be divided endlessly, and, keep what fragments we will, it would still be the living whole, a vessel of His Spirit! Such unrealities and inconsistencies would be a sore trial of faith, had not Jesus, who *knew what is in man*, forewarned us that it should be so. The scandals against the Gospel, so contrary to all human opinion, are but a testimony the more to the Divine knowledge of the Redeemer.

11. *What shall we do unto thee?* They knew him to be a prophet; they ask him the mind of his God. The lots had marked out Jonah as the cause of the storm; Jonah had himself admitted it, and that the storm was for *his* cause, and came from *his* God. "Great was he who fled; greater He who required him. They dare not give him up; they can not conceal him. They blame the fault; they confess their fear; they ask *him* the remedy, who was the author of the sin. If it was faulty to receive thee, what can we do that God should not be angered? It is thine to direct, ours to obey."

The sea wrought and was tempestuous; lit. *was going and whirling.* It was not only increasingly tempestuous, but, like a thing alive, and obeying its Master's will, it was holding on its course, its wild waves tossing themselves, and marching on like battalions, marshaled, arrayed for the end for which they were sent, pursuing and demanding the runaway slave of God. "*It was going*, as it was bidden; *it was going* to avenge its Lord; *it was going*, pursuing the fugitive prophet. It was swelling every moment, and, as though the sailors were too tardy, was rising in yet greater surges, showing that the vengeance of the Creator admitted not of delay."

12. *Take me up and cast me into the sea.* Neither might Jonah have said this, nor might the sailors have obeyed it, with out the command of God. Jonah might will alone to perish, who had alone offended; but, without the command of God, the Giver of life, neither Jonah nor the sailors might dispose of the life of Jonah. But God willed that Jonah should be cast into the sea, whither he had gone for refuge, that *wherewithal* he had *sinned*, *by the same, also, he* might *be punished* as a man; and, as a Próphet, that he might, in his three days' burial, prefigure Him who, after His resurrection, should convert, not Nineveh, but the world, the cry of whose wickedness went up to God.

For I know that for my sake. "In that he says, *I know*, he marks that he had a revelation; in that he says, *this great storm*, he marks the need which lay on those who cast him into the sea."*

13. *The men rowed hard;* lit. *dug.* The word, like our "plowed the main," describes the great efforts which they made. Amid the violence of the storm, they had furled their sails. These were worse than useless. The wind was off shore, since by rowing alone they hoped to get back to it. They put their oars well and firmly in the sea, and turned up the water, as men turn up earth by digging. But in vain! God willed it not. The sea went on its way as before. In the description of the deluge, it is repeated, *the waters increased and bare up the ark, and it was lifted up above the earth; the waters increased greatly upon the earth; and the ark went upon the face of the waters.* The waters raged and swelled, drowned the whole world, yet only bore up the ark, as a steed bears its rider. Man was still, the waters obeyed. In *this* tempest, on the contrary, man strove, but, instead of the peace of the ark, the burden is, the violence of tho tempest; *the sea wrought, and was tempestuous against them.* The Prophet had pronounced sentence against himself, but they would not lay hands upon him, striving hard to get back to land, and escape the risk of bloodshed, willing to lose life rather than cause its loss. O, what a change was there! The people who had served God, said, "Crucify him! crucify him! These are bidden to put to death; the sea rageth; the tempest commandeth; and they are careless as to their own safety, while anxious about another's."†

14. *Wherefore* [*and*] *they cried unto the Lord. They cried* no more *each man to his god*, but to the One God, whom Jonah had made known to them; and to Him they cried with an earnest, submissive cry, repeating the words of beseeching, as men do in great earnestness; *we beseech Thee, O Lord, let us not, we beseech Thee, perish for the life of this man*, (*i. e.*, as a penalty for taking it, as it is said, *we will slay him for the life of his brother*, and, *life for life.*) They seem to have known what is said, *your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man*

* Alb. M.

† S. Jer.

shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man. Do not these words of the sailors seem to us to be the confession of Pilate, who washed his hands, and said, *I am clean from the blood of this man?* The Gentiles would not that Christ should perish; they protest that his blood is innocent."

And lay not upon us innocent blood; innocent as to them, although, as to this thing, guilty before God, and yet, as to God also, more innocent, they would think, than they. For, strange as was this one disobedience, *their* whole life, they now knew, was disobedience to God, *his*, but one act in a life of obedience. If God so punishes one sin of the holy, *where shall the ungodly and sinner appear?* Terrible to the awakened conscience are God's chastenings on some (as it seems) single offense of those whom He loves.

For thou, Lord, [*who knowest the hearts of all men,*] *hast done, as it pleased Thee.* Wonderful, concise confession of faith in these new converts! Psalmists said it, *Whatsoever God willeth, that doeth He in heaven and in earth, in the sea and in all deep places.* But these had but just known God, and they resolve the whole mystery of man's agency and God's Providence into the three simple words, *as* [Thou] *willedst* [Thou] *didst.* "That we took him aboard, that the storm ariseth, that the winds rage, that the billows lift themselves, that the fugitive is betrayed by the lot, that he points out what is to be done, it is of Thy Will, O Lord." The tempest itself speaketh, that *Thou, Lord, hast done as Thou willedst.* Thy Will is fulfilled by our hands." "Observe the counsel of God, that, of his own will, not by violence or by necessity, should he be cast into the sea. For the casting of Jonah into the sea signified the entrance of Christ into the bitterness of the Passion, which He took upon Himself of His own will, not of necessity. *He was offered up, and He willingly submitted Himself.* And as those who sailed with Jonah were delivered, so the faithful in the Passion of Christ. *If ye seek me, let these go their way, that the saying might be fulfilled which Jesus spake, Of them which Thou gavest me, I have lost none.*"

15. *They took up Jonah.* "He does not say, 'laid hold on him,' nor 'came upon him,' but *lifted* him; as it were, bearing him with respect and honor, they cast him into the sea, not resisting, but yielding himself to their will."

The sea ceased [lit. *stood*] *from his raging.* Ordinarily the waves still swell, when the wind has ceased. The sea, when it

had received Jonah, was hushed at once, to show that God alone raised and quelled it. It *stood* still, like a servant, when it had accomplished its mission. God, who at all times saith to it, *Hitherto shalt thou come and no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed*, now unseen, as afterwards in the Flesh, *rebuked the winds and the sea, and there was a great calm.* "If we consider the errors of the world before the Passion of Christ, and the conflicting blasts of divers doctrines, and the vessel, and the whole race of man, *i. e.*, the creature of the Lord, emperiled, and, after his Passion, the tranquillity of faith, and the peace of the world, and the security of all things, and the conversion to God, we shall see how, after Jonah was cast in, the sea stood from its raging." "Jonah, in the sea, a fugitive, shipwrecked, dead, saveth the tempest-tost vessel; he saveth the heathen, aforetime tossed to and fro by the error of the world into divers opinions. And Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, Joel, who prophesied at the same time, could not amend the people in Judea; whence it appeared that the breakers could not be calmed, save by the death of [Him typified by] the fugitive."

16. *And the men feared the Lord with a great fear;* because, from the tranquillity of the sea and the ceasing of the tempest, they saw that the prophet's words were true. This great miracle completed the conversion of the mariners. God had removed all human cause of fear; and yet, in the same words as before, he says *they feared a great fear;* but, he adds, *the Lord.* It was the great fear, with which even the disciples of Jesus feared, when they saw the miracles which He did, which made even Peter say, *Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.* Events full of wonder had thronged upon them; things beyond nature, and contrary to nature; things which betokened His Presence, who had all things in His hands. They had seen *wind and storm fulfilling His word*, and, forerunners of the fishermen of Galilee, knowing full well from their own experience that this was above nature, they felt a great awe of God. So He commanded His people, *Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, for thy good always.*

And offered a sacrifice. Doubtless, as it was a large decked vessel, and bound on a long voyage, they had live creatures on board, which they could offer in sacrifice. But this was not enough for their thankfulness; *they vowed vows.* They promised that they would do thereafter what they could not do then—

"that they would never depart from Him whom they had begun to worship." This was true love; not to be content with aught which they could do, but to stretch forward in thought to an abiding and enlarged obedience, as God should enable them. And so they were doubtless enrolled among the people of God, first-fruits from among the heathen, won to God, who overrules all things, through the disobedience and repentance of His prophet. Perhaps they were the first preachers among the heathen, and their account of their own wonderful deliverance prepared the way for Jonah's mission to Nineveh.

17. *Now the Lord had* (lit. *And the Lord*) *prepared.* Jonah, as appears from his thanksgiving, was not swallowed at once, but sank to the bottom of the sea, God preserving him in life there by miracle, as he did in the fish's belly. Then, when the sea-weed was twined around his head, and he seemed to be already buried till the sea should give up her dead, *God prepared the fish to swallow Jonah.* "God could as easily have kept Jonah alive in the sea as in the fish's belly, but, in order to prefigure the burial of the Lord, He willed him to be within the fish, whose belly was as a grave." Jonah does not say what fish it was, and our Lord, too, used a name signifying only one of the very largest fish. Yet it were no greater miracle to create a fish which should swallow Jonah than to preserve him alive when swallowed. "The infant is buried, as it were, in the womb of its mother; it can not breathe, and yet thus, too, it liveth and is preserved, wonderfully nurtured by the will of God."* He who preserves the embryo in its living grave can maintain the life of man as easily without the outward air as with it. The same Divine Will preserves in being the whole creation, or creates it. The same Will of God keeps us in life by breathing this outward air, which preserved Jonah without it.

How long will men think of God as if He were man—of the Creator as if He were a creature, as though creation were but one intricate piece of machinery, which is to go on, ringing its regular changes until it shall be worn out, and God were shut up as a sort of mainspring within it, who might be allowed to be a primal Force to set it in motion, but must not be allowed to vary what he has once made. "We must admit of the agency

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*S. Cyr.

of God," say these men* when they would not in name be atheists, "once in the beginning of things, but must allow of His interference as sparingly as may be." Most wise arrangement of the creature, if it were indeed the god of its God! Most considerate provision for the non-interference of its Maker, if it could but secure that He would not interfere with it forever! Acute physical philosophy, which, by its omnipotent word, would undo the acts of God! Heartless, senseless, sightless world, which exists in God, is upheld by God, whose every breath is an effluence of God's love, and which yet sees Him not, thanks Him not, thinks it a greater thing to hold its own frail existence from some imagined law, than to be the object of the tender personal care of the Infinite God, who is Love! Poor hoodwinked souls, which would extinguish for themselves the Light of the world, in order that it may not eclipse the rushlight of their own theory!

And Jonah was in the belly of the fish. The time that Jonah was in the fish's belly was a hidden prophesy. Jonah does not explain nor point it. He tells the fact as Scripture is wont. Then he singles out one, the turning point, in it. Doubtless, in those three days and nights of darkness, Jonah (like him who, after his conversion, became S. Paul,) meditated much, repented much, sorrowed much, for the love of God, that he had ever offended God, purposed future obedience, adored God with wondering awe for His judgment and mercy. It was a narrow home in which Jonah, by miracle, was not consumed; by miracle, breathed; by miracle, retained his senses in that fetid place. Jonah, doubtless, repented, marveled, adored, loved God. But, of all, God has singled out this one point: how, out of such a place, Jonah thanked God. As He delivered Paul and Silas from the prison when they prayed with a loud voice to him, so when Jonah, by inspiration of His Spirit, thanked Him, He delivered him. To thank God only in order to obtain fresh gifts from Him, would be but a refined, hypocritical form of selfishness. Such a formal act would not be thanks at all. We thank God because we love him; because He is so infinitely good, and so good to us, unworthy. Thanklessness shuts the door to His personal mercies to us, because it makes them the occasion of fresh sins of ours. Thankfulness sets God's essential goodness

* Westminster Review.

free (so to speak) to be good to us. He can do what He delights in doing, be good to us, without our making His goodness a source of harm to us. Thanking Him, through His grace, we become fit vessels for larger graces. "Blessed he who, at every gift of grace, returns to Him in whom is all fullness of graces; to whom, when we shew ourselves not ungrateful for gifts received, we make room in ourselves for grace, and become meet for receiving yet more."* But Jonah's was that special character of thankfulness which thanks God in the midst of calamities from which there was no human exit, and God set His seal on this sort of thankfulness by annexing this deliverance, which has consecrated Jonah as an image of our Lord, to his wonderful act of thanksgiving.

Chapter II.

1. *Then* [*And*] *Jonah prayed; i. e.*, when the three days and nights were passed, he uttered this devotion. The word *prayed* includes thanksgiving, not petition only. It is said of Hannah that she *prayed;* but her canticle is all one thanksgiving, without a single petition. In this thanksgiving Jonah says how his prayers had been heard, but prays no more. God had delivered him from the sea, and he thanks God, in the fish's belly, as undisturbed as in a Church or an oratory, secure that God, who had done so much, would fulfill the rest. He called God *his God*, who had in so many ways shown Himself his, by His revelations, by His inspirations, by His chastisements, and now by His mercy. From these words, *Jonah prayed unto the Lord, his God, out of the fish's belly*, we perceive that, after he felt himself safe in the fish's belly, he despaired not of God's mercy.

2. *I cried by reason of mine affliction*, or, *out of affliction* which came *to me*. So the Psalmist thanketh God in the same words, though in a different order: *To the Lord in trouble to me I called, and He heard me.* He *called*, and God heard and answered. "He does not say, *I call*, but *I called;* he does not pray for the future, but gives thanks for the past."† Strange cause of thankfulness this would seem to most faith, to be alive in such a grave; to abide there hour after hour, and day after day, in one unchanging darkness, carried to and fro helplessly, with no known escape

* S. Bern, Sermon 27.

† S. Jer.

from his fetid prison, except to death! Yet spiritual light shone on that depth of darkness. The voracious creature, which never opened his mouth save to destroy life, had swallowed him, to save it. "What looked like death, became safe-keeping,"* and so the Prophet who had fled to avoid doing the will of God and to do his own, now willed to be borne about, he knew not whither, at the will, as it seemed, of the huge animal in which he lay, but, in truth, whither God directed it, and he gave thanks. God had heard him. The first token of God's mercy was the earnest of the whole. God was dealing with him, was looking on him. It was enough.

Out of the belly of hell cried I. The deep waters were as a grave, and he was counted *among the dead.* Death seemed so certain that it was all one as if he were in the womb of hell, not to be reborn to life until the last day. So David said, *The bands of death compassed me round about;* and, *Thou hast drawn my life out of hell.* The waters choked his speech; but he cried with a loud cry to God, who knew the heart. *I cried; Thou heardest.* The words vary only by a kindred letter, *Shivva'ti, Shama' ta.* The real heart's cry to God according to the mind of God and His hearing are one, whether for man's good, He seem at the time to hear, or no.

"Not of the voice but of the heart is God the hearer, as He is the seer. Do the ears of God wait for sound? How, then, could the prayer of Jonah, from the inmost belly of the whale, through the bowels of so great a creature, out of the very bottomless depths, through so great a mass of waters, make its way to heaven?"†. "Loud crying to God is not with the voice, but with the heart. Many, silent with their lips, have cried aloud with their heart; many, noisy with their lips, could, with heart turned away, obtain nothing. If, then, thou criest, cry within, where God heareth."‡ "Jonah cried aloud to God out of the fish's belly, out of the deep of the sea, out of the depths of disobedience; and his prayer reached to God, who rescued him from the waves, brought him forth out of the vast creature, absolved him from the guilt. Let the sinner, too, cry aloud, whom, departing from God, the storm of desires overwhelmed, the malignant Enemy devoured, the waves

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*S. Jer. †Tert. de Orat., § 17, p. 311. Oxf. Tr.
‡S. Aug. in Ps. 30, Enarr. 4, § 10.

of this present world sucked under! Let him own that he is in the depth, that so his prayer may reach to God."*

3. *For thou hadst* [didst] *cast me into the deep.* Jonah continues to describe the extremity of peril, from which God had already delivered him. Sweet is the memory of perils past. For they speak of God's fatherly care. Sweet is it to the prophet to tell God of His mercies, but this is sweet only to the holy; for God's mercy convicts the careless of ingratitude. Jonah then tells God, how He had cast him vehemently forth into the *eddying depth*, where, when Pharaoh's army *sank like a stone*, they never rose, and that, *in the heart* or center *of the seas*, whence no strong swimmer could escape to shore. *The floods* or *flood*, [lit. *river*,] the sea with its currents *surrounded* him, encompassing him on all sides; and, above, tossed the multitudinous waves, passing over him, like an army trampling one prostrate under foot. Jonah remembered well the temple-psalms, and, using their words, united himself with those other worshipers who sang them, and taught us how to speak them to God. The sons of Korah had poured out to God in these self-same words the sorrows which oppressed them. The rolling billows and the breakers, which, as they burst upon the rocks, shiver the vessel and crush man, are, he says to God, *Thine*, fulfilling Thy will on me.

4. *I am cast out of Thy sight*, lit. *from before Thine eyes.* Jonah had willfully withdrawn from standing in God's presence. Now God had taken him at his word, and, as it seemed, cast him out of it. David had said in his haste, *I am cut off.* Jonah substitutes the stronger word, *I am cast forth*, driven forth, expelled, like the *mire and dirt* which the waves drive along, or like the waves themselves in their restless motion, or the heathen (the word is the same) whom God had driven out before Israel, or as Adam in Paradise.

Yet (*Only*) *I will look again.* He was, as it were, a castaway, cast out of God's sight, unheeded by Him, his prayers unheardst; the storm unabated, until he was cast forth. He could no longer look with the bodily eye even toward the land where God shewed the marvels of His mercy, and the Temple where God was worshiped continually. Yet what he could not do in the body, he would do in his soul. This was his only resource. "If I be cast

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* S. Greg. in Ps. 6 Pœnit. L.

away, this one thing will I do, I will still look to God." Magnificent faith! Humanly speaking, all hope was gone, for when that huge vessel could scarcely live in the sea, how should a man? When God had given it no rest, while it contained Jonah, how should He will that Jonah should escape? Nay, God had hidden His Face from him; yet he did this one, this only thing; only this, "once more still *I will add to look to God.*" Thitherward would he look, so long as his mind yet remained in him. If his soul parted from him, it should go forth from him in that gaze. God gave him no hope, save that He preserved him alive. For he seemed to himself forsaken of God. Wonderful pattern of faith which gains strength even from God's seeming desertion! "I am cast vehemently forth from before Thine eyes; yet this one thing will I do; mine eyes shall be unto Thee, O Lord." The Israelites, as we see from Solomon's dedication prayer, *pray toward the temple,* where God had set His name and shewn His glory, where were the sacrifices which foreshadowed the Great Atonement. Thitherward they looked in prayer, as Christians, of old, prayed toward the East, the seat of our ancient Paradise, where our Lord *shall appear unto them that look for Him, a second time unto salvation.* Toward that temple then he would yet look with fixed eye for help, where God, who fills heaven and earth, shewed Himself to sinners reconciled.

5. *The waters compassed me about even to the soul.* Words which to others were figures of distress, *the waters have come even to the soul,* were to Jonah realities. Sunk in the deep seas, the water strove to penetrate at every opening. To draw breath, which sustains life, to him would have been death. There was but a breath between him and death. *The deep encompassed me,* encircling, meeting him whithersoever he turned, holding him imprisoned on every side, so that there was no escape, and, if there otherwise had been, he was bound motionless, *the weed was wrapped around my head,* like a grave-band. *The weed* was the well-known sea-weed, which, even near the surface of the sea where man can struggle, twines round him, a peril even to the strong swimmer, entangling him often the more, the more he struggles to extricate himself from it. But to one below, powerless to struggle, it was as his winding-sheet.

6. *I went down to the bottoms* (lit. *the cuttings off*) *of the mountains.* The "roots" as the Chaldee and we call them, the hidden

rocks, which the mountains push out, as it were, into the sea, and in which they end. Such hidden rocks extend along the whole length of that coast. These were his dungeon-walls; *the earth, her bars*, those long submarine reefs of rock, his prison-bars, *were around* him *forever:* the sea-weeds were his chains: and, even thus, when things were at their uttermost, "*Thou hast brought up my life from corruption*," to which his body would have fallen a prey, had not God sent the fish to deliver him. The deliverance for which he thanks God is altogether past: *Thou broughtest me up.* He calls *the* Lord, *my* God, because being the God of all, He was especially his God, for whom He had done things of such marvelous love. God loves each soul which He has made with the same infinite love with which he loves all. Whence S. Paul says of Jesus, *Who loved me and gave Himself for me.* He loves each, with the same undivided love, as if He had created none besides; and He allows each to say, *my God*, as if the Infinite God belonged wholly to each. So would He teach us the oneness of union between the soul which God loves, and which admits His love, and Himself.

7. *When my soul fainted;* lit. *was covered, within me*, was dizzied, overwhelmed. The word is used of actual faintness from heat, thirst, exhaustion, when a film comes over the eyes, and the brain is, as it were, mantled over. The soul of the pious never is so full of God, as when all things else fade from him. Jonah could not but have remembered God in the tempest; when the lots were cast; when he adjudged himself to be cast forth. But when it came to the utmost, then, he says, *I remembered the Lord*, as though, in the intense thought of God then, all his former thought of God had been forgetfulness. So it is in every strong act of faith, of love, of prayer; its former state seems unworthy of the name of faith, love, prayer. It believes, loves, prays, as though all before had been forgetfulness.

And my prayer came in unto Thee. No sooner had he so prayed, than God heard. Jonah had thought himself cast out of His sight; but his prayer entered in thither. His *holy temple* is, doubtless, His actual Temple, whitherward he prayed. God, who is wholly every-where, but the whole of Him nowhere, was as much in the temple as in heaven, and had manifested Himself to Israel in their degree in the temple, as to the blessed saints and angels in heaven.

8. *They that observe lying vanities; i. e.*, (by the force of the Hebrew form,) that diligently watch, pay deference to, court, sue, *vanities of vanities*, vain things, which prove themselves vain at last, failing the hopes which trust in them. Such were actual idols, in which men openly professed that they trusted. Such are all things in which men trust, out of God. One is not more vain than another. All have this common principle of vanity, that men look, out of God, to that which has its only existence or permanence from God. It is, then, one general maxim, including all men's idols—idols of the flesh, idols of intellect, idols of ambition, idols of pride, idols of self and self-will. Men *observe* them, as gods, watch them, hang upon them, never lose sight of them, guard them as though they could keep them. But what are they? *Lying vanities*, breath and wind, which none can grasp, or detain, vanishing like air into air. And what do they who so *observe* them? All alike *forsake their own mercy; i. e.*, God, "whose property is always to have mercy," and who would be Mercy to them, if they would. So David calls God *my Mercy*. Abraham's servant and Naomi praise God, that He *hath not forsaken His mercy*. Jonah does not, in this, exclude himself. His own idol had been his false love for his country, that he would not have his people go into captivity, when God would; would not have Nineveh preserved, the enemy of his country; and, by leaving his office, he left his God, *forsook* his *own Mercy*. See how God speaks of Himself, as wholly belonging to them, who are His. He calls Himself *their own Mercy*. He saith not *they who* do *vanities* (for *vanity of vanities, and all things* are *vanity*,) lest He should seem to condemn all, and deny mercy to the whole human race; but, *they who observe, guard vanities*, or lies, *they* into the affections of whose hearts those *vanities* have entered; who not only *do vanities*, but who *guard* them, as loving them, deeming that they have found a treasure. These *forsake their own Mercy*. Although *mercy* be offended, (and under Mercy we may understand God Himself, for God is *gracious and full of compassion, slow to anger and of great mercy*,) yet He doth not *forsake*, doth not abhor, *those who guard vanities*, but awaiteth that they should return: these contrariwise, of their own will, *forsake Mercy* standing and offering Itself."*

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* S. Jer

9. *But* [*and*] *with the voice of thanksgiving will I* [*would I fain*] *sacrifice unto Thee: what I have owed, I would pay.* He does not say, *I will;* for it did not depend upon him. Without a further miracle of God, he could do nothing. But, he says that he would never more forsake God. The law appointed sacrifices of thanksgiving; these he would offer, not in act only, but with words of praise. He would *pay what he had vowed*, and chiefly himself, his life which God had given back to him, the obedience of his remaining life, in all things. For *he that keepeth the law bringeth offerings enough; he that taketh heed to the commandments offereth a peace-offering.** Jonah neglects neither the outward nor the inward part, neither the body nor the soul of the commandment.

Salvation is of [lit. *to*] *the Lord.* It is wholly His; all belongs to Him, so that none can share in bestowing it; none can have any hope, save from Him. He uses an intensive form, as though he would say, strong *mighty salvation.* God seems often to wait for the full resignation of the soul, all its powers and will to Him. Then He can show mercy healthfully, when the soul is wholly surrendered to Him. So, on this full confession, Jonah is restored. The Prophet's prayer ends almost in promising the same as the mariners. They *made vows;* Jonah says, *I will pay that I have vowed.* Devoted service in the creature is one and the same, although diverse in degree; and so, that Israel might not despise the heathen, he tacitly likens the act of the new heathen converts and that of the Prophet.

11. *And the Lord spake unto the fish.* "*Wind and storm fulfill His word.*" The irrational creatures have wills. God had commanded the Prophet, and he disobeyed. God, in some way, commanded the fish. He laid His will upon it, and the fish forthwith obeyed; a pattern to the Prophet when he released him. God's Will that any thing should be completed, is law and fulfillment, and hath the power of law. Not that Almighty God commanded the fish, as He doth us or the Holy Angels, uttering in its mind what is to be done, as inserting into the heart the knowledge of what He chooseth. But if He be said to command irrational animals or elements, or any part of the creation, this signifieth the law and command of His Will. For all things yield to His

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* Ecclus. xxxv, 1.

Will, and the mode of their obedience is to us altogether ineffable, but known to Him.* "Jonah," says S. Chrysostom, "fled the land, and fled not the displeasure of God. He fled the land, and brought a tempest on the sea; and not only himself gained no good from flight, but brought into extreme peril those also who took him on board. When he sailed, seated in the vessel with sailors and pilot, and all the tackling, he was in the extremest peril; when, sunk in the sea, the sin punished and laid aside, he entered that vast vessel, the fish's belly, he enjoyed great fearlessness; that thou mayest learn that, as no ship availeth to one living in sin, so when freed from sin, neither sea destroyeth, nor beasts consume. The waves received him, and choked him not; the vast fish received him, and destroyed him not; but both the huge animal and the element gave back their deposit safe to God; and by all things the Prophet learned to be mild and tender, not to be more cruel than the untaught mariners, or wild waves or animals. For the sailors did not give him up at first, but after manifold constraint; and the sea and the wild animal guarded him with much benevolence, God disposing all these things. He returned, then; preached, threatened, persuaded, saved, awed, amended, stablished, through that one first preaching. For he needed not many days, nor continuous exhortation; but, by speaking those words, he brought all to repentance. Wherefore God did not lead him straight from the vessel to the city; but the sailors gave him over to the sea, the sea to the vast fish, the fish to God, God to the Ninevites, and, through this long circuit, brought back the fugitive, that He might instruct all that it is impossible to escape the hands of God. For, come where a man may, dragging sin after him, he will undergo countless troubles. Though man be not there, nature itself on all sides will oppose him with great vehemence."

"Since the elect, too, at times strive to be sharp-witted, it is well to bring forward another wise man, and show how the craft of mortal man is comprehended in the Inward Counsels. For Jonah wished to exercise a prudent sharpness of wit, when, being sent to preach repentance to the Ninevites, in that he feared that, if the Gentiles were chosen, Judea would be forsaken, he refused to discharge the office of preaching. He sought a ship,

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* S. Cyr. on Jon. ii, init.

chose to flee to Tarshish; but forthwith a tempest arises, the lot is cast to know for whose fault the sea was troubled. Jonah is taken in his fault, plunged in the deep, swallowed by the fish, and carried by the vast beast thither whither he set at naught the command to go. See how the tempest found God's runaway, the lot binds him, the sea receives him, the beast encloses him, and, because he sets himself against obeying his Maker, he is carried a culprit by his prison-house to the place whither he had been sent. When God commanded, man would not minister the prophesy; when God enjoined, the beast cast forth the Prophet. The Lord then *taketh the wise in their own craftiness*, when He bringeth back to the service of His own Will that whereby man's will contradicts Him."* "Jonah, fleeing from the perils of preaching and salvation of souls, fell into the peril of his own life. When in the ship, he took on himself the peril of all; he saved both himself and the ship. He fled as a man; he exposed himself to peril as a prophet."† "Let them think so, who are sent by God, or by a superior, to preach to heretics or to heathen. When God calleth to an office or condition whose object it is to live for the salvation of others, He gives grace and means necessary or expedient to this end. For so the sweet and careful ordering of His Providence requireth. Greater peril awaiteth us from God, our Judge, if we flee his calling as did Jonah, if we use not the talents intrusted to us to do His Will and to His glory. We know the parable of the servant who buried the talent, and was condemned by the Lord."‡

And it vomited out Jonah. Unwillingly, but constrained, it cast him forth, as a burden to it. "From the lowest depths of death, life came forth victorious."§ "He is swallowed by the fish, but is not consumed; and then calls upon God, and (marvel!) on the third day is given back with Christ."‖ "What it prefigured, that that vast animal on the third day gave back alive the Prophet which it had swallowed, no need to ask of us, since Christ explained it. As, then, Jonah passed from the ship into the fish's belly, so Christ from the wood into the tomb or the depth of death. And as he for those emperiled in the tempest, so Christ for those tempest-tost in this world. And as Jonah

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* S. Greg., Mor. vi., 31. † Lap. from S. Chrys. ‡ From Lap.
§ S. Jer. ‖ S. Greg. Naz.

was first enjoined to preach to the Ninevites, but the preaching of Jonah did not reach them before the fish cast him forth, so prophesy was sent beforehand to the Gentiles, but did not reach them until after the resurrection of Christ."* "Jonah prophesied of Christ; not so much in words as by a suffering of his own, yet more openly than if he had proclaimed by speech His Death and Resurrection. For why was he received into the fish's belly and given back the third day, except to signify that Christ would on the third day return from the deep of hell?"†

S. Irenæus looks on the history of Jonah as the imaging man's own history.

"As He allowed Jonah to be swallowed by the whale, not that he should perish altogether, but that, being vomited forth, he might the more be subdued to God, and the more glorify God, who had given him such unlooked-for deliverance, and bring those Ninevites to solid repentance, converting them to the Lord, who would free them from death, terrified by that sign which befell Jonah (as Scripture says of them, *they turned every man from his evil way*, etc.,) . . . so, from the beginning, God allowed man to be swallowed up by that vast Cetos who was the author of the transgression; not that he should altogether perish, but preparing a way of salvation which, as foresignified by the word in Jonah, was formed for those who had the like faith as to the Lord as Jonah, and with him confessed *I fear the Lord*, etc., that so man, receiving from God unlooked for salvation, might rise from the dead and glorify God, etc. . . . . This was the long-suffering of God, that man might pass through all, and acknowledge his ways; then coming to the resurrection, and knowing by trial from what he had been delivered, might be forever thankful to God; and, having received from Him the gift of incorruption, might love him more (for he to whom much is forgiven, loveth much,) and know himself, that he is mortal and weak; and understand the Lord, that He is in such wise Mighty and Immortal, that to the mortal He can give immortality, and to the things of time eternity."

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* S. Aug. Ep. 102, q. 6, n. 34. † De Civ. Dei, xviii. 30 2.

Chapter III.

1. *And the word of the Lord came a second time to Jonah.* "Jonah, delivered from the whale, doubtless went up to Jerusalem to pay his vows and thank God there. Perhaps he hoped that God would be content with this, his punishment and repentance, and that he would not again send him to Nineveh."* Anyhow, he was in some settled home, perhaps again at Gathhepher; for God bids him, *Arise, go.* "But one who is on his way is not bidden to *arise* and go." God may have allowed an interval to elapse, in order that the tidings of so great a miracle might spread far and wide. But Jonah does not supply any of these incidents. He does not speak of himself, but of his mission only, as God taught him.

2. *Arise, go to Nineveh, that great city, and preach* [or *cry*] *unto it.* God says to Jonah the self-same words which He had said before, only, perhaps, He gives him an intimation of His purpose of mercy, in that He says no more *cry against her*, but *cry unto her.* He might cry *against* one doomed to destruction; to *cry unto her*, seems to imply that she had some interest in, and so some hope from, this cry. *The preaching that I bid thee.* This is the only notice which Jonah relates that God took of his disobedience, in that He charged him to obey exactly what He commanded. "He does not say to him, Why didst thou not what I commanded?"† He had rebuked him in deed; He amended him, and upbraided him not. "The rebuke of that shipwreck, and the swallowing by the fish, sufficed, so that he who had not felt the Lord commanding might understand him, delivering."† Jonah might have seemed unworthy to be again inspired by God. But *whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth;* whom He chasteneth He loveth. "The hard discipline, the severity and length of the scourge, were the earnests of a great trust and a high destination. He knew him to be changed into another man, and, by one of his most special favors, gives him that same trust which he had before deserted. "As Christ, when risen, commended His sheep to Peter, wiser now and more fervent, so to Jonah risen He commends the conversion of Nineveh. For so did Christ risen bring about the conversion of the heathen by sending His

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* Lap. † S. Jer.

Apostles each unto large provinces, as Jonah was sent alone to a large city." "He bids him declare not only the sentence of God, but, in the self-same words, not to consider his own estimation or the ears of his hearers, nor to mingle soothing with severe words, and convey the message ingeniously, but, with all freedom and severity, to declare openly what was commanded him. This plainness, though, may be, less acceptable to people or princes, is ofttimes more useful, always more approved of God. Nothing should be more sacred to the preacher of God's Word than truth and simplicity, and inviolable sanctity in delivering it. Now, alas! all this is changed into vain show at the will of the multitude and the breath of popular favor."*

3. *And Jonah arose and went unto Nineveh,* as ready to obey as before to disobey. Before, when God said those same words, *he arose and fled;* now, *he arose and went.* True conversion shows the same energy in serving God as the unconverted had before shown in serving self or error. Saul's spirit of fire, which persecuted Christ, gleamed in S. Paul like lightning through the world, to win souls to Him.

Nineveh was an exceeding great city; lit. *great to God; i. e.,* what would not only appear great to man, who admires things of no account, but what, being really great, is so in the judgment of God, who can not be deceived. God *did* account it great, who says to Jonah, *Should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, which hath more than six score thousand that can not discern between their right hand and their left?* It is a different idiom from that when Scripture speaks of *the mountains of God, the cedars of God.* For of these it speaks as having their firmness or their beauty from God, as their Author.

Of three days' journey; i. e., sixty miles in circumference. It *was* a great city. Jonah speaks of its greatness, under a name which he would only have used of real greatness. Varied accounts agree in ascribing this size to Nineveh. An Eastern city inclosing often, as did Babylon, ground under tillage, the only marvel is that such a space was inclosed by walls. Yet this, too, is no marvel, when we know from inscriptions what masses of human strength the great empires of old had at their command, or of the more than three-score pyramids of Egypt. In population it

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* Mont.

was far inferior to our metropolis, of which, as of the suburbs of Rome of old, "one would hesitate to say where the city ended, where it began. The suburban parts are so joined unto the city itself, and give the spectator the idea of boundless length." An Eastern would the more naturally think of the circumference of the city, because of the broad places, similar to the boulevards of Paris, which encircled it, so that men could walk around it, within it." "The buildings," it is related of Babylon,* "are not brought close to the walls, but are at about the distance of an acre from it. And not even the whole city did they occupy with houses; eighty furlongs are inhabited, and not even all these continuously, I suppose because it seemed safer to live scattered in several places. The rest they sow and till, that, if any foreign force threaten them, the besieged may be supplied with food from the soil of the city itself." Not Babylon alone was spoken of, of old, as "having the circumference of a nation rather than of a city."*

4. *And Jonah began to enter the city a day's journey.* Perhaps the day's journey enabled him to traverse the city from end to end, with his one brief, deep cry of woe: *Yet forty days, and Nineveh overthrown.* He prophesied an utter overthrow, a turning it upside down. He does not speak of it as to happen at a time beyond those days. The close of the forty days and the destruction were to be one. He does not say strictly, *Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown*, but *Yet forty days and Nineveh overthrown.* The last of those forty days was, ere its sun was set, to see Nineveh as a *thing overthrown.* Jonah knew from the first God's purpose of mercy to Nineveh; he had a further hint of it in the altered commission which he had received. It is perhaps hinted in the word *Yet.* "If God had meant unconditionally to overthrow them, He would have overthrown them without notice. *Yet* always denotes some long-suffering of God." But, taught by that severe discipline, he discharges his office strictly. He cries what God had bidden him to cry, without reserve or exception. The sentence, as are all God's threatenings until the last, was conditional. But God does not say this. That sentence was now within forty days of its completion; yet even thus it was remitted. Wonderful encouragement, when one Lent

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*Q Curt., v. 4.

sufficed to save some six hundred thousand souls from perishing! Yet the first visitation of the cholera was checked in its progress in England upon one day's national fast and humiliation; and we have seen how general prayer has oftentimes at once opened or closed the heavens as we needed. "A few years ago," relates S. Augustine, "when Arcadius was Emperor at Constantinople, (what I say some have heard, some of our people were present there,) did not God, willing to terrify the city, and, by terrifying, to amend, convert, cleanse, change it, reveal to a faithful servant of his (a soldier, it is said,) that the city should perish by fire from heaven, and warned him to tell the Bishop! It was told. The Bishop despised it not, but addressed the people. The city turned to the mourning of penitence, as that Nineveh of old. Yet, lest men should think that he who said this deceived, or was deceived, the day which God had threatened came. When all were intently expecting the issue, with great fears, at the beginning of night, as the world was being darkened, a fiery cloud was seen from the East, small at first, then, as it approached the city, gradually enlarging, until it hung terribly over the whole city. All fled to the church; the place did not hold the people. But after that great tribulation, when God had accredited His word, the cloud began to diminish, and at last disappeared. The people, freed from fear for awhile, again heard that they must migrate, because the whole city should be destroyed on the next Sabbath. The whole people left the city with the Emperor; no one remained in his house. That multitude, having gone some miles, when gathered in one spot to pour forth prayer to God, suddenly saw a great smoke, and sent forth a loud cry to God." The city was saved. "What shall we say?" adds S. Augustine. "Was this the anger of God, or rather His mercy? Who doubts that the most merciful Father willed by terrifying to convert, not to punish by destroying? As the hand is lifted up to strike, and is recalled in pity, when he who was to be struck is terrified, so was it done to that city." Will any of God's warnings *now* move our great Babylon to repentance, that it be not ruined?

5. *And the people of Nineveh believed God;* strictly, *believed in God.* To *believe in God* expresses more heart-belief, than to *believe God* in itself need convey. To *believe God* is to believe what God says, to be true; *to believe in* or *on God* expresses not belief only, but that belief resting in God, trusting itself and all its con-

cerns with Him. It combines hope and trust with faith, and love too, since, without love, there can not be trust. They believed, then, the preaching of Jonah, and that He, in whose name Jonah spake, had all power in heaven and earth. But they believed, further, in His unknown mercies; they cast themselves upon the goodness of the hitherto *unknown God.* Yet they believed in Him, as the supreme God, *the* object of awe, *the* God (Elohim, Haelohim,) although they knew him not, as he is, the Self-Existent.* Jonah does not say how they were thus persuaded. God the Holy Ghost relates the wonders of God's omnipotence, as common every-day things. They are no marvels to Him who wrought them. *He commanded and they were done.* He spake with power to the hearts which He had made, and they were turned to Him. Any human means are secondary, utterly powerless, except in His hands who alone doth all things through whomsoever He doth them. Our Lord tells us that *Jonah* himself *was a sign unto the Ninevites.* Whether then the mariners spread the history, or howsoever the Ninevites knew the personal history of Jonah, he, in his own person and in what befell him, was a sign to them. They believed that God, who avenged *his* disobedience, would avenge theirs. They believed, perhaps, that God must have some great mercy in store for them, who not only sent his Prophet so far from his own land to *them* who had never owned, never worshiped Him, but had done such mighty wonders to subdue his prophet's resistance and to make him go to them.

And proclaimed a fast and put on sackcloth. It was not then a repentance in word only, but in deed. A fast was, at that time, entire abstinence from all food till evening; the haircloth was a harsh garment, irritating and afflicting to the body. They who did so, were (as we may still see from the Assyrian sculptures) men of pampered and luxurious habits, uniting sensuality and fierceness. Yet this they did at once, and, as it seems, for the forty days. They *proclaimed a fast.* They did not wait for the supreme authority. Time was urgent, and they would lose none of it. In this imminent peril of God's displeasure, they acted as men would in a conflagration. Men do not wait for orders to put out a fire, if they can, or to prevent it from spreading. Whoever they were who proclaimed it, whether those in inferior authority,

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*Jehovah occurs once only in this chapter, of God speaking to Jonah, iii. 1.

each in his neighborhood, or whether it spread from man to man, as tidings spread, it was done at once. It seems to have been done by acclamation, as it were, one common cry out of the one common terror. For it is said of them, as one succession of acts, *the men of Nineveh believed in God, and proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth from their great to their little*, every age, sex, condition. "Worthy of admiration is that exceeding celerity and diligence in taking counsel, which, although in the same city with the king, perceived that they must provide for the common and imminent calamity, not waiting to ascertain laboriously the king's pleasure." In a city, sixty miles in circumference, some time must needs be lost, before the king could be approached; and we know, in some measure, the forms required in approaching Eastern monarchs of old.

6. *For word came*, rather, *And the matter came; i. e.*, the "whole *account*," as we say. *The word*, *word*, throughout the Holy Scripture, as in so many languages, stands for that which is reported of. *The* whole *account*, viz., how this stranger, in strange, austere attire, had come, what had happened to him before he came, how he preached, how the people had believed him, what they had done, as had just been related, *came to the king*. The form of words implies that what Jonah relates in this verse took place after what had been mentioned before. People are slow to carry to sovereigns matters of distress, which they can not help. This was no matter of peril from man, in which the counsel or energy of the king could be of use. Any how it came to him last. But when it came to him, he disdained not to follow the example of those below him. He was not jealous of his prerogative, or that his advice had not been had; but, in the common peril, acted as his subjects had, and humbled himself as they did. Yet this king was the king of Nineveh—the king, whose name was dreaded far and wide, whose will none who disputed, prospered. He who was accounted and was the greatest of the kings of the earth, was not held back by any thought of his own splendor, greatness, or dignity, from fleeing as a suppliant to the mercy of God, and inciting others by his example to the same earnestness. The kings of Assyria were religious, according to their light. They ascribed all their victories to their god, Asshur. When the king came to hear of One who had a might, such as he had not seen, he believed in Him.

And he arose from his throne. He lost no time; he heard,

and he arose. It denotes great earnestness, haste, diligence. *And he laid his robe from him.* This was the large costly upper garment, so called from its amplitude. It is the name of the goodly Babylonian garment which Achan coveted. As worn by kings, it was the most magnificent part of their dress, and a special part of their state. Kings were buried as they lived, in splendid apparel; and rich adornments were buried with them. The king of Nineveh dreads no charge of precipitancy nor man's judgment. "He exchanges purple, gold, gems, for the simple, rough, and sordid sackcloth, and his throne for the most abject ashes, the humblest thing he could do, fulfilling a deeper degree of humility than is related of the people." Strange credulity, had Jonah's message not been true: strange madness of unbelief, which does not repent when a greater than Jonas cries, *Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.* Strange garb for a king, in the eyes of a luxurious age; acceptable in His who said, *If the mighty works which have been done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.* "Many wish to repent, yet so as not to part with their luxuries or the vanity of their dress, like the Greek who said 'he would like to be a philosopher, yet in a few things not altogether.' To whom we may answer, 'Delicate food and costly dress agree not with penitence; and that is no great grief which never comes to light.'" It was a marvelous thing that purple was outvied by sackcloth. Sackcloth availed what the purple robe availed not. What the diadem accomplished not, the ashes accomplished. Seest thou, I said not groundlessly that we should fear, not fasting, but drunkenness and satiety? For drunkenness and satiety shook the city through and through, and were about to overthrow it; when it was reeling and about to fall, fasting established it. "The king had conquered enemies by valor; he conquered God by humility. Wise king, who, for the saving of his people, owns himself a sinner rather than a king. He forgets that he is a king, fearing God, the King of all; he remembereth not his own power, coming to own the power of the Godhead. Marvelous! While he remembereth not that he is a king of men, he beginneth to be a king of righteousness. The prince, becoming religious, lost not his empire, but changed it. Before, he held the princedom of military discipline; now, he obtained the princedom in heavenly disciplines." (S. Maximus.)

7. *And he caused it to be proclaimed and published through Nineveh;* lit. *And he cried and said,* etc. The cry or proclamation of the king corresponded with the cry of Jonah. Where the prophet's cry, calling to repentance, had reached, the proclamation of the king followed, obeying. *By the decree of the king and his nobles.* This is a hint of the political state of Nineveh, beyond what we have elsewhere. It was not then an absolute monarchy. At least, the king strengthened his command by that of his nobles, as Darius the Mede sealed the den of lions into which Daniel was cast, with the signet of his lords as well as his own, *that the purpose might not be changed concerning him.*

Let neither man nor beast, etc. "Are brutes, too, then, to fast, horses and mules to be clothed in sackcloth? Yes, he says. For as, when a rich man dies, his relatives clothe not only the men and maid-servants, but the horses, too, with sackcloth, and, giving them to the grooms, bid that they should follow to the tomb, in token of the greatness of the calamity, and inviting all to sympathy; so, also, when that city was about to perish, they clad the brute natures in sackcloth, and put them under the yoke of fasting. The irrational animals can not, through words, learn the anger of God; let them learn, through hunger, that the infliction is from God; for, if he says the city should be overthrown, it would be one grave of us, the inhabitants, and of them also."* It was no arbitrary, nor wanton, nor careless act of the king of Nineveh to make the dumb animals share in the common fast. It proceeded, probably, from an indistinct consciousness that God cared for them also, and that *they* were not guilty. So the Psalmist looked on God's care of His creatures as a fresh ground for man's trust in Him: *O Lord, Thou preservest man and beast; how excellent is Thy loving kindness, O Lord; therefore the children of men put their trust under the shadow of Thy wings.* As our Lord teaches that God's care of the sparrows is a pledge to man of God's minute unceasing care for him, so the Ninevites felt truly that the cry of the poor brutes would be heard by God. And God confirmed their judgment, when He told Jonah of the *much cattle,* as a ground for having pity on Nineveh. The moanings and lowings of the animals, their voices of distress, pierce man's heart, too, and must have added to his sense of the com-

* S. Chrys. on the Statues, Hom. iii, 4.

mon misery. Ignorance or pride of human nature alone could think that man's sorrow is not aided by these objects of sense. Nature was truer in the king of Nineveh.

8. *Let man and beast be covered with sackcloth.* The gorgeous caparisons of horses, mules, and camels was part of Eastern magnificence. Who knows not how man's pride is fed by the sleekness of his stud, their "well-appointed" trappings? Man, in his luxury and pride, would have every thing reflect his glory, and minister to pomp. Self-humiliation would have every thing reflect its lowliness. Sorrow would have every thing answer to its sorrow. Men think it strange that the horses at Nineveh were covered with sackcloth, and forget how, at the funerals of the rich, black horses are chosen, and are clothed with black velvet.

And cry unto God mightily, "with might which conquereth judgment." A faint prayer does not express a strong desire, nor obtain what it does not strongly ask for, as having only half a heart.

And let them turn, every man, from his evil way. "See what removed that inevitable wrath. Did fasting and sackcloth alone? No: but the change of the whole life. How does this appear? From the prophet's word itself. For he who spake of the wrath of God and of their fast, himself mentions the reconciliation and its cause. *And God saw their works.* What works? That they fasted? That they put on sackcloth? He passes by these, and says, *that every one turned from his evil ways, and God repented of the evil which He had said that He would do unto them.* Seest thou that not the fast plucked them from the peril, but the change of life made God propitious to these heathen. I say this, not that we should dishonor, but that we may honor fasting. For the honor of a fast is not in abstinence from food, but in avoidance of sin. So that he who limiteth fasting to the abstinence from food only, he it is who, above all, dishonoreth it. Fastest thou? Shew it me by its works. What works? askest thou? If you see a poor man, have mercy; if an enemy, be reconciled; if a friend doing well, envy him not; if a beautiful woman, pass on. Let not the mouth alone fast; let eyes too, and hearing, and feet, and hands, and all the members of our bodies. Let the hands fast, clean from rapine and avarice! Let the feet fast, holding back from going to unlawful sights! Let the eyes fast, learning never to thrust themselves on beautiful objects, nor to

look curiously on others' beauty, for the food of the eye is gazing. Let the ear, too, fast, for the fast of the ears is not to hear detractions and calumnies. Let the mouth, too, fast from foul words and reproaches; for what boots it to abstain from birds and fish, while we bite and devour our brethren? The detractor preys on his brother's flesh."* He says *each from his evil way*, because, in the general mass of corruption, each man has his own special heart's sin. All were to return, but by forsaking, each, one by one, his own habitual favorite sin.

And from the violence. Violence is singled out as the special sin of Nineveh, out *of all their evil way;* as the Angel said, *Tell His disciples and Peter.* This was the giant (Goliath) sin. When this should be effaced, the rest would give way, as the Philistines fled when their champion was fallen to the earth, dead. *That is in their hands;* lit. *in their palms*, the hollow of their hand. The hands being the instruments alike of using violence and of grasping its fruits, the violence cleaves to them in both ways, in its guilt and in its gains. So Job and David say, *While there was no violence in my hands;* and Isaiah, *The work of wickedness is in their hands.* Repentance and restitution clear the hands from the guilt of the violence: restitution, which gives back what was wronged; repentance, which, for love of God, hates and quits the sins of which it repents. "Keep the winning, keep the sinning." The fruits of sin are temporal gain, eternal loss. We can not keep the gain and escape the loss. Whoso keeps the gain of sin, loves it in its fruits, and will have them, all of them. The Hebrews had a saying, "Whoso hath stolen a beam, and used it in building a great tower, must pull down the whole tower and restore the beam to its owner;" *i. e.*, restoration must be made at any cost. "He," they say, "who confesses a sin, and does not restore the thing stolen, is like one who holds a reptile in his hands, who, if he were washed with all the water in the world, would never be purified till he cast it out of his hands; when he has done this, the first sprinkling cleanses him."

9. *Who can tell* if *God will turn and repent?* The Ninevites use the same form of words which God suggested by Joel to Judah. Perhaps He would thereby indicate that He had Himself put it into their mouths. "In uncertainty they repented, and

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* S. Chrys.

obtained certain mercy." "It is, therefore, left uncertain, that men, being doubtful of their salvation, may repent the more vehemently, and the more draw down on themselves the mercy of God." "Most certain are the promises of God, whereby He has promised pardon to the penitent. And yet the sinner may well be uncertain whether he have obtained that penitence which makes him the object of those promises; not a servile repentance, for fear of punishment, but true contrition out of the love of God."* And so, by this uncertainty, while, with the fear of hell, there is mingled the fear of the loss of God, the fear of that loss, which in itself involves some love, is by His grace turned into a contrite love, as the terrified soul thinks *Who* He is, whom it had all but lost, whom it knows not whether it may not lose. In the case of the Ninevites, the remission of the temporal and eternal punishment was bound up in one, since the only punishment which God had threatened was temporal; and if this was forgiven, that forgiveness was a token that His displeasure had ceased.

"They know not the issue, yet they neglect not repentance. They are unacquainted with the method of the loving kindness of God, and they are changed amid uncertainty. They had no other Ninevites to look to, who had repented and been saved. They had not read the Prophets nor heard the Patriarchs, nor benefited by counsel, nor partaken of instruction, nor had they persuaded themselves that they should altogether propitiate God by repentance. For the threat did not contain this. But they doubted and hesitated about this, and yet repented with all carefulness. What account, then, shall we give, when these, who had no good hopes held out to them as to the issue, gave evidence of such a change, and thou, who mayest be of good cheer as to God's love for men, and hast many times received many pledges of His care, and hast heard the Prophets and Apostles, and hast been instructed by the events themselves, strivest not to attain the same measure of virtue as they? Great, then, was the virtue, too, of these men, but much greater the loving kindness of God; and this you may see from the very greatness of the threat. For on this ground did He not add to the sentence, 'but if ye repent, I will spare,' that, casting among them the sentence, un-

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* S. Chrys.

conditioned, He might increase the fear, and, increasing the fear, might impel them the more speedily to repentance?"* "That fear was the parent of salvation; the threat removed the peril; the sentence of overthrow stayed the overthrow. New and marvelous issue! The sentence threatening death was the parent of life. Contrary to secular judgment, the sentence lost its force, when passed. In secular courts, the passing of the sentence gives it validity. Contrariwise with God, the pronouncing of the sentence made it invalid. For had it not been pronounced, the sinners had not heard it; had they not heard it, they would not have repented, would not have averted the chastisement, would not have enjoyed that marvelous deliverance. They fled not the city, as we do now, [from the earthquake,] but, remaining, established it. It was a snare, and they made it a wall; a quicksand and precipice, and they made it a tower of safety."*

"Was Nineveh destroyed? Quite the contrary. It arose and became more glorious, and all this intervening time has not effaced its glory, and we all yet celebrate it and marvel at it, that thenceforth it has become a most safe harbor to all who sin, not allowing them to sink in despair, but calling all to repentance, both by what it did and by what it gained from the Providence of God, persuading us never to despair of our salvation, but living the best we can, and setting before us a good hope, to be of good cheer, that the end will anyhow be good. What was Nineveh? *They ate, they drank; they bought, they sold; they planted, they builded;* they gave themselves up to perjuries, lies, drunkenness, enormities, corruptions. This *was* Nineveh. Look at Nineveh now. They mourn, they grieve, are saddened, in sackcloth and ashes, in fastings and prayers. Where is that Nineveh? It is overthrown." †

10. *And God saw their works.* He did not then first see them; He did not then first see their sackcloth when they covered themselves with it. He had seen them long before He sent the Prophet thither, while Israel was slaying the prophets who announced to them the captivity which hung over them. He knew certainly, that if He were to send the prophets far off to the Gentiles with such an announcement, they would hear and repent. God saw them, looked upon them, approved them, accepted the

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* S. Chrys † S. Aug.

Ninevites not for time only, but as many as persevered, for eternity. It was no common repentance. It was the penitence, which our Lord sets forth as *the* pattern of true repentance before His coming. *The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation and shall condemn it, because they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and behold a greater than Jonah is here.* They believed in the One God, before unknown to them; they humbled themselves: they were not ashamed to repent publicly; they used great strictness with themselves; but, what Scripture chiefly dwells upon, their repentance was not only in profession, in belief, in outward act, but in the fruit of genuine works of repentance, a changed life out of a changed heart. *God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way.* Their whole way and course of life was evil; they broke off, not the one or other sin only, but all, *their* whole *evil way.* The Ninevites, when about to perish, appointed them a fast; in their bodies they chasten their souls with the scourge of humility; they put on haircloth for raiment; for ointment they sprinkle themselves with ashes; and, prostrate on the ground, they lick the dust. They publish their guilt with groans and lay open their secret misdeeds. Every age and sex alike applies itself to offices of mourning; all ornament was laid aside; food was refused to the suckling, and the age, as yet unstained by sins of its own, bare the weight of those of others; the dumb animals lacked their own food. One cry of unlike natures was heard along the city walls; along all the houses echoed the piteous lament of the mourners; the earth bore the groans of the penitents; heaven itself echoed with their voice. That was fulfilled; *The prayer of the humble pierceth the clouds.*" "The Ninevites were converted to the fear of God, and laying aside the evil of their former life, betook themselves through repentance to virtue and righteousness, with a course of penitence so faithful, that they changed the sentence already pronounced on them by God."* "As soon as prayer took possession of them, it both made them righteous, and forthwith corrected the city which had been habituated to live with profligacy, and wickedness, and lawlessness. More powerful was prayer than the long usage of sin. It filled that city with heavenly laws, and brought along with it temperance, loving kindness, gentleness, and care of

*S. Chrys.

the poor. For without these it can not abide to dwell in the soul. Had any then entered Nineveh, who knew it well before, he would not have known the city; so suddenly had it sprung back from a life most foul to godliness."*

And God repented of the evil. This was no real change in God; rather, the object of his threatenings was that He might not do what He threatened. God's threatenings are conditional, "unless they repent," as are His promises, "if *they endure to the end.*" God said afterwards by Jeremiah, "At what *instant I shall speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up and to pull down and destroy it, if that nation, against whom I had pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them.*" As God is unchangeable in nature, so is He unchangeable in Will. For no one can turn back His thoughts. For though some seem to have turned back His thoughts by their deprecations, yet this was His inward thought, that they should be able by their deprecations to turn back His sentence, and that they should receive from Him whereby to avail with Him. When then outwardly His sentence seemeth to be changed, inwardly His counsel is unchanged, because He inwardly ordereth each thing unchangeably, whatsoever is done outwardly with change."† "It is said that He *repented*, because He changed that which He seemed about to do, to destroy them. In God all things are disposed and fixed, nor doth He any thing out of any sudden counsel, which He knew not in all eternity that He should do; but amid the movements of His creature in time, which He governeth marvelously, He, not moved in time, as by a sudden will, is said to do what He disposed by well-ordered causes in the immutability of His most secret counsels, whereby things which come to knowledge, each in its time, He both doth when they are present, and already did when they are future."‡ "God is subject to no dolor of repentance, nor is He deceived in any thing, so as to wish to correct wherein He erred. But as man, when he repenteth, willeth to change what he has done; so when thou hearest that God repenteth, look for the change. God, although He calleth it repenting, doth it otherwise than thou. Thou doest it, because thou hast erred; He, because He avengeth or freeth. He changed the kingdom of Saul when *He repented.* And in the very place,

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* S. Chrys. † S. Greg. Mor. xvi. n. 45. ‡ S. Aug. in Ps. cv. n. 35.

where Scripture saith *He repented*, it is said a little after, *He is not a man that He should repent.* When, then, He changes His works through His unchangeable counsel, He is said to repent, on account of the change, not of the counsel, but of the act."* S. Augustine thinks that God, by using this language of Himself, which all would feel to be inadequate to His majesty, meant, to teach us that all language is inadequate to His excellencies. "We say these things of God, because we do not find any thing better to say. I say, 'God is just,' because in man's words I find nothing better: for He is beyond justice. It is said in Scripture *God is just and loveth justice.* But in Scripture it is said that *God repenteth*, 'God is ignorant.' Who would not start back at this? Yet to that end Scripture condescendeth healthfully to those words from which thou shrinkest, that thou shouldest not think that what thou deemest great is said worthily of Him. If thou ask, what is said worthily of God? one may perhaps answer that He is just. Another more gifted would say that this word, too, is surpassed by His excellence, and that this, too, is said not worthily of Him, although suitably according to man's capacity: so that, when he would prove out of Scripture that it is written *God is just*, he may be answered rightly, that the same Scriptures say that *God repenteth;* so that, as he does not take that in its ordinary meaning, as men are wont to repent, so also when He is said to be just, this does not correspond to His supereminence, although Scripture said this also well, that, through these words such as they are, we may be brought to that which is unutterable. "Why predictest thou," asks S. Chrysostome, the terrible things Thou art about to do? That I may not do what I predict. Wherefore also He threatened hell, that He may not bring to hell. Let words terrify you, that ye may be freed from the anguish of deeds." "Men threaten punishment and inflict it. Not so God; but contrariwise, He both predicts and delays, and terrifies with words, and leaves nothing undone, that He may not bring what He threatens. So He did with the Ninevites. He bends His bow, and brandishes His sword, and prepares His spear, and inflicts not the blow. Were not the prophet's words bow, and spear, and sharp sword when he said, *yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed?* But He discharged not the shaft; for it was prepared, not to be shot, but to be laid up."†

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* S. Aug. † Ib.

"When we read in the Scriptures or hear in churches the word of God, what do we hear but Christ? *And behold a greater than Jonas is here.* If they repented at the cry of one unknown servant, of what punishment shall not we be worthy, if, when the Lord preacheth, whom we have known through so many benefits heaped upon us, we repent not? To them one day sufficed; to us shall so many months and years not suffice? To them the overthrow of the city was preached, and forty days were granted for repentance: to us eternal torments are threatened, and we have not half an hour's life certain."*

And He did it not. God willed rather that His prophesy should seem to fail, than that repentance should fail of its fruit. But it did not, indeed, fail, for the condition lay expressed in the threat. "Prophesy," says Aquinas, in reference to these cases, "can not contain any thing untrue." For "prophesy is a certain knowledge impressed on the understanding of the Prophets by revelation of God, by means of certain teaching. But truth of knowledge is the same in the teacher and the taught, because the knowledge of the learner is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher. And in this way, Jerome saith that 'prophesy is a sort of sign of Divine foreknowledge.' The truth, then, of the prophetic knowledge and utterance must be the same as that of the Divine knowledge, in which there can be no error. But although in the Divine Intellect, the twofold knowledge [of things as they are in themselves, and as they are in their causes,] is always united, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation, because the impression made by the Agent is not always adequate to His power. Whence, sometimes, the prophetic revelation is a sort of impressed likeness of the Divine Foreknowledge, as it beholds the future contingent things in themselves, and these always take place as they are prophesied: as, *Behold a virgin shall conceive.* But sometims the prophetic revelation is an impressed likeness of Divine foreknowledge, as it knows the order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is other than is foretold, and yet there is nothing untrue in the prophesy. For the meaning of the prophesy is, that the disposition of the inferior causes, whether in nature or in human acts, is such, that such an effect would follow," (as in regard to Hezekiah and Nineveh,) "which

* Rib.

order of the cause to the effect is sometimes hindered by other things supervening." "The Will of God," he says again, "being the first universal Cause, does not exclude intermediate causes, by virtue of which certain effects are produced. And, since all intermediate causes are not adequate to the power of the First Cause, there are many things in the Power, Knowledge, and Will of God which are not contained in the order of the inferior causes, as the resurrection of Lazarus. Whence one, looking to the inferior causes, might say, 'Lazarus will not rise again;' whereas, looking to the first Divine Cause, he could say, 'Lazarus will rise again.' And each of these God willeth, viz.: that a thing should take place according to the inferior cause, which yet shall not take place, according to the superior cause: and conversely. So that God sometimes pronounces that a thing shall be, as far as it is contained in the order of inferior causes, (as, according to the disposition of nature or deserts,) which yet doth not take place, because it is otherwise in the superior Divine cause. As when He foretold to Hezekiah, *Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die and not live;* which yet did not take place, because, from eternity it was otherwise in the Knowledge and Will of God, which is unchangeable. Whence Gregory saith, 'though God changeth the thing, His counsel He doth not change.' When, then, He saith, *I will repent*, it is understood as said metaphorically; for men, when they fulfill not what they threatened, seem to repent."

Chapter IV.

1. *And Jonah was displeased exceedingly.* It was an untempered zeal. The prophet himself records it as such, and how he was reproved for it. He would, like many of us, govern God's world better than God Himself. Short-sighted and presumptuous. Yet not more short-sighted than those who, in fact, quarrel with God's Providence, the existence of evil, the baffling of good, "the prison-walls of obstacles and trials," in what we would do for God's glory. What is all discontent but anger with God? The marvel is that the rebel was a prophet! "What he desired was not unjust in itself, that the Ninevites should be punished for their past sins, and that the sentence of God pronounced against them should not be recalled, although they repented. For so the judge hangs the robber for theft, however he repent."* He

* Lap.

sinned, in that he disputed with God. Let *him* cast the first stone who never rejoiced at any overthrow of the enemies of his country, nor was glad, in a common warfare, that they lost as many soldiers as we. As if God had not instruments enough at His Will! Or, as if He needed the Assyrians to punish Israel, or the one nation, whose armies are the terror of Europe, to punish us, so that if they should perish, Israel should therefore have escaped, though it persevered in sin, or we!

And he was very angry, or, it may be, *very grieved.* The word expresses, also, the emotion of burning grief, as when Samuel was grieved at the rejection of Saul, or David at *the breach upon Uzzah.* Either way, he was displeased with what God did. Yet so Samuel and David took God's doings to heart; but Samuel and David were grieved at God's judgments; Jonah, at what to the Ninevites was mercy, only in regard to his own people it seemed to involve judgment. Scripture says that he was displeased because the Ninevites were spared, but not why this displeased him. It has been thought that it was jealousy for God's glory among these heathen, as though the Ninevites would think that God, in whose name he spake, had no certain knowledge of things to come; and so that his fault was mistrust in God's Wisdom or Power to vindicate his own honor. But it seems more likely that it was a mistaken patriotism, which idolized the well-being of his own and God's people, and desired that its enemy, the appointed instrument of its chastisement, should be itself destroyed. Scripture being silent about it, we can not know certainly. Jonah, under God's inspiration, relates that God pronounced him wrong. Having incurred God's reproof, he was careless about men's judgment, and left his own character open to the harsh judgment of men, teaching us a holy indifference to man's opinion, and, in our ignorance, carefulness not to judge unkindly.

2. *And he prayed unto the Lord.* Jonah, at least, did not murmur or complain of God. He complained to God of himself. He expostulates with Him. Short-sighted, indeed, and too wedded to his own will! Yet his will was the well-being of the people whose prophet God had made him. He tells God that this it was which he had all along dreaded. He softens it as well as he can by his word, *I pray Thee*, which expresses deprecation and submissiveness. Still, he does not hesitate to tell God that this was the cause of his first rebellion. Perilous to the soul, to speak with-

out penitence of former sin; yet it is to God that he speaks, and so God, in His wonderful condescension, makes him teach himself.

I know that Thou art a gracious God. He repeats to God, to the letter, His own words by Joel. God had so revealed Himself anew to Judah. He had, doubtless, on some repentance which Judah had used, turned away the evil from them. And now, by sending him as a preacher of repentance, He implied that He would do the same to the enemies of his country. God confirms this by the whole sequel. Thenceforth, then, Israel knew that to the heathen, also, God was intensely, infinitely full of gracious and yearning love;* nay, (as the form rather implies mastered, so to speak, by the might and intensity of His gracious love, *slow to anger*, and delaying it; *great in loving tenderness*, and abounding in it; and that toward them also, when the evil is about to be inflicted, or has been partially or wholly inflicted, He will repent of it and replace it with good, on the first turning of the soul or the nation to God.

3. *Therefore, now, O Lord, take, I beseech thee, my life from me.* He had rather die than see the evil which was to come upon his country. Impatient though he was, he still cast himself upon God. By asking of God to end his life, he, at least, committed himself to the sovereign disposal of God. "Seeing that the Gentiles are, in a manner, entering in, and that those words are being fulfilled. *they have moved me to jealousy with* that which is *not God, and I will move them to jealousy with* those which are *not a people, I will provoke them to anger with a foolish nation*, he despairs of the salvation of Israel, and is convulsed with great sorrow, which bursts out into words, and sets forth the causes of grief, saying in a manner, 'Am I alone chosen, out of so many prophets, to announce destruction to my people through the salvation of others?' He grieved not, as some think, that the multitude of nations is saved, but that Israel perishes. Whence our Lord also wept over Jerusalem. The Apostles first preached to Israel. Paul wisheth to become an anathema for his *brethren, who are Israelites, whose is the adoption and the glory and the covenant, and the giving of the law and the service of God, and the promises, whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ* came."† Jonah had discharged his office faithfully

* Both words in Hebrew are intensive, and, although adjectives, partake of the passive form.

‡ S. Jer.

now; he had done what God commanded; God had done by him what He willed. Now, then, he prays to be discharged. So S. Augustine, in his last illness, prayed that he might die before the Vandals brought suffering and devastation on his country.

4. *And the Lord said, doest thou well to be angry?* God being appealed to, answers the appeal. So does He often in prayer, by some secret voice, answer the inquirer. There is right anger against the sin. Moses's anger was right when he broke the tables. God secretly suggests to Jonah that *his* was not right, as our Lord instructed S. James and S. John that *theirs* was not. The question relates to the quality, not the greatness of his anger. It was not the vehemence of his passionate desire *for* Israel which God reproves, but that it was turned *against* the Ninevites. "What the Lord says to Jonah, He says to all who, in their office of the cure of souls, are angry. They must, as to this same anger, be recalled into themselves, to regard the cause or object of their anger, and weigh warily and attentively whether they *do well to be angry.* For if they are angry, not with men but with the sins of men, if they hate and persecute, not men but the vices of men, they are rightly angry, their zeal is good. But if they are angry, not with sins but with men, if they hate, not vices but men, they are angered amiss, their zeal is bad. This, then, which was said to one, is to be watchfully looked to and decided by all, *Doest thou well to be angry?*"*

5. *So Jonah went out of the city.*† The form of the words implies, (as in the Eng. V.) that this took place after Jonah was convinced that God would spare Nineveh; and since there is no intimation that he knew it by revelation, then it was probably after the forty days. "The days being now past, after which it was time that the things foretold should be accomplished, and His anger as yet taking no effect, Jonah understood that God had pity on Nineveh. Still he does not give up all hope, and thinks that a respite of the evil has been granted them, on their willingness to repent, but that some effect of His displeasure would come, since the pains of their repentance had not equaled their offenses. So thinking in himself apparently, he departs from the city, and waits to see what will become of them."‡ "He expected," apparently, "that it would either fall by an earthquake, or be burned with fire,

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* Rup. † Some render, contrary to grammar, *And Jonah had gone*, etc. ‡ S. Cyr.

like Sodom." "Jonah, in that he built him a tabernacle and sat over against Nineveh, awaiting what should happen to it, wore a different. foresignifying character. For he prefigured the carnal people of Israel. For these, too, were sad at the salvation of the Ninevites; *i. e.*, the redemption and deliverance of the Gentiles. Whence Christ came to call, not the righteous but sinners to repentance. But the overshadowing gourd over his head was the promises of the Old Testament, or those offices in which, as the Apostle says, there was *a shadow of good things to come*, protecting them in the land of promise from temporal evils; all which are now emptied and faded. And now that people, having lost the temple at Jerusalem, and the priesthood and sacrifice (all which was a shadow of that which was to come) in its captive dispersion, is scorched by a vehement heat of tribulations, as Jonah by the heat of the sun, and grieves greatly; and yet the salvation of the heathen and the penitent is accounted of more moment than its grief, and the shadow which it loved."*

6. *And the Lord God prepared a gourd*, [*a palm-christ*, E. M. rightly.] "God again commanded the gourd, as He did the whale, willing only that this should be. Forthwith it springs up beautiful and full of flower, and straightway was a roof to the whole booth, shadowing it like a bower, to his exceeding comfort. The prophet rejoices at it exceedingly, as being a great and thankworthy thing. See now herein, too, the simplicity of his mind. He was grieved exceedingly, because what he had prophesied came not to pass; he rejoiced exceedingly for a plant. A blameless mind is lightly moved to gladness or sorrow. You will see this in children. For as people who are not strong easily fall, if some one gives them no very strong push, but touches them, as it were, with a lighter hand, so, too, the guileless mind is easily carried away by any thing which impels or grieves it."† Little as the shelter of the palm-christ was in itself, Jonah must have looked upon its sudden growth as a fruit of God's goodness toward him, (as it was,) and then, perhaps, went on to think (as people do) that this favor of God showed that He meant, in the end, to grant him what his heart was set upon. Those of impulsive temperaments are ever interpreting the acts of God's Providence as bearing on what they strongly desire. Or, again, they argue, 'God throws this or that

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* S. Aug. † S. Cyr.

in our way; therefore He means us not to relinquish it for His sake, but to have it." By this sudden miraculous shelter against the burning Assyrian sun, which God provided for Jonah, He favored his waiting on there. So Jonah may have thought, interpreting rightly that God willed him to stay; wrongly, why He so willed. Jonah was to wait, not to see what he desired, but to receive, and be the channel of the instruction which God meant to convey to him and through him.

7. *When the morning rose; i. e.*, in the earliest dawn, before the actual sunrise. For one day, Jonah enjoyed the refreshment of the palm-christ. In early dawn, it still promised the shadow; just ere it was most needed, at God's command, it withered.

8. *God prepared a vehement* [E. M. following the Chaldee, *silent; i. e.*, sultry,] *East wind.* The winds in the East, blowing over the sand-deserts, intensely increase the distress of the heat. A sojourner [Layard] describes, on two occasions, an Assyrian summer. "The change to summer had been as rapid as that which ushered in the spring. The verdure of the plain had perished almost in a day. Hot winds, coming from the desert, had burnt up and carried away the shrubs. The heat was now almost intolerable. Violent whirlwinds occasionally swept over the face of the country." "The spring was now fast passing away; the heat became daily greater; the corn was cut; and the plains and hills put on their summer clothing of dull, parched yellow. *The pasture is withered, the herbage faileth; the green grass is not.* It was the season, too, of the Sherghis, or burning winds from the south, which occasionally swept over the face of the country, driving, in their short-lived fury, every thing before them. We all went below [ground] soon after the sun had risen, and remained there [in the tunnel] without again seeking the open air until it was far down in the western horizon." The "Sherghi" must be rather the east wind, Sherki, whence Sirocco. At Sulimania in Koordistan, (about $2\frac{1}{2}$ degrees east of Nineveh, and $\frac{3}{4}$ of a degree south,) "the so much dreaded Sherki seems to blow from any quarter, from east to north-east. It is greatly feared for its violence and relaxing qualities;" "hot, stormy, and singularly relaxing and dispiriting." Suffocating heat is a characteristic of these vehement winds. Morier relates, at Bushire: "A gale of wind blew from the southward and eastward with such violence that three of our largest tents were leveled with the ground. The

wind brought with it such hot currents of air that we thought it might be the precursor of the *Samoun*, described by Chardin, but upon inquiry, we found that the autumn was generally the season for that wind. The *Sam* wind commits great ravages in this district. It blows at night, from about midnight to sunrise, comes in a hot blast, and is afterward succeeded by a cold one. About six years ago, there was a *Sam* during the summer months, which so totally burnt up all the corn, then near its maturity, that no animal would eat a blade of it, nor touch any of its grain."

The sun beat upon the head of Jonah. "Few European travelers can brave the perpendicular rays of an Assyrian sun. Even the well-seasoned Arab seeks the shade during the day, and journeys by night, unless driven forth at noontide by necessity, or the love of war."

He wished in himself to die. [Lit. *he asked, as to his soul, to die.*] He prayed for death. It was still the same dependence upon God, even in his self-will. He did not murmur, but prayed God to end his life here. When men are already vexed in soul by deep inward griefs, a little thing often oversets patience. Jonah's hopes had been revived by the mercy of the palm-christ; they perished with it. Perhaps he had before him the thought of his great predecessor, Elijah; how he, too, wished to die, when it seemed that his mission was fruitless. They differed in love. Elijah's preaching, miracles, toil, sufferings, seemed to him not only to be in vain, but (as they must, if in vain,) to add to the guilt of his people. God corrected him, too, by showing him his own short-sightedness, that he knew not of *the seven thousand who had not bowed their knees unto Baal*, who were, in part, doubtless, *the travail of his soul.* Jonah's mission to his people seemed also to be fruitless; his hopes for their well-being were at an end; the temporal mercies of which he had been the Prophet were exhausted; the future scourge of his people was maintained in might. The soul shrinks into itself at the sight of the impending visitation of its country. But Elijah's zeal was *for* his people only, and the glory of God in it, and so it was pure love. Jonah's was directed *against* the Ninevites, and so had to be purified.

9. *Doest thou well to be angry?* "See again how Almighty God, out of His boundless loving-kindness, with the yearning tenderness of a father, almost disporteth with the simplicity of holy souls! He shades him by a palm-christ: the Prophet rejoices in

it exceedingly. Then, in God's providence, the caterpillar attacks it, the burning east wind smites it, shewing at the same time how very necessary the relief of its shade, that the Prophet might be the more grieved when deprived of such a good. He asketh him, skillfully, was he very grieved, and that for a shrub? He confesseth, and this becometh the defense for God, the Lover of mankind."

I do well to be angry unto death. "Vehement anger leadeth men to long and love to die, especially if thwarted and unable to remove the hindrance which angers them. For then vehement anger begetteth vehement sorrow, grief, despondency." We have each his own palm-christ; and our palm-christ has its own worm. "In Jonah, who mourned when he had discharged his office, we see those who, in what they seem to do for God, either do not seek the glory of God, but some end of their own, or at least think that glory to lie where it does not. For he who seeketh the glory of God, and not his *own* things, but those of Jesus Christ, ought to will what God hath willed and done. If he wills aught else, he declares plainly that he sought himself, not God, or himself more than God. Jonah sought the glory of God wherein it was not, in the fulfillment of a prophesy of woe. And choosing to be led by his own judgment, not by God's, whereas he ought to have joyed exceedingly, that so many thousands, being *dead, were alive again*, being *lost, were found*, he, when *there was joy in heaven among the angels of God over* so many repenting sinners, was *afflicted with a great affliction*, and was angry. This ever befalls those who wish *that* to take place, not what is best and most pleasing to God, but what they think most useful to themselves. Whence we see our *very* great and common error, who think our peace and tranquillity to lie in the fulfillment of our own will, whereas this will and judgment of our own is the cause of all our trouble. So then Jonah prays and tacitly blames God, and would not so much excuse as approve that, his former flight, to *Him whose eyes are too pure to behold iniquity*. And since all inordinate affection is a punishment to itself, and he who departeth from the order of God hath no stability, he is in such anguish because what he wills will not be, that he longs to die. For it can not but be that *his* life, who measures every thing by his own will and mind, and who followeth not God as his Guide, but rather willeth to be the guide of the Divine Will, should be,

from time to time, troubled with great sorrow. But since the merciful and gracious Lord hath pity on our infirmity, and gently admonisheth us within, when He sees us at variance with Him, He forsakes not Jonah in that hot grief, but lovingly blames him. How restless such men are, we see from Jonah. The palm-christ grows over his head, and *he was exceedingly glad of the palm-christ.* Any labor or discomfort they bear very ill, and being accustomed to endure nothing, and follow their own will, they are tormented and can not bear it, as Jonah did not the sun. If any thing, however slight, happen to lighten their grief, they are immoderately glad. Soon gladdened, soon grieved, like children. They have not learned to bear any thing moderately. What marvel, then, that their joy is soon turned into sorrow? They are joyed over a palm-christ, which soon greeneth, soon drieth, quickly falls to the ground and is trampled upon. Such are the things of this world, which, while possessed, seem great and lasting; when suddenly lost, men see how vain and passing they are, and that hope is to be placed, not in them, but in their Creator, who is unchangeable. It is, then, a great dispensation of God toward us, when those things in which we took especial pleasure are taken away. Nothing can man have so pleasing, green, and, in appearance, so lasting, which has not its own worm prepared by God, whereby, in the dawn, it may be smitten and die. The change of human will or envy disturbs court favor; manifold accidents, wealth; the varying opinion of the people or the great, honors; disease, danger, poverty, infamy, pleasure. Jonah's palm-christ had one worm; ours many; if the other were wanting, there is the restlessness of man's own thoughts, whose food is restlessness."

10. *Thou hadst pity on the palm-christ.* In the feeling of our common mortality, the soul can not but yearn over decay. Even a drooping flower is sad to look on, so beautiful, so frail. It belongs to this passing world, where nothing lovely abides, all things beautiful hasten to cease to be. The natural God-implanted feeling is the germ of the spiritual.

11. *Should I not spare?* lit. *have pity* and so *spare.* God waives for the time the fact of the repentance of Nineveh, and speaks of those on whom man must have pity, those who never had any share in its guilt, the one hundred and twenty thousand children of Nineveh, "who, in the weakness of infancy, knew

not which hand, *the right* or *the left*, is the stronger and fitter for every use." He who would have spared Sodom *for ten's sake*, might well be thought to spare Nineveh for the one hundred and twenty thousand's sake, in whom the inborn corruption had not developed into the malice of willful sin. If these one hundred and twenty thousand were the children under three years old, they were one-fifth (as is calculated) of the whole population of Nineveh. If of the six hundred thousand of Nineveh, all were guilty, who by reason of age could be, above one-fifth were innocent of actual sin.

To Jonah, whose eye was evil to Nineveh for his people's sake, God says, as it were, "Let the *spirit* which *is willing* say to the *flesh* which *is weak, Thou grievest for the palm-christ;* that is, thine own kindred, the Jewish people; and *shall not I spare Nineveh that great city*, shall not I provide for the salvation of the Gentiles in the whole world, who are in ignorance and error? For there are many thousands among the Gentiles, who go after *dumb idols even as they are led;* not out of malice but out of ignorance, who would without doubt correct their ways, if they had the knowledge of the truth, if they were shown the difference *between their right hand and their left; i. e.*, between the truth of God and the lie of men." But, beyond the immediate teaching to Jonah, God lays down a principle of His dealings at all times, that, in His visitations of nations, He, *the Father of the fatherless and judge of the widows*, takes especial account of those who are of no account in man's sight, and defers the impending judgment, not for the sake of the wisdom of the wise or the courage of the brave, but for the helpless, weak, and, as yet, innocent as to actual sin. How much more may we think that He regards those with pity who have on them not only the recent uneffaced traces of their Maker's hands, but have been reborn in the image of Christ His only-begotten Son? The infants clothed with Christ must be a special treasure of the Church in the eyes of God.

How much greater the mercy of God than that even of a holy man; how far better to flee to the judgment-seat of God than to the tribunal of man. Had Jonah been judge in the cause of the Ninevites, he would have passed on them all, although penitent, the sentence of death for their past guilt, because God had passed it before their repentance. So David said to God: *Let us fall now into the hand of the Lord; for His mercies are great; and let*

me not fall into the hand of man. Whence the Church professes to God, that mercy is the characteristic of His power; O God, who shewest Thy Almighty power most chiefly in shewing mercy and pity, mercifully grant unto us such a measure of Thy grace, that we, running the way of Thy commandments, may obtain Thy gracious promises, and be made partakers of Thy heavenly treasure."

"Again, God here teaches Jonah and us all to conform ourselves in all things to the Divine Will, that, when He commandeth any work, we should forthwith begin and continue it with alacrity and courage. When he bids us cease from it, or deprives it of its fruit and effect, we should forthwith tranquilly cease, and patiently allow our work and toil to lack its end and fruit. For what is our aim, save to do the Will of God, and in all things to conform ourselves to it? But now the Will of God is, that thou shouldest resign, yea destroy, the work thou hast begun. Acquiesce then in it. Else thou servest not the Will of God, but thine own fancy and cupidity. And herein consists the perfection of the holy soul, that, in all acts and events, adverse or prosperous, it should with full resignation resign itself most humbly and entirely to God, and acquiesce, happen what will, yea, and rejoice that the Will of God is fulfilled in this thing, and say with holy Job, *The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the Name of the Lord.* S. Ignatius had so transferred his own will into the Will of God, that he said, 'If, perchance, the society, which I have begun and furthered with such toil, should be dissolved or perish, after passing half an hour in prayer, I should, by God's help, have no trouble from this thing, than which none sadder could befall me.' The saints let themselves be turned this way and that, round and round, by the Will of God, as a horse by its rider."

THE LOGICAL RESULT OF THE NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.*

BY J. I. DOEDES, D. D., PROFESSOR IN UTRECHT.

THE struggle of our times turns upon the reality of the supernatural. On the one hand the credibility of the miracles recorded in the Gospels is maintained; on the other side it is denied. While it is admitted on both sides that the question respects the history of Christ, the parties are in the most direct antagonism to each other as to what, in the life of Jesus, is to be regarded as really historical. Miracle or no miracle? that is the question. The supernatural, in union with the natural, or every thing simply natural, and the supernatural excluded as not being historical, is the point in controversy; and with this, the result of the inquiry in respect to the genuineness of the historical books of the New Testament stands in connection, just as the issue of the inquiry into the genuineness and credibility of the books of the Old Testament, is, at last, for the most part, determined by the position taken in respect to the miracles it relates.

When will the controversy in respect to miracles and the supernatural be ended? On the side of those who reject them, it is replied: just so soon as the actual occurrence of a miracle shall be satisfactorily demonstrated. What should we do, it is asked, if, some day, a worker of miracles should appear, claiming, for example, to be able to raise the dead, and a serious consideration of his claim could be regarded as possible? A commission of physiologists, physicists, chemists, and persons skilled in historical criticism, should be appointed. This commission should select the body, satisfy themselves that death had really occurred in the case, designate the hall in which the experiment should be made, and, in short, take every precaution which might be necessary to exclude all doubt. If, under such conditions, the dead should be raised, there would be a probability nearly akin to certainty. Nevertheless, since an experiment must always be capable of repetition, and in the case of miracles there can be no place for the distinction between "easy" and "difficult," the worker of

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* Translated from *Stemmen voor Waarheid en Vrede* for September, 1865.

miracles should be required to repeat his miracle, in other circumstances, upon other bodies, and at another place. If the miracle should be wrought in every case, two particulars would be proved: the first, that supernatural events have occurred in the world; the other, that the power of causing them to appear is given to certain persons. But who does not see, it is said in the last place, that never in these circumstances has a miracle occurred? that always, down to the present day, the miracle-worker has chosen the subject, the place, and the witnesses?

In respect to the latter point, the answer is at hand, and can be made at once. According to the narratives of the miracles of Jesus, this can not be affirmed without limitations: according to the account of the resurrection of Lazarus, it was certainly not Jesus who chose the subject, the place, or the witnesses. But it will be of slight use to insist upon this point, since the credibility of the narrative will still be denied. We prefer to take our stand on the two particulars which, it is claimed, would be proved, if the miracle of the resurrection of the dead were repeated under the conditions named; and really we can not repress our astonishment at the credulity of those who, in the case supposed, should regard the two particulars as really proved. How? Because a so-called wonder-worker, in the presence of men of science, does, more than once, wake a dead person to life, are we to assume it as proved that supernatural, mark well, *supernatural* events occur in the world; *i. e.*, events which can not possibly be explained by causes lying within in the sphere of nature! A different conclusion is certainly possible; viz., that some men possess the power of doing what others can not do, and, accordingly, that there are powers and laws of nature which, down to the present time, have been discovered only by certain persons—the so-called miracle-workers—and not by ordinary physiologists, physicists, chemists, etc. Even after one or another worker of miracles had three, four, or five times changed a corpse into a living body, if I held the position of Renan, (for his view it is that we are now considering,) I should by no means surrender, but sturdily say; the supernatural is the superdivine, and, therefore, not to be spoken of: if ever a dead man be really restored to life, we must, in the end, be able to explain it on natural grounds.

But there is something further to be taken into consideration.

By the supposition, the proposed commission certify that the wonder-worker has really performed the so-called supernatural deed. Shall other physiologists, physicists, chemists, who were not members of the commission, and were not present at the experiment, believe, and must they believe, that it is possible, at least for some persons to change a corpse into a living being, and therefore conclude that it is possible for supernatural events to occur? Why should they not, you perhaps ask, if they hold the members of the commission to be competent, honorable, and impartial judges? Why not! Because many, in respect to miracles, have something more to say than that they are not properly attested. What think you of the materialists? According to them, every thing must be explained by the changes of matter. So long as it is not proved to them that the resurrection of a dead person can be explained by the laws of material changes, they will refuse to recognize, as a fact, his alleged return to life. What think you of the naturalist? Can he, holding, as he does, that there is nothing above nature, recognize any thing as supernatural? What think you of pantheism? In this system there is no room for the supernatural as something which can not be explained by natural causes. Even though the existence of a personal God be admitted, no obligation will be felt on that account to recognize Renan's pretended proof, exhibited in the presence of his proposed commission. On the ground of deism, no farther point is ultimately reached, so far as the recognition of the supernatural goes, than on that of materialism, naturalism, and pantheism; and on the theistic ground—but we know that among those who defend theism, and consequently conceive of the personal God as in constant connection with the universe, there are violent opposers of miracles and of every thing supernatural. We are reminded that it is possible to recognize a personal God, who is distinguished from the world, from all finite and individual things, by his infinity and his own consciousness of it, without being obliged to assume an interposition on his part, as if he was separated from the universe which, just as it is, is, with its immutable laws, the revelation itself of God. The so-called Monistic Theism is distinguished, as we know, from Deism by the assumption of an inner relation of God to the universe, and from the supernaturalistic Theism by the denial of the transcendence of God in respect to the universe. The universe, says the

Theist who defends Monism, is, with its unchangeable laws, the revelation of God. A variation from these laws is not to be admitted, for the laws are the expression of God's will; any thing deviating from them can not possibly be ascribed to God, who is immanent in the world. So long as the Theist, who stands on the ground of Monism, does not see the return to life of a dead person really occurring before his eyes, he will never be able to recognize it as a fact; or, if he is compelled to do so, he will never refer it to a "supernatural" cause, and never recognize in it a "supernatural" fact.

We must not shut our eyes against the ultimate ground on which miracles and every thing supernatural are denied. It is not the insufficiency of the evidence for the actual occurrence of miracles, but the *naturalistic theory of the universe*, in which materialists, pantheists, and monists essentially agree, and which by an inexorable necessity excludes the supernatural in nature and history. Their difficulty is not, in the last analysis, that miracles are not properly or satisfactorily attested; but that they do not fit into the world or the universe; *i. e.*, into *their theory* and apprehension of the system of the world or the universe. Rather than sacrifice these theories, these men endeavor to save them by hypotheses the moment that phenomena and facts appear which can not be harmonized with their speculations: witness the development hypothesis in its various forms, by which the origin of organized creatures from the inorganic creation, it is claimed, must be explained. It has been asked of what use it is to have proved that God can come between the two, or interpose in the natural development of things, when it is impossible to bring forward a single fact which has ever demonstrably proceeded from any such intervention or interposition *ex abrupto*. We admit that, if the demonstration of such an event is really impossible, the proof of the possibility of a divine intervention—that is, of the supernatural—amounts to nothing. But we ask, at just this point, whether, viewing the organic and inorganic creation in the full light of the results of scientific inquiry, we have the right to affirm that it is impossible (mark well, *impossible*) to bring forward a single fact which demonstrably proceeded not from a natural cause but from a supernatural interposition? Let men be entirely honest, and not hide behind what evidently can not, in the slightest degree, be assumed in advance; viz., "not yet

properly attested." This is really not the great difficulty; it lies elsewhere—namely, in the naturalistic philosophy; and, therefore, a hundred trials, however successful they might be, and performed, albeit, before a hundred competent commissions—commissions, too, which Renan would pronounce competent—of materialists, naturalists, pantheists, or monistic theists, would never insure the acceptance of a single fact or phenomenon as supernatural. If this result should ever be secured, it would certainly be not upon the testimony of others, however competent, but upon the evidence of one's own senses. I remember to have read somewhere in the writings of Dr. Reville, "How many poor souls would be relieved of the anguish of skepticism, how many hardened unbelievers would be converted and saved, if, some morning, the telegraph should startle Europe with the announcement that the French Institute had felt constrained to regard a miracle as having been actually performed! "But supposing such a telegram to be every-where sent, it is very probable that at least the "hardened unbelievers" would say, "As I did not see it myself, I will not believe it;" and if they should see it themselves, they would say, "It is incomprehensible certainly, but supernatural it can not be; the cause must be sought within the sphere of nature."

Consequently, to the question, when the struggle respecting miracles and the supernatural will be terminated, we are compelled to answer: not till men shall bid farewell to the naturalistic philosophy, and recognize the supernatural in accordance with its just claims.

But perhaps it is asked: is it worth the while to dispute so much upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of miracles? Of what importance is it, in the end, at least to the Christian theologian, whether the naturalistic or supernaturalistic philosophy be accepted? If men only stand upon the theistic ground and recognize a personal God, distinct from the world and yet immanent in the world, why insist upon the recognition of the supernatural, both in nature and history?

We would not, in the slightest degree, undervalue the importance of the recognition of a personal God to Christian theology. If the personality of God is denied, theology is at once annihilated: nay, more, religion (*godsdienst*, the worship of *God*) becomes impossible, because then it is nothing more than the adora-

tion of a conception, a principle; or an ideal. Religion presupposes, if we do not trifle with words, not only man, but a personal God; that is, a being who possesses self-consciousness. But religion presupposes more than this. It presupposes that man is something else than a being *determined* in his acts by laws independent of himself. It presupposes that man voluntarily consecrates and devotes himself to God; that he voluntarily obeys and glorifies Him. On this voluntariness, Christianity lays the strongest emphasis. The Apostolic Gospel, through the acceptance and preaching of which Christianity exerts its power, presupposes voluntariness. In calling men to faith, conversion, and holiness, it assumes to be speaking to men, who are responsible for their actions; who are worthy of punishment on account of their sins, and who, in consequence of the impurity of their hearts, stand in need of renewal. It appeals to their consciences and points out a way which they must enter, in order to come into the right relation to God. For this Gospel the naturalistic philosophy has no place, even though its adherents pay no homage to materialism, or naturalism, or pantheism, or deism, but recognize a personal God. For, notwithstanding this, they assume that all things are governed by immutable laws, by immutable laws must be explained, and by immutable laws come into being: and then they say, every thing that takes place is God's work, and —this is a necessary result—*is good*. Moral evil, they go on to say, is just like physical evil, willed by God, not indeed to be permanent, but to be subdued by an opposing force; yet in its existence in time, it is willed by God. The ideas expressed by the terms *good* and *evil*, in contrast with each other, are merely relative. In the sight of God there is no evil. God is the absolute cause even of the evil desires by which men are impelled to injure each other—the cause even of what we are accustomed to call "sin." Still, it is not God's will that sin should continue, and, therefore, he calls us to strive against it. To offer any explanation derived from the freedom of the human will is absurd. The recognition of God's omnipotence utterly excludes the assumption of free-will in man. Every event occurs in accordance with the law of cause and effect, under the all-embracing control of God. In the great whole which we call the world, there is less room for a free act of man than even for a miracle.

The determinism which makes these declarations is the entirely

logical development of the naturalistic philosophy. Every thing, without the slightest distinction, is referred back to one ultimate cause, God. Every thing is explained by natural causes which have their absolute cause, finally, in God. In the natural world there is no miracle—in the spiritual world no freedom of will pertaining to man. What else remains for the Gospel, we ask, with which Christianity appeared, except to regard itself as a superfluity?

The Gospel appeals incessantly to the human will. It exhorts and warns; it arouses and stimulates; it speaks as if it were saying, "you can if you will." The same thing indeed is said also by determinism and the naturalistic school. But there is one difference between them. The Gospel says that God works in us both to will and to do according to his good pleasure. This, too, determinism says. But with this difference, if man *will not*, this also is caused by God, says the determinist. But if man will not, we ask, does *then* the Gospel say that he is still acting according to the will of God? If man disobeys the Gospel, does not the Gospel, in that case, assume him to be worthy of punishment? Is the Gospel deterministic, in the same sense with naturalism, carried out to its logical result, even though standing on the ground of theism? No, a thousand times, no. And therefore it is evident what position the preacher of the Gospel must take in respect to the principle of the naturalistic philosophy, and what would finally become of religion if that philosophy should be accepted as true. If what we call sin is willed by God exactly like its opposite; if God is the author of one as well as the other, why should we call a man, at the moment he sins, less religious, less engaged in the service of God, than when he is not sinning? Why call him religious only in the latter case, when the whole idea of sin, as well as its opposite, is merely relative, and, in the sight of God, has no significance? To this result we must come, if the idea of religion is to be so defined as to be brought into harmony with this philosophy. Religion must in this case be independent of what we usually call sin: it must be regarded as simply the mental state or disposition possessed by the man who is deeply impressed with the idea that God reigns, and that he is wisdom and love—a state which, on this view, is neither excluded by, nor does it exclude, what passes under the name of sin. Here is a conflict between the naturalistic, especially the deterministic,

and the supernaturalistic, or Christian philosophy, and on this we must fix our attention if we would understand the great importance of the theological struggle before us, the radical difference between the two parties, and the vital interests at stake for theology, religion, and morals. In the naturalistic philosophy, the law of "continuity," whether observed or not, is always, and in all cases, assumed. In the material world, phenomena are found which can not be explained by natural laws; but no supernatural influence will it admit. In the sphere of history, according to certain records, events occur which can not be explained by natural causes; but the supernatural explanation it rejects and consequently denies that these events ever took place. In respect to man, we are ignorant of the causes of his volitions. But in view of his possession of conscience, and especially the consciousness of guilt which he manifests, we should be disposed to seek the cause in himself, and to make him responsible. No, no, exclaim our opponents, it is ultimately to be traced to God. So here, then, is no agency of man, as in the former case there was no agency of God. In the supernatural philosophy, on the contrary, the principle of continuity or invariable sequence is not made supreme, but a fair consideration is given to what the material world itself declares in respect to an interposition by a higher power; it does not shut its eye upon the testimony of history; it starts back from the idea of making God the author of sin, or seeking the cause of human volitions, without distinction, in God, or surrendering the doctrine of man's responsibility to his Maker, as indicated by his consciousness of guilt. Its adherents compelled to enter into such a controversy, accept it in courage and hope. The natural world will not be to them a sealed book. To the wide and rich field of history they will direct their studies, but most of all to the center of all history, the age, the appearing of Jesus Christ. We must also especially study man; man, particularly as a moral and religious being; man, with his need of religion and of life in communion with a personal God, and with conscience which is so inexplicable on the assumption that the causes of his volitions lie wholly outside of himself. The final and inevitable conclusion to which we are brought is, that we must take our choice between a naturalistic philosophy, with its logical results, and the Gospel of Jesus and the Apostles, and that there is and can be no middle course.

SIMEON ON THE MANAGEMENT OF A TEXT AND SERMON.*

TAKE it in the writer's meaning, and not as a motto. Of course, there may be some very exceptional case in which you must have a motto, and in which, as a motto, the text may do good. Get the subject of your text, and use the words only as your machinery. Do not fritter a text down, but in your management let the subject of it stand out clear, and as a whole. Suppose, for instance, the text (Gal. v: 1), "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free." Arrange it thus: 1st. The liberty into which Christ has brought us; and, 2nd. The duty arising therefrom. In this mode, the subject would be entire, and you might, in a side way, show who brings us into liberty; how He does it, and what are its effects. And, in speaking of our duty, you could show that it is to stand fast; and, as an illustration, could run back to the state of the Galatian church, etc. But all your thoughts and remarks should take their complexion from those of the Apostle in the text. Suppose, on the contrary, you were to arrange it in another way; for instance, 1st. The liberty; 2nd. Who brought us into it; and, 3rd. Its proper effects—or any such division: you would fritter the Apostle's idea down, and, instead of a sermon on the *subject*, you would preach one upon the *words*, and leave your auditory to scramble for the Apostle's subject as they could.

Take up your subject fully and neatly. Let it turn out simply and neatly; beware of putting a limb here and a limb there, but let it be a complete body. The difference between doing this and disregarding it, is like the difference between light bread and heavy bread, where the materials, although the same in both, are less nutritive and more uncomfortable of digestion in one than in the other. Beware, as Bishop Wilkins says, of crumbling the bread of life: "break it fully and fairly." To take up and bring out the whole subject, "clean and simple," is the entire *art* of constructing a sermon.

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* From *Recollections of the Conversation Parties* of the Rev. CHARLES SIMEON, M. A. London, 1863.

The ancients thought that every block of marble had a statue in it, and that the sculptor had but to chip away the matter by which it was encrusted: nor could he make any other figure out of it. Just so has every text a subject in it. Catch the view of that subject, and you will bring from it a compact and well-proportioned sermon, easy and useful. Is the statue in a posture of fighting? Do not make it in a posture of sitting. Is it impassioned? Dò not make it placid and serene.

Do not preach what *you* can tell, but what your people can receive. Suppose I have six narrow-mouthed glass bottles to fill. I have both a large pail, brimful of water, and a small tea-kettle, with a taper spout, also full of water. Which of the two shall I use in filling the narrow-mouthed bottles?

When you can not get at the full and real meaning of a text, leave it alone. Do not preach from an indistinct view of a passage.

Do not travel out of your text for a subject: for elucidation you must do so, but not for subject. Most men preach their text: see that you avoid this. Preach not your text, but the subject of the text. Take the subject of the text; illustrate it by the words of the text, but preach always the *subject* of it. Let you sermon come naturally out of your text, "*totus, tersus, atque rotundus*," like the kernel out of a hazel-nut; and not piecemeal, and, after much trouble to your hearers, like the kernel out of a walnut. Take hold of some point in a text which will give you a handle for the whole. Do not thrust in a handle, but find that which is already in the text. A sermon should be like a telescope: each successive division of it should be as an additional lens to bring the subject of your text nearer, and make it more distinct.

Every man who gives a new, apt, and important illustration of Scripture truth, confers a lasting benefit on the Church of Christ.

Observe the distinction in a sermon between division and distribution. The old writers were not well aware of this difference. For instance, Baxter, in one of his works, goes on, "Sixty-fifthly," as if any person could remember the sixty-four preceding heads. Yet, by attending to this simple distinction, you may have a hundred and fifty heads in your sermon without either confusion or obscurity. Only do not *name* the minute subdi-

visions of your sermons; it will confuse your hearers, especially if they have been a little inattentive. Let me illustrate this point. Take the human body; separate all its two hundred and fifty bones, and lay them promiscuously on a table: you see a confused heap of bones. You know their number, and that they are the bones of a human body; but have you any idea of the skeleton from what you see? *There* is division alone. Take now the bones of the head, and arrange them in one heap; do the like with the bones of the trunk, and the several members separately, laying each parcel in its proper place; you thus will obtain an idea of the skeleton, and, through that, of the human body. *There* is distribution.

Make your exordium always short and pointed, if you can, and get at once to the substance of your sermon. Thus, (John vi: 44), "No man can come to me except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." Suppose you are preaching on such a subject. Make such a division of it as this: 1st. It is difficult; let us explain it. 2nd. It has been controverted; let us confirm it. 3rd. It is liable to abuse; let us guard it. Such an opening will be sure to interest a congregation.

Never weary your hearers by too long preaching: endeavour to rivet their attention on your message for a reasonable time; but remember that the mind, and especially among the generality of persons, or the uneducated, will only bear a certain amount of tension. When weariness or exhaustion comes upon people, there is very little chance of your doing them more good on that occasion. Whole ordinary congregations must not in this respect be judged of even by the capabilities of spiritually-minded individuals among them.

THE CRITICAL LABORS OF TISCHENDORF, AND HIS DISCOVERY OF THE SINAI MANUSCRIPT OF THE BIBLE.*

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

Whilst the German Evangelical Church Diet, held at Altenburg, in September, 1864, was considering the most recent literature connected with the life of Jesus, I was solicited, by honored friends, to address a word upon the subject to that great assembly. I complied, directing attention to the fact that Renan, of France, had been guilty of a grievous misrepresentation in the view presented of the Holy Land, and also expressing my conviction that the earliest history of the Church, as well as that of the sacred text, would furnish the best possible weapons against the attacks upon our Gospels. This brief address was well received. A reporter of the *Allgemeine Kirchenzeitung*, writing on the third of June of the present year, thus speaks of it: "The reporter ventures to affirm that nothing else was said which awoke so deep an interest as the few words of Tischendorf, for the simple reason, that he confined himself to a field in which, beyond all others, he was at home, and because, when history speaks, all philosophy must keep silence."

The circumstance that researches, carried through many years, have brought me to an intimate acquaintance with facts, from which the clearest light may be derived, bearing upon the great question which is now agitating Christendom, seemed to impose upon me the duty of publishing, in a fuller form, the compendious address at Altenburg. A pamphlet, produced in fulfillment of this duty, appeared in the middle of March of the present year. It excited so much attention, that in three weeks not a single one of two thousand copies remained. Translations into

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*Translated from Dr. Tischendorf's essay entitled, *Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst*, Leipsic, 1865, by Rev. Henry Smith, D. D., Professor in Lane Theological Seminary. This timely and important treatise, which has excited much attention in Europe, has been forwarded by the learned author to the Theological Eclectic, with permission to present a translation of it to American readers.

English and French were undertaken, and a second edition of the original appeared in the month of May.

About this time, the managers of the Zwickau Association for the publication of books for the people, expressed the wish that I should prepare, for their use, an edition of the work remodeled and better adapted to the popular mind. Notwithstanding the pressure of other important labors, I undertook the task. It was an opportunity which I had desired to speak to a circle of readers, to whom most of my writings are inaccessible, although, in fact, the ultimate and best fruits of my researches were designed for the benefit of the entire Christian community.

The little work which I herewith commit to the indulgent consideration of the reader, although inferior in popular tone to many other publications of the Association, will be found, I trust, universally intelligible. Its chief design is to demonstrate that *our venerable Gospels actually originated in the times of the Apostles, and that they were actually the works of the holy men whose names they bear.* At the same time it will give the reader a glimpse of one of the most interesting and important periods in the history of the Christian Church.

At the time when I undertook to adapt this little work to the benevolent design of the Association, its managers presented another special request—the request, namely, that I should attach to it a narrative of my researches, and particularly an account of the discovery of the Sinai Bible; a work to which the chief place of honor is due among the sources of proof employed in the present publication. It is true, indeed, that similar accounts have been given both by myself and others, yet it is quite possible they may never have met the eye of the majority of the patrons of the Association. In complying with this desire of the managers, I have only to express, on my part, the hope that the narration may not prove unprofitable to my readers.

After several of my youthful writings, among which were two theological prize essays, had been favorably received, I undertook, in the year 1839, to prepare an edition of the New Testament in Greek, the language in which the Apostles wrote. In this work I availed myself of the learned helps produced within the last three hundred years, for the restoration of the text to the state in which it left the hands of the Apostles. This edition of the New Testament was published in the autumn of the year

1840. In the progress of these labors, the conviction fastened itself upon me that the helps referred to, in order to the highest result, demanded a much more careful investigation than they had hitherto received; and I imposed upon myself the task of a new investigation of this character. This undertaking rendered necessary a considerable amount of travel, requiring not only much time, tact, and industry, but a large outlay of money as well. The last of these elements of success was wanting. The Theological Faculty of Leipsic had recommended the undertaking to the government of Saxony, but as this remained without result, they applied to Dr. Von Falkenstein, at the time the government representative at the University. The issue was, that the sum of one hundred thaler ($72) was paid to me for traveling expenses, and a like sum was promised for the following year. Upon such a pecuniary foundation, it certainly appeared impossible to rest an undertaking which demanded long scientific journeys to foreign lands. Nevertheless, I consoled myself with the maxim that God helps the bold, and gives success to the earnest-hearted. Clad in a coat which had not been paid for, I took my departure for Paris on the day of the Reformation festival, 1840. The journey, at that time, cost fifty thaler. With the remaining fifty, of which I was master, I reached Paris.

It is not my purpose, however, to weary the reader with tedious details. In Paris I found men who interested themselves in my undertaking. While I was making collections for the future, I was at the same time able to realize from my labors enough to satisfy the wants of the present. I was obliged not only to spend two years in researches, in the rich Parisian libraries, but to travel, for the same purpose, through Holland and England. In January, 1843, I went from Paris to Switzerland, and after a long residence in Basel, I traveled through Southern France and Italy, exploring the libraries in Rome and Naples, in Florence, Venice, and Modena, in Milan, Verona, and Turin. In April, 1844, I undertook a journey from Italy to the Orient; Egypt, with the Coptic convents upon the Natron lakes of the Lybian desert; Sinai, in the Arabian desert; Jerusalem, together with Bethlehem and St. Saba, on the Dead Sea; Nazareth, with its surroundings, east and west; Smyrna and Patmos; the island of John; Beirut, Constantinople, with the Prince Islands, and Athens. These were the chief points of my Oriental researches. After visting, on

my homeward journey, the libraries of Vienna and Munich, I returned to Leipsic, in January, 1845.

This series of journeys had cost five thousand thaler. How a traveler, who had left Leipsic in 1840 with less than nothing, had obtained so considerable a sum, will appear to the reader sufficiently enigmatical. Still I have already given some intimations touching the solution of the riddle, and others will follow. True it is, that a little art and a great deal of enthusiasm lurk in the background. But, first of all, the reader will ask in what precisely the labors consisted, to which a series of journeys, lasting almost five years, over a great portion of Europe, and through portions of Africa and Asia, were devoted.

Before speaking of my travels, I referred to a new edition of the New Testament, in the same language in which it was written by the Apostles. We must now return to it. Soon after the Apostles had composed their writings, they were transcribed. Indeed, copy after copy being made, they were immensely multiplied down to the sixteenth century, when the printing-press took the place of the pen in the work of transcription. Many copies, from the very beginning, abounded in blemishes and oversights. Moreover, transcribers permitted themselves, without authority, though with good intent, here and there, to introduce alterations, sometimes in the expression, sometimes in the matter itself. Omissions were indulged in, or, what more commonly happened, additions were made.

In the sixteenth century, when the first printed editions were undertaken, the copies were taken from a few manuscripts which were at hand. These first printed copies were spread abroad, and the impression often repeated. Men became accustomed to regard, with high veneration, the text of these copies, without knowing whether it tallied precisely with the written text of the first century. Soon after, however, manuscripts were found in Europe a thousand years old, and an examination of them showed many points of difference between them and the printed text. And from these, even in the earliest centuries, the Greek text had been translated into various languages, into the Latin, Syriac, Egyptian, and other languages. Of these translations there existed, likewise, ancient manuscripts, and an examination of these confirmed the position that many variations of the sacred text had long been current. The same thing was proved finally by

those citations of Biblical passages which the fathers of the Church, from the second century onward, had incorporated into their works. In a word, it became in all these ways perfectly evident that the text of the Apostles, having been for five hundred years reproduced in manuscripts, whether in Greek, Latin, or any other language, had undergone manifold changes which left it doubtful what, in any given passage, the Apostle himself had written.

Now, it may be remarked, that learned men have for a long time employed themselves in the task of purging the common text of this foreign element, until, more recently, the idea has been conceived that the end would be more certainly attained by setting aside altogether the ordinary text, and substituting in its place a new one derived directly from the oldest and best sources. This last named idea is, without doubt, the correct one. In this way, and in this alone, is it possible to reform the text, and the criticism of the text; that is, to carry back our text, as nearly as possible, to that of the Apostles, and to regulate and clarify the judgment of scholars upon what, in any given place, has been actually printed or written. But to make this reform fundamental and thorough, it is absolutely essential that the basis should be assured, that is, that it should be most carefully and critically examined. That this had never yet been done, though so many able and eminent men, among whom may be named Erasmus, Robert Stephens, Thedore Beza, Mill, Wetstein, Bengel, Griesbach, Matthäi, and Scholz, have, for centuries, labored upon it. I became convinced in 1840, during the preparation of my first edition of the New Testament. From this conviction sprang the enterprise which rendered my journeys necessary. It was my purpose in them, to subject the oldest Greek manuscripts found in the libraries of Europe, to a new and exhaustive exploration. In this undertaking, it appeared to me expedient to publish the most important of these documents separately, and with the utmost care, that they might become the common property of the Church, and also for their preservation, should any of the originals chance to be destroyed.

In connection with the Greek, the most ancient Latin manuscripts, also, on account of their special value, were made the objects of my researches. Very soon, also, I extended these documentary labors to the Greek text of the Old Testament,

which was used even by the Apostles, for the most part, instead of the Hebrew, but which, notwithstanding the high importance to the Church which this circumstance gives it, in the lapse of two thousand years has undergone perplexing changes, even beyond that of the New Testament. The Apocrypha of the New Testament, so called, constituted another department of my researches; writings in regard to which the reader, in the progress of the present essay, will receive more particular information. They stand in manifold relations to the canonical books of the New Testament, and throw important light upon Christian antiquity. Many works of this discription had remained unnoticed in the libraries, and scarcely one of those already known had received an adequate degree of attention. Finally, from all the manuscripts written before about the year 1000, and still extant, including those which do not relate to the Bible, I wished to produce a work, from which it might be better understood than has heretofore been possible, how the ancient manuscripts of different dates and centuries were written, and from which, likewise, one might learn, what very few of scholars even understand, why this manuscript must have been written in the fourth century, that in the fifth, and a third in the eighth, even when containing no notation of the year.

The reader has thus, in a general way, been put in possession of the points aimed at in the researches to which my travels were devoted. It is not impossible they may at first appear too abstruse, but it will be found that taking their rise in an erudite background, they emerge into the realm of practical life. The two chief purposes of these labors, the illustration of the history through which the sacred text has passed, and the restoration of the true and genuine text of the Apostles, on which our faith, our Christianity so much depends, is it possible that these can be matters of indifference to any reader? Has not all Christendom an interest in them? That such is the fact, my own personal experience has proved in the extraordinary sympathy which has been accorded me, in the various countries of the Christian world.

But one aim, standing in close connection with the studies to which I have referred, and indeed presiding over them, has not yet been mentioned. It forms the motive which took me over the Mediterranean, to Africa and Asia. Our European libraries

procured the treasures of which I was in search, for the most part, from the convents of the East, in which, by the hands of industrious monks from the early centuries of the Christian Era, the sacred writings as well as others had been transcribed, and had been collected from all quarters. Might there not now lie in the nooks of these convents, Greek, Coptic, Syrian, Armenian, one or another of these manuscripts, concealed? Would not every leaf of parchment, which might be found existing in them, and bringing testimony from the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, be a little treasure—an appreciable enrichment of Christian science?

Such were the questions which I proposed to myself, and for this reason, from the close of the year 1842, I turned my eyes wistfully toward the Orient. At that time I had finished a work which obtained a most marked recognition throughout Europe. A Prussian Theological Faculty bestowed upon the author, then twenty-seven years of age, an honorary Doctorate of Theology, anticipating another from Switzerland, the purpose to bestow which had been communicated to me. Beyond the limits of Germany, three governments conferred the dignity of their orders; several others honored the author with large golden medals, in recognition of scientific service, and one, that of Holland, at the instance of her learned theologians, caused a medal to be struck especially for this service. The reader will doubtless be curious to know what this service was.

There was in Paris one of the three most important manuscripts of the Greek New Testament at that time known to exist. Written in the fifth century, and revised, with many additions, in the seventh and ninth, it had been washed off in the twelfth century, in order that upon the parchment, an article at that time scarce and costly, thus purified and newly calendered, the works of an old Church father, of the name of Ephraim, might be transcribed. Traces of the ancient defaced writing were first observed in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth, the Swiss theologian, Wetstein, had made an attempt to read it. But at the close of this century, the Parisian librarian informed the theologian, Griesbach, of Jena, that it was impossible for the eye of a mortal to decipher, with any degree of exactness, a writing which six centuries before had been so thoroughly destroyed. In the year 1834, the French government attempted, by chemical means, to restore the legibility of the

faded letters. But a theologian of Leipsic, who was at that time in Paris, proved so unsuccessful in his attempts to read it, that he publicly declared an edition of the text, even with the means employed by the French Government, in the present condition of the manuscript, to be impracticable. Nevertheless, in the years 1841 and 1842, a success so complete attended my effort to decipher this primitive document, that I was able to discriminate perfectly the different hands which had taken part in the work. This success naturally excited, in the circumstances, general astonishment and recognition.

With this result, and the distinction which grew out of it, my courage rose. I now looked upon it as my duty, by the consecration to it of all my powers, to endeavor to attain an object which, from another point of view, had been regarded as chimerical. Moreover, the government of my little Saxon fatherland did not leave me in embarrassment. King Frederic Augustus II, and his illustrious brother, John, a man highly accomplished in his knowledge of the sacred writings, accorded to the young Saxon their personal favor. In addition, many patrons of science in Frankfort, in Geneva, in Rome, in Breslau, offered noble-hearted aid in the attainment of my object.

But I must carry my readers into no further details touching these travels, although many interesting circumstances in this connection might be mentioned; as, for example, the interest expressed in my undertaking by the Pope, Gregory XVI, in a long audience given me in May, 1843, as well as my intercourse with that distinguished philologist, Cardinal Mezzofante, who even honored me with some verses in Greek. Let us rather pass directly to the journey to the East, undertaken in the year 1844. as already mentioned, it was in April, 1844, that I embarked at Leghorn for Egypt. My hope touching the discovery of precious remains of manuscripts, especially of Biblical manuscripts of high Christian antiquity, was even in this journey, beyond expectation, realized. The pearl among them was found at Sinai. In May, 1844, at the convent of St. Catherine, at the foot of Sinai, as I was exploring the library, a huge, wide basket was observed standing in the middle of it, containing a quantity of ancient parchments. The librarian, an intelligent man, informed me that two basketsful of similar remains had been committed to the flames. How great was my astonishment at finding in this

third filling of the fateful basket a considerable number of the leaves of a Greek Bible of the Old Testament, which instantly made upon me the impression of being one of the most ancient which I had ever seen! I had the great satisfaction of securing, without any considerable cost or trouble, about one-third part, in all forty-three leaves; notwithstanding the entire contents of the basket had come so near taking a departure for the fire. I did not, however, succeed in securing the remaining leaves. To the perfect unconsciousness touching my aim, I had neglected to oppose the reticence necessary for its attainment. Transcribing an entire page from the text of Isaiah and Jeremiah, I earnestly recommended the most careful preservation of all the remainder, and of every thing similar which might be discovered.

On my return to Saxony, there was no want of scholars who seemed to comprehend how great a prize I had brought with me. The place in which it had been found, however, I held as a secret, regarding the purposed discovery of the remaining portions as rendering this a duty. My entire rich collection of manuscripts from the East I made over to the Saxon Government, in order to cover the expenditures of necessary future travel. This, however, had been preceded by the statement that, from motives of gratitude, I regarded the government as joint owner with myself. Whilst about fifty manuscripts, some of them very rare and important, retained my own name when they were deposited in the library of the University of Leipsic, I named the Sinaitic Fragments after King Frederic Augustus, and having caused a lithographic impression to be made with the utmost exactness of every letter and mark, I published it in a handsome edition, at Leipsic, in 1846.

In the midst of the labors at home, which stood connected with my foreign researches, I did not permit the distant treasure to escape from my thoughts. Through an influential friend, whom I had secured at the court of the Viceroy of Egypt, I prosecuted the effort to obtain it. He wrote me, however, as the result of the effort, that the monks of the convent, since my departure, had become well aware that they possessed a treasure, and that no sum could tempt them to alienate it.

Then, at length, I resolved upon a new journey to the East, with a view of transcribing the convent manuscript, an original so important for the sacred text. In January of the year 1853,

I left Leipsic, and embarked at Trieste for Egypt. In February I found myself, for the second time, in the convent at Sinai. In this second Oriental journey I was, if possible, still more fortunate than in the first, in the discovery of valuable Scriptural documents; but of that treasure of the year 1844 I obtained no intelligence, nor could I fall upon any trace of it. Yes, a single trace certainly; for in another manuscript I found a little fragment containing eleven short lines on each side, from the book of Genesis. It furnished apparent proof that the manuscript had originally contained the entire Old Testament, but that it must long since have perished.

After my return home, I commenced the publication of a new collection of Christian documents of the highest antiquity, and in the first volume, issued in 1854, I directed attention to the page of the manuscript left behind at Sinai, which I had transcribed in 1844, without, however, even now indicating the place in which it was discovered. I gave public notice, however, that I must claim for myself the honor of the discovery, as touching the remaining fragments of that ancient Scriptural document, from whatever quarter they might at a later day make their appearance. This was occasioned by the conjecture that, through some one of the learned travelers who had visited Sinai after myself, they had found their way to Europe.

I had now to proceed to the preparation of the rich stores in my possession. To a second journey to Paris, undertaken as early as 1849, I now added new travels through Germany, Switzerland, and England, and I was also obliged to devote several years of most diligent labor to a seventh edition of my Greek New Testament, which had in the mean time become necessary. Nevertheless, I felt a constant heart-pressure toward new Oriental researches. On various accounts, but especially because I knew that the name of the Czar of Russia was held in the highest esteem in the Oriental convents, I presented myself, in the autumn of 1856, to the Imperial Russian Government, with the plan of an extensive Oriental journey of research. Objections were not wanting in St. Petersburg to a foreign Protestant scholar who desired to be intrusted with a mission to the East, from an emperor of the Greek orthodox faith. But the good cause prevailed. The sympathy which my proposal secured, even in the Imperial household, exerted a decisive influence upon

the Czar. In September, 1858, my proposal was accepted, and the funds which I had solicited were placed at my disposal. Three months later, after three years of labor, I had happily finished the seventh edition of my New Testament, and in the beginning of January, 1859, I departed for the third time to the East.

Just before this, an incident occurred which afforded me special satisfaction. An English scholar, with whom I was on friendly terms, had been sent by the English Government to the East, for the like purpose of discovering and procuring ancient Greek manuscripts. Notwithstanding all the gold at his disposal, he had been able to obtain almost nothing, as he represented in his report to the royal government of Great Britain. In this report, however, it is remarked that he did not go to Sinai; "for," to quote literally his words, "after the visit of so eminent a paleographer and critic as Dr. Tischendorf," no success was to be hoped for. It was clear from this, that I had done well in keeping my own counsel touching the secret of 1844.

In the last days of January, for the third time in the course of fifteen years, I greeted the convent of St. Catherine. In honor of the mission with which I was intrusted, I was received with marks of special consideration. The prior greeted me with the wish that I might succeed in discovering new supports for the Divine truth. In this he uttered more than he himself was probably aware of.

Having spent several days among the manuscripts of the convent, and having been fortunate enough to discover considerable valuable matter, on the 4th of February I ordered the camels to be in readiness for my departure to Cairo on the 7th. At noon of the above-named day, I made an excursion, in company with the steward of the convent, to the neighboring mountain, and, as we were returning to the convent at nightfall, he invited me to take some refreshment in his cell. We had hardly entered, when, alluding to our previous conversation, he said: "I also have here a Septuagint," (*i. e.*, a copy of the Greek Old Testament translated by the Seventy.) He went to a corner of the room and brought a parcel wrapped in a red cloth, and laid it before me on the table. I opened the cloth, and to my extreme astonishment beheld before me the Sinai Bible. It consisted not merely of the fragments of the Old Testament which I had taken

from the basket fifteen years before, but also of other Old Testament fragments, and especially the entire New Testament, as well as the complete Epistle of Barnabas, and a portion of the Shepherd of Hermas. (These additional constituents of the parcel had been discovered soon after my departure in 1844. Their connection with the fragments which I had so urgently commended to notice had been recognized, and all had been placed together.) In the most joyful excitement, which, of course, neither the steward nor any of the brethren present comprehended, I begged permission to take the cloth with its entire contents to my room. There first I gave myself up to the impression produced by the event. I knew that I held in my hand the most precious jewel which, for the investigation of the Bible, could be found; a manuscript which exceeded all others in the world, with which I had busied myself for twenty years, in antiquity and value. To the emotions of such an hour no description can do justice. The night was cold, yet I sat down immediately to the work of transcribing the Epistle of Barnabas. Of this document, which ascends so nearly to the origin of the Christian Church, the first part, in the Greek text of the original, had been sought in vain since the second century. And the Epistle of Barnabas, as well as the Shepherd of Hermas, from the end of the second to the beginning of the fourth century, had been regarded by many as a component part of the New Testament. For this reason both were included in the Sinai Bible, which had been written in the first half of the fourth century, or about the time of the first Christian emperor.

Very early on the 5th of February, I summoned the steward, and asked permission to take the manuscripts with me to Cairo, for the purpose of a full transcription. As, however, the prior had departed for Cairo two days before, in order to accompany the authorities of the mother convent in that city to Constantinople, for the choice of a new archbishop, and, as one of the brethren raised objections to my request, I departed hastily on the morning of the 7th, desiring, if possible, to meet the authorities there, and to come to an understanding with them. My third departure from the convent was honored by a formal and stately adieu. The Russian flag waved from the walls, and a discharge of firearms awakened the echoes of the mountain. The

most prominent among the brotherhood escorted me to the borders of the neighboring plain.

The same sympathy which had so highly favored me among the Sinaitic brotherhood was repeated in Cairo. The priors, who fortunately had been detained there, after a short deliberation, granted my request, and sent an express messenger by dromedary, to bring it from Sinai. As early as the 24th of February that invaluable prize was placed in my hands for transcription.

The labor was prodigious; for it contained more than one hundred and ten thousand lines, with countless passages obscured by later corrections, and many also faded, which had to be transcribed under a most painful scrutiny. Moreover, the temperature at Cairo, in the months of March, April, and May, never fell below some twenty degrees, Reaumer, in the shade.

A continued intercourse with the convent gave me opportunity to suggest to the brethren the idea of presenting the original Scripture manuscript to the Czar of Russia, as the shield and protector of the Greek orthodox faith. The thought met with favor; yet the actual realization of it found an unexpected obstacle. The new archbishop, who had been unanimously chosen on Easter-week, and with whom rested the final decision touching this presentation, still lacked consecration by an ecclesiastical superior, and a recognition by the Sublime Porte. At this point, the Patriarch of Jerusalem interposed a protest against his person. However, the hope was entertained that his official installment would be reached in the course of three months. In this state of affairs, I departed for Jerusalem in the beginning of May.

In Jaffa, I fell in with the Grand Duke Constantine, of Russia, who, from the outset, had manifested the liveliest interest in my mission, and accompanied him to Jerusalem. After having here consulted, in furtherance of my object, the old libraries of Jerusalem and of the convent of St. Saba, on the Dead Sea, I proceeded to Beirut and Ladakia, and thence to Smyrna and the Isle of Patmos. In these travels, also, my researches had met with excellent success; but at the appointed time, at the end of July, I hastened back to Cairo. There a most unexpected disappointment awaited me. The Sinaitic brotherhood were far from having obtained their wish. The Patriarch of Jerusalem had reaffirmed his protest in the most peremptory manner. The five

deputies of the convent had been sitting for months, helpless, at Constantinople, their well-established rights finding no audience at the Porte, whilst thus opposed by the authority of the hostile patriarch.

The archbishop and his friends now solicited my interposition in behalf of their imperiled privileges. Without hesitation, I decided to proceed, in the character of an advocate to Constantinople in support of their deputies. Received most courteously by Prince Lobanow, the Russian Embassador at the Sublime Porte, and lodged in his own country-seat on the shores of the Bosphorus, it was in my power to be serviceable to the cause intrusted to me. Still the implacable and powerful opponent maintained his ascendency. At last, it appeared that the object was to be accomplished only by the personal appearance of the archbishop, and by an appeal on his part to an assembly of the patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops; and, in fact, before the expiration of the year, in consequence of this counsel, the just cause of the convent prevailed. Bearing this counsel to Cairo, I connected with it a proposition, supported by Prince Lobanow, looking to the attainment of my own object.

On the 27th of September, I arrived again in Cairo. From the assembled brotherhood and their archbishop, I received an expression of most hearty thanks for the zeal with which I had prosecuted their cause at Constantinople; and on the 28th of September, with demonstrations of the highest respect and confidence, they placed in my hands the Sinai Bible for transmission to Petersburg. In the present condition of the convent, this could be only a provisional and not a definitive conveyance. The possession of the manuscript was primarily accorded to myself, but only for the object, by a constant inspection of the original, to prepare an exact edition of it for publication.

In the early days of October, whilst yet the palm-groves were basking in the glowing heat of the South, I left the land of the Nile, and on the 19th of November, when the northern winter was already settling upon St. Petersburg, I presented my rich collection of ancient manuscripts, in the Greek, Syriac, Coptic, Arabic, and other languages, to the Imperial Majesty of Russia, at Zarsko Selo. The cynosure and crown of the collection was the Sinai Bible.

Tempting invitations to settle in St. Petersburg permanently,

or at least for a number of years, I deemed it my duty to decline. On the contrary, it was at Leipsic, that in the course of three years, making in the mean time a triple journey to St. Petersburg, I finished this difficult undertaking by the publication of the work in four volumes, folio.

In October, 1862, I went to St. Petersburg, in order to make presentation of it. The gracious Emperor, who had liberally borne the expense, and also granted my request, that a work so important for Christendom might make its appearance in connection with the millenary festival of the Russian monarchy, distributed the major part of the copies to the Christian Church at large. The deepest gratitude for this act has manifested itself in the collective Christian Church, without distinction of creed. The Pope himself, in an autograph letter, expressed to the editor his kind wishes and his admiration. It is only a few months since that the two principal univerities of old England, Cambridge and Oxford, honored the discoverer and editor of the Sinai Bible with the most hearty recognition of his services, bestowing upon him their highest academic dignity.

A venerable man of letters availed himself of this opportunity to remark, that he would rather be the discoverer of the Sinai Bible, than the finder of the Kohinoor of the Queen of England, (the so-called "mountain of light," the great diamond, valued at millions of money.)

But what is far dearer to me than all these flattering tokens of recognition and gratitude, and the pleasure derived from which can not be diminished by the assaults of envy, is the conviction that the Sinai Bible is a gift of Providence, bestowed upon us in this period, so fruitful in the products of an anti-Christian activity, as a clear light in the exploration of the Sacred Scriptures, both to establish their truth and to demonstrate their uncorrupted form.

One of the most important tasks, therefore, now devolving upon me, is the careful translation of the New Testament from the Sinai original into German. This translation will be accompanied with an extended preface, in which I shall endeavor to answer all the questions which the inquisitive reader, with the Bible of Luther in his hands, would be likely to propound as touching the Sacred Text.

WHEN WERE OUR GOSPELS COMPOSED?*

BY DR. CONSTANTIN TISCHENDORF, PROFESSOR IN LEIPSIC.

THE question is often asked, how does the case really now stand in regard to the Life of Jesus? No one is ignorant of the fact, that works have recently been composed by men of letters, for the purpose of proving that He whom Christendom calls its Lord did not in fact live such a life as the Scriptures describe. These works have been distributed with the greatest zeal, and have been read by multitudes. Much which they contain may not be understood; but one thing is clear to all, that their purpose is to rob the person of the Savior of his divine character.

Now, is this divine character of the person of Jesus an essential element of Christianity? May we not find the glorious ethical system of Christianity still remaining, even if Christ himself is not the Son of God? He who can believe that, has either no idea at all, or an entirely false idea of Christianity. Christianity does not depend upon the moral system of Jesus, however glorious it may be found to be, but upon his person. The Church is founded upon the person of Christ. That person is its corner-stone. To it the doctrines of Jesus and of his Apostles, in the most explicit terms, bring us directly back. If we are in error in believing in the person, in the sense of the teachings of the Evangelists, then the Church is deceiving itself. It is time to give up the Church.

The connection between the Church and the person of Jesus is so intimate, that the discussion concerning the person of Jesus touches the existence or non-existence of the Church itself. That this is the fact, is deeply felt by the Christian community. The existence of this conviction is attested by the earnestness with which light is sought in regard to the life of Jesus, through which the truth in regard to his person may be reached.

Every reader knows that our Gospels are made up of descriptions of the life of Jesus; indeed, upon these Gospels the life of

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Jesus directly depends; for as to our other knowledge of him, derived from a high Christian antiquity, it in part depends upon the Gospels themselves, in part it is limited to trifling supplements, and in part it proceeds from a hostile opposition to him. Hence, it has come to pass, that those who have assailed the life of Jesus, his miraculous works, and the divine character of his person, have directed their attacks against the truth and credibility of the Gospels.

But how was it possible to assail the truth and credibility of the Gospels—those books which were written by Matthew and John, two immediate disciples of the Lord; by Mark and Luke, two trusted assistants and companions of the Apostles?

The answer is, it became possible, by denying that our Gospels were composed by the men whose names they bear on their face. Does any one ask, why so great importance attaches to this circumstance? Because the declarations of immediate eye-witnesses, as Matthew and John, and of men who stood in a most intimate relation to eye-witnesses, as Mark and Luke, put forth an extraordinary claim to credibility and trustworthiness. This claim is narrowed down and frittered away in proportion to the lateness of time after the events in which the writings were composed; in proportion to the distance of the narrators from the facts narrated, so that they could have related only what they had heard or read from other reporters, who themselves, perhaps, were not trustworthy. To such authors, men who were in no position to give proper testimony, who composed their reports long after the time of Jesus, from existing traditions and rumors, the attempt is made to ascribe our Gospels, by severing them from the Evangelists whose names they bear.

Manifestly, this is a sure way to annihilate the high value and authority of the Gospels. It is true, indeed, that there exists another still more convenient way, and this method also has been adopted. Some very wise heads, namely, long ago entertained the idea that the sound human understanding is superior to what is called divine revelation. What is said in these writings about miracles must be derived from the imperfect ideas of that period, from a prejudiced apprehension of the meaning of the Old Testament, in a word, from the accommodation, so-called, through which Jesus adapted his discourses and actions to the Jewish ex-

pectation, in his period, and by which he gave himself out to be more than he really was.

This glorification of the sound human understanding, which, we may easily see, presents a very attractive aspect to the world, has by little and little grown up into modern infidelity. Modern infidelity consists in severing the human spirit from God and Christianity, and in it, hollow phrases about freedom, and the dignity of man, have rendered a capital service. According to it, man was not born in sin, and standing in need of a redemption, but as a free being, who is to be eductated for every thing good and beautiful, and who is thus to enjoy a dignified life. That it makes quick work with the Gospels, and with the entire Scriptures; that it despises them as the product of an antiquated point of view which humanity has left behind; that without more ado it strips them off as uncomfortable fetters imposed by a sensuous age, all this will be readily understood.

One of the issues of this modern infidelity is that Parisian abortion of the year 1863, which has made so much noise in the world, the Life of Jesus by Renan. This work has absolutely nothing in common with an honorable investigation. With a perfectly arbitrary caprice, having no foundation whatever, it converts history into conjecture. What sort of historical investigation do my readers imagine it to be, when Renan, for example, represents John as having written his Gospel from motives of wounded self-love, full of envy in respect to Peter, full of hatred against Judas? What sort of historical investigation is it, which represents that the sympathy of the wife of Pilate with Jesus may have arisen from having noticed from a window in the palace, which looked upon the court of the temple, the "gentle Galilean," the "beautiful young man," and that now, under the thought that his blood is about to be shed, she was oppressed with a nocturnal night-mare?—when he ascribes the resurrection of Lazarus to a deception, which escaped the notice of Jesus himself, practiced by Lazarus and his sisters rendered irresponsible by fanaticism; the sick man, namely, permitting himself in grave clothes to be conveyed to the family sepulcher, and coming forth from the vault during the almost epileptic excitement of Jesus, who believed in the reality of the death?—when he throws light upon the conflict in Gethsemane by language like this; that his thoughts,

perchance, were reverting to the clear fountains of Galilee, where he might have refreshed himself; to the vine and fig-tree, in whose shadow he might have rested; to the young maidens, who might have reciprocated his love?

These few specimens will satisfy the reader. He will be able from them to make up a judgment upon Renan's book. That, in spite of its utter untenableness, its reckless disfiguration of the facts of history, it should have found an extraordinary circulation in Germany itself, proves only to what a lamentable extent, in the lack of an intelligent understanding of Biblical history, the taste of an age, fallen into unbelief, prevails even among us.

But in the case of this book, a special reproach falls upon German science itself. As the view of the Bible already spoken of, the view, namely, which erects the unassisted reason above revelation, and which is the growth of German soil, is the starting-point of the whole book, so German men of letters are to supply, it seems, the scientific basis which it lacks.

This brings us back to the attacks upon the genuineness—the apostolic origin—of the Gospels. In this relation the shallowness of the French work is obvious. The thinking, reasoning German demands, if he is to surrender the Divine authority of the Gospels, that it shall be demonstrated to him, that they were not in fact composed by the men to whom the Church ascribes them.

In order to understand the merits of the question, the line of proof of which the opponents of the Gospels avail themselves must be closely scrutinized. In this process of proof, greater stress is laid upon no point than upon this: that from the history of the second century, it is apparent that the Gospels did not make their appearance until after the expiration of the apostolic period. In support of this position, an appeal is made to the earliest literature of the Church. It is affirmed that in the Christian writings, which were composed immediately after the apostolic age, the traces of a knowledge of our Gospels, and of a reference to them, are wanting, particularly in the case of the Gospel of John; and the conclusion is hence drawn, that they were not at that time in existence.

If this can be established; if there exists in the Church such a literature, that is, a series of works, which were composed from about the end of the first century to the year fifty of the second century, and we look into them in vain for traces of the existence

of our Gospels, the case indeed becomes a critical one for the affirmation and belief of the Church, that these same Gospels were composed as early as the second half of the first century by the holy men whose names they bear. Before examining the fact, there is but one objection which we could raise against such a process of proof. We could simply raise the question, whether the literature referred to is of such a character, or of such an extent, as to justify us in deriving so important an inference, from its silence touching the Gospels, its failure in making citations from them. One might write very much that is excellent, without being obliged on that account expressly to recognize our Gospels, and to make citations from them. But the case certainly would have a far higher significance, if the very opposite should be made to appear; if, namely, our Gospels should be forced to be recognized in works written soon after the apostolic age; if, perchance, they should be found to have been treated with great respect, and even thus early distinguished as canonical sacred writings. In this case, clearly, we should regard it as a point made out, that our Gospels were actually written in the apostolic age itself, however strenuously their opponents might assail or deny it.

The author of this article, in common with many candid scholars, entertains the conviction, that a conscientious investigation of the subject proves a position directly opposite to that which the opposers of the Gospels, particularly of the Gospel of John, the most important and decisive of the whole four, believe themselves able to establish.

It will serve to throw a welcome light upon this deeply interesting problem, if we attempt to present the proof itself; if, with our best powers, we investigate the question, whether the earliest Christian literature renders its verdict *for* or *against* our Gospels.

Let us begin, then, by transporting ourselves, in imagination, to the latter part of the second century, and let us look around to note appearances in Christendom, as touching our Gospels. We observe, then, that at this period, in all parts of the Church, our Gospels were regarded as Holy Scripture. At that time there were writings which had been composed in different countries, and by the most distinguished teachers in the Church, in manifold passages of which our Gospels are referred to, and

treated as apostolic sacred books. In *Lyons*, where the first Christian Church of Gaul was established, the bishop, *Irenæus*, at this period composed a great work upon the earliest, to-wit, the Gnostic, heresies; that is, philosophical systems arbitrarily changing the doctrines of the Church. In this work he availed himself throughout of our Gospels, in his contest against these philosophical errors. The number of passages in which this is done amounts to about four hundred. The passages with citations from John alone amount to more than eighty.

The career of the ardent and learned *Tertullian*, in the last ten years of the second century and onward, at *Carthage*, in proconsular Africa, exhibits a similar state of facts. In his numerous works, we find many hundred passages of our Gospels cited as decisive proof-texts; from the Gospel of John alone, over two hundred. The same holds true in a still higher degree of *Clement*, the famous teacher of the Catechumen school of *Alexandria*, in Egypt, about the end of the second century. Here, too, we may place a document, commonly called by the name of its discoverer, *Muratori*, a catalogue, namely, of the books of the New Testament, which in the earliest time were regarded as canonical and sacred. This catalogue was written soon after the time of the Roman bishop Pius, (A. D. 142–157), consequently, about A. D. 170, and in all probability at *Rome*.* In this catalogue, at the head of the books of the New Testament, which at that time were regarded in the Church as canonical, stand our four Gospels. It is true, indeed, that the first lines of this manuscript, which relate to Matthew and Mark, have perished; but in the still existing conclusion upon Mark, the Gospel of Luke is designated as the third, and that of John as the fourth, so that, even at this early period, the order of arrangement of the several Gospels is proved to have become universally customary.

In this connection we will produce two other witnesses, although one of them reaches back to a still higher antiquity; we mean the two oldest translations of the Greek text of the New Testament, which originated with the Apostles. The one is the *Syriac*, and bears the name of the *Peshito;* the other is the *Latin version*,

* This designation of the time is determined by the fact that the author of the catalogue thus writes: "The Shepherd" was written *very lately, in our time*, by Hermas, in the city of Rome, whilst Pius, his brother, occupied the Episcopal Chair.

known by the name of the *Itala*, both of which give to our four Gospels the first place. The canonical authority of these four Gospels must have been fully established in the mother Church, when they were thus translated into the vernacular languages of the newly converted communities of the Latin and Syrian Christians. Now, at what time did this take place? The Syriac translation, which carries us to Asia, to the vicinity of the Euphrates, is almost universally referred to the end of the second century; and good reasons may be assigned for this judgment, even though a demonstrative proof is wanting. The Latin version, on the other hand, before the end of the second century, had already acquired a degree of public authority; for the Latin translator of the great Greek work of Irenæus "against the heretics," who is to be placed at about the close of the second century (and this translator is followed by Tertullian in his citations from Irenæus), as well as Tertullian himself, at the close of the same century, follow the text of the Itala. This authority of the Latin translation of the Gospels, at the end of the second century, necessarily presupposes that at that time it had an age of several decades of years. How important a fact in determining the antiquity of our Gospels this is; that already in the second half of the second century, and that, too, in their determinate number of four, they had received a common translation into Latin, as well as into Syriac, will appear more clearly in the sequel.

For the present, we will linger a little with the two first of the great Church teachers above named, Irenæus and Tertullian. Their testimony touching our four Gospels is absolute, and has been drawn into doubt by no one, not even by the opposers of the Gospel of John. But there remains the question whether this testimony can be limited to their own time; that is, whether it proves nothing more than that the Gospels were current at their period. Not only does *Irenæus* employ the Gospels with all confidence and emphasis against the heretics, he gives utterance to the sentiment that there exist, of necessity, *four* Gospels, precisely four, neither more nor less. He compares this case with the four quarters of the globe, the four principal winds, the four faces of the cherubim. He says the four Gospels are the four pillars of the Church spread over the earth's surface, and he recognizes in their quadruplicity a special decree of the Creator. Is a view like this reconcilable with the idea, that the four Gos-

pels began to acquire their authority in the time of Irenæus himself?—that to the three elder, a later fourth was at that time striving to attach itself? Are we not rather compelled to suppose that even at that time their authority was an authority derived from antiquity, that it was perfectly established, and that even their quadruplicity presented itself as a thing long since and firmly settled, so that it occurred to the bishop of Lyons to speak of and illustrate the four-fold number of the Gospels in the ingenious manner referred to above? Irenæus died in the second year after the expiration of the second century, but in his youth he had sat at the feet of the aged and highly-venerated Polycarp, who in his time had been a disciple of the evangelist John; and he had, moreover, been acquainted with other eye-witnesses of the Gospel history. In relating this fact, Irenæus, with deep emotion, at the same time mentions Polycarp's communications to him of what he had heard from the mouth of John and the other disciples of Jesus, adding expressly, that the whole agreed with the Scripture. But let us hear him for ourselves. In his letter to Florinus,* he thus writes: "I saw thee when I was yet young, with Polycarp, in Asia Minor; when thou wast living in the splendor of the Imperial Court, and wast at pains to secure his approbation. For what happened at that period I remember better than what has recently occurred. That which we receive in youth grows with ourselves, and clings to us firmly. And so I am able now to tell where the blessed Polycarp sat in his addresses, how he came in and went out, how he lived and how he looked; what discourses he held to the people; how he spoke of his intimate intercourse with John and with others who had seen the Lord, and quoted their own discourses; how he rehearsed what he had heard from those, who with their own eyes had seen the Light of the World, in full agreement with the Scripture."

Such, then, is the language of Irenæus himself touching his intercourse with Polycarp, and the communications of Polycarp. Who can, who dares nevertheless suspect that Irenæus heard no word from Polycarp in regard to the Gospel of John? The time of the intercourse of the young Irenæus with the aged Polycarp,

* See Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V, 20. (Iren. opp. ed. Stieren, I, 822. Also, Iren. adv. Haeres. III, 3, 4.

who suffered martyrdom at Smyrna about the year 165, can certainly not be put later than about the year 150.

At this time, then, are we to believe that Irenæus heard from his teacher, in whose communications concerning John he expressly glories, nothing in regard to the Gospel of John? It must be granted that a testimony for the Gospel of John, on the part of Polycarp, carries us directly back to John himself. For if Polycarp did speak to Irenæus of the Gospel of John, as a work of his teacher, he must have learned from John's own mouth that he was the author of that Gospel. No more stunning blow, therefore, can fall upon the head of the opposers of the genuineness of the Gospel of John, than the testimony of Polycarp in its favor. But this blow is inevitable, for to dispute this testimony is possible only to an absurd skepticism. The case becomes the more decisive, the more carefully we examine the contradictory proposition. For the opponents of the Gospel of John maintained that it made its first appearance about the year 150, and that Polycarp never spoke of it to Irenæus. But now, in this case, is it conceivable that Irenæus should have believed the work to be genuine, a work which appeared as the most sublime legacy of John to the Christian world, as the report of an intimate eye-witness of the life of the Redeemer, as a Gospel which, with an air of independence, took its position over against the three other Gospels, and put their authority in peril? Would it not have been convicted, in the eyes of Irenæus, of the grossest deception by the single circumstance that Polycarp had never mentioned it? And yet are we to believe that Irenæus employs this work as a sacred and safe weapon in his conflict with heretics, with men who dealt in corrupt Scriptures and apocryphal writings? Are we, moreover, to believe that, without any ado, he bound it up in that close, indissoluble bond with the other three Gospels?

What we here employ as an argument is nothing new; it stands, at any rate, in the writings of Irenæus, and has often been read in them; read, however, it must be admitted, without sufficient consideration, or it could not have been so lightly esteemed. We, on our part, can find only its proper force given to the argument, when sober-minded men—men who give the highest weight to historical authority—prefer to regard the testimony of Irenæus, propped by Polycarp, in behalf of the Gospel of John,

as outweighing all the scruples and counter-proofs of skeptical men of letters.

The case is similar with *Tertullian* and his testimony in behalf of our Gospels. This man, who, from a heathen, worldly advocate, became a powerful defender of Christian truth, is so exact in investigating the origin and relative value of the four Gospels that he ascribes only a subordinate rank to Mark and Luke as apostolic men: that is, as companions and assistants of the apostles, in comparison with John and Matthew, to whom, as real apostles—as men who were personally chosen by the Lord—the full apostolic authority is attributed. (See adv. Marcion, iv, 2.) Moreover he presents an irrefragable principle by which the truth of the several parts of the Christian canon and (a point on which he insists most earnestly) the genuineness of the apostolic writings are to be tested. He shows and demands that a testimony which now passes for truth should bear this test; that it was regarded as truth in former days; that from this previous authority we are to ascend to the Apostles themselves; but that apostolic genuineness is to be measured by the testimony of the Apostolic Churches, the Churches which were founded by the Apostles in person. (See adv. Marcion, iv, 5.) Is it at all credible that this acute man should have fallen into an uncritical carelessness just at this point; his reception, namely, and defense of the genuineness of the four Gospels? The passages just referred to are in his famous work against Marcion, who, following the bent of his heretical humor, had arbitrarily tampered with the Evangelical text. Of the four Gospels he had entirely suppressed three, and in the fourth, Luke, he had made such changes as suited him. Now Tertullian, in his work against him, appeals expressly to the testimony of the Apostolic Churches for the four collective Gospels. Is this assurance in the mouth of a man like Tertullian to pass for nothing? At the time when he wrote it, scarcely more than an hundred years had yet passed since the death of John. At that time the testimony of the Apostolic Church of Ephesus, to which he appeals—a Church in which John had long labored, and in whose bosom he died—was, in fact, perfectly decisive, as touching the genuineness or the spuriousness of the Gospel of John: and the task of ascertaining the judgment and testimony of this Church was perfectly easy. In this connection, it is a point not to be overlooked that

we have not here to do with a mere man of letters, dealing in learned observations, but with a man with whom this was a question of deep and holy solemnity touching his faith; yea, touching the salvation of his soul. The foundation scriptures of Christianity, claiming for themselves an apostolic origin, books which even at that time awoke the universal opposition of that worldly wisdom, from whose school Tertullian himself had proceeded, is it possible to believe that he would have accepted these books with an unscrupulous credulity? But now, since he, in addition, expressly assures us that in his decisive defense of the apostolic origin of all four of the Gospels, he goes back to the warrant of the Apostolic Churches, it would plainly fall into the category of contemptible quibbling, to pretend to cherish doubts touching his conscientious investigation of the apostolic origin of the Gospels.

We affirm, then, that the authentication of the four Gospels by Irenæus and Tertullian can not be confined to their own times, but their testimony must be regarded as representing the very earliest testimonies which were placed within their reach. And that we are entirely justified in this is demonstrated not only by the still older co-witness already cited, the author, namely, of the catalogue of the New Testament books, discovered by Muratori, and the African Latin translator of the Gospels, the author of the so-called Itala, but also by all the considerations and testimonies derived from periods ante-dating Irenæus and Tertullian.

The reader has doubtless heard of books in which a single whole has been formed out of the four Gospels; they are called Harmonies. In this way an attempt has been made to give a more distinct picture of the life of our Lord. The fuller statement of one Evangelist is employed to supplement another; and particularly by interspacing the narrative of John in the narratives of the three other Gospels, step after step is traced in the facts of the three last years of our Lord's life. Works of this character were undertaken as early as about the year 170, by two men of learning. The name of the one was *Theophilus*, who was bishop of Antioch in Syria; the name of the other, *Tatian*, a pupil of the great theologian and martyr, Justin. It is true, both these works are lost; but of the first, that of Theophilus, Jerome, in the fourth century, has preserved notices, and calls it a compilation of the four Gospels into one whole; and

of the second, in like manner, Eusebius and Theodoret, in the fourth and fifth centuries, have preserved notices. Tatian himself called it, "the Gospel formed from four," (Diatessaron).—Now these two men composed other works which are still extant. In these works are found undoubted citations, not to speak of the others, from the Gospel of John. Their harmonies, however, which have not come down to our time, far surpass the significance of single citations, for the attempt made in them carries us necessarily to a time when the Gospels presented an absolute whole; a time in which their multifarious narratives, which, in many particulars, bore in themselves the appearance of a real diversity, excited the desire and felt necessity of producing from them a higher unity—a harmonious whole. If these two attempts were made soon after the middle of the second century, it must of necessity be presupposed that the use and recognition of all the four Gospels are facts which existed at a far earlier period.

Passing by other testimonies belonging to this period, we have now to mention the letters of *Ignatius* and *Polycarp*, two disciples of the Apostles, which conduct us to a very early point of time, to the beginning of the second century. When the devout servant of God, Ignatius, whom his teacher John had consecrated as bishop of Antioch, after a long and faithful official life, was conveyed to Rome, between the years 107 and 115, to meet a martyr's death, he composed, during the journey, a number of letters, of which a twofold text, a longer and a shorter, have come down to us. For our object, we refer only to the shorter, because this alone is recognized by most scholars as the original. There are to be found in them references to Matthew and to John. Thus, in his letter to the Romans, he writes: "The bread of God will I, the bread of heaven, the bread of life, which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, . . . and the drink of God will I, the blood of the same, which is imperishable love and eternal life." These words exhibit a dependence upon the 6th chapter of John, where we read, "I am the bread which came down from heaven," (verse 41); "I am the bread of life," (verse 48); "And the bread that I will give him is my flesh," (verse 51); "Who so eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life," (verse 54). In the same letter Ignatius writes: "For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul," which may be found literally in Matthew xvi, 26. In like

manner, the passage in his letter to the Church of Smyrna, where it is said of Jesus that he was baptized of John, in order that all righteousness might be fulfilled of him, refers to Matthew iii, 15, ("for thus it becometh us to fulfill all righteousness.") In like manner, the short letter of *Polycarp*, written soon after the death of Ignatius, consequently about 115, refers to passages in Matthew, as, for example, where he writes: "We will implore the All-seeing God that he lead us not into temptation, as the Lord hath said, The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." (Compare Matt. vi, 13, and xxvi, 41.) We do not presume, however, to attribute to these citations a perfectly decisive weight. They do not exclude, especially those compared with John, all doubt that they were borrowed from our written Gospels; the reference, however, must ever remain highly probable, and they afford a support to the supposition that our Gospels were in use as early as the beginning of the second century. But of one circumstance it is our duty to take special notice. We find, namely, in Polycarp's letter, a certain trace of his use of the first epistle of John. Polycarp writes: "For every one that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is Antichrist." In John iv, 3, it stands: "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God, and this is that spirit of Antichrist."

This passage, cited by Polycarp from the epistle of John about the year 115, has especial value for this reason, that this epistle and the Gospel of John, in virtue of their close connection, in contents and expression, must have been the work of one and the same author; the authentication of the epistle, therefore, serves at the same time for that of the Gospel. But a testimony of Polycarp, respecting the writings of John, considering the intimate relation in which he stood to John, as already explained, possesses a value so extraordinary as hardly to admit any further objection against the genuineness of the writings under consideration. For this reason there has been no failure in applying to it that infamous art which would weaken and set aside the fact of the citation. A sharp-sighted man cries out: "There is no need of regarding the words of Polycarp as a quotation from John, for it may have been a sentence which was current in the Church, and which might have been reduced to writing as well

by John as by Polycarp, even if the latter knew nothing of the former.

Even before the author of this conjecture, another person of like proclivities, had fallen upon a different evasion! Why could not the supposition be reversed, making the author of the so-called epistle of John to cite Polycarp? It requires some courage to hurl into the world a senseless whim; yet there are some learned people who are by no means lacking in courage of this character. If, however, as in the present case, it is possible by whims of this description to reach no just conclusions, there is at hand a universal and radical expedient. That expedient has been resorted to here. It is this: Polycarp never wrote the letter. It is true, indeed, that Polycarp's own pupil, Irenæus, believed and affirmed the contrary; but plausible reasons are never wanting for an affirmation like this; and so we may be tossed and jolted even upon the most solid ground. Now who permits the convictions of a thousand years to be shaken by agitations like these? The question is not hard to answer. On this point, the opinion of the reader, I presume, will not be at variance with my own.

We now proceed to one of the most worthy cotemporaries of Polycarp, *Justin Martyr*, who, even before his witness-death at Rome, about A. D. 166, had made him dear to the memory of the Church, had acquired high fame by his writings. Two of these are defenses of Christianity, which he presented to the Roman Emperor, the first in A. D. 138, the second in A. D. 161. It is obviously an important question whether Justin, who composed one of his chief works about A. D. 138, delivers any testimony for the use and authority of our Gospels. As touching the three first Gospels, particularly that of Matthew, in spite of the prevailing skepticism, Justin's employment of them stands firmly and strong. But the denial of the position that he also made use of the Gospel of John, is all the stronger on that account. On our side, however, we must unconditionally maintain this position. The sentence, which is entirely peculiar to John, "And the word was made flesh," reappears unmistakably in several passages in Justin. The answer which, in Justin, the Baptist gives to the interrogating messengers of the Jews, "I am not Christ, but the voice of a preacher," depends absolutely upon John i: 20 and 23. The words of the prophet Zachariah, (xii: 10),

John quotes in a manner nowhere else to be found; since, however, Justin perfectly agrees with him, he must be dependent upon John.

Finally, we find in Justin, in his first work in defense of Christianity, A. D. 138, the following: "Christ has said, Except ye be born again, ye can not enter the kingdom of heaven. But that it is impossible that those who have once been born should enter again into their mother's womb, is clear to every man." On this passage there has been much debate. We ourselves adhere stringently to the view that Justin here refers to John iii: 3, 4, where the declaration of Jesus to Nicodemus thus reads, "Except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God." That this passage of John was floating before the mind of Justin, who often quotes the Old Testament with a certain freedom of expression, is reduced, in my judgment, to a certainty by his own addition to the words of our Lord; for in John, also, the following verse reads, "Nicodemus saith unto him, How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born?" But if we are justified in assuming the use of John by Justin, this single fact proves the position that our Gospel of John first made its appearance about the year 150, and is therefore spurious, to be an idle invention.

In still another way we are able to demonstrate that Justin testifies to the prevailing authority of our Gospels in his time. In this connection we will point only to a single fact. He mentions, namely, in the same work above referred to, of the year 138, that every Sunday in the Christian assemblies, "the memoirs of the Apostles," "called Gospels," were read in connection with the writings of the prophets. Here, at the first glance, we have the Gospels placed on an equal footing with the writings of the prophets. Without any doubt, this converts the Gospels into canonical, sacred books; as the others, according to the regulating custom of the Jewish synagogue, had been from the beginning of the Church. Who in all the world now can suppose that, in Justin's time, other Gospels besides our own, in regard to which we know with absolute certainty, that in a few decades of years after Justin they resounded through the whole Christian world, could have been in the sacred use of the Church? Moreover, it contradicts all that we know of the development of the canon of Scripture, to suppose that at the

beginning, and consequently also in Justin's time, merely Matthew, Mark, and Luke were regarded as Holy Scripture, and that **John was added only at a later day.**

We have thus far been occupied, almost exclusively, with the writings of men, whom the Church, in whose service they had spent their lives, from the second century, honored as venerable pillars of the Faith. At this same period there existed an ample literature, which, like wild sprouts and off-shoots, flourished, side by side, with that of the Church; a literature which erected a proud, foreign wisdom above the simple faith of Christianity—the Heretical literature, or that of the teachers of error. Even from this literature we obtain perfectly satisfactory testimonies to this point, that already about the middle and before the middle of the second century, our Gospels enjoyed the highest authority in the Church. This, on the one hand, is interesting, as making us better acquainted with the character of these earliest heresies, and, on the other, important, as touching the question of the antiquity, and, consequently, the origin of our Gospels. In summoning these teachers of error as witnesses for our Gospels, we have a predecessor no less distinguished than Irenæus, the bishop of Lyons, of whom we have already had occasion often to speak. In Irenæus we find this declaration: "So firmly established, however, are our Gospels, that even the heretics bear witness in their behalf, and that every one of them makes them his point of departure in establishing his own doctrine." (See adv. Hæres. iii, 11, 7.) This, then, is a judgment from the second half of the second century touching the first half. And this first half of the second century is the precise period in which the opposers of the genuineness of our Gospels suppose themselves able to find ground upon which to rest their opposition. Now, let us ask, would not a man like Irenæus, who lived only a few decades of years after the period in question, be likely to have known this better than the professors of the nineteenth century? High as is the respect due to that progress of Science which adorns our century, those men of letters can claim at our hands small respect who employ their knowledge and acuteness in smiting the face of history and of truth. What Irenæus says is capable of being supported, even at this day, by facts, and we shall proceed all the more safely if we accord to him our full confidence. The records of the oldest Church fathers touching the

earliest heretics, (and these records, let it be remarked, we have chiefly to thank for our knowledge of them,) prove most conclusively that they depend upon our Gospels, as upon books held in high and holy estimation in the Church. Irenæus himself is one of the chief authors of these records. To his work must be added one, discovered only about twenty years since, of a pupil of Irenæus, Hippolytus by name, who stood, therefore, near enough to the time in which these heretics flourished, to force a recognition of him, in company with his teacher, as a trustworthy voucher.

One of the most intellectual and bold thinkers among these teachers of error was *Valentin*, who, in the first forty years of the second century, went from Egypt to Rome, and who may have lived twenty years from that time. He undertook to write an entire history of the heavenly emanations, which, in the realm of the divine powers and supernal beings, preceded the mission of the Only-begotten of the Father; as well as to determine more exactly, in connection with these emanations, which his fancy had created, the nature and the operations of the Only-begotten. In this extravagant undertaking, he did not disdain to borrow from the Gospel of John, and to employ for his purpose a multitude of expressions and ideas, as the Word, the Only-begotten, Life, Light, Fullness, Truth, Grace, Redeemer, Comforter. We have here so undeniable a relation between the Gospel of John and the system of Valentin, that only two explanations are possible. Either Valentin used John, or John, Valentin. The latter supposition, after what has thus far been said of the second century, must appear pure nonsense, and a close examination of the subject will confirm this verdict. If, however, a literature hostile to the Church can reconcile itself to it, it condemns itself. But Irenæus declares in plain words that the sect of Valentin availed itself in the fullest manner of the Gospel of John. Very especially does he show, in detail, that it derived one of its chief elements from the first chapter of John. The statement of Irenæus is confirmed and completed by Hippolytus; he cites particular expressions of our Lord, peculiar to John, which Valentin used. The clearest instance of this is John x: 8, for Hippolytus writes: "Because the prophets and the law, according to Valentin's doctrine, were inspired only by a subordinate and foolish spirit, therefore Valentin says, 'Even for this reason

speaks the Redeemer: all who come before me were thieves and robbers.'" (Hippol. in the Philosophumena, vi, 35.) And as the Gospel of John was employed by Valentin, it is susceptible of proof that the same was true of the other Evangelists. According to the statement of Irenæus, he used as a symbolic representative of the above-mentioned subordinate spirit, whom he called the Demiurge, (the architect,) the centurion at Capernaum. (Matt. viii: 9; Luke vii: 8.) In the maiden of twelve years, the daughter of Jairus, who died and was resuscitated, (Luke viii: 41.) he recognized a symbolic representative of his "Inferior Wisdom," (Achamoth,) the mother of Demiurge. In like manner, he saw represented in the woman, who, for twelve years, had suffered from an issue of blood, and was healed by our Lord, (Matt. xix: 20), the sufferings and deliverance of his twelfth primeval spirit, (æon).

Now, what significance has all this for our question? Even at that time, before the middle of the second century, the authority of our Gospels (and John here takes precedence,) was so great, that even so fantastic a philosopher strove to make it appear that these creations of his fancy of heavenly essences and æons were derived from the simple language of the Gospels, and were justified by it.

Of a disciple of Valentin, *Ptolemæus* by name, a learned letter has come down to our day. In this is found, in connection with several citations from Matthew, one also from the first chapter of John, in the words: "That all things are made by the same (the Word,) and without the same, nothing is made, saith the Apostle." Another distinguished follower and contemporary of Valentin, Heracleon by name, wrote an entire commentary, still existing in many fragments, on the Gospel of John, and aimed in this, with a wearisome ingenuity, to ground the doctrines of Valentin upon John. What an authority then must the fourth Gospel have already, about the middle of the second century, possessed, when a distinguished follower of so absurd and fantastic a heresy felt himself compelled to write an entire commentary upon it, and that, too, in the interest of this heresy.

As Valentin and his school, notwithstanding all the anti-Christian willfulness, very earnestly desired to have the authority of the Gospels with, and not against themselves, the same was true at this period, and even earlier, of other kindred sects. We men-

tion two of the eldest, those who, after the serpent-spirit, active at the Fall, were called the *Naasenes* (or Ophites,) and those who, from the heavenly land *beyond* the grave, were called the *Peratics.* Both had citations especially from John in their dogmas, as Hippolytus shows in detail. Already in the time of Hadrian, A. D. 117–138, *Basilides* composed a great work, with explanations of our Gospels, probably in order, in the same artful way with Valentin, to justify from them his fanciful views of Divine things. Still we are able to draw this conclusion only from a small number of extant notices of it. We are more safe, however, in affirming that he also availed himself of the Gospel of John; for Hippolytus expressly informs us how he understood the passages, (John i: 9), "That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world;" and (John ii: 4), "Mine hour is not yet come."

We must refer to still another opposer of the Christian doctrine, in the first half of the second century, because he has often been referred to, to sustain views directly the reverse of our own. We mean that *Marcion*, against whom Tertullian composed the work already mentioned. He was born at Sinope, on the Black Sea, but put forth his peculiar doctrines chiefly in Rome. His special effort was to rupture the connection between Christianity and Judaism. For this reason, he sought to sift from the apostolic writings every thing which seemed to favor Judaism. As now, it has come down to us from antiquity, that Marcion, in the interest of his peculiar views, made a collection of the sacred writings, which falls between the years 140 and 150; that he placed in this collection only the Gospel of Luke, together with ten Pauline Epistles, and that, too, after he had mutilated and deformed the text of all these writings to bring them into harmony with his sentiments, some learned men have imagined that this was the very first collection of the sacred writings of the Church; that his Gospel served as the pattern of that which we call the Gospel of Luke, and not the reverse, but that he knew nothing whatever of John. All three affirmations we hold to be entirely groundless, and as touching the second, this is universally acknowledged. The supposition of Marcion's ignorance of John's Gospel, upon which special stress is laid, is proved to be groundless by the circumstance that Tertullian gives us information of an earlier epistle of Marcion, from which

it appears that at first he had all four Gospels in use, and only at a later day, in the interest of his imaginary improvement of the Church doctrine, limited himself to the mutilated Luke. We have not the smallest right to draw the credibility of this declaration into doubt: the less so, because the entire process of argumentation employed by Tertullian against Marcion rests upon it, as upon an established fact.

Thus, then, the heretics of the ancient Church have rendered us excellent service, as witnesses to the truth in regard to the high antiquity of our Gospels. We must leave them now, to take a step beyond the limits of the Church itself, where we meet the open opposers of Christianity, to whom the entire preaching of the Cross was foolishness and an offense. About the middle of the second century there lived such a man, *Celsus* by name, who left a book full of contempt and scoffing against Christianity. The book itself has long since perished, as it deserved. In spite of all its heat and bitterness, it did no harm at the time to the still youthful and much persecuted Christendom; a fact which the reader will permit to speak comfort to his heart, when he sees or hears the tumult made in our own time by the enemies of Christianity. But, nevertheless, we are compelled to place a high value upon the fact that Origen has preserved for us many extracts from the book of Celsus. From these extracts we learn that Celsus, in his assault upon Christianity, made chief use of our Gospels; as the "writings of the disciples of Jesus," they furnished him with a solid foundation of knowledge, touching what was believed by Christians. Thus he attacks the narrative of the wise men from the East, the flight of the child to Egypt at the bidding of the angel, the appearance of the Dove at the baptism of Jesus, the birth from a virgin, the agony in Gethsemane, the thirst on the cross, and other points. Having taken these and other particulars from the three first Gospels, he assails, also, several things taken from the Gospel of John; for example, that a miracle was demanded of Jesus by the Jews in the temple; that Jesus was characterized as the Word of God; that at the crucifixion blood flowed from his side. From the reports of the resurrection, he mentions that, according to some, two angels came to the grave; according to others, one; in regard to which even Origen observed that the former refers to Luke and John, the latter to Matthew and Mark.

Thus, then, it appears that this heathen opposer of Christianity, in the middle of the second century, entertained no doubt that the four Gospels were to be regarded, as they were looked upon by the Church, as genuine apostolic writings.

The same service as that rendered by this enemy of Christians and by the heretical teachers of the second century is also rendered to us by another literature, closely approximating the latter, which bears the name of the *New Testament Apocrypha*. Some of my readers will ask at once, What is the meaning of this word Apocrypha? Now I am the better able to give information on this point, that, for a long time, I have been every-where searching for these writings, and have been instrumental in bringing many from the dust of the libraries to the knowledge of the world. Moreover, sixteen years ago, I wrote an essay, which secured a prize in Holland, on the origin and value of the Apocryphal Gospels. The New Testament apocryphal books are writings which aimed to secure an adoption into our New Testament, or, at least, to obtain a coördinate place with it, but which were repudiated by the Church. They bear on their face the names of apostles, or of other men highly esteemed in the Church, but falsely. These names were wrongfully employed by unknown writers, in order to obtain currency for their productions. But for what purpose were the apocryphal books composed? In part, to extend, at the discretion of the writer, the truths derived from the Sacred Scripture; in part, arbitrarily to supplement the narratives concerning the Savior, Mary and Joseph, and the Apostles, and, in part, to give authority to heresies by bringing them into coördinate rank with the Scriptures, and into opposition to them. Plainly, these are all base purposes, and the Church was perfectly right in discrediting and rejecting them. Nevertheless they contain much, in a high degree interesting to us, at the present day, in various directions; and in early antiquity, when men did not always know how to distinguish counterfeits and crafty inventions from that which was genuine and true, they were esteemed and used by many persons. For what purpose we ourselves are now to use them, the reader has already been apprised. They are to augment and strengthen our proofs of the early acceptance of our Gospels. In this undertaking we are, of course, dependent upon the determination of the antiquity of the apocryphal writings themselves, and we, therefore,

limit ourselves to the two oldest of those which we have in our possession: the so-called *Gospel of James* and *The Acts of Pilate*. Of both of these we believe ourselves authorized to affirm that they were composed in the first ten years of the second century. Does the reader demand the proof of this affirmation? We present first that which respects the Gospel of James.

In his work of the year 138, as well as in his Dialogue, written somewhat later, Justin makes several statements touching the birth of Jesus, the origin of which can be traced only to the Gospel of James. Justin relates that the birth of Jesus took place in a grotto at Bethlehem. Such a statement is found only in the Gospel of James. In the annunciation to Mary, Justin concludes with the words: "And thou shalt call his name Jesus," adding directly to them, "for he shall save the people from their sins." So precisely does it stand in the Gospel of James. In Matthew, on the other hand, the words are spoken to Joseph, and in Luke the last clause is wanting altogether. But does the dependence of Justin upon the book of James admit of no objection? Of course men can object. It has been conjectured that Justin might have quoted from some work which is lost. How does the objection please the reader? Me it does not please at all, especially when I reflect upon the unfortunate attempt to discover some trace of the lost work. As the authority for Justin's statement has before us the Gospel of James, what justifies us in refusing to recognize it? Not only does Origen, after the expiration of the second century, make mention of the Book of James; not only is his constant subsequent use of it beyond a doubt, we have now, in addition, more than fifty manuscripts of the Greek text, written from the ninth century onward—nay, even a Syriac manuscript of the sixth century. It is only the desire to evade the conclusion that even Justin employed it, which prompts men to lose themselves in the realm of idle conjectures.

But now the work named after James stands in such a relation to our Gospels that they must have been in long and general use before the fictitious writing was produced. Matthew and Luke had asserted that Mary was a virgin mother; still there were sects, diverging from the Church doctrine, who fancied Jesus to be the son of Joseph and Mary. That the brethren of Jesus are mentioned in the Gospels seemed, at least, to prove a later

marriage of Joseph and Mary. Learned Jews threw suspicion upon the correctness of the translation of the prophetic passage touching the Virgin in Matt. i: 23; nay, both Jews and heathen poured contempt and calumny upon the Son of the Virgin. This took place in the first half of the second century, and the Gospel of James was composed to meet it. In this it was shown, in a historical form, that, from her birth onward, Mary had always maintained the highest character; that the virgin-birth was a matter of demonstration, and that she sustained a relation to Joseph far above that of marriage. If this work really falls into the first decade of years in the second century, the composition of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, to which, as a pretended supplement, it refers, must certainly fall into the last ten years of the first century.

The case is similar with the *Acts of Pilate*, save that this work refers as distinctly to John as to the first Gospels. For this production, also, Justin is our oldest guaranty. It professes to have been written under Pilate, and by the allegation of wonderful occurrences before, during, and after the crucifixion, to deliver a strong testimony for the divinity of Christ. That it must have originated with a Christian hand, engaged in a work of pious fraud, was indeed not discovered by Justin, nor was it detected by Tertullian and others. On the contrary, in his work of A. D. 138, Justin appeals to it twice. First, he mentions the prophesies touching the events heralding the crucifixion (Isai. lxv: 2, and lviii: 2; Ps. xxi: 16, 18), and says: "That they really occurred, you may learn from the Acts composed under Pontius Pilate." Then, again, he appeals to the miraculous cures of Jesus, predicted by Isaiah (xxxv: 4, 6), and adds: "That Jesus really did these things, you may learn from the Acts composed under Pontius Pilate." The testimony of Tertullian is rendered in still more ample terms (Apologetic. 21); for he says that Jesus, from envy, was delivered by the Jewish scribes to Pilate, and by him, yielding to the pressure of the accusers, delivered to crucifixion; that, hanging upon the cross, with a loud cry, he yielded up the ghost; that, at the same moment, the full day was interrupted by the obscuration of the sun; that, as Jesus had predicted his resurrection, a watch of soldiers was set at the grave to prevent the abstraction of the corpse by the disciples; but that upon the third day the earth suddenly quaked,

and the stone which had been rolled before the grave was removed; that nothing but grave-clothes was found in the grave: that a report was spread abroad by the authorities that the disciples had taken the body; but that Jesus himself spent forty days with his disciples, in Galilee, instructing them, and that after he had charged them with the duty of preaching, he was transported to heaven in a cloud. This full report Tertullian concludes with the words: "All this did Pilate himself, forced by conscience to become a Christian, report of Christ to the reigning Emperor, Tiberius."

Such are the testimonies of Justin and Tertullian touching the Acts of Pilate. A work answering to these quotations, and bearing also the same title as in Justin, we possess at present, in many ancient Greek, Latin, and other original manuscript documents. Is it the same which was read by Justin and Tertullian? The affirmative answer has been resisted in many ways. It has been imagined that both men indulged a false opinion of the existence of such a work, and that it was therefore found only at a later date. This is an utterly groundless fancy. Others will have it that the old work itself is lost, and that the extant one is only an imitation of it. Has this opinion any solid foundation? By no means; none at all. True, indeed, the oldest text, when subsequently transcribed, was in many passages altered, as touching the expression; nay, more, in the middle ages, the Latins exchanged the title, The Acts of Pilate for the title "The Gospel of Nicodemus," and added a preface. We have, also, in connection with the elder Greek text, a more modern revision, but, upon the whole, we have decisive grounds for believing that our Acts of Pilate, with its elder text, in the main, really contains the work used by Justin and Tertullian. By our own researches in the European libraries, important proofs of this position have been discovered; namely, a manuscript written in the Egyptian language, on paper of the oldest kind, (papyrus,) of the fifth century; and, also, a parchment manuscript, with the Latin text, of the same century, which, although washed out about a thousand years ago, and replaced by a new inscription upon the parchment, thus cleansed, (such manuscripts are denominated palimpsests,) remaining, for good eyes, still legible. These two ancient documents, with an Egyptian and a Latin translation, insure the high antiquity of our Greek text, from

which they were derived; for, if even in the fifth century there existed such translations, the work itself, as highly esteemed, must have existed long before. But we must present the matter with still greater exactness. The primitive work was very precious to Christians. The example both of Justin and Tertullian proves it. Justin makes his appeal to the Roman Cæsar, upon this basis, as if it were a work of decisive weight. This high estimation of it naturally continued. Eusebius and Epiphanius prove this, as touching the fourth century. We learn from the former that, at the beginning of the fourth century, the Emperor Maximin, who was bitterly hostile to Christianity, caused spurious Acts of Pilate, full of scoffing and calumny, to be published, and even to be distributed in the schools, plainly in order to suppress and counteract the work held in such esteem by the Christians. In this state of facts, is it in the smallest degree credible, that precisely at this period, from the fourth or fifth century forward, the old work, so remarkably serviceable, should have been entirely revised; and that precisely at this period, the ancient and famous work itself having entirely disappeared, the revision should have been every-where distributed—should have been translated and preserved to our day? The supposition is in flat contradiction to a sound judgment. It contradicts the work itself as we have it, inasmuch as it unites a very peculiar freedom of narrative with a dependence upon the Gospels. It can therefore perplex those people only who are entirely unacquainted with the subject. Not desiring to be reckoned in this number, we draw, with perfect confidence, the conclusions which follow from our conscientious examination. Our "Acts of Pilate" not only presupposes the narratives of the first three Gospels, but also absolutely and very especially the Gospel of John. For while its report of the crucifixion and resurrection connects itself with the first, that of the trial, in its entire complexion, depends upon the narrative of John. What is the inference as touching our question? If the so-called Acts of Pilate, for the reason that Justin, as early as the year 138, so earnestly emphasizes its value, must be admitted to have been written at the beginning of the second century, then the Gospel of John and the rest, since they are so completely presupposed, must be admitted to have been written in the *first* century.

This inference is so grand and so decisive, that we are not in-

clined to draw upon the New Testament Apocrypha for other materials which might perhaps be employed in our argument.

The testimony of the Acts of Pilate and of the Gospel of James falls, then, at the beginning of the second century. By a retrogressive movement, we have been conducted, step by step, from the end of this century to its beginning. But we are carried back to the same time, also, by another work of high fame in Christian literature—a work which, from the end of the second century to the beginning of the fourth, was reckoned to belong to Holy Scripture, and that, too, by men of the highest authority. That this work is able to render a testimony of the highest significance, in relation to our question in regard to the antiquity of the Gospels—for this result, as already intimated, we have to thank the fortunate discovery of the Sinai Bible. We refer to the *Epistle of Barnabas.*

This letter, in object and character, is similar to the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is directed to those Christians who, having been converted from Judaism, desired to retain under the New Covenant some of the leading peculiarities of the Old; as, for example, some of the false teachers among the Galatians, opposed by Paul, had maintained that it was necessary to do. In opposition to this product of a Judaizing Christianity, the epistle cites the proof that the New Covenant, founded by Christ, had entirely canceled the old one, and that, in general, this was only an imperfect picture of the new.

For two centuries past, the Christian Church has occupied itself much with this epistle, but, unfortunately, in all the manuscripts of the Greek text to be found in European libraries, the first five chapters are wanting. An ancient but very imperfect Latin translation alone supplied the defect. In this Latin translation, a passage in the fourth chapter has for a long time drawn to itself very especial attention. It is this: "Let us therefore beware that we be not found as it is written, 'many called but few chosen.'" The expression, "as it is written," the reader will have become sufficiently familiar with from the New Testament. I must beg him to read again Matt. iv: 1–11, where the temptation of our Lord is narrated. The weapon which the Savior uses against the tempter consists in the words, "It is written;" and the tempter also employs the same weapon against the Savior, for he also cries out, "For it is written." It is the

formula by which sentiments from the Holy Scripture, as the established Word of God, are distinguished from all others in the world. The Apostles, like the Savior, often employ it when they quote sentiments from the Old Testament. To the writings composed by Apostles, plainly this formula could not be applied until these writings had attained a footing of equal authority with those of the Old Covenant. If we find, therefore, in the ancient writings of the Church passages quoted from the Gospels, with the same formula, then, at the time when these writings were composed, the Gospels must have had a coördinate authority with the Old Testament. As soon as this equal authority was attained, there existed a New Testament, side by side with the Old. The words, however, which, in the Epistle of Barnabas, are quoted with this formula, are found, it is well known, in the Gospel of Matt. xxii: 14; also, xx: 16. If this is correct, it follows that at the time of the composition of the Epistle of Barnabas, the Gospel of Matthew was regarded as Holy Scripture.

As the Epistle of Barnabas belongs to the highest Christian antiquity, this fact has appeared to many scholars entirely incredible. And the doubt whether the writer of the epistle really annexed to the passage from Matthew the great formula, "as it is written," has been supported by the circumstance that the first five chapters were to be found only in the Latin translation. It was possible, therefore, to say this great formula was inserted at a much later day by the translator. A learned theologian (Dr. Credner), writing in the year 1832, used upon this point the following language: "The passage in question is no longer extant in the original Greek text. The formula to which he had become accustomed was easily added to the words by the translator, and on internal grounds we must lay claim to the adjustment of the text in our passage, until the contrary is proved." In order, therefore, to decide upon the origin of the formula, the Greek text was required. And it was the order of Providence that this original text should be presented to the Christian world, soon after these words were written. Whilst in learned Germany the question was undergoing discussion, whether in this important particular the Latin text was trustworthy, the decisive original text was lying concealed in the solitary Arabian desert, among the old parchment books of a Greek convent.

However many of these had perished in the course of centuries by the tooth of time, and been destroyed by the hands of ignorant monks, an invisible Eye was watching over this treasure; at the very moment when it was on the point of perishing by fire, the Lord interposed for its rescue. In the Sinai Bible, then, the entire Epistle of Barnabas, in the original Greek text, now reappears. And what is the decision of this original text touching the passage in question? Its decision is, that the great Christian classic formula, "as it is written," was prefixed to the passage from Matthew by the author of the epistle, and not by the translator.

After this unexpected fact had been established in so surprising a manner, a new question was raised, whether the important inference from it must be unconditionally admitted. May not the formula, "as it is written," by possibility refer to any written book whatever? How little possible this is, our previous explanations touching the use of this formula will have satisfied the reader. We have not the least right to explain away its significance in the present case. But occasion has here been found for a very extraordinary device. In an apochryphal book, probably composed by a Jewish Christian, after the destruction of Jerusalem, called the fourth book of Esra, we have these words: For many have been born, but few will be saved. This declaration has a certain similarity to that of the Savior in Matthew, but is certainly distinct from it. Nevertheless, a certain scholar has had the ingenuity, in all gravity, to affirm that the words of the Savior in Matthew, cited in connection with this formula, "as it is written," in the Epistle of Barnabas, were not taken from Matthew, but from Esra, only the author of the epistle exchanged the one passage for the other. Accordingly, the formula, "as it is written," refers to the apocryphal book of Esra, and not to Matthew. It is characteristic enough of Strauss, the theologian, who has converted the whole life of Jesus into a fantastic vision, that he should accord his approbation to this piece of intellectual legerdemain, touching the passage in the Epistle of Barnabas. For ourselves, we can find in it nothing but an expression of that anti-Christian wit belonging to the atmosphere of such men as Renan. In cases like this, the prediction of Paul, in the Second Epistle to Timothy, (iv: 4,) finds a fulfillment: "And they shall turn away their ears from the truth,

and shall be turned unto fables." Now I presume the reader will agree with me, that so long as nothing better can be produced to weaken the passage in the Epistle of Barnabas, no one will permit himself to be led astray in this case who is sincerely asking for the truth. The device which has here been presented only serves to show what desperate efforts are put forth in order to escape from the inferences derived from the passage.

These inferences, however, we have now more distinctly to vindicate. The Epistle of Barnabas can not be placed later than at the beginning of the second century. Opinion formerly wavered between the first and second decades of years in this century, but the Sinai Bible, which, for the first time, has thrown a true light upon the entire epistle, has produced an inclination (as in the case of Dr. Weizsäcker,) to go back to the last decade of years in the first century. In this venerable work, which, at the close of the second century, Clement of Alexandria reckoned as a part of Holy Scripture, there are found (a fact not yet mentioned by us,) several obvious references to the Gospel of Matthew, *e. g.*, ix: 13, (in the fifth chapter, "that he might show that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance;" the words "to repentance," both in the Epistle of Barnabas and in Matthew, were interpolated as an explanation, borrowed from Luke v: 32,) in all probability also to the passage in John iii: 14, where, in the twelfth chapter, the serpent hanging upon a cross is made a symbol of the crucified Savior. But we direct special attention to the fact, that in it (for this is a matter which here particularly concerns us,) Matt. xxii: 14, is quoted with the formula accustomed to be employed only for citations from Holy Writ. Hence, it follows that at the beginning of the second century the Gospel of Matthew possessed already the authority of Sacred Scripture.

This result, this fact becomes all the more significant, if we are justified in affirming that the Gospel of Matthew could not be taken into the canon, that is, into the number of the Sacred Books, by itself alone, but only in connection with the other three Gospels. How do we prove this position? In our previous investigations, carried over the three first quarters of the second century, the figure prominent in the foreground has been sometimes Matthew, sometimes John, and sometimes Luke, whereas

Mark, on the other hand, from his essential characteristics, as compared with those of the others, was less suited to citation. How can this be interpreted to mean that the particular Gospel which on any occasion was employed, enjoyed, in distinction from the others, the highest authority in the Church? Thus it appeared, from the reference to the Acts of Pilate in Justin, that the Gospel of John presupposed in this book must have been written about the close of the first century; for Justin himself, in the first half of the second century, had quoted John, and still more frequently Matthew. Is not this alone a sufficient proof that if, at the period of the Epistle of Barnabas, Matthew possessed canonical authority, John also possessed a like authority? Basilides, in the time of Hadrian (A. D. 117–138), referred to John and Luke; Valentin, about A. D. 140, to John, Matthew, and Luke. Do they not yield fresh proofs of like tenor? Moreover, at a very early period, for example in the time of Justin, the Gospels were gathered into one whole, under the name of the Gospel, so that the names of the individual authors receded, in the presence of the common character of their writings; and in the second half of the second century we have found in Irenæus the quadruplicity of the Gospels established as a fact, long since perfectly settled. In the whole course of the century we hear nothing of discussions or decisions upon the subject. What is the inference from all these facts? It is that no one of our four Gospels is entitled, in preference to the others, to the authority of Holy Scripture? On the contrary, the Church placed her Gospels, as she possessed them, in a fourfold form, and as esteemed by her in this fourfold form to be genuine apostolic writings, side by side with the Old Testament.

If, now, we inquire further, when this took place, every consideration forces us to the latter part of the first century. This was the time when, at the death of the aged John, all the holy men who in person had been with Christ, as well as Paul the great Apostle to the Gentiles, had departed from life, and no longer formed a central point for the infant Church. This was the period when the Church, widely spread abroad in the world, saw her faith assailed from without, as a folly, and from within by heretical teachers. At that time she consecrated and hallowed the writings left by the Apostles, as precious, imperishable legacies, as incontrovertible testimonies of the life of the Redeemer,

as containing the highest norms of faith and of life. The proper time also had arrived for placing these writings on an equal footing with those of the Old Covenant. For at this time the perfect separation of the Church from the synagogue had taken place. After the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple, in the year 70, the Church was thrown more and more upon its own resources, and became more and more independent. It was a significant act of this independence, the act of annexing to the ancient Holy Scriptures of the synagogue, upon which Christianity itself so fundamentally rested, the perfectly attested records of the Savior's life, and other primeval apostolic written documents, as having sprung from the same source, and entitled to equal consideration.

Does the reader inquire in what way and by what act this took place? Of a surety, no learned assembly held a sitting in the case. If such men as Matthew, as Mark and Luke, as John, had left memoirs of the life of our Lord, was any thing more than their venerable names required to insure to their writings the highest authority in the Church?—and had not all these men stood in a personal relation to the Church sufficiently intimate to secure it from any possible works of imposture, decorated with their names? Of no Gospel more than that of John does this consideration hold true. If his Gospel emanated from his congregation in Asia Minor, and took possession of a wider field, could the slightest suspicion of spuriousness have attached to it? In case, however, that it did not originate in his own congregation, must not that congregation have at once, and without hesitation, recognized the fraud? It would have been impossible to introduce among them, from a foreign quarter, a pretended work of their own bishops, and especially such a work.

We possess a piece of information of ancient date, which must here be noticed. Eusebius records it in his Church History, (iii, 24). It is, that the three first Gospels, already widely circulated, were laid before John by his friends. He bore testimony to their truth, but noticed in them the omission of what Jesus had done at the commencement of his public ministry. For this reason his friends expressed the wish that he would supplement the omitted period. This information is confirmed by the contents of John's Gospel, as Eusebius himself has remarked.

We recognize, then, the close of the first century, the time in

which the death of John took place at Ephesus, as the period when the Church began to regard her four Gospels, (not to mention here her other written monuments of similar date,) as Holy Scripture. Even the considerations which we have just presented, in order to determine the point of time at which this took place, justify this assumption; but we should not be able to state it with perfect confidence, did not the history and literature of the entire second century, which we have traced as far as possible, urgently constrain us to this supposition, nay, to this conviction.

We have only one thing more to add to our survey of the earliest Christian literature. We refer to the testimony of *Papias*, which, beyond all others of late years, has been perverted by the enemies of our Gospels. The obscurity which rests upon the man himself, as well as upon his testimony, disqualifies him to become an independent witness, or even to be placed in antagonism to other witnesses; yet this has happened.

Through Eusebius (iii, 39), we know that he wrote a work in five books, which he styled, "An Exposition of the Sayings of the Lord." In collecting materials for this work, he entertained the idea that his purpose would be better served by the living word of tradition than by what he might find in "books." His sources of information, therefore, according to his assurance, were such oral reports as were capable of being traced to the Apostles. His own language in regard to these sources is as follows: "I shall collect what I have learned from the Elders (Presbyters) and have retained in memory, at the same time confirming their truth by my own explanations." Again: "Also when I fell in with any one who had had intercourse with the Elders, I made inquiry concerning the communications of the Elders, what Andrew or Peter had said, or what Philip, or what Thomas or James, or what John or Matthew, or what any other of the disciples of the Lord." Who the Elders referred to in these words were is not entirely clear. Those men of letters who would make the term refer to the Apostles themselves are certainly in the wrong. We are rather to understand by it venerable men, who had had personal intercourse with the Apostles. So Eusebius, whose judgment rested upon a knowledge of the entire work of Papias, understood the word, and expressed himself upon the point in still more definite terms. He testifies expressly that

Papias by no means claims to be a man who had himself heard and seen the holy Apostles, but a pupil of Aristion, and of the Presbyter, or Elder, John, to whose testimony also he most frequently appealed. Even Eusebius regarded it as an error in Irenæus, that he had characterized him as a "hearer of John and a companion of Polycarp," a passage in which Irenæus must have confounded Presbyter John, mentioned by Papias as his teacher, with the Apostle of the same name. This is confirmed by the circumstance that Irenæus derives an extravagant tradition touching the millenial kingdom expressly, "from the mouth of the Elders, who had seen John, the disciple of the Lord." In this passage, beyond doubt, Irenæus distinguishes the Elders from the Apostles; but since he appeals to Papias for the tradition concerning the millenial kingdom, he leaves no room to doubt that the Elders of whom he speaks were no other than those mentioned by Papias.

Now Eusebius extracts from the contents of this work of Papias several paragraphs; namely, one stating that the daughters of the Apostle Philip, at Hierapolis, reported to him the resuscitation of a dead person effected in the lifetime of their father; and one stating that Justus Barsabbas partook of a cup of poison without suffering any harm from it. Furthermore, and we here cite literally the language of Eusebius, Papias declared that he learned much more in the form of oral tradition, "also some unheard-of (strange)* parables and teachings of the Lord, and some other matter partaking too much of the fabulous." Of this character, Eusebius pronounces the doctrine of a millenial kingdom, which, after the resurrection of the dead, in a sensuous way, should exist upon this earth. The description of this kingdom is given not by Eusebius, but by Irenæus. The language stands thus: "There shall come days in which vines shall grow, each one of which shall bear ten thousand branches, each branch ten thousand twigs, each twig ten thousand sprouts, each sprout ten thousand grapes, and each grape shall yield twenty-five measures of wine; and when one of the saints shall pluck a grape, another shall cry out: I am a better grape, take me; through me praise the Lord! In like manner shall a kernel of

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* The Greek word has both senses. Eusebius appears to have expressed by it his own judgment, touching the pretended discourses of our Lord.

wheat produce ten thousand ears, and each ear ten thousand kernels," and more of like character. Even this representation Papias, according to the testimony of Irenæus, traces to his elders, and through them even to John himself. Eusebius thereupon remarks that Papias, as a man of very limited intelligence, which his whole book proves, had gathered them from misunderstood expressions of the Apostles. He then proceeds to say that still other reports, springing from Aristion and the Presbyter John, are to be found in the book of Papias, but refers those who feel an interest in them to the book itself. He then remarks that he will add to his previous quotations his tradition concerning Mark. His language is: "And this said the Presbyter: Mark, the interpreter of Peter, wrote down carefully what he remembered; not, however, in the order in which Christ had spoken or acted, for neither had he heard the Lord nor did he follow him; but, as already said, Peter, who delivered his discourses according to occasion, but did not wish to collect, in an orderly way, the discourses of the Lord. Mark, therefore, was not in fault when he wrote down any thing as he remembered it. On one thing only was he intent, not to omit any thing which he had heard, and not to falsify any thing." To this statement of Papias, Eusebius immediately annexes another concerning Matthew, proceeding to say: "This, then, Papias writes concerning Mark, but of Matthew he says: Now Matthew wrote the discourses of the Lord in the Hebrew language, but each one interpreted them as he could." In these sentences there is much which is obscure. It is doubtful, for instance, whether we have rightly translated the expression, "the discourses of the Lord;" for that which Papias had previously spoken concerning Mark (we mean the words, "which Christ had spoken or acted,") makes it probable that discourses and actions both are to be understood. Now, do these statements of the Presbyter and Papias refer to our two Gospels which are named after Matthew and Mark? Even if the expression, "discourses of the Lord," should be correct, it can not thence be inferred that a historical clothing of the discourses is excluded, for neither Eusebius nor any theologian of Christian antiquity has supposed that the expressions of Papias stand opposed to the two Gospels. If, on the other hand, any in our time have built upon this the conclusion that our Gospel of Mark is to be regarded as the proper book of Mark only in

the second degree, and that it sprung from a later revision of the book written by Mark, this supposition is obviously nothing but a groundless speculation. It serves only to deliver over our investigations touching the origin and mutual relations of our first three Gospels a prey to endless conjectures. This is true of Mark, and it is not less true of Matthew. The statement of Papias concerning the latter has its point in this, that he ascribes to Matthew only a Hebrew text. If there is any truth in this statement, then, especially if we accept the other, that every one interpreted it as he could, a wide field of conjecture is opened between the primeval Hebrew text and the Greek text in our possession. That Hebrew text must have been lost in the very earliest times, for not a single one of the earliest Church fathers had seen or used it. The reader will understand that we have here had a glimpse of a subject in the highest degree uncertain and perplexed. For our part, we are fully satisfied, and rest quietly in the conviction, that the supposition of a primary Hebrew text of Matthew, on the part of Papias, originated entirely in a misconception. Perfectly to establish the truth of this conviction would require an elaborate and learned discussion, for which this is not the proper place. We will barely indicate to the reader the source of the error into which Papias fell. We learn even from the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians the existence of vexatious party strifes arising from Judaizing teachers. After the destruction of Jerusalem they seem to have manifested themselves with ever-increasing violence. There were two chief parties. One, which we may call that of the Nazarenes, was of a more simple character than the other, that of the Ebionites. Both used a Gospel named after Matthew; the first in the Hebrew, the other in the Greek language. That they did not hesitate to alter the text which came into their hand according to their own taste, is a fact springing from their very posture—that of mere arbitrary sects; and what has come to our actual knowledge on the subject proves at once a very great similarity to our Matthew, and an arbitrary departure from him in particular passages. When now, at a later day, it was repeated that the Nazarenes, who had sprung from the oldest Christian stock, possessed a Matthew in Hebrew, what was more natural that the one or the other should assume, perhaps in accordance with the pretense of the sect itself, that Matthew wrote in Hebrew, and

that the Greek text was a translation? How widely these texts differed from each other was a matter which no one knew accurately or inquired into. Moreover, the remote position of the sect of the Nazarenes, who resided chiefly near the Dead Sea, would not prompt such an investigation.

In this explanation of the statement of Papias, we are supported by Jerome. Jerome, who (a singular accomplishment in his day) was acquainted with Hebrew, in the fourth century actually got possession of the Hebrew Gospel of the Nazarenes, and at once cried out that he had the original Hebrew text of Matthew. After a closer investigation, however, he said only that many held this Hebrew text to be the real Matthew. He translated it into Greek and Latin, and published some observations derived from it. From these observations of Jerome, as well as from other ancient sources, it can now be proved that the view of Papias, shared by many learned men in modern times, that the so-called Hebrew Gospel is more ancient than our Matthew, must be directly reversed; for that Hebrew book was rather borrowed from our Greek Matthew, with arbitrary variations of the text. The same remarks are applicable to the Greek text of the Hebrew Gospel, already mentioned, which was used by the Ebionites. In a word, this was better known in the Church than the Hebrew, simply because it was Greek; but in the earliest times it was also regarded as only another text of Matthew. With this agrees what Papias has written concerning the various interpretations of Matthew.

But we have something more to say of Papias and his compilation. As touching his efforts in collecting materials, he wrote that he believed he should be less aided by that which was found in books. What books? Did he refer to our Gospels? From the expression, this is not impossible, but, from the whole character of his book, it is very improbable; for manifestly he aimed, on the basis of what at that time—perhaps A. D. 130 or 140—was still orally related concerning the Savior, to produce a kind of supplement of the Gospels. These last, therefore, he could not have regarded as sources—as presenting materials for his collection. By the books referred to, he must rather have understood the unauthorized apocryphal delineations of Christ, so many of which made their appearance from the earliest times onward. These he placed in contrast with his oral sources, the

genuineness of which appeared to him perfectly established, since, equally with the Gospels themselves, they had been derived from the Apostles, although through the testimony of the Elders.

Of the citations of Eusebius, made as noteworthy from the book of Papias, we have already referred to the story of the resuscitation of a dead person, which the daughter of Philip professed to have heard from her father, as well as of a cup of poison by Justus Barsabbas. In the third place, he mentions, saying at the same time that the Hebrew Gospel also contains it, the case of a woman, who, on account of manifold sins, was accused before Jesus. Of a like character with this, there stood in the book, as we learn at a later day from Œcumenius, that the body of Judas, the traitor, was so swollen that it was crushed by a rapidly moving vehicle coming upon it in a narrow street, and that his bowels gushed out. Touching the remaining contents of the book, as already observed, Eusebius informs us that Papias spoke of some unknown parables (see above) and doctrines of the Lord; but he considered it not worth the trouble to communicate a single one of them. And, moreover, no writer in the Church has done this, except that Irenæus has given us his extravagant description of the millenial kingdom, and Andreas of Cæsarea, in the sixth century, introduced a remark of Papias concerning fallen angels into his commentary on the Book of Revelation.

Eusebius again, after referring to the pretended parables and doctrines of the Lord, mentions, as additional contents of the book of Papias, only "some other things partaking too much of the fabulous."

Now, can any important historical information touching our Gospels be derived from all that Papias and his book have to offer upon the subject? Even though a man of intellect, with much to support him, has actually answered this question in the affirmative, we can not but give it an unconditional denial. The judgment of Eusebius, touching the man, that he was a person of limited understanding, is not only justified by the particulars already presented, but is confirmed by the fact that his pretended enrichment of Evangelical literature was entirely disregarded by the Church. What value would not a single parable of the Lord have had, if it could lay claim to credibility? But no one has taken the least notice of all those described by Papias.

The fabulous character of which Eusebius, a man not distinguished for critical acumen, speaks, without doubt belonged to the entire work.

Nevertheless, in our century, Papias has grown into a torch-bearer, and that, too, among men who claim special eminence in acute criticism. For, in consequence alone of his obscure and defective notices of Matthew and Mark, the task has been attempted of severing our two first Gospels into their genuine and spurious contents. This is at least to erect a monument to Papias. But, if possible, Papias is of greater weight and more welcome among the opposers of the Gospel of John. Why? Papias is silent in respect to this Gospel. This silence is arrayed by Strauss, Renan, and other critics of like spirit, in opposition to the faith of the Church touching the genuineness of John's Gospel, as a fact suggesting the very gravest doubts. I presume my readers, after the statements which have been made in regard to Papias and his book, will find this hardly credible. Does it not betray—I appeal for an answer directly to my readers—a perfect misconception of what Papias has said of his own book, when any one demands from him a testimony respecting the Gospel of John? His notices of Mark and Matthew do not alter the character of his book as a whole. But it is maintained that Papias could have known nothing of John's Gospel, because he does not mention it. Of course, herewith would be gained nothing less than a decisive testimony against the genuineness of this Gospel; for Papias, the bishop of Hierapolis, resided in the vicinity of Ephesus, whence the Gospel of John must have gone forth to the world, and the earliest information places the martyr-death of Papias at the same time with that of Polycarp; that is, in the sixteenth year of the second century.

Now a more groundless and frivolous affirmation could hardly be made, than that the silence of Papias concerning the Gospel of John yields "a strong proof against its genuineness." For, in the first place, to bear a testimony concerning John's Gospel, is a matter entirely aside from the plan and object of Papias; in the second place, from the circumstance that Eusebius has quoted nothing from the book of Papias concerning the Gospel of John, we are by no means able to infer that nothing in reference to John existed in that book. The notices touching Mark and Matthew are not given by Eusebius as testimonies for the

genuineness of their Gospels, but on account of particular circumstances mentioned in them. Concerning John, therefore, and this is the only conclusion yielded by the silence of Eusebius, no similar notices were found. But Eusebius is as silent concerning the writings of Luke and the Pauline Epistles, in citing from Papias, as concerning John's Gospel. Is it not an absurdity to suppose that Papias knew nothing of all these? Yet this absurd affirmation must necessarily be made, side by side, with that concerning John's Gospel.

But we have not yet mentioned that Eusebius, at the conclusion of his article concerning Papias, observes that he cited proof-texts from the 1st Epistle of John and the 1st Epistle of Peter. Does not this make against us, if we deny any significance to his silence concerning Luke, Paul, and the Gospel of John? No, the reverse. The genuineness of the four Gospels and of the Pauline Epistles was doubted by no one in the Church; therefore Eusebius could not have conceived the idea of gathering ancient testimonies to establish it. The case was different with the Catholic Epistles, with the Apocalypse, and with the Epistle to the Hebrews. To collect ancient witnesses to these writings was a matter of importance to him. But may it not be alleged that this is a mere arbitrary representation? We have at hand two vouchers for the correctness of our view, which will entirely exclude the charge of arbitrariness. Of Polycarp's letter to the Philippians, Eusebius (iv: 14) says nothing, except that it contains proof-texts from the 1st Epistle of Peter, and yet this very letter is full of citations from Paul. In like manner he proceeds to say (iv: 26), that Theophilus, in his book to Autolycus, used the Apocalypse, and makes no mention of the fact that these very books distinguish themselves by the citation of a passage from John's Gospel, containing even a mention of the name of John. All this a blind zeal against the Gospel of John has overlooked. One thing in this connection we must not leave untouched. Eusebius then testifies that Papias used the 1st Epistle of John. We have already, at an earlier stage, declared that upon grounds of the most convincing power, that Epistle and Gospel must have had the same author. The testimony of Papias to the Epistle is, therefore, at the same time a testimony for the Gospel of John. But it must be admitted that, in proportion as the disciples of a school of criticism which scoffs at

all history, pronounces the Pauline Epistles to be spurious, in that proportion may be drawn into doubt a point which, apart from the most obstinate prejudice, is lifted above all doubt—the identity of the author of the 1st Epistle of John and of the Gospel.

These, then, are our weapons against the above-named school of criticism, hostile to our Gospels. The attainment of our end, the vindication of the truth scarcely requires any thing further; still a final weapon, or rather a whole new arsenal, claims a notice at our hands. It bears the name of the *New Testament Textual Criticism.* What this name signifies will hardly be intelligible to all my readers: we must, therefore, by all means make it so.

The name indicates that science which has to do with the sources of the sacred text. The investigation of these sources is designed to teach us the history of the sacred text; that is, we are in this way to learn what in every period the Christianity of the various countries found written in the books which contained the New Testament; for instance, what Columban, in the sixth century; what Ambrose and Augustine, in the fourth; what Cyprian and Tertullian, in the third and second centuries, read in their Latin copies of the New Testament; or what the Patriarch Photius, in the tenth; Cyril, the bishop of Jerusalem, in the fifth; Athanasius, in the fourth; Origen, in the third centuries, found written in the Greek copies of their times. But the highest object of these investigations consists in the recovery of the exact expressions and words which the holy Apostles either wrote with their own hands, or dictated to the pens of their amanuenses. If the New Testament is the most valuable and most holy book in the world, we must certainly esteem it a matter of the highest importance to possess all the writings which it contains, in their exact text, as they came from the hands of their authors, without additions, without omissions, without alterations. All this has already been spoken of in the narrative of my own journeys of research; we may, therefore, refer the reader to what is there said.

Now, should the reader perchance inquire whether our Luther's German Bible does not then contain the genuine text of the Apostles, I may reply both yes and no. Yes, for whatever is necessary for the salvation of the soul, is to be found with absolute certainty in Luther's Bible. No, for Doctor Luther derived his translations from a Greek text, which, in very many passages, stood in need of correction. For this Greek text was

no better than could be procured, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, from manuscripts which were at hand. We have already informed the reader that this text has manifold divergences from the oldest written sources of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, and therefore must be replaced by a text which can vindicate its claim to be the oldest, and therefore the most correct. The reproduction of this text, however, is greatly embarrassed by the circumstance that we meet, even in our oldest sources, a great variation in the text. They themselves, therefore, are to be closely compared one with another, and the surest possible marks are to be sought out which indicate a superiority of one to another.

There is one circumstance of very great importance. It is that we are able to prove, with certainty, that the Latin text, as it exists in a certain class of ancient manuscripts, which we may call the old Latin, was extant and in extensive use in the Church in the second century. The text of these old Latin manuscripts is at least, in essential points, the same which was followed by Tertullian, about the end of the second century, and even before him, by the Latin translator of Irenæus. If we possessed a Greek manuscript which agreed with this old Latin text of the second century, very plainly we should recognize in it the Greek text, as it was read in the second century. And in this case thus much is clear, that an important step would be taken toward finding the original Apostolic text; for it requires no proof to show that the text of the second century stands nearer to that of the first, than does that of all later centuries. Now, such a manuscript has, in fact, been found; it is the manuscript from Sinai, which distinguishes itself beyond all others which we possess, by an agreement with the old Latin text. We do not mean to be understood that the Sinaitic manuscript was connected by the very closest bond of kindred with that in the hands of the old Latin translator in Africa, in the vicinity of the present Algiers, (for that was his home), and that other manuscripts of similar character were not distributed in other parts of Christendom at the same period. On the contrary, the oldest Syriac translation, recently discovered, which is hardly younger than the old Latin, but which proceeded from an entirely different region of the Christian world, for the most part confirms the same text; as do the testimonies of the Egyptian Church fathers of the second and third centuries.

But what have we gained from these discussions toward the answer of our question? First of all, we must lay stress upon this, that as early as the middle of the second century, our four Gospels had received a common Latin and a common Syriac translation. This proves not only, like the Gospel harmonies of the second half of the second century, upon how solid a basis the churchly and canonical authority of these four Gospels stood at that period; it has also a high significance in reference to that debatable question, if we please to call it so, already referred to, touching the Gospels of Matthew and Mark. The reader will remember that upon the ground of the loose and untrustworthy notices of Papias, an inclination has been manifested to affirm that our Matthew and our Mark are only later revisions of the real Matthew and the real Mark. Against this affirmation both the translations above named utter their protest. At least at the time when they were made, must Matthew and Mark, as we possess them, have been regarded as genuine. If this is so, then it would be a groundless, idle conceit to imagine that still, perhaps in the first half of the second century, two other books were in use as the genuine Matthew and the genuine Mark; for they must already in the earliest time have perished without leaving a trace, and the later books, arbitrarily derived from them, must, even from that early period forward, have been by every one erroneously regarded as the genuine, which, nevertheless, had been lost.

Finally, we have still an inference to draw from the interior character of the text of the oldest Greek, Latin, and Syriac sources and testimonies above referred to. Notwithstanding these present the customary text of about the middle of the second century, it may still be clearly shown that even prior to this text, there lies an entire history of it; that is, that this text had even previously passed from hand to hand, by transcription after transcription, and that its original form had suffered injury in the process. I must here content myself with simply announcing this to my readers as a result of my researches into the text, carried through many years, without adducing the proofs of it, for which this is hardly the proper place. I must, however, affirm it as one of the most important and sure results of my labors in the criticism of the text. If no one before me has reached it, the reason is to be found in the circumstance that the treasure fortunately discovered a few years since at Sinai

has thrown a distinct light upon the point. If am right in my assurance, in my conviction—and in a more suitable place I shall undertake perfectly to establish this—it yields the proposition that our four Gospels must have had a circulation in the Church from the end of the first century. I am making here no new statement to the reader. It serves only to confirm every thing which, through my entire essay, I have been presenting and endeavoring to make clear.

At this point I must conclude. If what I have written should fall into the hands of learned opponents, they will say, without doubt, that much has been passed by which is important. Opposition of this sort I pronounce beforehand to be mere sophistical imposture. It is true, indeed, that such persons have known how to present misconceptions of the earliest Church history, for which themselves alone were responsible, and manifold subtleties, under an appearance of serious and important truth, and in a manner which has very easily entrapped the ignorant. It is against such sophistical argumentation that the power of historical facts must be summoned. One single ancient, well-established fact has more weight than the most brilliant wit; than all the most ingenious conjectures, by whose aid any thing which fancy or infidelity prompts may be made of that which happened eighteen hundred years ago.

It is my prayer that what I have written may serve to make the reader distrustful when novel explanations, hostile to our Gospels, are brought to his notice; when he is informed that all the great and glorious things reported in the Gospels touching the person of his Savior rest upon ignorance or deception. The Gospels, with the Only-begotten of the Father, will endure as long as humanity itself; but the discoveries of an overweening wisdom, whether of earlier or later date, like exploding air-bubbles shall vanish into nothing. He who has suffered shipwreck in the life of faith, and has sunk to the life of the flesh, can never endure that others should cling with true, unshaken hearts to their Savior. Let not the reader, then, be confounded by the loud-echoing tumult. Let him hold the more firmly that which he has the more others seek to wrest it away. Think not that we are anxious concerning the victory of the truth. For this victory One stands pledged, before whom the whole world is nothing more than a mote. Still it is our duty, according to our best ability, conscientiously to bear witness for the Truth.

THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY TO COME.*

If orthodoxy may be much too rigid, there is something else that may be much too lax. It may be in the nature of bigotry that it should fail to do justice to an adversary's truth; but it is in the nature of latitudinarianism that it should fail to do justice even to its own truth. There is a maudlin candor, in comparison with which a stout-hearted conviction, though it should lead to some intolerance, is manly and brave.

Far be it from us not to cede even to the assailants of revelation, whatever praise may be due to them on the ground of their truth, their virtue, or their ability. But bold men are not always wise. Innovation is fully as likely to be on the side of error as on the side of truth. As we have said, if to cleave to the old may be anile, to run after the new may be childish. In our recent pulpit literature we have some indications, especially in the case of a few of our younger men, of a tendency to look for models as religious teachers in quarters where it is hardly likely the best models will be found. One of the symptoms of such a tendency meets us in a certain mannerism of style, which sufficiently betrays its origin. Another effect of such evil communication is observable in a verbose and cloudy method of dealing with the distinctive doctrines of the Gospel—so much so, that if the nature of these doctrines be not learnt from other sources, there is nothing in this new style of exposition to afford you the least assistance in attaining to a just conception of them. Nor is this all: where such tastes are perceptible, it is commonly found that the preacher is much more disposed to dwell on what is collateral to the Gospel than upon what is properly of its substance; the sympathy of the preacher being, it would seem, not so much with what is really Christian, as with that ethical or border truth which is common to Theist and Christian. Men to whose public instructions, and to whose utterances from the press, this description will apply, should not be surprised if they find the impression concerning them to be, that they are seriously the

* Abridged from the *British Quarterly Review.*

worse for their visits to the schools of the Julianists. The facts in this case warrant the inference, that not only the taste of the preacher, but that his Christian convictions, and his Christian sympathies, have suffered greatly from such intercourse. It was not a good day for Christianity when its professed teachers began to discourse about it in the pulpits of Alexandria more after the manner of the Platonists than after the manner of the Apostles.

Men may become unfaithful to the essential truth of Christianity in two ways—by not presenting it with sufficient *prominence*, or by not presenting it with sufficient *clearness*. In either case the result is mischievous. We must be allowed to express it as our conviction, that with all men professing to be Christians, the writers of the New Testament should be taken as authority, not only as to what Christian truth really is, but as to the laws of proportion and of distinctness with which that truth should be presented. Many of the allusions and illustrations in the pages of the New Testament are, no doubt, of a nature to admit of being described as local and temporary. But the doctrines set forth by the writers of those pages as being THE TRUTH, the SPACE assigned to this special truth in their general teaching, and the EXPLICITNESS with which they deliver themselves concerning the nature of the truth thus prominently given, these are all facts which Christians are bound to interpret, not as being of a merely transient significance, but as meant to operate in the way of a permanent authority. But there are men who say strange things on this subject, some in direct terms, others by the manner in which they acquit themselves as public teachers. While professing to regard the New Testament as containing a divine revelation, their language, either in words or in their manner of proceeding, is, that it would be a matter of sincere regret with them if their friends should suppose them incapable of seeing the doctrines of the Gospel in other lights than those in which they appear to have been present to the mind of the Apostles, or of presenting those doctrines in a manner much less open to exception than is the manner observable in the first preachers of the Gospel, both as regards the extent in which such themes should be introduced in popular discourses, and the kind of language in which they should be clothed. Some men take the extreme ground in this respect unblushingly; others, of better meaning, proceed far in this direction without being alive to what they do

really say, by allowing themselves to be thus influenced. What is done in this way is done for the most part insidiously, and the inexperienced are, perhaps, little sensible to the inroads thus silently made on all manly taste and consistency, and on the convictions and feelings that should distinguish them as Christian ministers. It is an old policy of the enemy to neutralize what may not be superseded, to emasculate what may not be destroyed. We fear much less from the open assailants of the Gospel than from those who allow themselves to be used as tools in corrupting it, in reducing it to a mere name, devoid of its proper substance and effect.

We have a school of theology growing up among us just now, which, while distinguished by many excellencies, is open, as we think, to a large extent, to the above kind of exception. We refer to the class of writers and preachers who may be said to be represented by Hare, Maurice, Trench, and Kingsley. These gentlemen, while they do not by any means take their place among the evangelical clergy, are very far from showing any disposition to substitute the cold ethical teaching of the high-and-dry priesthood in the place of the Gospel. Nothing, indeed, could be more repugnant to their thinking and feeling than the notion that the chief design of the Gospel is to teach the poor to obey magistrates, to touch their hat to the parson, and to be sure never to enter a conventicle. Not that these writers are unmindful of the bearing of the Gospel on social duties. On the contrary, it is one of their characteristics, that they aim to diffuse a Christian influence over every thing human. Religion has been made to consist too much, in some connections, in the receiving of a certain creed, the performance of certain ceremonies, and the cultivation of certain religious affections. But, according to this class of divines, there are lying beyond every thing of that nature the manifold every-day duties of life, all of which should have their relation to Christian motives, and be imbued with Christian feeling. The true fruit, it is maintained, of a Christian creed, of Christian observances, and of Christian affections, will be, that a man's every doing shall become a part of his Christianity—his buying and selling, his marrying and giving in marriage, his duties as neighbor, patriot, and philanthropist, being all in themselves, and in the temper in which they are performed, a part of his religion. We scarcely need say that we regard this view of

the nature of religion as just and Scriptural. It is at once true and beautiful. This is to deal with religion as an inward life, not as a mere outward manner; as a leaven which should pervade every thing, not as a restricted, conventional feeling, affecting few things.

In harmony with this general idea as to the connection—we may say the identity—between morality and religion, the writers under consideration, while they are bound to be quite as moral as they are theological in their teaching, so are they bound to be quite as theological as they are moral. Theology with this school, accordingly, is no slighted science. Its claims are admitted. Its questions are often elaborately treated. It connects itself, in their hands, with the erudition and with the philosophical thought of the times. In their pages it is never presented as a cold, angular orthodoxy, but is ever allied with an elevated and devout feeling. There is a degree of poetical beauty and impressiveness in their mode of dealing with such topics. The cultivated power of perception, the chastened imagination, the affections refined by the influence of good taste—all are there. In the effect produced we trace much of the better feeling found in the better class of evangelical believers, but feelings partaking of more discrimination, of more breadth, of more mellowness, and altogether of a larger style in its relation both to taste and thinking.

Concerning the great fact of the world's depravity, these writers express themselves with grave emphasis, at the same time with care to avoid the blind, undistinguishing style of denunciation too common on that subject. With great emphasis, too, do they pronounce that the deep need of this world is the need of a remedial dispensation of religion of the kind placed before us in the Gospel. Men, in their view, are every-where more or less conscience-smitten, sensible to a state of moral degradation, and casting about for some means wherewith to provide against the exigencies of their condition, every-where devising for themselves false gospels, when they have not access to the true. Religious sentiment is thus at the root of all religions. Religious ideas ever come up from that source—they are not of priests, nor of law-givers, but from humanity. Priests and law-givers may be observant of these susceptibilities, and may strive hard to make their own uses of them; but they do not create them, they can not destroy them. In Trench's Hulsean Lectures on "The

Unconscious Prophecies of Heathendom," and in Maurice's Lectures on "The Religions of the World," these views are worked out with much learning and ability. In the views themselves there is nothing of novelty. Orthodox divines, of the more intelligent class, have always looked substantially thus on the condition of humanity, and on the religions which that condition has generated. But the class of writers of whom we speak have done better than their predecessors in this field, bringing to the cultivation of it much more discrimination than we commonly find in our evangelical pulpits, and, at the same time, more warmth of imagination and more Christian feeling than will be found in the old dry orthodox mode of writing about it.

As will be supposed, the style of these writers is altogether devoid of those Methodist conventionalisms, which come upon us so monotonously and so unceasingly from many quarters. It is in the main elevated and scholar-like. The only exception is when Archdeacon Hare or Mr. Kingsley attempt to express themselves in a manner not natural to them, with a view to the edification of the poor.

But in expressing these opinions, we have said nearly all we have to say in favor of this school. Its excellencies are many, but they are subject to some heavy drawbacks; and its inconsistencies, of more than one complexion, are such as must impede, and in great part frustrate, their great and common object.

Even their style, though rich and beautiful of its kind, is by no means of the best kind for their purpose, whether that purpose be to affect the popular mind generally, or that portion of the more educated classes, who, from their active, alert, independent cast of thinking, are the most likely to go astray on religious matters. We have said their style is scholar-like, but unfortunately it is so much so as to be fit only for scholars. It is the sonorous, lengthy, verbose, half light, half dark sort of style which is sure to be acceptable to clergymen, and to others with whom reading is a lounge or an amusement, rather than an outlay of time and attention, from which an adequate return is expected. Every paragraph gives you its gleam of thought, but it is as of light traced through darkness. Often, at every available halting-place, you feel the need of retracing your steps, that you may ascertain what you have learnt or understood from what has gone before. But to effect this, you have not unfrequently

to do something like translating your author, though what has been written is in English; and, when you have so done, your patience perhaps is not a little tried on finding how fragmentary and how obvious is the thought which this huge, high-sounding vehicle of words has been employed to convey to you. This may all be very well in drawing-rooms, or in the libraries of ladies in rich houses, but it is not easy to conceive of any thing less adapted to that impatience of the obscure, the tedious, the roundabout, of the much-talk-and-little-work style, which is so characteristic of our age.

Had Luther spoken in tones so softened into music, so much in the smooth, subdued, lullaby strain, as we find in the case of these gentlemen, we fear that his labors would have tended rather to hush the world into a deeper slumber than to have called it into wakefulness. The demand of the order of mind among us most needing to be brought under the help which these writers are otherwise so competent to give is not for a professional style of writing, however good of its kind, but for a style which shall be natural—natural to religion as to every thing beside. We have, of course, in a state of society like ours, many dreamy, poetical, sentimental people, who are much more desirous of being soothed by melody than of being startled by force; who would rather see thought glide before them like beautiful figures, all but lost in the silvery clouds through which they float, than see it stand out as an object defined and settled, ready, as with a trumpet tongue, to call the indolent to action. The style required by the men who are doing the work of our generation, is a style which shall be characterized by directness, by clearness, by vividness, by force—in a word, a style which shall give you thought as a mirror gives you back your countenance, in a manner which fits you to see it as a reality, wholly forgetful of the medium through which it comes. But this style neither Mr. Maurice nor Mr. Trench has realized. They have simply given us the mannerism of an Oxford or Cambridge pulpit in place of the mannerism of our early Methodists, or of our later evangelicals. The one thing needful—a pulpit-style which shall not be a mannerism of any sort, but nature—is still to come. When we say that this is still to come, we of course merely intend to say that it is not now, to any large extent, the style of the pulpit; we do not forget the admirable examples of this description supplied by

such men as Arnold and Whateley. We should say, also, that the taste of which we complain in the writers before named, is mostly observable in the more elaborate of their works. In some of Mr. Maurice's sermons it is less perceptible than in his lectures and treatises; and in Trench's volume on the parables, which is occupied almost wholly in exposition, we trace nothing of the kind.

We should not omit to observe, that the discourses of all these preachers are distinguished from those usually heard in evangelical pulpits, as being without any formal indication of plan. The scholastic method of division and subdivision has, no doubt, been often pushed to a ridiculous extent. But we greatly distrust the wisdom of the modern fashion, which seems to proceed upon the idea that, if you are to convey your instructions with method, the art to be exercised by you is not in giving that method clear announcement, but in concealing it from the auditory as completely as possible. The conclusion would appear to have been, that it is not desirable that the hearer should be at all assisted by break or halting-place of any kind, and that if he can not be sufficiently attentive to retain the connection of a discourse without such helps, he deserves to lose it—a conclusion not exactly in accordance with professions of special solicitude for the improvement of the class of minds which are sure to need assistance in that way and in every other. The natural effect of a taste of this sort, where the style of composition is itself flowing and monotonous, is to add to that monotony, and, at the same time, to expose the preacher to the danger of becoming superficial and rambling. Faults of this latter description are observable, and in great part, as we think, from this cause, even in the case of the gifted men whose works are now before us.

But the gravest fault in the writings of this class of divines, is in their manner of presenting theological truth. We see not on what ground they can be charged with deserting the standard of orthodoxy. That they hold in substance the doctrines usually so designated we do not doubt; but speaking generally, they do not present those doctrines with the requisite clearness, nor do they always assign them their due prominence.

They can not be said to reject the doctrine of the atonement. They speak often of Christ as dying for our sins, and of his death as a sacrifice—*the* sacrifice which the old law had so long prefigured. But they never present this doctrine with the largeness

and thoroughness wherewith Paul presents it. Its relation to the spirituality of the moral law, and to the rectitude of the divine government, are themes but lightly touched. The idea of the Innocent One sorrowing and dying that the guilty might be pardoned, is presented in phrases and general expressions as a great fact, but as a fact the depths of which we can not hope to comprehend. In their care to avoid some of the exaggerations of orthodoxy in relation to this doctrine, they fail to give us its whole truth. Men of cultivated feeling may well be shocked by the bargain-making, commercial spirit which some theologians have brought, in all its arithmetical minuteness, to their expositions of this tenet. But in rejecting the coarseness of the fanatic, it behooves us to guard against placing ourselves at issue with the example which the Apostles themselves have set before us. Paul, and Peter, and John speak clearly and fervently in regard to this doctrine. In the Epistle to the Romans it is given with elaborate development, and given, as we suppose, for our learning.

But if the references to Christ in his relation to the *cross* are less frequent and less distinct and emphatic than they should be in this class of writers, they dwell with much interest on the beauty of the Savior's *character*, and from the attractive influence of so much goodness they expect large results. It is not so much the *cross* as the *incarnation* that makes the Gospel to be what it is to their feeling. Mention is made of the sacrifice of Christ, and of help to our weak nature from the Holy Spirit; but it is the beauty of goodness stooping so low, and enduring so much, and all this as a manifestation, not simply of the human, but of the divine in the human—it is this which calls forth the highest admirations of these writers, and is the great instrument by which they hope to move the hearts of men toward goodness. Hence it happens that, without being Unitarians or even Arians, there is scarcely any thing in the religious feeling of these persons with which a devout Arian, or even a Unitarian of the Channing school, might not fully sympathize. The points of belief to which such persons would object are so softened, and those in which they feel their chief interest are given in such lights and such fullness, that the boundaries between orthodoxy and something supposed to be very different, almost cease to be perceptible.

We repeat, it would be unjust to charge these gentlemen with

having surrendered their orthodoxy, but we feel bound to say that their manner of presenting the doctrines of Christianity is not Paul's manner; that over some departments of truth, in respect to which he is elaborately explicit, they are as elaborately hazy; and that through their whole system, the *assimilating* element of the Gospel, as resulting from the *character* of Christ, is much more prominent than the *redeeming* element as resulting from his *death*. For ourselves, we are ready to admit that modern orthodoxy was open to some improvement in this direction; but we regret that religious truth should have been obscured in this attempt to make it productive of a deeper religious feeling. We covet, most earnestly, all the spiritual influences from the doctrines of the Gospel which these writers aim to realize, but we wish to see these influences realized after the apostolic manner, by a full, clear, scriptural inculcation of the facts of the Christian redemption, and not by such an artistic treatment of them as shall throw any one phase of them into undue shadow, out of deference to our modern tastes or philosophies.

Of the manner in which this may be done, we have already given some intimation; and it may be proper to advert for a moment to a tendency, proceeding from this same source, to confound the scriptural difference between the natural and revealed, and to raise the simply natural virtues of humanity into the place of the Christian virtues. Thus, in the sermon in Mr. Kingsley's volume, entitled, "The Work of God's Spirit," the whole drift is to show that every capacity and possession of man, inasmuch as it must come from God, is a part of "the work of God's Spirit!" The work of the Holy Spirit on the soul, as commonly understood, is glanced at toward the close of the sermon, but the great purport of the discourse is as above stated. Surely this is a manner of attempting to give a religiousness to the whole life of man, which is hardly consistent with doing justice to what is distinctive of the Gospel, or with a due regard to the manner in which that distinctive truth is set forth by the inspired writers. Most proper is it that effort should be made to bring men to feel that every good gift must have come to them from the Father of lights. But is it not possible to do that without losing sight of those theological and of those moral distinctions which the writers of the New Testament are so careful to keep in view? It would be easy to give further illustration to this effect, showing how the

spirit of reaction against a frequent narrowness of modern orthodoxy may run into excess of an opposite kind, so as to displace an alleged bigotry by a mischievous latitudinarianism.

But it is time that we should now pass from this estimate of the Christian ministry, as it is striving to adapt itself to the times, to state in a few direct terms what, in our view, this ministry must be, if the demands of the coming time are to be met by it.

I. We say, then, that the Christian ministry to come must be a ministry the doctrine of which shall find its grand utterance in the two old words REDEMPTION and REGENERATION. We say that such *must* be the ministry to come, because we believe in the destined progress of Christianity, and we see this agency in the order of means necessary to that end. But we say this, also, on other grounds, much broader and less open to exception. Any thing short of this will not be the message which the Bible contains—will not be the message which man needs. Nor must there be any paralyzing hesitancy as to the fact that such *is* the message which the book brings to us. The ministry to come must be ready with its reasons, of various kinds, for having a mind thus made up on this point; but thus made up it must be. The authority which attaches to holy Scripture must be clear and settled, if it is to be an authority wielded to any purpose. The doctrine announced as contained in those Scriptures must be of the old compass, embracing the substance of the old views in relation to guilt and sin, to redemption and renovation—pointing with a steady finger to God's world above us, into which Paul so much longed to enter, and to the devil's world beneath us, which commends itself so little to the taste of some of our moderns. Men content to preach these doctrines in a dubious, peradventure tone, to a sensuous, luxurious, and skeptical age like ours, are the men to do the devil's work, not the work of God. So to preach must be to leave the sensuous to their filth, the luxurious to their selfishness, the skeptical to their doubting. The men to move other men, must be men who can earnestly say, "We *believe*, and *therefore speak*."

We commend this course, and we believe this course is to constitue the strength of the ministry to come—not because the theme of the Christian minister is one that does not admit of being dealt with in the way of jealous scrutiny, but because it

has been so dealt with times and often, dealt with so long, and with such results, that we have a right now to look upon it as a settled matter, and have a right to speak of it accordingly. We say this in full memory of the endless exceptions that have been urged against this theme, and of all the silly boastings we sometimes hear about the supposed effect of these hostilities. The withes have been laid on, but Samson is not bound. Christianity, which, according to the Platonists and pagans of the first five centuries in its history, was always about to die with the next generation, is not yet dead. The faith which Voltairism was to annihilate, is still in the field, and doing battle there with a stronger hand than ever. Each new onslaught has been proclaimed as surely the fatal one; but somehow the blow does not perform its expected office, the antagonist keeps his footing, and seems only more likely than ever to continue to keep it.

How is this? It is because the strong side of the controversy is with us—because, if we may so speak, the *humanity* of the controversy is with us. There is nothing in the world so white but that men may reason to prove it black, and that with a sufficient degree of plausibility to puzzle the wits of the uninitiated. It argues great ignorance—an expectation of the monstrous from the Almighty—to suppose that if a revelation come to man, it must so come as to preclude all ground for objection, or for difference of opinion. Moral truth knows nothing of such evidence. It is not on earth, it is not in heaven, it can never be. That infidelity and heterodoxy have their case we admit; but that it is, when rightly viewed, in either instance, a good case, we deny—deny with no puling hesitancy of speech, but in terms the clearest and strongest we can command for the purpose.

Nor is the strength of evidence on the Christian side the strength of mere learning. It is much more a strength derived from the consciousness, the experience, the sense of religious want in man. Men of research have found this sense of voidness and evil, and this consequent feeling of need, every-where in the past. They see, also, that every-where this feeling has been putting men upon expedients to find a deliverer, who may be to them what they can not be to themselves, and a purifier who may do for them what they may not do for themselves. The lore to this effect which has been brought together by modern scholarship is great, and a sort of digest from it has been given of late to our

own reading public.* But the very philosophical process of reasoning which this digest is intended to sustain, is to the effect, that as men were so long and so generally employed in seeking a gospel in the ancient world, without finding it, all hope of our ever finding a gospel to be a fit object for human trust must be a delusion! Whatever may be the judgment of some of our philosophers, it may, we think, be safely left to the common sense of the unsophisticated, every-where, to say whether the natural inference in this case be not precisely the reverse of that which is thus pressed upon us. It used to be the doctrine of philosophers that capacity must imply object, and that where a sense of want in man is evidently from his nature, provision has been made for that want somewhere in nature. If this be not denied—if this law be found to obtain through all gradations of existence, from the lowest upward, until we reach the human spirit, are we to expect that it will fail there? No. Reason affirms that it will not only be in force there, but there more than elsewhere. It is manifestly in the nature and condition of man, as we know him, that he should feel his need of a deliverer and a renovator, as the great want of his being; and all his self-devised religions, accordingly, will be found to consist, in their main features, of so many attempts to construct for himself this needed gospel. Now the history of every false gospel, so originated, points, with strong presumptive evidence, to the existence of a gospel somewhere which is not false. Egypt and Asia, Greece and Italy, proclaim to us from of old that this feeling was in them, and they relate to us the search they made in the hope of finding a provision for it. Hindooism, Buddhism, and our own Romanism all proceed, in these latter times, on the same ground. The great heart of humanity, through the past and the present, is thus imperative in its demands of *a* gospel—of instruction that may lead man to a deliverer and a renovator. Is this language of humanity, so diffused and so imperishable, a lie? Then humanity itself is a lie. If our nature be false here, in these its most widely-spread and deeply-rooted instincts, where can it be true—wherein may we trust it?

In cleaving to our old truth, then, the truth of a religion founded upon the old doctrines of redemption and regeneration,

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* Makay's *Progress of Intellect.*

we are not vesting our faith in notions called forth by accidents, or in a narrow formula which the peculiarities of race or country have originated and fashioned. On the contrary, in so doing, we take our stand on ground as broad and as permanent as humanity, and we have authority to say to men every-where that the necessity of our nature, which heaven has permitted, is, as reason might suggest, a necessity for which heaven has provided. Surely the Being who has given men the capacity to feel that their present condition is degraded and unhappy, has not left them wholly without the means of rising to something higher and more felicitous. Belief in *a* gospel existing somewhere for humanity, is the most rational of all beliefs; and to believe thus must be, in our circumstances, to believe in the Gospel which has come to us through the Anointed One as in the "health" designed for all nations.

During the early centuries of the church the controversy raged, as we have seen, without ceasing, between a philosophical paganism and the Christian faith. But nearly a thousand years followed in which a dominant church tolerated no rival. Those years closed with the age of Luther. Since that age changes so great have come over the conditions of mind and of society, that the old antagonist parties are now fronting each other again upon the same battle-field. It is true, we have no reason to expect that the modern Julianism will be put down by the arm of the civil power. But it is to be remembered that, even in the fourth century, that power came in the wake of the Christian victory, not in the van of it, and that it would not have come at all, with any permanent effect, if it had not come in that order. Now, also, as anciently, the Christian may be sure of thus much in respect to his antagonists: with all their talk about *earnestness*, there are very few earnest men among them, and with all their talk about *faith*, they have to learn, for the most part, what such an exercise of mind, as directed toward any thing above the earthly, really means. As a rule, loosened from Christianity, they settle in nothing. Rejecting that external authority, like their precursors in the remote past, they find nothing steady to put in its place, and are like sands drifted to a new position by every action of the tide. Either they have no convictions, or, in Stirling fashion, they get a new supply about every two years. Let the men set for the defense of the Gospel preach it—preach from

the pulpit and the press—with the manly fullness wherewith the Apostles preached it, and with the earnestness to be expected from men who feel that it is no fable, and the first memorable discomfiture of Julianism will be followed by a second not less memorable.

But it must never be forgotten that the doctrine of the Gospel is the doctrine of a Renovator, and the spirituality of feeling proper to the preacher of such a doctrine must, after all, be the great secret of power in the pulpit. With regard to many of his hearers, the minister can not hope to be, to more than a very limited extent, an instructor. Not a few of them will be his equals, if not his superiors, in general intelligence. But there is one high department of influence that will always be open to him. It will be within his power, as often as he ascends the pulpit, to make himself felt as one giving a hallowed impulse to the thoughts, affections, habits, and lives of those who listen to him, causing heavenly contemplations to act as an anchor to the *heart*, and so keeping the whole man sure and steadfast.

II. From our observations elsewhere, it will be seen that we fully sympathize with the feeling that the ETHICAL element in Christianity has not been inculcated on its just grounds, or in its proper breadth, in the general teaching, either of the orthodox or the evangelical schools, by churchmen or non-conformists. In the ministry to come there must be no assigning of reasons taken from religion for what is wrong in its own nature; no preaching up of creeds or forms, or even of spiritual experiences, to the neglect of those virtues of truthfulness, honesty, and kindliness which society has a right to expect in the every-day conduct of men who profess to be Christians. The pharisaic error which once allowed church-going to pass as evidence of piety is no longer found available, and the delusion which has allowed the profession of a particular creed, and the possession of certain religious experiences, to pass as the evidence of sanctity, the necessity of such moral virtues as are named above being tacitly ignored, that, too, must come to an end. All the natural virtues have a basis of their own, and are not to be superseded, but strengthened and elevated, by religious influences. This doctrine may seem to be one of the most obvious and simple kind, but it is one of the hardest things in the world to bring a large class of religionists to act as though they understood and believed

it. To be a sensualist, in the sense of being a drunkard or an impure person, excludes from recognized Christian fellowship; but in a healthy state of religion that effect would follow hardly less certainly in the case of the man who is immoral in the sense of being insincere, virtually untruthful, virtually dishonest, or devoid of all nobleness. In the ministry to come the preachers themselves must be men of this order of goodness, and men who will dare to insist on it in others. If in the fiery process before it, Christianity is to come forth as gold, there must be more, much more, done to separate between its pure gold and the dross thus adhering to it. In the category of the proscribed must be the lusts of the *spirit*, no less than the lusts of the *flesh*.

It may be right to add, that by the healthy moral teaching that will be demanded from the ministry to come, we mean something other than the feeling which often finds its outlet in speeches or pamphlets on prison discipline, against capital punishment, against the evils of war, or in the talk which seems to regard the forgiveness of injuries as the beginning and the ending of Christian morality. Let the wise and humane be done, say we, in relation to all these things, but let not our morality come to be of that morbid kind which spares the wrong in sparing the wrong-doer, which does dishonor to virtue by making light of vice, and which overlooks the fact that as are the reasons which bind us to love the good, such are the reasons that bind us to hate the evil. The Christian spirit is a spirit of truth and a spirit of rectitude, and it is not to be a spirit of love at the cost of either of these. Consideration for the infirmity of sinners is a Christian duty; and so is that deeply-principled repugnance to sin, without which to pretend that we approve of the government of God, as before us either in providence or revelation, must be to utter the language of self-deception or of hypocrisy.

III. With regard to the STYLE and MANNER which must characterize the ministry to come, our idea is simple. It must cease to be professional—it must become natural. All that we could wish to say on this subject is included in that statement. We are far from wishing that the language of Scripture should not be frequently heard from the lips of the preacher. If the commerce of his spirit with the writers of the New Testament be what it should be, intimate and habitual, it will be sure to be thus with him. Their words will often come with their thoughts, their man-

ner with their matter. But the nomenclature of the New Testament, really peculiar to it, goes within a small compass. In its general style it differs from the usual style of the scholar only in the degree in which that style needs to become different if it is to possess fitness for popular instruction on any subject. It is remarkable that a book which is ours to make us acquainted with the sublimest truths that have ever commended themselves to the human mind, is a book characterized, almost from beginning to end, by the exceeding simplicity and naturalness both of its language and its illustrations. It is said that the greatness of genius is in nothing more conspicuous than in the fact that it generally utters its greatest things without any apparent effort, and without seeming to be aware of their greatness. In the writings of the Apostles, and in the records of His teaching who was greater than they, the man of taste must often have felt the beauty of this peculiarity, this total absence of any thing like a straining for effect, or of a conscious attempt to give a shade either of artificial brilliancy or of artificial mystery to truth. We so *feel* the natural in these writings as never to think of meeting with any thing else. Admirable models! How little in the manner of the *great* sermons of our great preachers!

Young men who begin to get some acquaintance with the hard words of philosophy, and with writers who are accounted great because they indulge in a tumid Ciceronian style of expression, are sometimes tempted to take scientific phrases and imitations of such a style into the pulpit, the effect of which is just to tell every body that, in respect to aptness for teaching, their babyhood is still upon them. Men, finished men, though they may have spent much time in class-rooms, never so express themselves as to suggest that they were ever there; and though well up in authors who write in a stately style, very well suited to stately people, you never hear them talk after that fashion, and rarely do you find them teaching or writing according to such models.

THE THEORY OF AN INCARNATION WITHOUT A FALL.*

We purpose to sketch occasionally the scope of recent discussion among continental divines on the Incarnation, and to throw some of their favorite speculations into the crucible. One of these, to which we shall devote the present article, is the theory that an Incarnation would have taken place without a Fall.

It may be proper at the outset, however, to refer more generally to continental opinion on the whole subject. From the first the Reformed Church acted, as we can not but regard it, a wiser part than the Lutheran, on the doctrine of the Incarnation. She encamped on the patristic theology, and made it her own. The Lutherans, under the influence of ubiquitarian prejudices, and to vindicate their position, were for progress, and committed themselves to views on Christ's person which can no longer be maintained.

Calvin wisely held that further progress on this question was impossible; and, instead of entering on a voyage of discovery, acted upon the principle that the conclusions of the patristic theology, and in particular, the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon, were exhaustive. The great writers of England, whose attention has specially been directed to the person of Christ—Bull, Pearson, Waterland—acted upon the same principle. They were right. Of what use was a vague and aimless search, when the truth was, in reality, achieved in the early centuries? If opinion were in solution again, would it not, after a time, crystallize in the same or nearly the same form? Why should all be thrown loose again, as if nothing certain were attained, nothing on which the mind could repose? After the discussions of four centuries, it had become clear that conscience finds no resting-place till, so to speak, the deity and humanity of Christ equally enter into their rights. In no formula, where full provision is not made for both, that is, where they are not equally and completely recognized, can the spiritual mind, acquainted with the teaching of Scripture, find satisfaction and repose. But that formula was found; and the Reformed Church entered into these

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* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review.*

attainments as at once safe and felicitous. We have always regarded this as a happy event for her, and a mark of true wisdom. In the decisions of Chalcedon she could rest, and any progress since made within her pale on this great theme has not been gained by throwing opinion loose again, nor by indulging a random course of innovation, but by grounding the truth thus won more deeply in the doctrine of sin, from which it is best reflected, and by organically connecting it with the entire plan of salvation, which presupposes the great truth of the Incarnation at every point.

The Lutherans adopted a different course. They contended from the first for an advance. They regarded the position in which the Reformed Church found it safe to rest as unsatisfactory, and argued that the form of doctrine and the course of thought, which came down as an inheritance from the early centuries, was already overcome in the progress of opinion to which they thought it necessary to give the rein.* Their ubiquitarian theory, in a word, would not harmonize with it; and hence, we think, may be explained their present difficulties, and the straits to which they are now reduced by the course of speculation.†

The principal topic that has occupied, and continues to occupy the attention of divines on the continent, since the revival of a sounder theology, is the person of Christ. But whether we look at their "Lives of Jesus," numerous and of various merit, or at works which aim at a dogmatic exhibition of the doctrine of the Incarnation, it can not be said that any thing has as yet appeared, in the entire range of German theology, which can be accepted as a satisfactory and all-sided discussion of the question. The reconstruction of this doctrine, the central one of all theology, to which, as to a converging point, modern thought turned by an inner necessity, has met with many disturbing influences; and there is, by no means, that fullness of statement or success which leaves us nothing to desire. Nor is the cause of this difficult to trace. The breaking up of the old Lutheran theology, committed to positions no longer tenable, and which its most enlightened advocates are now forced to modify; and the Pantheistic philosophy, amid the atmosphere of which the discussions were car-

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* See Thomasius's Christi Person und Werk, part II.

† Thomasius's Dogmatik furnishes a striking proof of the breaking up of orthodox Lutheranism. He is in inextricable embarrassment.

ried on, go far to explain the taint which is found in their best works on the person of Christ. Opinion has, no doubt, advanced, and may be said to have entered on its second stage, and perhaps the more critical one of the two—that of formulas and definitions.

The first stage, which may be termed that of new spiritual life, was passed in a constant collision with Pantheism. During this period we find on every side a strenuous and, on the whole, a not unsuccessful vindication of the great truth, that the Incarnation took place in one historic individual, as contrasted with the deep untruth that the race, as such, is God-man. The theory, in opposition to which Christian divines were forced to recast their thinking and phraseology on this subject, ascribed to Jesus nothing beyond the discovery of an idea. It asserted a universal incarnation. This anti-Christian philosophy allowed to Jesus of Nazareth only the possession of a humanity like our own, and the consciousness of God-manhood, which it set forth as a self-subsisting relation between God and man. Admitting that this idea dawned on the consciousness of Jesus first among the sons of men, it at the same time maintained that we could not affirm of any historic personage that he was God-man in a peculiar sense, or in any way above his felllows. He was just what all men are, but was only first aware of it. According to this notion, with which Christianity is eternally at war, and which outrages the deepest Christian feelings, a God-man, in the Scriptural sense, exists not; the unique character of Jesus ceases; he sinks down to the level of other men, with this single distinction above the others, that on his mind first dawned the discovery or the consciousness that he was what all others are—God-man. But of this our modern Pantheists, forsooth, claim also to be conscious, and in an equal measure.

The great aim of believing theologians, and, in a word, of all possessed of a Christian consciousness, was to establish, in opposition to this, that the Incarnation took place *in a historic person*, and in one only; and that he comprehended in himself a body, a multitude who have his life abiding in them. It was maintained as the deepest conviction of the Christian mind, that instead of being one among his fellows, Jesus was the everlasting Head of a company who find redemption and life in him. All doctrine was now made to bear an immediate reference to Christ. This

epoch, during which theology in all its departments was connected with the personal Redeemer, was the period of fresh life, sin and redemption being the prominent thoughts. Much of that freshness of thought and feeling attaching to the modern Christology is coincident with this period. Neander, who may be regarded as the impersonation of this epoch, never went further. It is true, indeed, that the exhibition of the Incarnation as a subject of thought, or as doctrine in a rounded form, was by no means complete, nor perfectly accurate. But the faith of the heart was sound. Without doing much, scarcely any thing, in the way of definitions and formulas, they were content to view the Incarnation in connection with life, redemption, and union to God, of which it is the source. That a fresh influence, like a new tributary stream, was poured into theology and the church by means of this tendency, can not be questioned. For it is not too much to say, that wherever thought is in any definite way fixed upon this capital article of Scripture, wherever, as in the instance to which we have referred, the Incarnation is held in faith, and regarded as the deep ground of union to God, of life and reconciliation, it will be found that a renovating influence is shed both over doctrine and Christian activity, even though the scientific statement of the doctrine is not wholly correct or given in a rounded form.

While it is admitted that all who thus regard the Incarnation receive in their measure the saving benefits, it is not the less true that a misconception on this capital article of Christianity is not innocuous. The history of opinion in all ages, and in every quarter, too plainly attests this. Nor is the mischief of an error upon such a topic soon removed, the very sacredness of the theme putting a restraint on innovation and a reconstruction of the truth, when a definite view has once taken form in the community. An urgent necessity must exist for a change. This makes us all the more regret the fact, that Pantheistic influences are not yet removed, nor Pantheistic elements yet purged from the Christology of Germany. At this day they are, to no small extent, still found in it.

One of these offshoots of Pantheism is the mode in which the NECESSITY OF THE INCARNATION is commonly put in the theology of Germany. That the Incarnation was necessary is admitted on all sides, but not unfrequently on grounds to which decided

objection must be made. The exceptionable view to which we refer is, that the Incarnation would have taken place though no sin had entered to disturb the harmony of the universe. This favorite speculation of the modern theology can no longer be ignored. Though it was thought, in the past periods of the Protestant Church, that the theory had passed away with the Scholasticism of mediæval times, where it had its seat, it has, in our day, reappeared abroad and at home,* and obtained a wider acceptance than at any former period. So generally is it held by the leaders of theological opinion, and so seductive and forcible is the form

* Dean Trench expresses himself thus: "It behooves us, indeed, to speak with hesitation and modesty on a matter like this. Had there been no fall, the conditions under which that transcendent manifestation of love and of honor done to man must have taken place, would, of course, have been infinitely different. . . . But the thing itself, we may reverently believe, would not the less have been. They only reaffirm what has been the conviction of many theologians, in all times, who are persuaded that the Headship of the race of man would have pertained to Him not the less, to whom all Headship of men or of angels rightly appertains; all things in heaven and in earth being recapitulated in Him; since only in this recapitulation could the race of Adam have attained the end of its creation, the place among the families of God, for which from the first it was designed.

"In this view, the taking on himself of our flesh by the eternal word was no make-shift to meet a mighty, yet still a particular, emergent need; a need which, conceding the liberty of man's will, and that it was possible for him to have continued in his first state of obedience, might never have occurred. It was not a mere result and reparation of the fall, such an act as, except for that, would never have been, but lay bedded at a far deeper depth in the counsels of God for the glory of his Son, and the exaltation of that race formed in his image and his likeness. For against those who regard the Incarnation as an arbitrary, or as merely an historic event, and not an ideal one as well, we may well urge this weighty consideration, that the Son of God did not, in and after his ascension, strip off this human nature again; he did not regard his humanity as a robe, to be worn for awhile and then laid aside, the convenient form of his manifestation, so long as he was conversing with men upon earth, but the fitness of which had with that manifestation passed away. So far from this, we know, on the contrary, that he assumed our nature forever, married it to himself, glorified it with his own glory, carried it as the form of his eternal subsistence into the world of angels, before the presence of his Father. Had there been any thing accidental here, had the assumption of our nature been an afterthought (I speak as a man), this marriage with the Son of God with that nature could scarcely be conceived. He could have hardly so taken it, taken it, that is, forever, unless it had possessed an ideal as well as a historic fitness, unless preëstablished harmonies had existed, such harmonies as only a divine intention could have brought about between the one and the other.—*Five Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge.* London, 1837.

in which it is put by many whose zeal and faith are not less distinguished than their position in theology, and we think it high time to challenge the questionable shape in which it comes, and to test its merits before it forces its way, with other too-readily-admitted notions from the same quarter, to a place among our English beliefs. It is a position that goes far to vitiate every department of truth, whether we turn our thoughts to anthropology or christology, when the necessity of the Incarnation is deduced, as it commonly is by German divines, from the NATURE OF GOD or from the IDEA OF HUMANITY, and not from the fact that man, disunited from God, was to be restored in the exercise of FREE AND SOVEREIGN LOVE. Our modern divines think that they have found a deep truth, and intend, by the use they make of it, to underprop the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. But it is a thought borrowed from the influences of Pantheism; and though there are different forms in which it is presented, in all of them it is alike objectionable.*

To adduce one phase of it: it is held that the idea of humanity is to be apprehended as God-manhood, and that, to give realization to this idea, it was necessary that the archetype should appear. And then it is set forth as man's destiny to display this unity of God and man. The Incarnation is thus not viewed in connection with the doctrine of sin, which is the only rationale

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* The German divines of note who express themselves against this theory are the exceptions, the testimony being so general in its favor. Kurtz, in the last edition of his work, "The Bible and Astronomy," has given it up. J. Müller and Thomasius express themselves decidedly against it, the former being directed to go against the current by his deeper views of the doctrine of sin (see Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1853, No. 43), Thomasius standing on the old Lutheran orthodoxy. Philippi, too, has intimated (in his introduction to his Kirchliche Glaubenslehre) his opposition to the theory.

But the great body of the German divines who have been influenced by Schleiermacher confess to it with almost one voice. The ablest advocate in favor of it is Dorner, in his great work on the Person of Christ—a magazine of learning equal to Petavius's, exhibiting all that has been done both in patristic and Protestant theology in historical succession, with all the distinctive landmarks in the development of the doctrine. This great work from one of the greatest of modern divines, to which we shall have occasion afterward to refer more at large in subsequent articles, advocates this theory with the greatest energy. (See Entwickelungegeschichte der Lehre der Person Christi, vol. ii., 430 and 1244). Ebrard (Dogmatik, vol. ii. 95, etc.), Martensen (p. 171, 1st ed.), Liebner, Lange, Schmid, Rothe, Ehrenfeuchter, Chalybäus, etc., etc., all eagerly contend for it as an undoubted fundamental truth.

and ground of all Christian truth, but looked upon as a necessary fact. It is exhibited as the completion of man's creation: Christ is the blossom of humanity; and the end contemplated by Christ's coming in the flesh is the realization of the idea of man, the same thing being repeated in every member of that new humanity which was to run on from that day to the end of time.

Though there is a certain truth underlying all this extravagance of speculation, just as some neglected phase of truth is in almost every error which happens to win its way to men's approval, yet the deep and dangerous untruth of such a theory lies upon the surface. Man was never intended to be ought else than a creature made in the likeness of God, a dependent creature, without any thing approaching to God-manhood or identity of essence with the God-man. That is the only true idea of humanity; and where it is not admitted, these high-sounding phrases, which lift up man to a superhuman elevation, in the same proportion do dishonor to the God-man. Humanity as such never was, and never can be, even in the highest perfection that awaits it, an Incarnation; and the Christian consciousness of all the redeemed would be violated in the most tender part by any thing akin to such a thought. The theory is contradicted, too, by the fact that no believer ever arrogated the consciousness of God-manhood, and that it never was, or could be warranted by any thing in the Christian Church. That view to which we have adverted, as making Christ and us one, was Schleiermacher's theory. It is false, deeply false.

But even where the Schleiermacher Christology is surmounted, in a great degree—and in men like Dorner, Lange, Liebner, it is surmounted—the theory in question still substitutes a wholly false conception of man's created state. If we suppose, according to the theory in question, the necessity of an incarnation to make humanity correspond to its idea, what does this involve? It reflects on the perfection of that nature in which our race was created. It implies that it was imperfect in its constitution and adaptation to the end designed; and that it could not with its native powers, though exerted to the utmost, and with the divine aids within its original sphere, complete its destiny. If there still remains an extraordinary intervention to supplement and carry to completeness the act of creation which, by the supposition, was imperfect not merely in degree but in kind—that is,

not as requiring a fuller development into the perfection of its capacities, but deficient in its very nature—then every thing is seen through a distorted medium. If imperfection, to such a degree, attached to the creation in its original and normal state, if it did not already correspond to its idea, though capable of further progress, reason would be staggered. It would be impossible to speak of the whole as "very good,' or to vindicate the ways of God to man. This mode of viewing man's original condition has a tendency to introduce a new gospel. Christ becomes the perfected creation, the ideal of the creation which, till his day, remained incomplete; the Rationalistic notion that man was formed in a rude, untutored state, and that he, step by step, advanced in an ascending scale, is but reëchoed, and the whole is reduced to a natural process. We may speak of nature, but not of grace; for the Son of God, in his incarnation, is no longer the Restorer of the lost, but the Perfecter of the imperfect. All is thus natural process, but not redemption. From such a mode of viewing the Incarnation, we find a certain phraseology becoming current, viz., that humanity is anew created in Christ; a phrase, true in the sense of restoration to its ideal through the power of regenerating grace; but as used by Archdeacon Hare, and certain writers of that school, that is, in the sense of a physical creation, it dislocates every thing, introducing a scheme of thought that breaks loose from Biblical conceptions, either of the first creation or of the new creation in Christ. This is too self-evident to need proof.

We can not dissemble the impression that, under this airy speculation and the high-sounding words in which it deals, we find a perilous deviation from the truth. We not seldom find men by means of it avoiding the offense of the cross. According to the Biblical view, which represents the historical appearance of the Son of God and his sufferings as conditioned by sin, there is no room for giving any sort of double foundation to the Incarnation. There is not first a natural necessity, and then a peculiar modification by sin. That stupendous fact is a means to an end worthy of such a cost, but not necessary except on the supposition of sin, and that mankind was to be redeemed. The Incarnation and the Cross are inseparable; but they are both means to an end. The expiation of sin, the vindication of divine justice, the meritorious obedience to be rendered to the law, are

the grand and only *rationale* of that infinite condescension which is displayed in the Incarnation and the Cross.

But the modern Christology, in many cases, looks askance, and with no full surrender of heart at the great work of atonement, for which the Son of God took the flesh. It seemed necessary, therefore, to find some other ground for the Incarnation; and a natural necessity, founded in the very constitution of things in creation, was sought as a basis on which to place that indispensable and distinctive doctrine of Christianity. The propounders of this theory seem to have felt that some ground or reason must be found for this stupendous fact; and in order to obviate the appearance of having an incarnation which accomplishes nothing that could not as well have been won without it, and to escape from the gratuitous and the arbitrary that must otherwise attach to this great truth, they needed another incarnation, not of grace, but of nature; not of redeeming love, but of natural process. This hollow substitute has been sought. Another foundation has thus been found. But if the church were to accept that view of the Incarnation, and give this great truth not a single but a two-fold ground, the inevitable result would be, and that, too, not far off, that the atonement, instead of being the principal object, would be reduced to a very subordinate and secondary matter in this great transaction. The whole question would thus turn on the manner of the incarnation, and not on the thing itself. If it must be brought about in the course of history, and if it is viewed as springing either from a necessity in God, or to give a realization to the idea of humanity, the historic Incarnation is only the accomplishment in one peculiar way of a result which must have taken place in any case. But if it flow from some inner necessity, what becomes of free divine love? and love ceases to be, if it is not free. Where is the self-moving, uncaused, sovereign exercise of that divine love to the fallen race of man? It is obvious that, to speak either of the creation, or of the incarnation, as necessary to God, is in a manner to affirm that his happiness was incomplete in himself without them, or to hold that the exercise of his goodness was controlled by something not unlike the heathen fate.

From this point of view, we can easily obviate the objection to the ordinary view advanced by Scotus, and repeated with one voice by all the modern defenders of the theory. They consider

it unworthy of so glorious a work of God that it should be ushered in only by occasion of sin, and allege that this is to make it occasioned,* fortuitous, accidental, arbitrary. We might at the threshold meet all this by asking, What possible application can such terms have to the free manifestation of divine love, which, surely, is under no necessary law? Is not this to live in a cloud-land of terminology, with no corresponding ideas? Is it not the very tyranny of nomenclature, or its pedantry, as the case may be? But looking at the thing itself, we can not but affirm that it is no disparagement to the Incarnation, to view it as brought about by the occasion of sin, though it was by no means caused by sin. Though the greatest work of God, it is still but a work or deed, which can, therefore, be compared with the creation or any other divine act *ab extra.*

If the Incarnation is not to be viewed as ushered in by occasion of sin, or, in other words, among the category of MEANS for the production of a certain result, there is no other alternative than to view it as an END. And is it a safe mode of contemplating it, to consider it as an ultimate object in itself, as an end for the ever-blessed and self-complete God? The scholastics, who took this view of the matter, and especially Wessel,† set forth the self-manifestation of the Son of God, or the exhibition of the most perfect Being in his divine and human nature united, as the ultimate design of the Incarnation. It was thus represented as sought for its own sake, or an object for Christ himself. But though this act, like every other, will redound to Christ's glory, and show forth the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God, it is to think unworthily of God to make it an end. Such a notion tends all too surely to the conclusion that it is of the nature of God to become incarnate, and thus destroys the grace of the Incarnation. To affirm that either the creation or the incarnation is necessary to God is pantheistic. There was no incompleteness or unsatisfied want in the blessed God, which rendered any thing external a necessity to him. And it is not too much to say, that if the speculative defenders of this theory looked with less favor on Sabellianism, and realized the intercommunion in

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* Ergo Christus est bonum occasionatum; *i. e.*, occasione peccati datum. Scotus quoted by Quenstedt.

† See Ullmann's "Reformers before the Reformation."

which the Father and Son dwelt from eternity, they would not so readily speak of any outward thing as necessary to God. A right conception of God's completeness in himself, as the ever-blessed one, and of the ineffable complacency and love in which the persons of the Godhead dwelt before the world was, will always remind us that there was no unsatisfied want in him which the world was necessary to fill. The communicative goodness of God is free, and equally so is the Incarnation. There was a divine fitness that the infinite fullness in God should act itself out, and find an outlet in creation; but that arose from no want within, and no cause without. And so, too, the Incarnation arose from no inner want, but was the free and self-moved act of the Eternal Son. It would not be love if it were not free. That the Incarnation, however stupendous in itself, is but a means to an end, and not an ultimate object in the divine economy, is a position which we must hold, if we would not open the way for that false and perilous thought to which we have adverted. But this relation of means to end is not to be brought within the sphere of ordinary thought, as if, in this case, the end must needs be greater and the means subordinate.

Nothing short of such means, costly and stupendous as it is, could suffice to bring about the end designed. And from the ineffable greatness of the means, as well as the end itself, it is called "so great salvation," (Heb. ii.) The problem was, How a guilty creature could appear not guilty, how the partition-wall of human enmity, on the one side, and of divine wrath, on the other, could be so removed that divine love could go freely forth, and man be once again the habitation of his Maker. This, moreover, was to be effected in such a way, that what had been the greatest wrong should be the occasion of the greatest glory, and God be more glorious in saving than in condemning. The end contemplated was, how every attribute of God should be magnified, the persons of the Trinity honored, and every want of man so fully met, that from the broken fragments of the first vessel another should be formed, with larger capacities of happiness and glory. If so great good could be educed from so great evil, if man, once estranged from the love of God, could, in harmony with the divine claims and the honor of the law, be made to stand in a still closer union to him, and be brought from the deepest misery to bask anew in the beams of divine love, with a nearer

intercourse and a more absolute dependence than if no fall had been, who shall say that, though this is brought about by occasion, it was not an END worthy of God?* And though the means, and, so far as we know, the only means, involved the stupendous fact, that the Son who was in the Father's bosom should be put in the sinner's place, a substitute to bear his guilt and undertake his duties, which he could only be by becoming man, and thus uniting God and man, till in his one person the objective restoration of mankind was complete, who shall say that this is occasioned, fortuitous, arbitrary, unless "it possess an ideal as well as an historic fitness?" (Trench.) This historic mode of viewing the matter, gave origin to that phrase of the Latin hymn, though it is somewhat overdone and extravagant: "O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem." When Dean Trench argues for his ideal view from the fact that the Son of God assumed our nature forever, "not to be worn awhile and then laid aside," he might have applied the same thought to another work of God—the Creation. God will not annihilate the creation, as if he had made it to glorify himself awhile, and then to pronounce its extinction. But we do not, on that account, say that the creation was a necessary act.

The main argument for this theory, however, is derived from the Headship of the human race. By Martensen, and all the defenders of this opinion, it is contended that if the Logos had not become man, the human race would have been without a point of union, without a Head; that there would have been wanting an actual mediator to lead over our race from a relation of created dependence to that of spiritual freedom, and raise them from the grade of natural life to perfection. Where this language is correct, and not disfigured by the modern philosophy, as it too plainly is, it is an argument from what is not conceded. It assumes what we must deny; viz., that nature, as it is, still remains

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* Dorner, who sees every thing in connection with his favorite theory, says groundlessly: "Whoever saw in the Incarnation the perfection of humanity, or a greater boon given in Christ than was forfeited in Adam, recognized, at least in its premises, the necessity of the Incarnation in the eternal idea of the world." (Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre der Person Christi, vol. ii. 435.) So little ground is there for such a conclusion, that it may be affirmed that every one who has pondered Rom. v. 12–21, or reflected at all on the permission of evil in the world, must have come to this view. (Comp. Confession of Faith, 6, 1.)

very much in its normal state, imperfect, indeed, but not disorganized. Whether we think of distance from God or of disunion between the members of the race, the disunion is the fruit of sin. The bond to God being dissolved, a severance from each other followed. But the fact that humanity is again united in one body, by being recapitulated or gathered together in one Head, may be said to throw light on man's original condition. Why may we not conclude that, according to the constitution of things, humanity had its standing in the Son of God as its Archetype, Head, and Lord? And if this is so, as Scripture clearly indicates, mankind was not constituted without a point of union, without a Head. Every person who has reflected on man's original condition, must have come to the conclusion that the Son of God, apart altogether from the Incarnation, stood in a close relation to man as his Head.

To assign Adam his due place, as the counterpart of the second Adam, while we contend also for the other side of the truth, that humanity stood in the Son, is confessedly a difficult problem. We content ourselves with two things which come out, all too plainly to be questioned (1), the recapitulation of all things in the Son, by the constitution of nature, (Col. i: 15, 16); and then (2), that the race was in Adam, so as to be all that one man, (Rom. v. 12.) Beyond these two points, we will not permit ourselves to theorize. We are canvassing a theory as not legitimate, and it becomes us ourselves to stop where Scripture stops. But while we do not intend to fashion into a scheme what Scripture leaves indefinite, or to affirm aught that is left obscure, the two points to which we have referred enter, undoubtedly, into the original constitution of things. And they are found in a new combination in the second Man, the Lord from heaven.

Some, not content with accepting these two elements, put them into a system, and affirm that the Logos was the internal bond of union, and that the patriarch Adam was the external bond. Thus Thomasius, who views the matter in this light, maintains that the race would have developed itself normally from Adam, and that around him all the individuals, families, and tribes into which it branched would have been again conjoined in unity. We can not but feel that such a supposition assigns more than can well be assigned to a creature. There can be no doubt that the sinless life of Adam would have been reproduced in the

human family, just as the organic ruin of our whole nature now is by his fall. But still the great Archetype to whose image the race would have been conformed was the Eternal Son, "the first-born of every creature," who would have apprehended man in all his powers, and carried on the development of his capacities through the Spirit, till he stood forth in his perfection both in body and soul. While standing in Adam as that one man, the race would no less have been conscious of being in the Archetype, from whom the stream in divine life flows down through time and eternity. And these two elements, though in a different manner, are combined in the second man.

From this point of view, it is easy to dispose of Dorner's main objection to our view of man's relation to the Head of the human race. He argues as if the question at issue were reduced to this: Did God will man to be an organism, placed, therefore, in connection with a Head, in which the unity is as actually realized as the abiding diversity of individuals, or did he design mankind to be a loose mass of beings? This is just another case of arguing from nature, as it now is, as if that were its normal state. The race never was or could be such a granulated mass. Though Müller concedes this as the original divine idea of humanity, such a notion is altogether contrary to the idea of the Gospel, as a restoration. We deprecate the concession that mankind was, according to its idea, a mere heap of unconnected individuals, a mere sand-heap, and not an organic unity. The idea of humanity, as may be proved by a variety of arguments, is that of a unity in multiplicity, constituting an organic body with its various members supplementing one another in a living head; and an accurate view of nature, as it is, suffices to prove this. The rich variety of gifts with which the Christian Church has been adorned, and which are called forth in every age to ennoble and edify her, are only natural endowments distributed in the amplest profusion. They are not properly grace, but mental gifts with which men are created, and are, therefore, in the man before he is united to Christ, the Church's Head. And this sufficiently proves that man was originally created to be an organism. The Son of God would have been King and Governor of a kingdom, occupying a close relation to him, or Head of a body with many members, and with an infinite variety of gifts, to bind the whole in one and to supplement each other's wants, without the necessity of an Incarna-

tion. The condition of things into which the race of mankind is ushered by the historical Christ, implies, inferentially, but surely, that what is restored was once possessed, though mutably, in the creation-state of mankind.

Whether the theory of an Incarnation without a fall has any root in Scripture, and whether it can be reconciled with a biblical anthropology, must now be examined. They who defend it generally claim for it nothing more than this: That Scripture does not repudiate it, and avow that it is essentially Christian speculation, based on the idea of God. Thus, Dorner, after designating it a fundamental truth, admits that "the necessity of this truth will less commend itself to theologians who are wont to proceed experimentally and anthropologically than it must do and does to those who, proceeding from the notion of God, acknowledge a Christian speculation as at once possible and necessary." But if it has no place in Scripture, it can not be said to belong organically to the substance of the church's safe knowledge of divine things; and to the extent in which we search for knowledge by mere inference, the risk is incurred of savoring not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men. The propounders of the theory adopt it, because they think it befitting the character of God, without claiming for it, that it is evolved from Scripture, or that it is a reproduction of a divine idea. Such a method of deducing doctrines may be in keeping with mediæval scholasticism, but not with Protestant theology, especially in this age of grammatico-historical interpretation, which must as severely fence the domain of doctrine as science keeps theories at a distance, without the basis of a true induction.

It is true that Martensen, the ingenious Danish divine, adduces a few texts in support of this theory, viz.: Eph. i: 10; Col. i: 15, 16; Eph. iv: 24; Col. iii: 10, 11. These are two pairs of texts on the same themes in cognate epistles, but do not prove the point in question. As to the first (Eph. i. 10), it brings before us nothing but the recapitulation of all things to himself by the historical Christ; the same thought being repeated at Col. i: 20. The second text (Col. i: 15, 16), is the only one that can be said to have any application, even in appearance, to the theory in dispute, and to apprehend its peculiar scope, it is necessary to notice that, in the previous context, the design of Christ's coming

is explicitly connected with man's redemption; and the verses under consideration are intended to show that the work of creation and the work of redemption are both effected by one and the same person. When it is said that all things were created "in him," (ἐν ἀυτῷ,) and "for him," (εἰς ἀυτόν,) as being the "first-born of every creature," the allusion is not to any absolute Incarnation of the Son, but simply to the preëxistent state of the Son, and to the fact that, according to the original state of things, the world was constituted in him. Though the introduction of this branches off from the mention of the historical Christ, the allusion is simply to the original constitution of things. The recapitulating of all things under Christ, actually come in the flesh (v. 20), leaves it rather to be understood that this was the original constitution of things, and that humanity had its standing in the Son. As to the second pair of texts quoted by Martensen (Eph. iv: 24; Col. iii: 10, 11), they are an exhortation to put on the new man, and have thus a direct reference to the historical Christ and to the image of God *renewed.* But from this we not unwarrantably infer that this image, so restored, was once already possessed by mankind, in the creation-state.

But apart from these texts, which have no reference to the question, there are not a few which plainly announce the design of Christ's mission. When we put these together, we find it said that he came to save the lost (Matt. xviii: 11); that he came to give his life a ransom (Matt. xx: 28); that he was made of a woman to redeem men (Gal. iv: 4); that he came into the world to save sinners (1 Tim. i: 15); that he took part of our flesh and blood to destroy death (Heb. ii: 14); that he was manifested to destroy the works of the devil (1 John iii: 8). To assign a different intention to the Incarnation, is not only to be wise above what is written, but well-nigh a contradiction to the explicit and authoritative statement of the only design on which the Spirit of truth concentrates the attention and adoration of the church.

But are we not entitled, it is replied, to deduce inferences? And what would theology be, if this were forbidden? To this subject, which engages the full attention of the best minds in every church in our day, it is impossible to refer in a merely incidental way when it demands ample discussion. But we do not hesitate to say that it is not a legitimate deduction to infer a

FACT as necessary, or to come by inference to a GREAT DOCTRINE of the faith, if it has no other evidence to rest on. The speculation in question is a mere inference, and deduced in a way that can satisfy no severe or rigid intellect that duly estimates the one source of knowledge. Are men's minds to be tyrannized over, or held under the spell of visionary inferences, when imagination plays so large a part in every thing to which men thus come? If the theory does not lean upon the Word of God, the ultimate authority, the absolute wisdom, the final standard of appeal, but rather contradicts what Scripture does assign as the one reason of the Incarnation with which men's minds are to be occupied, we may affirm that this is replete with serious consequences. It is fatal to the theory, but it is something more. If we find a doctrine of the last importance, the very center-point of the whole Christian system, placed on a new foundation, and that merely by inference; if we find men not content with drawing inferences as to the ramifications of doctrine and duty, which they must do, but inferring a FACT, the greatest of all facts, to the danger of putting Christianity on a new foundation, it is calculated to suggest serious reflections.

The theory is, moreover, irreconcilable with a biblical anthropology. If Adam had a life in the Spirit and the divine image, which is the deep ground-thought presupposed by Christianity, it follows that the elements were already in him by which he could have attained the full development and perfection of his being. The advocates of this theory, who have more or less of Schleiermacher's views as to man's original state, commonly speak of his commencing with a lower condition and rising to a higher. The more recent representations admit that Adam had a life in the spirit. But in doing so, they subvert their theory, because the idea of man was, therefore, found or realized in his creation-state. The passage in 1 Cor. xv., which makes mention of a natural body and of a spiritual body, implies that the human being, though not yet seen in its utmost possible perfection, which it could not win till he stood the probation before him, yet contained in germ all that he could be. And the same thing is proved by God's resting from his work and pronouncing all "very good." A conclusive refutation of the whole theory, however, is to be found in the trial to which the race was subjected. What possible end could be served by the probation of man, if his na-

ture were not so formed by his Maker as to come out of it entire? Let the theory in question look at this in the light of God's character, and say why this probation was imposed at all, if man in no sense realized his idea. Did the Creator give what was inadequate to undergo the trial? or had man all that was necessary for the probation? The latter admission refutes the theory; for the probation safely passed, the immediate result would have been that mankind would at once have entered on its utmost perfection, on a state of things beyond conception higher than it occupied before. And the partaking of the Tree of Life, awaiting the successful probation, would, doubtless, have placed him in the incorruption and glory of the resurrection-state.

Till within recent memory, the theory found little or no response in the Protestant Church of either confession. At the time of the Reformation, it was maintained by Osiander, who contended that man was created after the image of Christ, about to be incarnate. But that speculation was refuted by Calvin, who says, in reference to the theory of an Incarnation without a fall, that it argued too much temerity. It can scarcely be said to have found any footing in the Reformed Church; and the proofs of this, adduced by various German writers in our day, as well as in former times, rest on an obvious mistake. We have only to examine the passages to see that there is no ground for the allegation that several of the Reformed divines actually adopted it. It is only in our own day that the theory has risen into prominence, and threatens the church with mischief. But we have every confidence that the Christian consciousness of the church, which turns only on two things—sin and redemption—will erelong oppose a barrier to its spread, sure that it never can be dominant in the Christian Church.